The politics of human suffering

LESS THAN A year ago, United States marines landed on the beaches of Mogadishu to the acclaim of its citizens. They did so at the beginning of "Operation Restore Hope," authorized by the United Nations Security Council "to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for international humanitarian relief operations in Somalia." Within six months, television screens contained disconcerting images of American Cobra helicopter gun-ships inflicting civilian casualties as they fired on targets in Mogadishu and of angry Somalis denouncing United Nations forces as an army of occupation. A little more than a year ago, in June 1992, the deployment of United Nations troops to protect Sarajevo airport in order to allow the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies was hailed. By the following summer, the nightly news programs showed an anguished Moslem population in Sarajevo deprived of water and electric power, and nearly empty United Nations relief supply warehouses. Early in 1991, the successful use of the armed forces of the United States and its allies in support of Kurds fleeing from the Iraqi army captured the imagination of the world community. But that Security Council-authorized operation has not been complemented by a similar concern for the welfare of other Iraqi civilians affected by the war and continuing sanctions.

Security Council Resolution 688, insisting on access by humanitarian organizations "in all parts of Iraq," was regarded as something of a breakthrough by some international lawyers, adding substance to the idea of a "right of humanitarian intervention." By this is meant the right of states to deliver assistance forcibly to people deprived of the necessities of life or otherwise abused by their governments. Security Council decisions on Bosnia and Somalia, particularly Somalia Resolution 794, were seen as significant further steps in the defacto establishment of the legitimacy of such interventions. Now, the seeming debacles in Bosnia and Somalia have raised doubts about the workability of the new approach to humanitarian intervention.

So far, more attention has been paid to peacekeeping than to the most appropriate humanitarian arrangements for minimizing loss of life and life-threatening suffering in situations of civil conflict. This oversight is curious. It was concern for the suffering and death of civilians that led directly to armed intervention in Somalia and gradually deeper involvement in Bosnia. In Iraq, Bosnia, and Somalia the United Nations, through its various humanitarian and other agencies has been a major provider of relief assistance. It has also coordinated the entire international relief effort, involving the work of many private voluntary agencies, or non-government organizations (NGOs), as they, are more usually called. It was the failure of the United Nations to perform these roles satisfactorily that was a major reason why the use of armed troops became necessary in Somalia.

There will be many more occasions when the Security Council is faced with humanitarian crises where action on its part is inescapable. The question arises whether humanitarian goals may not be better achieved under a new and different regime. I believe they would. The United Nations should confine its role to political functions associated with the resolution of disputes, the prevention of conflict and coercive interventions to end it. Reaching and succoring the victims of conflict and coordinating the relief efforts of the international community should cease to be a United Nations responsibility.

Principles of Humanitarian Action

THERE IS NO agreed definition of the meaning of "humanitarian" in international law, or in the Security Council Sanctions Committee, or among non-government organizations. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has defined humanitarian action as: "action to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it is found," that "makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, class, religious beliefs, or political opinions." In relieving suffering ICRC is guided solely by the "needs of individuals." In order to enjoy the confidence of all, the Red Cross movement "may not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature."

It is appropriate for the United Nations to be selective about its political and security interventions. Neither the interests of states nor the likely availability of financial and other resources would allow any other course. A genuinely humanitarian organization like the ICRC, however, cannot be selective about which innocent people in life-threatening situations it will help. All must be eligible, the only practical limitation being set by the availability of money, organizational capability, and manpower.

Maximizing the relief of suffering requires access to all affected people. This may well be best brought about by gaining the consent of the parties to a conflict rather than through forcible intervention. In my experience, the indispensable condition for gaining the consent of the parties is for the negotiator to be seen to be "working impartially and with strictly humanitarian motives" (UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182), that is to say being concerned, and concerned only, to prevent civilian loss of life and life-threatening suffering.

