NATO: the dilemmas of expansion - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The fiftieth anniversary of NATO, which falls next April, will mark the conclusion of the first enlargement of the Alliance undertaken since the peaceful end of the Cold War. It is also certain to give rise to a new debate as to whether the Alliance should continue to expand. It is therefore not too early to ponder the several ramifications of that issue. They involve such broad geostrategic matters as the nature of the long-term relationship of America to Europe, the proper scope of the Euroatlantic alliance, its connection to the also ongoing expansion of the European Union, the relationship of Russia to the expanded Euroatlantic and European structures - as well as the more immediate policy choices that may need to be made regarding the specific timing of any further expansion, its geographical direction, and its depth.

In brief, whether, and if so, why, when, where, and how much next to expand, and eventually where to stop, are the questions that need to be addressed and aired.

Europe is Unfinished Business

The basic lesson of the last five decades is that European security is the basis for European reconciliation. Without NATO, France would not have felt secure enough to reconcile with Germany, and both France and Britain would have even more actively opposed Germany's reunification. It is enough to recall here the last-ditch maneuvers by both Thatcher and Mitterrand to delay (and thus even prevent) the reunification of Germany in order to appreciate the extent to which NATO has helped pacify the persisting European fears of a powerful and potentially dominant Germany, its good democratic and European postwar record notwithstanding.

Moreover, without NATO, it is most unlikely - for the same reasons - that the EC and now the EU would have ever come into being. Similarly, the ongoing reconciliation between Germany and Poland would not have been possible without the American presence in Germany and the related sense of security that Poland's prospective membership in NATO has fostered in Poland. The same is true of the Czech Republic and Germany, Hungary and Romania, Romania and Ukraine; and the desire to get into NATO is also having a similar influence on Slovenia's attitude toward Italy and Lithuania's toward Poland.

In the foreseeable future, the evolving reconciliation between Poland and Russia is also likely to become more marked. The Poles, once in NATO, will fear less that a fraternal embrace by their more powerful neighbor will become again a stifling yoke. And once the Russians realize that Central Europe is no longer a geopolitical vacuum, their definition of their sphere of influence will become less ambitious. Given the fact that all of Russia's western neighbors - rightly or wrongly - fear its aspirations, greater regional security thus will be to the benefit of all of Europe, Russia included.

This point - that security breeds reconciliation - deserves reiteration, given the recent debates over NATO's expansion. Even a cursory review of the arguments made by the principal opponents of that expansion indicates how dramatically wrong have been their diagnoses. In fact, it would be positively unkind to list serially and identify all the apocalyptic predictions made by various scholars, ex-ambassadors, and editorialists regarding Russia's likely behavior in the wake of NATO's expansion. They simply failed to draw the most elementary lessons from Europe's recent history.

Moreover, the construction and expansion both of the EU and of NATO are clearly long-term historical processes that are still far from finished. Even if at this stage it may be premature to draw a demarcating line - and perhaps it should never be drawn with any degree of finality, given the contingent nature of historical processes - it is certainly evident that neither the EU nor NATO can be viewed as having reached its ultimate limits. Both institutions are committed publicly to further expansion, and even a glance at a map indicates why their present scope cannot be considered as final.

The expansion of the EU and of NATO are also mutually reinforcing processes. Each tends to facilitate the other, and the overlap between the two creates also the reality of greater political interdependence. That enhances the sense of shared security and even further binds Europe and America together. The two processes also leapfrog each other. At any point in time, expansion of one may be ahead of the other. Poland will be in NATO before it is in the EU. Estonia is likely to be in the EU before it is in NATO. But the overlap between most of the EU and most of NATO creates a sense of common geopolitical space that collectively reassures all involved in the two frameworks.

For NATO, however, the commitment to expansion does raise the more specific and fundamental question of the degree to which the organization should remain primarily an integrated political-military alliance and to what degree it should evolve into a regional security system. In the former case, collective defense has to be the central concern; in the latter, more emphasis can be assigned to peacekeeping. Again, in the former case, additional members should be judged primarily by the degree to which they may enhance the Alliance's political-military potential; in the latter, by the extent to which they increase the scope of political stability. The former argues for greater selectivity in admission; the latter for less discrimination.

