Correcting future call-ups

Below is the report from the vice chair for Army: This is the time of the year when NATIONAL GUARD magazine asks the NGAUS vice chairs to report on issues of importance to their respective components. Maj. Gen. Martha Rainville, vice chair for Air, will offer her thoughts next month.

Recent Army Guard mobilizations were accomplished despite a flawed process

First, let me express my appreciation to all members of this association for electing me as your NGAUS vice chairman for Army I take this responsibility seriously and hope I can fulfill your expectations as we collectively work the many issues that affect our formations and, particularly, our soldiers.

I have written an expose capturing what I believe are several impediments to soldier and unit readiness. You might categorize these as "soldier-caring" issues. You might label them as mobilization concern for further study. You might even consider these topics for NGAUS actions in the near-term.

However we quantify them, they are nuts-and-bolts specifics, which can be resolved and can contribute greatly to our deployment value.

We all recognize the dynamics of geopolitical events that make it difficult to follow the established Time-Phased Force Deployment and Data, or TPFDD, process for every contingency.

Despite some of the surprises we've encountered during recent deployments, we have been able to answer every call for deployable units, to date. I say "to date" because as we work through the many mobilization and deployment procedures, issues and anomalies exacerbate an already challenging process. These are the tenets of this article.

Some of the issues I explore may be controversial, but I believe are certainly worthy of debate. If we want to improve the processes critically important to our purpose of mobilizing and deploying forces ready for a variety of contingencies, then I believe these are topics for discussion.

Let me first give a recent example of a mobilization concern that has been rectified through the joint efforts of many to include the Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee and the NGAUS. The issue is medical care for families of mobilized soldiers.

Until recently, the Active Guard/Reserve, or AGR, soldiers we deploy as a members of their units were losing their Tricare Prime Remote health care and were transferred into Tricare Extra or Standard. This was required because the soldier (sponsor) was geographically separated from his family. This did not make sense and caused an additional financial hardship on our families.

However, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or OSD, recently (NEWSBREAKS, page 20) developed an implementation plan that provides uniform benefits to all deployed soldiers and their families.

This is a good example of how major new points of focus, like quality-of-life and Army well-being, can create real-world improvements. Matching soldier needs with institutional programs is a win-win for our soldiers and their families. It also reinforces that when all three components-active, Guard and Reserve-work together, positive results are obtained.

A significant reason for non-deployable Guard and Reserve soldiers during the first Persian Gulf War was dental fitness. This old problem is returning. One study of recent mobilizations suggests approximately 30 percent of the soldiers mobilized had Category III or IV dental problems, making them non-deployable.

Despite a special funding account distributed to the 54 states and territories for soldier dental services, the problem persists. The funding may only be expended on soldiers in units 75 days out for deployment.

Units, however, are not receiving 75 days notice. My experience indicates the timeline from alert to mobilization to deployment is more like three to 10 days. Unless there is a statutory or policy change, these set-aside funds may not help.

We have a source of help within our ranks. But our National Guard dentists are not authorized to provide dental care to our soldiers, except for emergencies. However, our dentists routinely deploy to Central America to provide dental care to civilians.

Humanitarian efforts contribute much needed assistance to a needy audience, but could we divert some of these services to our own soldiers based upon readiness imperatives?

Dental services and care should be categorized as a readiness issue, not just a soldier benefit. TRICARE dental insurance is not meeting the need. Is it possible to craft a dental insurance program that soldiers can opt out of if they have sufficient civilian dental coverage (similar to Soldiers Group Life Insurance coverage)? I believe this initiative would serve readiness, soldier well- being and families.

Another issue is Military Occupational Specialty, or MOS, qualification. The Army has mandated that 85 percent of our soldiets be qualified in their duty MOS by 2005. This is going to be a full-court press for many commanders without an administrative process to "subtract" soldiers in the training pipeline. Our best units, with turnover rates of 9 percent to 12 percent, routinely have 4 percent to 10 percent of their personnel unavailable for legitimate reasons.