When the United Nations first sought to bring about a cease-fire in Mogadishu during the early months of 1992, the basic concern of the official entrusted with negotiations was to use food aid as an inducement to the parties. Because his goal was political and not humanitarian, he gave no serious attention to the extraordinarily complex and urgent problem of getting food to civilian victims under the conditions prevailing. The succession of United Nations failures in Somalia began from that first mistaken judgment, an unwillingness to recognize that bringing about cease-fires and achieving access of relief supplies to victims are driven by different imperatives and practical constraints.

This is a very important point to be clear about. While successful humanitarian action may sometimes promote negotiated conflict resolution, in most UN interventions the two functions of providing humanitarian relief and resolving conflict are mixed up. The structure that is emerging in complex emergencies, such as those in Somalia and Mozambique, is for the secretary-general's representative to be in overall charge, with a representative of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs in charge of relief coordination and a military officer responsible for peace keeping. The under secretary-general for humanitarian affairs is at the same time answerable to the secretary-general.

This linkage of the incompatible security and humanitarian roles of the United Nations is precisely the problem in Bosnia, Iraq, and Somalia. In Somalia, at the moment of writing, the United Nations is not distributing relief food in south Mogadishu--that is, to the area where General Aideed's forces are located--because of the security situation. Relief agencies are complaining that they are unable to work in other areas requiring armed escorts because the United Nations forces are preoccupied with the intense security problems they face in Mogadishu.

The use of force against General Aideed has meant that the United Nations, including its relief agencies, has ceased to be seen to be neutral in the eyes of Somalis. It is equally true that if United Nations forces had intervened in Bosnia in a serious way against one of the parties, even to secure the delivery of relief, it would have ceased to be seen as impartial. Hence the emphasis always placed when bringing in relief under the protection of UN forces on doing so with the consent of the parties. The denial or provision of food in a conflict situation has tactical and even strategic implications for the parties to the conflict. They either consent to its delivery, or, if force is to be used to get it through, the user of force becomes a party to the conflict.

In February 1992 the secretary-general of the United Nations over-ruled the UN high commissioner for refugees (UNHCR), Ms. Sadako Ogata, when she suspended most relief shipments in Bosnia in the face of the belligerents' failure to allow access to desperate civilians. Ms. Ogata justified her decision on the grounds that the political leaders on all sides had made a mockery of United Nations efforts. Suspension of its efforts by the ICRC is not unknown, in the face of rampant violations of law and humanity in which continuance of activities would bring into question the organization's fundamental integrity. In overruling Ogata, Mr. Boutros-Ghali, reportedly said, "I'm supposed to direct this operation." The incident demonstrates once again that in the last resort United Nations humanitarian agencies are subject to political direction.

The UNHCR is seen by some non-governmental organizations concerned with human rights as inconsistent in the application of humanitarian principles, in effect too political" in its decision-making. This is particularly so in its dealings with major donors, as in its alleged failure to uphold the rights of refugees from El Salvador in the United States, and of the several hundred thousand Cambodian "non-refugees" who took refuge inside the Thai border. There was also disagreement between UNHCR and the ICRC about the most appropriate course of action in relation to the creation of "safety zones" for vulnerable ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia.(1) The UNHCR has not favored evacuation of civilians from zones of conflict, on the grounds that such steps could contribute to the consolidation of "ethnic cleansing"--that is, a politically grounded decision, justified on the basis that efforts should concentrate first on bringing safety to people, rather than people to safety. The ICRC, on the other hand, maintains that this consideration must be secondary to the purely humanitarian consideration of how best to relieve suffering.

The necessity for separating political and humanitarian action was clearly spelled out by the president of the ICRC in an address to the General Assembly of the United Nations last December. The ICRC is convinced, he said, that "humanitarian endeavour and political action must go their separate ways if the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian work is not to be jeopardised." He went on to state the ICRC's belief that, "it is dangerous to link humanitarian activities aimed at meeting the needs of victims of a conflict with political measures designed to bring about the settlement of the dispute between the parties" [italics in original].