Ultimately, neither formula can be seen as iron-clad, and expansion cannot be guided mechanically by either criterion. Nonetheless, the distinction should be kept in mind, in order to make certain that any additional expansion does contribute tangibly to collective security, and that it does not produce a watered-down NATO that gradually loses its political-military cohesion and its capacity for united and effective action. Concern for the preservation of the primacy of collective defense should also guide - and restrain any excessive enthusiasm in codifying - the formulation of NATO's new strategic doctrine and the assumption by NATO of new "out-of-area" roles and mission. By seeking to take on too much, one could run the risk of undermining the magnetic core of the Alliance.

Hence, gradual and measured expansion - one that provides time for the integration of new members, one that carefully meets the objective criteria of membership, and one that is derived from the subjectively voluntary desire of a given nation to join - is both desirable and even necessary. Halting the process would be arbitrary, demoralizing for those left out, and pernicious to Europe's security. A significant gap between the eventual scope of the EU and of NATO could create tensions in the American-European connection, breed misunderstandings, and perhaps in some cases even tempt external challenges. A proclaimed or even de facto halt in NATO'S expansion would also be a denial of everything that has lately been affirmed by all the top NATO leaders. It would thus fundamentally damage Euroatlantic credibility while perhaps unintentionally signaling that what is beyond NATO may be up for grabs.

When, Where, and How Much?

The three new members - Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary - will be admitted early in 1999, either before or during the Alliance's fiftieth anniversary. At that point, some overt confirmation of the Alliance's oft-stated commitment to a continuing process ("open door policy") will be necessary, lest the impression be created that the first enlargement has been the last. One can anticipate that Russia will pursue that objective and might even condition President Yeltsin's attendance at the Washington fete - presumably much desired by the Clinton administration and justified by the existence of the NATO-Russia Council - on a promise that the issue of enlargement be ignored or muted, and that formal enlargement not even take place on that occasion.

Yet silence and inaction on the issue could prove as counterproductive as excessive emphasis on immediate and substantial follow-on enlargement. The Alliance is hardly ready to take on promptly a large second wave of members. It must absorb the newly admitted members, while Russia must accustom itself to the non-threatening reality of a gradually expanding alliance. That will require several years, and it is no betrayal to acknowledge this reality. But silence or only a token enlargement limited to a single geopolitically insignificant and thus non-controversial new candidate would be tantamount to a message that further expansion has been relegated to ad calendas grecas. For reasons already stated, such a price should not be paid, even for a spectacular American-Russian public relations success at the 1999 NATO summit.

Accordingly, given these conflicting considerations, the best course of action should involve coupling a ceremonious welcome to the new members in April with a collective statement that the foreign and defense ministers of the Alliance are being charged with the task of identifying at a December 1999 ministerial the next potential candidates for membership. Negotiations with these candidates regarding the matter could subsequently begin, pointing perhaps to eventual admission a year or so later, depending on their respective states of readiness. This would give everyone concerned time to learn that gradual expansion enhances European reconciliation, while avoiding an ego contest at the April 1999 summit among the heads of state regarding the selection of any new candidates.

The foregoing would thus reconfirm that expansion is a continuing historical process, related to the construction of a new Europe and to the progressive redefinition of the scope and role of the Euroatlantic alliance. But doing so would necessitate also making a prudent choice regarding the direction and the depth of the second wave of enlargement. Expansion to the southeast of Europe would pose fewer problems with Russia, and probably hardly any if it were limited to Slovenia; expansion to the northeast, namely the Baltic states, would involve a wide crossing of Russia's declared "red line" and thus reignite the controversies that took place during the first enlargement. The southeast involves an area of greater instability but lesser external threat; the opposite is the case with the northeast. What follows from that fact in so far as NATO'S interests are involved?

It has already been noted that expansion confined to only one and very non-controversial state would be more an act of evasion than of fidelity to oft-stated commitments. Yet selecting several states in one direction only could also prompt complications. To pick the Baltic states in one bite would be, indeed, to invite a quarrel with Russia that could be divisive both for Europe and for the Alliance itself. Yet to go deep exclusively in the southeast direction rims the risk, not only of selecting candidates who might not be quite ready for membership and thus actually weakening the Alliance's cohesion, but also of legitimating through the passage of time Russia's unilaterally drawn "red line."

