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  • 标题:Victory through information dominance
  • 作者:David L Grange
  • 期刊名称:Army
  • 印刷版ISSN:0004-2455
  • 出版年度:1997
  • 卷号:Mar 1997
  • 出版社:Association of the U.S. Army

Victory through information dominance

David L Grange

Information and the ability to gather, process and disseminate it are crucial to the Army's success. The Army's information operations (IO), conducted daily, are essential to national security and are embedded in a wide range of ongoing Army missions including peacetime engagement, conflict prevention and military support to the nation. They are used to compel an adversary in actual combat.

In August 1996, the Army completed a rigorous multiyear effort to integrate all aspects of information into the conduct of military operations with the publication and distribution of Field Manual (FM) 100-6, Information Operations.

This capstone manual outlines the fundamentals associated with the conduct of warfare and operations other than war in the information age, and specifies the offensive and defensive measures the Army will take to achieve "victory through information dominance." To gain perspective on the nature and scope of IO, one must understand some basic terminology and acquire an appreciation of its role in military operations.

Army units conduct IO across the full range of military operations, from garrison activities through deployment, to combat and continuing through redeployment. No unit is exempt, whether stationed in the continental United States, forward based or deployed to a contingency with split-based operational support. The ultimate goal is to enable the unit commander to achieve information dominance-a degree of information superiority that makes it possible to use information systems to achieve an operational advantage in combat or to control the situation in operations other than war. Commanders attain information dominance and gain a distinct advantage when they have achieved a level of knowledge about their own situation, the environment in which they are conducting operations and any potential adversary or influential participant.

Information operations are made up of three components: information systems, relevant information and intelligence, and operations. Commanders require reliable and robust information systems to collect, process and disseminate enormous volumes of data in near real time. Given advances in technology, however, it is easy to become awash in data. For this reason, a critical aspect of IO is getting the relevant information and intelligence (RII) that enables commanders to focus their efforts. Information operations are predicated on the right person receiving the right information in the right place and at the right time. The operations dimension of IO capitalizes on information systems and RII enabling commanders to synchronize the elements of electronic warfare, deception, operations security, psychological operations, and, if necessary, physical destruction focused against an adversary's command and control (C2) systems and the will and support of the adversarial populace. Public affairs and civil affairs also affect information operations. A coordinated IO plan that incorporates the aspects of public affairs and civil affairs is critical for building legitimacy for host nation, coalition, U.S. and world support (especially in operations other than war).

At the same time, commanders need to protect their C^sup 2^ systems from attack or exploitation by an adversary. Finally, legal advisers analyze international and domestic law and help formulate appropriate IO rules of engagement to guide the conduct of these operations. Such efforts result in coordinated and fully integrated IO that, in turn, lead to information dominance, thereby creating a significant operational advantage.

Armies have conducted information operations throughout history. When Genghis Khan had his scouts ride out ahead of his invading hordes, information gathering was not their only mission. They also placed fear in the hearts of the locals by telling them the great Khan was coming their way. These early psychological operations were certainly information operations. Today, however, expanded methods and capabilities make IO distinctly more important, effective and necessary for successful operations.

Before the successful U.S.-led multinational force (MNF) intervention in Haiti in September 1994, the United States waged an aggressive and skillful information campaign aimed at convincing the military regime there of the futility of its cause and that it should peaceably step aside in favor of the legitimate government. In Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia, IO were conducted 24 hours a day. Through information operations, the Implementation Force (IFOR) knew where the rival factions were and what they were doing at any given time. This enabled IFOR to control the situation on its own terms. Constant interaction with the media along with the message of hope sent to the inhabitants via psychological operations and civil affairs remain key ingredients of IO in Bosnia. Clearly IO has contributed to IFOR's successful conflict prevention efforts.

The application of technology is at the heart of information operations. Advances in computer technology combined with dramatic advancements in telecommunications have merged to create a global information environment. The world today confronts the Army with an interconnected and interdependent information processing web that affords great opportunities and advancements, but also presents major new vulnerabilities.

The Department of Defense relies on commercial telecommunications networks to carry more than 95 percent of its information traffic. These commercial networks have proved to be susceptible to attack and exploitation. Efforts to digitize the Army will enhance situational awareness and visualization of the battlefield. These efforts, however, which are exemplified by the Army's Force XXI initiative, rely heavily on the ability to capitalize on a host of new information systems. As the Army develops and fields these systems, it must be constantly vigilant to protect them and to ensure soldiers are trained in security techniques.

In addition, satellites, overhead imagery and CNN allow individuals to receive near-instantaneous information worldwide. This affects national and world opinion. The Army must learn to operate effectively in this environment to support its forces and military operations.

Headquarters, Department of the Army has established an IO triad consisting of the offices of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT), and the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications and Computers (DISC4). The triad receives direction from the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff. It ensures unity of effort among the three IO components.

Within the triad, DCSOPS-the overall focal pointcoordinates, integrates, provides resources for and prioritizes information operations in the Army. The DCSOPS ensures the adequacy of the organizing, training and equipping of the Army in the field to conduct information operations.

The DCSINT is responsible for ensuring the intelligence community provides timely support to IO with relevant information and intelligence. This requires change-now intelligence personnel must not only process intelligence from traditional sources, but also information from nontraditional sources such as the Internet.