The president of the highly respected private organization Medecins Sans Frontieres recently pointed out that, in situations of armed conflict, aid workers have only one option, namely, "to attempt to build a relationship of trust with the local strongmen." He went on to say, "I am convinced that only private organizations are in a position to build up and maintain this relationship. In other words, our strength in wartime lies in the fact that our motives are so obviously disinterested. You can see evidence of this in Somalia, where we worked under fire for eighteen months without protection. Today, however, the military intervention has disrupted relations between non-government organizations and the local people so much that operating without protection has become unthinkable."

Bosnia and Somalia are showing that exercise by the United Nations of a "right of humanitarian intervention" through use of armed forces is not a panacea for the unqualified achievement of humanitarian goals. Only where practically and politically there is no alternative, should force be used to achieve humanitarian goals.

Flawed Structures

ALTHOUGH THE international community has been concerned about the organization of humanitarian relief for well over a century, neither under the League of Nations nor when establishing the United Nations was serious consideration given to establishing a permanent and comprehensive relief capability.

The post-World War II United Nations relief system evolved from a structure created for different purposes. With the exception of UNHCR and UNICEF (United Nations Childrens Fund), the other main agencies now involved in emergencies--i.e., WFP (World Food Program), UNDP (United Nations Development Program), FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), and who (World Health Organization)--acquired that task as a secondary function. Their principal role was the promotion of economic and social development. Emergencies were incidental to their work until the 1980s, as they were for UNICEF, which long before had switched to "development" as its main focus. Then, notwithstanding the upsurge in their humanitarian relief work, the organization of the agencies underwent no fundamental change. Staff recruited for intellectually challenging "development" work were disdainful of relief. Intergovernmental committees overseeing their work invariably focused on activities in support of development. This reflected the fact that the officials concerned were drawn mainly from development assistance agencies or technical departments of government, like agriculture. As a rule their understanding of, or interest in, humanitarian assistance was low. The development culture of the United Nations agencies, geared essentially to projects undertaken in the public sectors of developing countries, meant that there was little interaction with NGOs working at the local level, often on disaster related activities. Meanwhile, the extraordinary growth in the number of voluntary aid agencies working in developing countries added to the overall pattern of a chaotic, unprofessional international response to successive humanitarian crises.

The system of governance of the United Nations system very much compounded the problem. The agencies of the United Nations system are linked in the loosest way with the United Nations proper. In the principal coordinating body of the system, the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC), the United Nations secretary-general is primus inter pares. The operational programs like UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR, and WFP, though legally less independent, in practice work with much the same autonomy as the specialized agencies. All have separate intergovernmental managing councils. This very loose system of governance grew out of the view that international cooperation was best built around the nations working together in areas of mutual functional interest: food and agriculture, education, telecommunications, health, civil aviation and so on. Humanitarian relief was not seen as such a function. There was also fear that if the functional agencies were not kept separate from the United Nations, political division in the latter would spill over into the former.

Separate agencies are inevitably in competition for scarce funds and want to be seen to be making a major contribution to a problem exercising donor governments--that is, in recent years, any headline catching major humanitarian disaster. This competition--as well as the conflicts between, and gaps in, mandates of agencies--prevents the kind of swift and purposeful action required to come to grips with complex, rapidly evolving humanitarian emergencies due to armed conflict, or sudden natural disasters such as regularly afflict Bangladesh. The secretary-general does not have the authority to adjudicate these conflicts. To the extent they are resolved, settlement emerges from what is essentially a bargaining process. The governing bodies share with the secretariats of the agencies concerned an interest in their continuing autonomy and prosperity. Accordingly, General Assembly resolutions calling for the pursuit of appropriate coordination policies by the various governing bodies are rarely seriously addressed or followed up over time. In the field, that is at the point of humanitarian intervention, the system of independent agency representation means that much critical time is spent on attempts at coordination. The result is that decisive action is invariably too slow.

