Whitman sampler: how a national GOP star barely survived a difficult re-election challenge for governor - New Jersey Gov. Christine Todd Whitman almost loses to neophyte Democrat Jim McGreevey - Grand Old Party

Democrat Jim McGreevey, a virtually unknown 40-year-old small-town mayor and first-term state senator, came within 22,000 votes - out of 2.4 million cast - of unseating Gov. Christine Todd Whitman of New Jersey.

How did this obscure Mayor of Woodbridge give such a glowing national GOP star the fight of her political life?

Through a well-orchestrated, well-disciplined media strategy, McGreevey effectively framed his message around two quintessential middle-class issues that the patrician Whitman had neglected during her first term - soaring auto insurance rates and property taxes. And, in doing so, McGreevey transformed himself into a middle-class populist champion sensitive to the needs of the working family.

Whitman responded slowly to McGreevey's charges that she was uncaring in her handling of New Jersey's steep auto insurance rates. And by the time she was forced to grapple with this increasingly potent issue, her young challenger, with his razor-sharp focus on rolling back rates, had eaten into her early lead. Steady attacks leveled against Whitman's auto insurance policies gradually began to overshadow the celebrated 30 percent income tax cut that she had delivered during her early days in the governor's mansion.

Through a simple, well-defined comparative message, the McGreevey camp succeeded, early on, in blunting the advantage of Whitman's deep income tax cut. In fact, McGreevey controlled the campaign dialogue to such an extent that Whitman's own message, by default, became a passive response to McGreevey's proposals to reduce New Jersey's ballooning car-insurance rates and property taxes, both of which, carried the ignoble distinction of being the highest in the nation.

Of course, McGreevey needed big issues to make a race of it. A poll taken in February '97 by Quinnipiac College placed Whitman ahead of the suburban mayor, 58-22 percent. At the time, McGreevey was also polling a mere three points in the Democratic primary.

By early March, polls gave Whitman a 52 percent positive job rating, a 44 percent negative rating and a re-elect of 39 percent. At that time, her lead over McGreevy had narrowed but was still a healthy 53-30 percent. The Democrat who polled the best against her was Cong. Rob Andrews, but he lost the primary to McGreevey's last-minute surge.

It would be an uphill climb to topple Whitman. To do it, McGreevey assembled a professional campaign team that included Struble, Oppel and Donovan; Message & Media; and Penn + Schoen, the polling firm that worked for President Clinton's re-election.

Whitman also had an experienced consultant team in her corner that included Murphy, Pintak, Gauthier - the media firm that handled her '93 win - and The Tarrance Group for polling.

Back at the Trough

Political analysts frequently refer to New Jersey as a traditional "trough" state. That is, a state in which incumbents must continuously "feed" voters with economic benefits. Garden State voters are known for their propensity to elect candidates based on their ability to deliver. They're often split down the middle in hotly contested partisan battles.

In '81, moderate Republican Tom Kean defeated Democrat Jim Florio by 1,797 votes out of 2.4 million cast. The battle, and the recount, was bitter and bloody. Florio came back eight years later and won the governorship.

In '90, a little known local official named Christine Todd Whitman took on two-term U.S. Senator and "good government" icon Bill Bradley in a race that pundits handicapped as an easy incumbent win. Though Bradley started far ahead in the polls, and massively outspent Whitman, $12 million to $900,000, he won with a disappointingly thin 50.4 percent of the vote.

In '93, Whitman defeated then-incumbent Gov. Florio by a slim 26,000 votes, roughly 1 percent of the 2.5 million total. That year, her campaign message centered on Florio breaking a no-new-taxes promise. Whitman offered a 30 percent income tax reduction - a $1.2 billion cut that was crafted with the help of publisher Steve Forbes - and voters ate it up.

This time, McGreevey followed Whitman's formula for success by promoting a rollback in auto insurance rates and property taxes.

According to GOP consultant Mark Campbell, the McGreevey campaign recognized the nature of the New Jersey voter and capitalized on it. "They ran a classic 'what have you done for me lately' campaign,'" he explained. "Although Whitman had a very productive first term and did some remarkable things, the voters asked what's next? What have you done for me lately?"

The centerpiece of McGreevey's platform was an immediate 10 percent across-the-board cut in auto insurance premiums. He also called for an elected (not appointed) state insurance commissioner, and, in populist keeping, proposed the appointment of a public advocate to represent consumers.

Whitman's insurance plan, which had failed to gain legislative approval, tied a 25 percent rate reduction to consumers waiving their right to sue for accident "pain and suffering."

Despite her efforts to soften the insurance issue, polls showed that it continued to be a big drain on Whitman. A Mason-Dixon/PMR survey conducted two months before election day revealed that 41 percent of voters favored McGreevey's insurance plan, while 32 percent favored Whitman's proposal.

A New York Times/CBS News poll around the same time gave Whitman an anemic 17 percent approval rating on the issue with a whopping 67 percent disapproval. Her numbers on property taxes, which had skyrocketed after the income tax cut, weren't much better: 24 percent approval/53 percent disapproval.

McGreevey repeatedly attacked Whitman for the 11 insurance-rate hikes approved during her four-year term - a hard hit given the saliency of the issue. "We really hurt her on auto insurance," said McGreevey consultant Karl Struble. "We made it the defining issue of the campaign."

Republican Campbell agrees that the focus on insurance was a direct hit. "It was a very good challenger issue," he said. "It's always easier to focus on things that people are unhappy about."