The DISC4, the Army's chief information officer, is the focal point for C2-protection and information systems. Today, the threat to Army information systems from foreign governments, criminal organizations and hackers is growing at an alarming rate. With the Army increasingly relying on the Internet, the impact of hacker activity and attempted intrusions into its information systems has increased drastically. The DISC4 oversees the newly established Army Computer Emergency Response Team (ACERT) which reacts to such activities. His staff has also developed a C2-protect library that outlines the Army's policy for protecting its IO systems. (This library is available for downloading from the DISC4 home page at http://www.army.mil/disc4/isec/isec.htm.)

Today, the weakest link in the C2-protect program is education and training of system administrators and users. To overcome this deficit, the Army is using training from a variety of sources until formal Army courses are established. A complete listing of these courses is also on the DISC4 home page. Even without formal training, individual computer users (that is, every soldier in the digitized force of Army XXI) can take steps to help win the information war. Protecting passwords, using a virus check before downloading files and not leaving computers on while unattended will dramatically increase the level of security. There are also C2-protect tools that enhance system security. They are available from the Defense Information Systems Agency (telephone, 1-800-357-4231 or DSN 327-4700).

The commander of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., is the information operations proponent for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and is responsible for developing IO doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel and soldier-focused issues. With the publication of FM 100-6, CAC's next task is the development of IO tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP). The information operations TTP manual now under development will describe how to plan and execute IO at the corps and division levels. The commander of the Combined Arms Center is also incorporating IO into various school curriculums and exercises such as the battle command training program for divisions and the Prairie Warrior Exercise for Command and General Staff College students.

An organization critical to information operations in the Army is the Land Information Warfare Activity at Fort Belvoir, Va. It provides assistance to commanders in the field through field support teams, which augment their staffs for IO. Field support teams provide commanders with specialized technical expertise. The teams coordinate, plan and synchronize the various elements of information operations to facilitate their execution during military operations. They also advise commanders on the C^sup 2^-attack and C^sup 2^-protect aspects of such operations. For example, a team assisted U.S. Army Europe in developing the C^sup 2^-protect plan for Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia. Land Information Warfare Activity field support teams continue to work with various headquarters during major exercises and contingencies.

The activity also has responsibility for helping identify vulnerabilities in information systems and networks. Its teams do this by characterizing threat capabilities (or "red teaming") and simulating enemy attacks. A Land Information Warfare Activity team will be conducting this type of operation at the National Training Center during the Force XXI advanced warfighting experiment for the digitized task force.

The activity's newest mission is the establishment of the Army's Computer Emergency Response Team, which is developing the capability to respond to Army computer intrusions or attacks for secure and nonsecure networks. Its reaction to such an incident will be to identify the problem, establish control, repair system damage and coordinate counterintelligence or law enforcement support. The response team will also assist in reducing vulnerabilities by providing hardware, software, training and standing operating procedures to fend off foreign intelligence operatives, saboteurs, terrorists, hackers, disgruntled employees or others who attempt to penetrate Army Cz systems. The ACERT coordinates closely with and is supervised by the DISC4. (ACERT telephone numbers are 1-888-203-6332 or DSN 235-1113.)

To integrate IO into the Army, Chief of Staff Gen. Dennis J. Reimer has directed that a campaign plan be drafted and implemented to provide for the incorporation, synchronization and execution of IO throughout the force. Its primary thrusts are institutionalizing IO through training and education; making IO viable within the Army by employing Headquarters, Department of the Army staff elements and the Land Information Warfare Activity to help warfighting organizations meet immediate operational missions and threats; and developing a funding strategy for IO research, development and acquisition initiatives for C^sup 2^-protect and C^sup 2^-attack systems.

While the campaign plan addresses long-term tO objectives and supports Joint Vision 2010, its immediate focus is on essential tasks that must be accomplished during the next 12 months. This near-term focus will be on enhancing C^sup 2^-protection skills and competencies while increasing the general awareness of IO throughout the Army. The plan identifies lead agencies for a wide variety of tasks and establishes specific milestones for their accomplishment. Ultimately, the information operations campaign plan will affect every soldier in the Army.

In the recently published Army Vision 2010 pamphlet, Gen. Reimer emphasized that gaining information dominance through information operations will be the key factor in 21st century operations. The future of IO will be further outlined in an upcoming brochure cosigned by the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, which will capture how the Army will conduct knowledge-based operations in the 21st century. It will also describe the steps the Army will take to fully integrate IO throughout the force.

Developing leaders and soldiers with the requisite skills to conduct IO in the future will take time and resources. The Army already has individuals trained in the IO disciplines of psychological operations and electronic warfare, but few have any background or training in the broad concept of information operations. There are, however, several aspects of IO, such as C^sup 2^-protect, in which everyone can start to become proficient.

Commanders can start incorporating information operations by having their staffs familiarize themselves with FM 100-6. They can also ask the following: Does a corps, division or task force-sized unit need an ad hoc IO cell? How does the unit integrate IO into contingency plans and exercises? Is there training to which a commander can send system administrators to enhance their knowledge of network security measures? The Army must address these issues to raise the overall level of understanding and to help increase its C^sup 2^-protect posture.

Today's battlefield has been profoundly changed by the technology revolution. The Army's ability to gather, process, disseminate and use information is critical to its success. At the same time, protecting its own information and systems while adversely affecting an adversary's allows it to gain information dominance as needed. As Gen. Reimer said, "Victorious military operations demand the successful conduct of IO. There are few greater challenges facing us today or in the future."

MAJ. GEN. DAVID L. GRANGE is director of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. LT. COL. JAMES A. KELLEY is assigned to the Information Operations Division in the Office of the DCSOPS.

Copyright Association of the United States Army Mar 1997
Provided by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights Reserved

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