A further serious inhibition to effective United Nations coordination in the field, is the United Nations doctrine, deriving ultimately from the concept of national sovereignty, that coordination of humanitarian effort is the responsibility of the government of the affected country. Since quite often the government is unable to discharge the task (human disasters occur most often in poor countries with weak and inefficient governments), a lot of effort often has to go into establishing institutional structures that give the appearance of government cooperation, and in negotiation with government on many aspects of implementation.

Unless the secretary-general has a strong, "charismatic" personality and a good sense of the practical problems of emergency management, he is not really able to give coherent leadership to the multiplicity of agencies claiming a role in the United Nations emergency response system. No matter how gifted, a single person cannot oversee effectively the whole system, or even the United Nations proper and the programs linked to it. Inevitably and properly, the secretary-general has to give most of his attention to diplomatic issues.

Moreover, merit and general suitability are less significant than political connections in determining who is appointed to senior United Nations posts. Most appointees tend to be diplomats, and posts are frequently filled in response to political pressures from national governments, especially the major powers. Diplomatic skills are essential attributes for top-level United Nations appointees, but diplomats are renowned neither for their management skills nor their sense of what is feasible or practical by way of action in response to concrete situations such as natural or man-made disasters.

An effective emergency response requires capacity for expeditious decision making, flexibility and improvisation as well as a capacity for quick organization and planning. None of these qualities is particularly characteristic of national civil services. Yet, not only have United Nations relief agencies been set up and staffed on civil service lines, and therefore share their characteristics, but for reasons connected with their multinational/multicultural composition they are much more rule-bound and inflexible than most civil services.

United Nations agencies are sometimes criticized for being desk-bound and generally ineffectual in coping with emergencies. Their performance, and what is seen as their often premature withdrawal from dangerous posts, is contrasted unfavorably with non-government organization performance. This criticism is misplaced. The professional staff of United Nations agencies have been recruited to and accepted employment in an international civil service equivalent to a national foreign service. They are not "hands on" volunteers such as the employees of non-government organizations recruited for disaster work. In practice, many. career United Nations officials are ready to accept extremes of discomfort and danger that are not expected of diplomats from national foreign services.

A fundamental problem in securing a more cohesive and efficient international humanitarian response is the donor government practice of allocating most of their emergency resources bilaterally, usually through non-government organizations. The lobbying power of NGOs is formidable when emergencies have become the focus of media attention. Governments respond by channeling resources through them. While key NGOs may sometimes be more efficient than United Nations agencies, the practical effect is that in almost all disaster situations a large number of non-government organizations are involved on the ground. For example, 140 different international NGOs are listed as operational in Mozambique alone. NGOs have conflicting aims and agendas, and often insist on working in particular regions of affected countries. The task of harmonizing the total effort, which falls to the United Nations, is far from easy. Very often the representatives of donor embassies insist on being involved. While their efforts can sometimes be helpful, more often than not they make the coordination problem even more difficult to solve.

In terms of volume and value, food and its transport are usually the preponderant part of the cost of emergency humanitarian responses. So much of the justified criticisms of too scanty or excessive food aid, and its untimely delivery in emergencies, is due, first, to donor insistence on independent decision-making and, second, to their slowness in giving data on their decisions and actions to the coordinator. The situation in Somalia in October 1992 illustrated dramatically how dangerous the effects of individual donor decision-making can be. Not only was the port of Mogadishu clogged with unscheduled ships (a routine occurrence in any major famine, no matter how much warning lead-time has been given to donors) but some donors were shipping commodities such as dates, wheat flour, rice, and sugar that were highly prized on the black market. Their relatively high value inevitably led to intervention and theft by armed looters.

The provision of the kind of data sought by donor aid ministries leads to centralization of coordination at United Nations headquarters, whereas an effective United Nations intervention requires leadership at the country level, by a person experienced in disaster management but having the kind of personality able to persuade the parties involved to work together under his broad direction. The country coordinator needs considerable autonomy and cannot discharge his task efficiently if subject to a burdensome reporting requirement to headquarters--reporting which, in turn, inevitably leads to undue intervention from the center. At best, the consequence is to slow down decision-making; in the worst cases, something approaching paralysis can result.