Media Strategy

Both candidates realized that winning the election, in large part, hinged on appealing to the state's large block of independent, nonaligned voters - a constituency that is notoriously late in deciding. To this end, both McGreevey and Whitman had planned to save resources for the final push - an 11th-hour media blitz, as well as an aggressive get-out-the-vote drive.

This late-spending strategy held up for Whitman, who along with other New Jersey GOP candidates, enjoyed some $3 million in party committee largesse for campaign ads. The RNC alone put up $750,000. McGreevey was not as fortunate as his party could only muster up $100,000.

When Whitman kicked off her general election media campaign (she had done extensive advertising before the primaries earlier in the year) she did it on a positive note, touting her accomplishments. Her ads, however, seemed to have little impact on her standing. Her trial heat numbers hovered in the mid-40 percent range for months.

After opening positive, Whitman then aired an ad that portrayed the still undefined McGreevey as a traditional tax-and-spend liberal who supported then-Governor Jim Florio's $2.8 billion tax increase. But it fell short of the all-out multi-media attack that some Democrats feared would effectively "take out" McGreevey as a contender before he could even make his case.

It was McGreevey who kept Whitman on the defensive throughout most of the campaign, effectively neutralizing many of her advantages, which included her handling of the income tax cut, economic development, education and crime. He argued that Whitman's deep income tax cuts were nullified by sky-high property taxes and made the point that she was forced into a "fiscally irresponsible" $2.8 billion pension bond sale to compensate for her earlier tax slashing.

McGreevey and his media team defined a comparative message that translated into a rising sentiment that he cared about "people like me."

"Our message defined clear differences between the two candidates," Struble said. "And differences are what all campaigns are about."

Even though McGreevey was successful in drawing issue distinctions between himself and his opponent, his campaign never entirely succeeded in portraying McGreevey as a credible governor. As late as October, two-thirds of New Jersey voters had no particular impression of him. Campaign insiders say a lack of money was to blame for that apparent communications gap.

Complicating the equation for Whitman, though, was the abortion issue. Her strong pro-choice position, her distaste for the power held by the Religious Right in her party's organizational structure and her opposition to a ban on late-term abortions had angered social conservatives to a boil. Some openly bolted the GOP to support other candidates, particularly pro-life Libertarian Martin Sabrin and, to a lesser extent Conservative Richard Pezzullo.

The movement of thousands of Republican-leaning voters between Whitman, Sabrin and the undecided column during the closing weeks of the election were critical to the eventual outcome. National pro-lifers such as Dan Quayle, Gong. John Kasich (R-OH) and Sen. Rick Santorum (R-PA) were brought in to help Whitman rally the GOP faithful.

Though Whitman's moderate social policies turned off her party's right wing, her loss was offset to some extent by her appealing to some swing voters who normally voted Democratic.

Mea Culpa

A New York Post/Zogby poll conducted Oct. 8-9 showed McGreevey within four points of Whitman, 39-35, with 22 percent undecided.

Whitman's standing had weakened to the point that she was forced to do what other embattled incumbents have resorted to over the years: a "Mea Culpa" spot. "I am proud of what we have done together," she said in the ad. "But I know there is more to do. You have sent me a message - auto insurance and property taxes cost too much and people are hurting. I've heard you loud and clear."

According to Struble, the "Mea Culpa" ad backfired on Whitman because it reinforced McGreevey's message and almost pushed the Democrats through to victory.

As the race wound down to the nerve-wracking last days before voters went to the polls, it became a nightmare for pundits, pollsters and election prognosticators. Televised pundits such as Mark Shields, Bob Novak and Paul Gigot called it for McGreevey, while Kate O'Berne, Eleanor Clift and Tim Russert projected a GOP win.

The Political Oddsmaker, the online elections handicapping service provided by Campaigns & Elections magazine, had the race even over the weekend before election day but then tilted a tiny advantage to Whitman on Monday, its last posting of odds. The final Oddsmaker gave Whitman a 50 percent chance of winning and McGreevey an 18:17 shot (a 48.6 percent chance).

Polls showed it close, too, though to differing degrees. Mason-Dixon/PMR (Oct. 27-29) had Whitman ahead by three points; The New York Times/CBS poll (Oct. 25-29) gave the incumbent a larger 11 point lead; the Newark Star-Ledger showed Whitman on top by an even bigger 14 points; the Zogby International Tracking poll (Oct. 21-Nov. 2) had the incumbent two points ahead of her challenger.

Turnout would be vital. Both sides invested considerable resources in get-out-the-vote drives. Whitman's campaign, along with local GOP committees, sponsored a grassroots mobilization that put thousands of volunteers to work. McGreevey was helped mightily by an extensive effort led by organized labor that included phones, mail, neighborhood canvassing and poll workers.

In the end, Whitman held off McGreevey 47-46 percent, winning 1,107,225 votes to McGreevey's 1,085,639 and Sabrin's 111,727. It was a photo-finish win, but it was still a win.

An exit poll conducted by Voter News Service revealed that McGreevey drew strong support from voters who were frustrated by Whitman's failure to control soaring insurance rates. As many as nine in 10 voters identified auto insurance as "important" in making their choice for governor.

McGreevey received 83 percent of the black vote - which comprised 10 percent of the total. That was eight points higher than Florio's vote in '93.

Whitman had received 46 percent of her votes from women in '93. In '97, it jumped to 52 percent.

Though they didn't quite make it, McGreevey's campaign team was happy they had come so far. "Campaigns like ours that are patient, set their strategy early and stay disciplined on their message are ultimately rewarded," Struble summed up. "We controlled the dialogue of the campaign and consequently almost won a race we had no business being in."

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