Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War

Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War. By Norman Friedman. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2003. 360 pages. $29.95.

Norman Friedman has written an excellent book that seamlessly moves across the three topics that his title advertises. His analysis begins with an account of the 9/11 attacks and the events leading up to and following that terrible day. I was reluctant to rehash these events in reading Chapter 1, and many Americans, intimately acquainted with 9/11, may feel the same way. However, the first chapter was a very engaging read, pulling the reader into familiar events and illuminating many aspects of the attacks and their aftermath with which readers may be unfamiliar. The next chapters, recounting the recent history of terrorism and the American response, were especially interesting, as the release of the book was in time for controversial testimony to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9-11 Commission). Friedman covers systemic problems in the national counterterrorism apparatus and is particularly critical of the restrained response of the Clinton Administration during the 1990s.

After his discussion of terrorism, Friedman transitions to an exposition on Afghanistan. This section of the book is also compelling and well-researched, describing the Taliban regime as a "terrorist-sponsored state" that was essentially ruled by Osama bin Laden. These chapters reveal the large number of foreign terrorists and the significant degree to which they influenced the internal workings of Afghanistan. This sets up nicely for a transition to the war in Afghanistan, where Friedman describes a much more active and instrumental role of al Qaeda Arabs in the Taliban resistance than many Americans might realize.

The final portion of the book covers in detail the last item in the title series: a new American way of war. The book, written shortly before the American invasion of Iraq, makes some incorrect predictions about similarities between Afghanistan and Iraq. Friedman's observations nonetheless provide valuable insights into modern warfare as exemplified by Operation Enduring Freedom. Several themes emerge. First, coalition warfare is of extraordinary significance to augment the limitations of power projection. The coalition forces to which the author alludes are not our British and Australian allies (although he describes these as well), but more significantly the indigenous military forces that joined the fight, specifically the Northern Alliance. Second, naval platforms provide mobile bases for reconnaissance and air support, although there are serious logistical complications that follow. This point is significant on a political level because it reduces the possibility that neighboring countries can have veto power over the campaign. Friedman writes that this maritime access was "probably decisive" in Afghanistan. Third, network-centric warfare and precision munitions were dramatically successful (indeed, this is a major similarity with the Iraq war). Finally, Dr. Friedman is sympathetic to the "neo-cons" of the Bush Administration, arguing the central benefits of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to the war on terrorism. (And he presciently did not emphasize the presence of weapons of mass destruction.)

While the book has many strengths as a whole, there are some flaws. At some points, the author relied on secondary sources even when making controversial or unexpected claims. An example of this was connecting Iraq to 9/11 by pointing out that the Iraqi military went on high alert immediately before 11 September. If this is true, deeper inquiry into the source and more analysis should be provided; if it is unreliable, then it should be omitted. There are other examples of this pattern. More problematic is a reference to a "secret study" in June 2001 that has no endnote, leaving the reader uncertain whether it is a government (presumably American CIA or military) study, whether the classification is secret or the study was conducted covertly (or both), and how the author knows of the study (firsthand or secondhand) to indicate whether it is a trustworthy assertion (presumably the author trusts it since he includes it). Finally, the book suffers from some editorial oversights and typographical errors, including a reference to the ejection of "UN weapons inspectors in 1988," instead of the correct year, 1998.

Overall, I recommend the book to senior members of the national defense community. The flaws mentioned above are minor details, and these slight imperfections are outweighed by a very strong and well-written analysis that contributes in a timely way to our ongoing professional forum on the war on terrorism.

Reviewed by Captain Matthew J. Morgan, Fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society.

COPYRIGHT 2004 U.S. Army War College
COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group