Measures to Improve UN Performance

THE INSTITUTIONAL structure of the United Nations that has grown up and which deals inter alia with disasters is inherently cumbersome and ponderous in action. Without root and branch changes in structure, which so far governments have shown little willingness to tackle seriously, marginal improvements at best may realistically be expected.

Creating an effective United Nations disaster response mechanism has been a vexing problem for many years. Twenty years ago the General Assembly set in place a comprehensive framework or "architecture" for the organization of the United Nations humanitarian response. However, the system introduced made little real difference to the generally haphazard way in which the United Nations disaster agencies went about their business. Over the years, donor governments and the principal NGOs concerned with humanitarian aid had become increasingly critical of the United Nations' overall performance in emergencies. The United Nations' perceived shortcomings in 1991 in relation to the Kurds and a catastrophic cyclone in Bangladesh gave every appearance of being the last straw.

The stage therefore seemed to be set for real advance. The General Assembly debated the issue at length that year. After intense negotiations, a comprehensive resolution, 46/182, was adopted in December 1991. The new arrangements, however, were deeply flawed and only peripheral problems were addressed.

Every important element embodied in the resolution passed twenty years earlier (2816 (XXVI)) found its place in Resolution 46/182, though there were, of course, differences in detail and emphasis. Thus Resolution 2816 (XXVI) called upon the secretary-general to appoint a disaster relief coordinator at the under secretary-general level to report directly to him. Resolution 46/182 called for a "high level" official to be appointed as emergency relief coordinator and having "direct access" to the secretary-general. As it happened, the actual appointee is also at the under secretary-general level. However, the new resolution does place great weight on the leadership role of the secretary general, which is rightly said to be "critical." In the earlier resolution this had been more implicit. Putting the responsibility fairly and squarely on the secretary-general is critical because of the structure of the United Nations system, in which, as already noted, even the secretary-general is only primus inter pares. Some of the heads of specialized agencies (and programs) do not readily accept leadership from United Nations officials they do not regard as peers.

On the other hand, on paper 2816 (XXVI) gave the disaster relief coordinator clear-cut power. He was authorized on behalf of the secretary-general "to mobilize, direct and coordinate the relief activities of the various organizations of the United Nations system," though in practice he was never able to do so. In Resolution 46/182 the powers of the new senior official are rather fuzzy. He is to "process" requests for assistance, to "systematically pool and analyze early warning information," to "organize" joint inter-agency needs assessment missions, to "serve as a central focal point" with governments and inter governmental and non-government organizations, to provide consolidated information" to interested governments, to "actively promote" the smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation, and to prepare an "annual report" for the secretary-general. The most substantive tasks he is given include "coordinating and facilitating" (but not managing or directing) the United Nations emergency response; "managing" a central emergency revolving fund; and, as noted above, "actively facilitating" access by humanitarian organizations to people in need.

In short, we have a situation extending over a period of twenty years during which governments have been dissatisfied with the coordination system that they have established but at the same time are unable to agree on anything significantly different. The problems of efficient United Nations disaster management are much more deeply rooted than can be addressed by further detailed changes. They go back to the way in which the United Nations system has been constructed and how in practice it functions.

An Alternative Relief Regime

IF THE HUMANITARIAN goal of saving lives and reducing suffering in situations of armed conflict is best assured by keeping distinct the function of peacekeeping, in all its guises, from humanitarian action; and if, as well, the United Nations structure for humanitarian relief is irredeemably flawed, as I have argued--then the conclusion is inescapable: the time has come for the United Nations to vacate the humanitarian relief field. A thoroughly professional humanitarian agency, which itself plays a significant front-line relief role and has the authority, standing, and competence to be acceptable as coordinator of the international relief effort, is required.

The International Committee of the Red Cross is the obvious body on which to build. Indeed, in some situations it virtually plays the leading role already, and with considerable success. The bravery and competence of ICRC staff are beyond reproach and justifiably have aroused great admiration. On the other hand, the multiplying of conflict situations has imposed strains on the organization.

