Light, Lean, and Lethal

Richard M. Bereit

Logistics Lessons from the Little Bighorn

In this country ... no man need fail in life if determined to succeed....

Major General George A. Custer

Custer's Last Stand

On 25 June 1876,211 Americans (soldiers, scouts, journalists, and contractors) were struck down near the Little Bighorn River. Every soldier under Lieutenant Colonel Custer's (Brevet Major General George Armstrong) direct command was killed, a rare occurrence in US military history. What went wrong? What impact did logistics have on shaping the battlefield and forces? And most important, what are the lessons that would prevent American forces from suffering such a defeat again?

A Young but Proven Leader

Custer's own credentials were impeccable. He was a West Point graduate, a superb cavalry officer, and the youngest soldier to be made a brevet brigadier general in the history of the US military. [1] When promoted to brevet major general, he was the youngest American to ever hold that rank. [2] Military historians rank Custer below only General Philip H. Sheridan and Major General Alfred Pleasonton as an American cavalry tactician and field commander. [3] Custer was schooled and experienced, and he understood the importance of logistics. He was also notorious for his willingness to attack a larger force. [4] On the last and most critical day of the Gettysburg campaign, Major General George G. Meade's army stopped Major General George E. Pickett's charge at the center-front of the line. It was Custer's (age 23 and recently promoted to brevet brigadier general) Michigan Cavalry that repulsed the cavalry attack by Major General J. E. B. Stuart's Invincibles at the Union rear. [5] In the final days of the war, Custer's cavalry rushed to Appomattox Station to capture four Confederate supply trains, which Lee desperately needed. Cut off from both his supplies and his means of escape, Lee surrendered. [6]

Pursuing an Elusive Enemy

As Custer headed up the Rosebud River on 22 June 1876, his soldiers and packtrain carried supplies for a 15-day march. His orders were to march to the headwaters of the Rosebud, looking for the main Sioux camp. Each man carried 100 rounds of ammunition for his carbine and 24 rounds for his pistol. [7] Brigadier General Alfred H. Terry's (Major General) and Colonel John Gibbon's (Brigadier General) forces were to travel aboard the riverboat Far West up the Yellowstone and Bighom Rivers, as far as water depth would allow. The combined forces of Gibbon and Terry, moving by river from the north, were to link up with Custer's force, coming overland from the south, thus trapping the Sioux between them. [8]

Based on Custer's own estimate of distance and speed of 25-30 miles per day, the rendezvous was to be made on 26 June. However, on the 24th, Custer increased the normal rate of march to 40 miles by traveling most of the night and early morning. [9] Consequently, he reached the headwaters of the Rosebud at around 3:15 a.m. on the 25th. This accelerated pace left horse and soldier tired and hungry. After only a short rest, he continued another 12 miles that same day. [10] Custer's scouts had sighted campfires from a very large Indian village, approximately 14 miles to the north on the west bank of the Little Bighom River. He knew he was closing in on his prey but was not convinced this was the main village. [11]

At this point, he divided his force into four components. Three troops (125 men) under Captain Frederick W. Benteen (Brevet Brigadier General) were sent northwest at a 45 degree angle to scout for Indians to the west of the Little Bighorn River and provide defense on the left flank. Major Marcus A. Reno (Brevet Brigadier General) with three troops (140 men) was sent up the center to attack the village from the south. [12] Seven soldiers from each of the other 11 troops were detailed to Captain Thomas M. McDougall (Brevet Brigadier General) to guard the packtrain and baggage. These 130 men were more than 20 percent of the total regiment. [13] Custer took five troops (225 men and most of the scouts) with him. He ordered an increased rate of march, leaving his packtrain well behind the attacking force. [14]

The Battle Begins

The battle occurred in three phases and at three separate locations.

Reno, up the Middle. The first to engage the combined Sioux and Cheyenne forces was Reno and his 140 troopers and scouts. He forded the Little Bighorn south of the village and advanced along the west bank to the edge of the encampment. He had been assured the rest of the force would support his attack. As he advanced, he was met by increasing numbers of mounted and running warriors to his front and left flank. The combined force of Sioux and Cheyenne warriors was much larger than he had expected. Post-battle estimates of warrior strength were 3,000-5,000. The highest prebattle estimate had been 1,000-1500, though Custer's own Indian scouts believed the number was much higher. [15] Reno halted the advance and took up a defensive circle in a large clump of trees near the river. Measurement of the village after the battle revealed a camp 4 miles long and a half mile wide. Reno could see that his brigade was being encircled. Indian warriors were also running along the bank across the river. Neither Benteen's nor Custer's force had come to his assistance. After 30 minutes of fighting in the trees, Reno ordered his men across the river to a more defensible position. Not all of his men heard the order, and several were left in the trees. He withdrew most of his force and established a defensive position among the high bluffs on the opposite side of the river. [16]