Perhaps the best choice would be to remain faithful to three principles: first, that only qualified candidates who truly desire and are ready for membership should be considered; second, that in keeping with the solemn declaration of Madrid, no qualified European state can be excluded by Moscow's unilateral "red line"; and third, that there are no automatic linkages or clusters of states that have to be admitted together, either in the southeast or the northeast. Just as the EU did not hesitate to select Estonia ahead of the other Baltic states, so NATO should not feel compelled to consider states in some special clusters.

Accordingly, it might be appropriate and constructive to examine the possibility of a limited expansion both to the southeast and to the northeast, involving no more than two or so states, depending on the degree to which they satisfy respectively the criteria of membership, and demonstrating thereby - but on a prudent basis - that no democratic state of Europe can be arbitrarily blackballed by a non-member from participation in the Euroatlantic alliance.

At the present time, in the southeast, Slovenia and perhaps also Romania seem to be most advanced in their preparations; and in the northeast that is the case with Lithuania. A decision in favor of Slovenia and Lithuania would have the advantage of enhancing the Alliance's geographical cohesion (and of establishing a direct land connection with Hungary), and both Italy and Denmark would be especially gratified. In the event that Lithuania were to be the northeastern choice, and given Estonia's advanced status in negotiations with the EU, it might also be wise to make concurrent efforts to facilitate Latvia's entrance into the WTO and to open a NATO information office in Riga (such offices exist in Moscow and Kyiv), in order to reassure Latvia that it was not being permanently left behind the "red line."

The Issue of Russia

A properly paced process of enlargement should be one that neither over-stretches the Alliance's cohesion and capabilities nor unnecessarily delays Russia's liberation from its imperial nostalgia. Hence, Russia cannot, and should not, be excluded from the process of constructing a larger Europe securely embraced by the Euroatlantic alliance. But Russia cannot be allowed to exercise a veto on the free choice of individual European states and, even worse, to justify doing so on the basis that some of them had formerly been part of the Soviet Union. To the Baltic states, the additional fact that Russia still formally insists that they had in 1940 joined the Soviet Union voluntarily only adds insult to insecurity.

However, the process of expansion must be pursued in a fashion that gives Russia time to digest the new realities and to learn from them that enhanced security breeds more genuine reconciliation. That process has already started in Russian-Polish relations. It is important that it be matched by reconciliation with the Baltic states and also with Ukraine. At some point, Ukraine too might opt for a closer link with NATO, and NATO certainly cannot a priori exclude Ukraine simply because Moscow might disapprove. Moreover, Russia, if it is to be a truly European national state and not a nostalgic craver of empire, must accept the fact that democratic European states do wish to coalesce in a joint security framework with America, and that sovereign right cannot be denied to them. Lines drawn on the basis of the old Stalinist empire can only serve to separate Russia from Europe.

By the same token, Russia cannot be asked to accept the expansion of NATO if it is at the same time seen as excluded forever from a deepening association with it. The creation of the Joint NATO-Russian Council is a good beginning in forging a new relationship, and that step too should be viewed as a continuing and evolving process. If President Yeltsin were to attend the Washington NATO summit, he should hear there not only a reaffirmation of NATO's commitment to growth - in keeping with the voluntary desire of democratic European nations - but also a more explicit affirmation of the principle that, in tandem with the expansion of Europe, NATO's doors will remain open to all European states - Russia included - that subjectively desire membership and objectively meet the requirements of that membership.

In politics, one should never use the words "never" or "end." One simply does not know where Europe will "end", say, fifty years from now, and hence one cannot also postulate that Russia should "never" be considered for membership. No one ever dreamed a hundred years ago of a Euroatlantic community and no one can stipulate categorically what that community of values and interests will encompass a century from now. The key issue is to keep the historical process of growth open, to sustain it with prudence and deliberation, and to be clearheaded about the shared values it implies.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security advisor to the president of the United States, is author of The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives (1997).

COPYRIGHT 1998 The National Interest, Inc.
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