Vote Earley - and often: five critical decisions that led to the landslide election of a GOP attorney general in the old dominion - election of Mark Earley as Virginia Attorney General

Five Critical Decisions that Led to the Landslide Election of a GOP Attorney General in the Old Dominion

When Mark Earley received the endorsement of both the liberal-leaning Washington Post and the conservative-leaning Washington Times - on the same day even the most myopic of political observers knew something was definitely up. After all, Republican Earley had already been endorsed by Pat Robertson and the Virginia President of the NAACP.

Earley, who had served 10 years in the Virginia state Senate, simply refused to play by the long-established rules of Virginia politics. A social conservative with a strong independent streak, drew support - and opposition - from the unlikeliest quarters.

A hero to Virginia's pro-lifers and religious conservatives, Earley had won the GOP primary against three well-funded opponents, including Paula Jones' attorney Gil Davis.

While Davis and two other Republicans spent heavily on television, Earley built a massive grassroots organization and relied exclusively on direct mail and Christian radio, winning by an unexpectedly large margin. Although our firm had been brought into the campaign primarily to handle electronic media, we concurred with the mail-only strategy due to the projected low primary turnout.

Democratic Attorney General nominee Bill Dolan, who did not have primary opposition, used his funding advantage to immediately launch a general election radio campaign against Earley, accusing him of extreme views on abortion. In what would prove to be Critical Decision Number One, strategy consultant and lead fundraiser Guy Rodgers argued that we should ride out Dolan's attack and concentrate on fundraising.

Not answering a charge in the medium in which the charge is made can court disaster. In Earley's case, the risk paid off, thanks to the groundwork laid by Earley's lead consultant, Anne Kincaid. Kincaid had correctly predicted that Dolan would attack immediately and had assiduously worked the press corps in advance, stressing Earley's established record in the Senate. The press largely dismissed Dolan's attacks on Earley's alleged "extremism," with several papers editorially excoriating Dolan for taking the low road so early.

Immediately, our campaign was confronted with an unusual dilemma: Farley had gone from perceived underdog in the primary to perceived frontrunner in the general election. Ironically, neither was true.

Dolan had run for Attorney General four years earlier; he had name identification and a fundraising base. Earley had never run statewide and was being frozen out of the Richmond "Main Street" money. This problem would plague us through the late summer and early fall.

In July, Jim McLaughlin would join the team as pollster, a move which proved vitally important at a later juncture. Earley had not spent a dime on survey research in the primary and had beaten all the candidates who did. He was a tough sell when it came to spending hard-earned dollars on polls.

Still, there were things we needed to know. Clearly, an abortion attack was coming and we needed, I believed, to use it as springboard to counter-punch.

McLaughlin was convinced we would win by being the "tough-on-crime Republican," believing that if abortion was the sole issue, we would lose. In the end, we were both partly right, although neither strategy might have worked alone.

McLaughlin exhibited a gratifying flexibility when confronted with our firm's obsession with choice-model polling techniques. The creative tension illuminated a very clear path to victory. Testing Dolan's attacks and our responses in a choice-model format proved to be Critical Decision Number Two.

We found we could confront Dolan's expected abortion attack head-on with one of two responses, both of which produced sizable majorities and left respondents questioning Dolan's fairness and truthfulness. We also found that simply being a Republican was a major advantage. Some in the campaign believed it would be foolhardy for Dolan to trot out the time-weary "abortion extremism" attack.

McLaughlin believed Dolan's only credible avenue of attack was to invent an ethics charge of some sort, which Dolan did, in fact, attempt to do by linking Earley to a bill in the Senate which Dolan claimed gave special consideration to Pat Robertson. Once again, Earley's reputation and Kincaid's skillful press inoculation saved us from having to expend media dollars defending against these charges.

Critical Decision Number Three occurred halfway through September. McLaughlin strongly pressed for an early television buy, despite our lack of resources and earlier decision to run a counter-punching campaign. McLaughlin argued that we would not only be building our name identification (which remained low), but that we might well recover whatever we spent through improved fundraising once we were on the air.

I proposed that we try to engage the other two statewide Republican candidates (for governor and It. governor) in a joint 30-second TV spot, composed essentially of three 10s. I produced a 10-second ad that featured a clip of popular Republican Governor George Allen commending Earley at a rally, followed by his crime proposal for "Adult Time for Adult Crime" and banning parole. The spot closed with a shot of Earley holding his small son, Frankie.