Benteen, to the Left. During the same time, Benteen's brigade searched the plain to the west and found neither trail nor Indian. By the time he returned to the Little Bighorn, Reno's force had recrossed the river. Benteen joined forces with Reno and led the effort to build defensive positions along the high bluffs. From those positions, the combined brigades fought the evening of the 25th and all day the 26th against continuous attacks. They, too, would likely have been entirely wiped out had Terry's force not arrived the morning of the 27th. [17]

Custer, to the Right. Custer, with his five troops, proceeded downstream on the east side of the Little Bighorn valley. (Since there were no survivors, his final moves and intentions can only be surmised. However, subsequent interviews with Sioux and Cheyenne warriors, as well as studies of spent bullets and body locations, have added some understanding.) Custer attempted either an actual or a feint crossing at a point directly across the river from the center of the village. He withdrew and again headed north, perhaps to find a point of attack at the north end of the village [18] He must have been surprised at the size of the village and the number of warriors that rushed to meet him. His troops dismounted on a sloping field, cut by numerous ravines, unsuitable for mounted maneuver. They formed several defensive circles. Early in the battle, the advancing Sioux stampeded their horses. This deprived them not only of a way to escape but also of the spare ammunition. Armed with only pistols and carbines and th e ammunition each soldier carried, they succumbed to a force at least ten times their number. [19] Thus, the entire force was pinned down, encircled, and killed.

Was it Just Bad Leadership?

Most historical analysts have focused on Custer's, Reno's, and Benteen's actions and leadership. Historians have alternately criticized the decisions of all three. It was well known that Benteen and Reno (who survived) had been critics of Custer. It should be remembered, however, that all three of these men were decorated Civil War veterans, and all had been commended for acts of courage. There were other factors that weakened the force. For instance, communication between the widely dispersed units was nonexistent. [20]

Mounted couriers were the fastest means available but were still slow and uncertain. Soldiers could be used as couriers only when the route was both familiar and safe; otherwise, this duty demanded skilled frontiersmen. The slowness, however, meant supplies had to be arranged far in advance and could not be adjusted as needed. Another consequence was that concerted action between far-separated columns was nearly impossible. [21]

No specific battle plan had been communicated before the three elements divided, and no one expected several thousand Indian warriors to be present. No one, not even the Indian scouts, had ever even seen a Sioux/Cheyenne encampment of more than 600-800 warriors. Most analysts, whether Custer fans or critics, agree that the principal cause of the defeat was Custer's dividing of his force in the face of an enemy of unknown size, allowing the much larger Indian force to fight his units one at a time. [22] The Army commission that examined the events found no fault on the part of Reno or Benteen. [23] Since there were no eyewitnesses to the last 2 hours of Custer's actions and because of his fame as an Indian fighter, the board was equally reticent to place blame on him. The board's conclusion was Custer attacked a force of unknown size, which turned out to be larger than predicted. Dividing his force into three separate elements (a tactic that had worked well for him on multiple occasions in both the Civil War and previous Indian campaigns) further diminished his capability. Finally, by attacking alone on the 25th, he eliminated an opportunity for a combined attack with Terry and Gibbon. [24] So is that it? A few bad choices based on poor intelligence? Were there other factors that affected the outcome?

Changing Times, Changing Force

Custer lived during a period of postwar transition, similar in many ways to our own post-Cold War and Desert Storm era. While Custer had perfected his tactics in one kind of war, in 1876, he was leading an expeditionary force in an entirely different kind of war. To make matters worse, the Army had made no attempt to develop doctrine and strategy for the Indian campaigns.

The Army brought to the task no new strategy. In fact, there had never been any formal strategy for fighting Indians, and there never would be. The generals looked on Indian warfare as a momentary distraction from their principal concern--preparing for the next foreign war. [25]

In this war with the Indians, the cavalry had become the primary attack force, supported when and where possible by artillery and infantry. From 1863 to 1865, Custer had led a group of volunteers who were committed to winning the war. The men submitted willingly to capable leadership. They knew each battle hastened the war's end and their return home. When the war ended, most of them did go home. The composition of the force after the war changed markedly. The cavalry units in the Far West were mostly manned with recruits from immigrant families. [26] Units often had as many as 40 percent trainees. The Civil War was popular and had a clear, expected end, but duty in the west was not so well defined. It was endless drudgery, units had high rates of desertion, [27] and soldiers who remained were often incapacitated by alcohol. [28] Actual combat experience was rare. It is estimated that as many as 30 percent of the men who rode with Custer had never been in combat prior to the Little Bighorn. [29]

A Different Kind of Enemy, A New Kind of Warfare

As Custer pursued the Sioux across Wyoming and Montana in 1876, he was attempting to find and fight an entirely different kind of enemy, in surroundings much different than Gettysburg and the Shenandoah Valley. The Army rarely was able to locate and fight Indians in large numbers, and the Indians did not engage in frontal, force-on-force battles. They chose opportunities where they momentarily had superiority and surprise. Their warfare consisted of guerrilla tactics, and when engaged by a larger force, they would disperse and disappear in the vast plains. Only a mobile force was going to be able to catch this elusive enemy--a force that was light and fast.

