期刊名称：International Journal of Strategic Property Management
印刷版ISSN：1648-715X
电子版ISSN：1648-9179
出版年度：2021
卷号：25
期号：3
页码：216-227
DOI：10.3846/ijspm.2021.14552
语种：English
出版社：Vilnius Gedinimas Technical University
摘要：In PPP projects, insufcient risk management may lead to the breakdown of partnerships and even project failures. Among them, the government credit risk is regarded as unbearable risk and a key risk affecting PPP projects because of its high frequency and impact. Therefore, based on the contractual relationship between both sides, a principal-agent model for the optimal choice of investors and the government under the government default probability is constructed. This paper explored the quantity relationship of the government credit risk and the project utility through analysing the effect of government default probability perceived by both parties on the investor’s optimal effort level and government allocation ratio. The results demonstrate that the government credit risk will decrease the effort level of investors and have a negative impact on the utility of the project. Furthermore, the government’s modifcation of the contract allocation ratio based on its own credit rating can offset the negative impact of its credit risk on the effectiveness of the project. But this regulatory effect is limited. The fndings effectively provide some insights and theoretical basis for solving the negative effects of government credit risk.