Anne Kincaid went to work on our ticketmates, miraculously securing a $60,000 pledge from each. Gubernatorial candidate Jim Gilmore's media consultants joined the three 10's into a 30 and, with the combined total of $180,000, we went on the air. With less than half of the buy expended, Gilmore opted out and we were faced with a decision to either put more money into our solo 10, or write off the initial $30,000 as essentially wasted. We chose the former, concentrating on the Richmond and Norfolk markets - and immediately began to see an improvement in our fundraising.

McLaughlin's gamble had paid off - and we were in the game. Soon, we had enough money to run a 30-second version of our 10, which we bought, expanding into Roanoke and Southside Virginia. Too late, Dolan went on the air with a law enforcement spot of his own. Apparently, assuming we would never buy television in his Northern Virginia base, Dolan pulled his expensive Washington, DC-area media buys. We bought metro Washington just as the avails ran out, in what would prove to be a huge tactical success. Meanwhile, our candidate was running his own personal campaign among a normally Democratic constituency....

Critical Decision Number Four was one the candidate matte over 15 years earlier. It was '82, halfway through Reagan's first term. There weren't many white Southern Republicans joining the NAACP. But that's what Mark Earley did. Now, in '97, Earley's genuine commitment to racial reconciliation was opening doors usually closed to Republicans. Every Sunday, Earley was invited to large black congregations across the state. And every Sunday, he went, refusing to let the campaign schedule any conflicting events.

On election night, Mark Earley broke down barriers that had stood since Reconstruction. In area after area, Earley significantly scored better than any Republican had ever scored among African-American voters, contributing to the largest Republican winning percentage (58) for an Attorney General in Virginia history, and leading the ticket in the Republican party's first sweep of all statewide offices on the ballot.

The End Game

We had expected a savage abortion attack act from the opposition. We were even reasonably certain what it would be, since Dolan's media consultant had been unable to contain himself on a talk show several weeks earlier. The ad would focus on a pro-life rally held in the Shenandoah Valley which local sponsors had given the unfortunate name "Field of Blood." The event featured a hillside on which hundreds of small crosses were placed, representing the lives of children whose lives were lost to abortion.

We had thoroughly researched the event, at which Earley had indeed spoken, along with dozens of other pro-life church and community leaders. We knew there were no photos, tape recordings or troublesome quotes from the event, so it seemed obvious the sort of ad we would be facing.

Dolan's "Field of Blood" TV ad was privately screened for at least one reporter who described it in an article before it actually aired. We now felt confident enough to cut a response, even though we had never actually seen it. The Dolan camp's leaks and exuberance gave us all we needed.

Critical Decision Number Five was to put Mark Earley directly on the air, responding to the charges. based upon polling data developed by our campaign, Kincaid had encouraged the Gilmore campaign to employ the same tactic earlier when Gilmore's Democratic opponent had tried to play the abortion card. Gilmore's rebuttal was the turning point in the Governor's race.

Virginians have a strong sense of personal honor and fair play. Mark Earley went on the air, looked into the camera and spoke directly to Bill Dolan. In essence, he "called him out." In such a situation, Dolan needed to respond personally, on the air. He didn't, and every day the Earley spot ran against "Field of Blood," Dolan's support among middle-ground voters eroded. Earley carried 40 percent of self-identified "pro-choice" voters.

Counting the Votes

At the end, as is so often the case, our fundraising caught fire, as Rodgers' efforts began to pay off. During the eight weeks after Labor Day, Earley raised $800,000, more than he had raised in the first eight months of the year.

It was Rodgers' view that Earley's broad-based victory was due to a willingness on the part of voters to support "pro-family conservatives who defy liberal stereotypes both through their temperament and through their record." He said that voters had become "weary of a demonizing strategy that seems to be the only play in many Democrat playbooks."

Kincaid, who earned her spurs in the pro-life movement, correctly recognized that in a democratic system, it's necessary to change hearts and minds before one can change laws. Both she and Earley have articulated a pro-life agenda that recognizes the realities of politics. Accordingly, the Earley campaign shifted the debate's focus to partial-birth abortion and parental notification, where the "pro choice" Democrats were woefully at odds with voters.

And while pro-choice Gov. Christine Whitman's near-death re-election experience in New Jersey left her state's GOP coalition in tatters, Earley enjoyed the strong support of all wings of the Virginia GOP.

Without retreating an inch from his pro-life beliefs, Mark Earley successfully defined the parameters of the political debate. That's an important lesson for pro-life Republicans across the nation for '98.

Wayne Johnson is president of Wayne C. Johnson & Associates, Inc., a California-based media company. Johnson also serves on the Board of Directors of both the American and International Associations of Political Consultants.

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