Speed and Power: Complements, Not Substitutes

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld wants to radically restructure the U.S. military, particularly the Army, to put even more emphasis on the speed of strategic deployment. Under the so-called "10-30-30 plan," major forces must be capable of deploying to a distant theater in 10 days, defeating an enemy within 30 days and then be ready for redeployment to a new battle somewhere else within another 30 days. This is a much more ambitious goal than the previous standard of being able to deploy a corps-sized force of up to five divisions in 30 days.

Yet at a time when 20,000 American soldiers have been told they are needed in Iraq for up to three months beyond their initial one year deployment, there is a serious question of whether the 10-30-30 objective matches the real world. One is reminded of Karl von Clausewitz' distinction between "ideal" war, which is dominated entirely by operational considerations taken to the extreme, and wars as actually fought, bounded by politics and subject to "friction." The Iraq campaign has shown an abundance of both politics and friction.

It is not clear that higher speeds of strategic deployment are necessary beyond the occasional raid or evacuation operation conducted by special operations units, airborne forces or the Marines. The kind of major crisis that would lead to the commitment of corps-sized American forces does not materialize out of the blue, nor do the diplomatic foundations for large-scale intervention fall into place overnight. Though some chafe under these delays-especially when the pursuit of a peaceful resolution appears futileplanners should welcome the chance to better prepare for an impending test of arms and its aftermath.

The most telling example of the superior speed of military deployment compared to diplomatic preparation was the arrival of a fleet of ships carrying the heavy equipment of the 4th Infantry Division (4ID) (Mechanized) off the coast of Turkey well before the process of obtaining Ankara's permission to unload had reached its disappointing climax. This diplomatic failure on the eve of the Iraq War prevented the opening of a major offensive on the northern front aimed at pacifying the Sunni areas and blocking the Syrian border. The too rapid initial deployment of the 4ID, one of the most technically advanced units in the Army and a test bed for new tactics and doctrine, kept the division out of the fight until it could be redeployed to the Persian Gulf.

Both the Gulf and Iraq wars have shown a two-step process involving military and diplomatic maneuvers. In the early stages, American air-transportable troops, prepositioned equipment, and Marine amphibious unitsbacked by airpower-are rapidly deployed to put down political markers. This first wave is not strong enough to fight a decisive campaign, but it does show national resolve and puts muscle behind diplomacy. As the situation deteriorates, diplomacy shifts to building military coalitions and securing local bases for the deployment of heavy units needed to fight and win the war. Because America's superior strength is known to its adversaries, Washington is able to maintain the initiative and thus control the time when large scale military action will commence, which ought not to be until adequate forces are deployed to prevail.

The speed that counts is in the conduct of operations once forces are in the theater. Two centuries ago, Napoleon argued that to wage war "energetically and with severity" is the only way to "make it shorter." It takes an army with adequate strength and a solid operational plan, however, to actually pull off such a campaign in any era. Speed is an important capability, but not a magic bullet that can substitute for everything else, especially if other important capabilities such as combat power, logistics and unit depth are sacrificed to attain mere speed.

Great strides have been made in the rapid strategic deployment of heavy units through prepositioning of equipment and forward basing. One of the goals set forth in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was reorienting the global posture of U.S. forces so as "to render forward forces capable of swiftly defeating an adversary's military and political objectives with only modest reinforcement." The QDR did recognize that in some cases "decisively defeating an adversary would likely require substantial reinforcement." More can be done by building fast sea transports to hurry the movement of reinforcements into or between theaters. To reach the pace Rumsfeld has called for, however, would require both a large increase in the procurement of air transports, a much more expensive option than sea transports, and the creation of ground forces that are much lighter in arms and armor so as to be air-transportable. This would inevitably lead to a trade-off of combat power for deployment speed at the cost of huge sums that could be spent on other defense projects.

The notion advanced by advocates of a lighter Army is that producing "chaos" on the battlefield through "agility" is the way to overcome large, heavily armed foes with a dedication to fighting. Asian foes, reportedly an important focus of the new Pentagon planning, are not assumed to be as fragile and inept as the Iraqis. In such an environment, small, lightly armed American troops could suffer high casualties and even an early defeat. The opening phase of the Korean War, when inadequately armed infantry ("light" not from design, but from neglect) were thrown into the path of tank-supported assault troops, was not encouraging.

When Turkey denied access to the 4th Infantry Division, the 173rd Airborne Brigade was parachuted into Iraq to open a northern front. Though crack troops with air support, this light unit had a rough go of it because it lacked integral armor, adequate artillery and sufficient numbers. The offensive got moving after Ml Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles from the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) were flown into captured airfields by C-17 cargo planes to reinforce the paratroopers two weeks after their dramatic airdrop.

Much can be done to improve the readiness and capabilities of units earmarked for rapid deployment. This is the proper role of the Future Combat System (PCS), to strengthen the combat power of light forces. However, vehicles whose primary design parameter is that they be small enough to fit inside a C-130 transport plane cannot be reasonably expected to substitute for the heavy forces that will continue to be needed to win the decisive battles that take the war into the heartland of the enemy.

Converting one-third of the active force, 15 brigade-size units of action, to the FCS and related systems would cost an estimated $92 billion.

Recently, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker told Defense News, "The current force we have today, the heavy force, for instance, is still going to be around in this Army out to 2030-Ml tanks, Bradleys and all the rest of them." New technologies, including those developed for the PCS, can and should be used to upgrade the Army's heavy units, which are unmatched in combat power by any other military on the planet.

The doctrine of regime change has been a major contribution to strategic policy by secretary Rumsfeld. To fulfill this objective, however, requires a lengthy postwar commitment of troops, including heavy combat units. The "10-30-30" emphasis on getting out fast is even more illusionary than the desire to intervene fast. Failure to adequately prepare for the rigors of occupation in Iraq is at the core of the low-level conflict that had been building into the insurrection that broke out in April. By attacking lightly armed and armored patrols and supply convoys, militants were able to engage American infantry and paratroopers on more equal terms in hitand-run gun battles.

Creating a new regime requires a variety of security forces, including special operations forces, police/paramilitary/infantry units and hard-hitting mechanized forces. Central Command's Gen. John Abizaid has recognized this last requirement and wants two heavy brigades as a mobile strike force in Iraq. The 1st Armored Division has been playing this role, giving the Marines valuable support. This penultimate heavy division and the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment are the main units being kept in Iraq beyond their scheduled withdrawal.

This leaves the third element, the need for units to be ready to fight again in 30 days. It seems the demand for this stressful goal is to make up for the failure to reconstitute the force levels cut during the 1990s. At the end of the Cold War, then Defense secretary Dick Cheney stated that 14 Army divisions was the "irreducible minimum" requirement. The Army was reduced to only 10 divisions during the Clinton Administration. The last time the Army had only 10 divisions was before the Korean War. Regular, Reserve and National Guard units are already being pushed beyond their design limits. The proper response is to expand the number of troops that can be deployed in accordance with America's global responsibilities, with a balanced force-that is capable of dealing with the variety of contingencies a turbulent world is likely to produce. There is substantial Congressional interest in rebuilding Army force levels, but secretary Rumsfeld has opposed making an expansion of the ground forces part of his "10-30-30" program.

WiLLMM R. HAWKINS is senior fellow for National security Studies at the U.S. Business and Industry Council, Washington, D.C.

Copyright Association of the United States Army Jun 2004
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