The active component has a special soldier-accounting category to preserve deployable units' readiness statistics. Could the Guard invest in such a process through a force-structure trade-off?

This may relieve some pressure on unit commanders to achieve mandatory MOS qualification goals while ensuring units are full strength with deployable soldiers and full-up weapons crews. I believe this issue requires our immediate attention.

Can we seek assistance from the Army Training and Doctrine Command, or TRADOC, at Fort Monroe, Va., to convert many of our inactive-duty training (Phase I) plus annual-training (Phase II) MOS courses to condensed two-week plus two-week, back-to-back style courses? This would be an alternative to working through an eight-- to 10-month MOS qualification process.

Unit commanders can ill afford a soldier absent for such a protracted period. It might also be easier for employers and families to schedule a single 30-day absence for a soldier. Soldier readiness, soldier retention and the quality of collective training would benefit immediately.

In addition, do we need the authority to involuntarily call non-qualified soldiers to duty for training? Would our soldiers have an easier time with their employers if they were ordered to duty for MOS training instead of presenting their employers with training options?

Maybe we could take some of the heat off of our soldiers with their families and shoulder it ourselves by driving the schedule for MOS schooling. This may even provide advantages to TRADOC where seasonal MOS schooling schedules can become overloaded. It seems a proactive approach will be necessary to accomplish the 85 percent qualification requirement. Business as usual simply won't get us there.

Also needing attention are the power-- projection platforms, or PPPs, the large active-duty installations our units go to for post-mobilization training before deploying. There don't appear to be enough PPPs for one Major Regional Contingency, or MRC, scenario. When we mobilize units inconsistent with TPFDD, we overbook platforms with newly arriving reserve-component units in addition to active-component units already there. This has certainly played out during current mobilizations.

If we were to execute two simultaneous MRC scenarios, what delays could we expect? If we would re-designate our maneuver training centers, or MTCs, as power-support platforms, or PSPs, we might capitalize on a capability that already exists. Are we really contracting billets for thousands of soldiers when we have sufficient capacity at nearby installations?

Our installations have proven capable in previous mobilization efforts. These same installations can support both individual and collective post-mobilization training and reduce the logistic burden on centralized PPPs. As one example, Camp Grayling, Mich., which is C-130-capable, can house 7,000 soldiers with a C-5-capable Air National Guard base within 60 miles.

Presently, Michigan units convoy 350 plus miles to Fort McCoy, Wis., or more than 500 miles to Ft Campbell, Ky., to wait their turn in the deployment pipeline. This scenario is repeated nationwide. Guard MTCs scattered across the country, could undoubtedly fill this need.

Home-station mobilizations have been successfully executed in the past few years. Adjutants general with their capable state-- area-command staffs have been able to provide soldier-readiness processing, or SRP at each unit's home station or nearby.

We currently send unit personnel and equipment to a PPP where they often repeat SRP Then there are of up to several weeks while airflow and theatre TPPFDs un-kink. Meanwhile, soldiers spend additional time away from work and their families.

In many cases, regional Guard MTCs could have supported more meaningful unit training prior to deployment. Could we get better utility from our MTCs by conducting more home-station mobilizations, as we have proven we can do to standard? Wouldn't families and soldiers be positively impacted by more home-station mobilizations?

Some combat formations may require a large PPP for post-mobilization training, but certainly many combat service and combat service support units could be mobilized at home station.

I recognize I have touched on several aspects of the challenges of readiness, mobilization and deployment. I have presented them as my "view from the field." I know some are already receiving Pentagon attention.

Some resolutions will require legislative action. Others can occur more quickly through Army policy changes or revision. Whatever the administrative action, it seems incumbent on all of us to expedite whatever the "fixes" may be.

Our soldiers, their families and employers, and equally important, our collective readiness will prosper as a result.

Copyright National Guard Association of the United States Apr 2003
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