The ICRC is not an international organization but remains a private, independent Swiss institution subject to Swiss law. Its governing bodies are composed of Swiss nationals. Given Switzerland's neutrality policy and the fact that it is not a member of the United Nations, its Swiss character has brought many advantages. On the other hand, my own experience has convinced me that the multicultural, multinational composition of United Nations organizations docs promote a great sensitivity to the values and concerns of other nations and cultures. In WFP's dealings with governments involved in conflict, we sometimes found suspicion of the ICRC as an arrogant European organization lacking appreciation of the aspirations and concerns of developing countries. Given the concern of developing countries about infringement of sovereignty, an internationalized ICRC would almost certainly enjoy more confidence from developing countries and therefore be more effective in negotiating access to all victims of internal conflict.

Internationalization of the ICRC in a way that avoids the defects of United Nations organizations ought to be feasible. A possible model could be the international agricultural research organizations grouped within the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Minimal changes in line with that model would be for membership of the supreme governing body of twenty-five members, i.e. the Committee, to be co-opted world-wide by the existing Committee of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement among outstanding persons known for their international experience and devotion to humanitarian values. The president could continue to be elected by the Committee. However, the pool of nationalities from which delegates are chosen would need to be progressively widened.

In the event an internationalized ICRC decided that a humanitarian crisis could no longer be satisfactorily managed by the family of humanitarian organizations it could so advise the secretary-general of the United Nations in a formal report. The secretary-general in turn could inform the Security Council. Taking account of that report and other relevant criteria the Council would decide what action, if any, should be taken including the most appropriate form of intervention. Under such an arrangement, the developing countries could be reasonably assured that if the Security Council decided to authorize the use of force, then the humanitarian argument would not be an excuse to disguise political or other motives. In situations akin to that covered by Resolution 688, action could continue to be initiated by the Security Council without a prior report by the ICRC, i.e. the Security Council would remain master of its decision-making on questions of peace and security.

The Swiss Government and the ICRC may not welcome attempts to confer such a role on the ICRC, seeing in internationalization a derogation in some way from its unique situation derived from the neutrality of Switzerland. Moreover, the ICRC recognizes that it can barely cope with its present responsibilities and does not wish to expand them. It wishes to focus less on humanitarian operations and more on its role as custodian of international humanitarian law and to related functions such as the protecting of war victims.

It may well be a more feasible course, therefore, for governments to create a new organization, though still preferably outside the United Nations. In order to avoid the problems associated with United Nations agencies, such an organization should be constituted along the lines of my proposal for a remodeled ICRC, that is to say an organization fully backed by governments but not, strictly speaking, an inter-governmental organization in terms of its governance. Alternatively, a specialized agency within the United Nations system established by formal inter-governmental agreement could be set up. Such an agency would not be under the direction of the secretary-general. The relief functions of existing agencies and those of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs would be transferred to the new agency. Though less satisfactory than the other alternatives suggested, such an arrangement would be a major improvement on the existing situation. It would also be easier to achieve politically.

There is an opportunity to make real progress toward an efficient humanitarian regime during the current session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Assembly has on its agenda a report from the secretary-general on the new arrangements established under its Resolution 46/182, discussed earlier in this article. Donors are again seriously questioning the ability of the United Nations to coordinate its own relief efforts, let alone bring real cohesion to the overall international humanitarian response. The time has come for governments to turn away from a system that has over decades failed too often. The victims of conflict deserve better than more tinkering at the edges of an incorrigible system. (1) Kathleen Newland, "Ethnic Conflict and Refugees," Survival (Spring 1993), p. 98.

James C. Ingram was executive director of the United Nations World Food Program from 1982 to 1992. Currently he is a visiting fellow at the Australian National University, Canberra.

Adapted from James C. Ingram's contribution to the forthcoming Humanitarianism Across Borders, edited by Thomas G. Weiss and Larry Minear, Copyright [C] 1994 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Used with permission of the publisher.

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