What About Logistics?

There were significant logistics decisions that contributed to the outcome. Perhaps the best known was Custer's refusal of the Gatling guns and additional forces offered by Terry. Custer reasoned that dragging the guns and ammunition over mountain trails would have decreased his speed and ruined his chances of finding the elusive Sioux. [30] A lesser known decision was Custer's order to box all of the sabers and leave them aboard the supply ship, the Far West. Custer felt they would make too much noise and there was little chance of close-in combat. [31] In the final hours of pursuit, Custer increased the rate of march, leaving his baggage train and reserve ammunition far to the rear. There are several other lessons from the Little Bighorn that offer valuable insight for modern expeditionary force planners and warriors.

Expeditionary Logistics

Logistics support in the Far West was extremely difficult. Supporting concentrations of men and horses in the field was always a huge task, but in the desolate Far West, it was nearly impossible to keep every man and horse supplied all the time. The difficulty of moving, storing, and calling forward military supplies reduced the effectiveness of forces and reduced the scope of the possible. Field commanders were tethered to and limited by a very rudimentary logistics infrastructure. John S. Gray's analysis of frontier logistics is extremely insightful and thought provoking:

These preliminaries to the Sioux campaign of 1876 provide a glimpse into the difficulties the frontier army faced in conducting a major campaign against the plains Indians in the formidable wilderness of the West. The problems stemmed not from army incompetence, but from the unusual conditions, especially alien to a force trained in the Civil War in the developed East. For the benefit of today's readers, these monumental problems deserve an explanatory note.

The West posed special problems in logistics--the transport of troops and their essential supplies. Veritable mountains of rations, shelter, clothing, arms, and ammunition for the men, and forage for the animals had to be delivered over long distances. Facilities for such transport were readily available in the densely populated East but not in the forbidding, unsettled, and arid West. There, steamboats could ply only a rare river and then only in spring and summer. The Union Pacific was the only railroad west of the Missouri, and winter service was erratic indeed. Even wagon roads were few and rough, which translates to long and slow. Army contract trains, usually oxdrawn, made only 15 miles a day to allow grazing time, for to carry forage meant no payload. Quartermaster trains that supplied immediate needs of troops on the march were usually mule-drawn and could make 20 miles a day. As we have seen, even the assembling of troops and supplies at a staging base was time-consuming and often impossible in winter.

The cavalry was the most mobile, but its range was inversely proportional to its speed. The range could be extended and speed still maintained if the column was supplied by a packtrain, but only Gen. Crook [Major General] had developed an efficient one that could keep up with the cavalry it served. It consisted of specially trained mules managed entirely by expert civilian packers and therefore too expensive for general use. Others had to rely on draft mules and novice soldier-packers that both slowed and weakened the cavalry column. [32]

After the staging base was left, transport problems intensified, for there were often no roads whatever. Yet, a trail suitable for heavily laden wagons simply had to be found, with essential wood, water and grass at each night's bivouac. In unfamiliar country these requirements called for expert guides. For any prolonged operation, supply depots had to be established in the field and then replenished by successive supply trains; troops, usually infantry, had to be detached to guard such depots.

Sheridan had ordered a winter campaign in 1875. He knew that was when the Indians were at their weakest. Indian ponies were undernourished and generally ineffective during the winter months. Villages were scattered, and a number of warriors were always away from the village hunting for food. He failed to reckon with the logistical problems of mounting forces in isolated, winter-bound posts. [33] During the winter, natural fodder was not available in sufficient quantities to support a large equestrian force. Sheridan and Custer had conducted smaller winter campaigns previously. The Washita Campaign (winter 1868) had used 400 wagons to support the combined cavalry and infantry force. [34] However, a three-division force simply could not be supported in a winter campaign. After months of delay, when the spring of 1876 arrived, the steamboat Far West was loaded near Fort Lincoln, at Bismarck, and began to move Terry's supplies up the Missouri and Yellowstone Rivers. The troops and horses moved overland from Bism arck, west to the Yellowstone River, where they would link up with their resupply ship. The overland contingent was well stocked for the march--150 wagons drawn by 6-mule teams, an equal number of 2-mule wagons, a towed battery of Gatling guns, a herd of cattle, and a herd of extra horses and mules. The whole group, soldiers, and supplies, stretched over 4 miles. The Far West was also well stocked, including a battery of Gatling guns and 10,000 rounds of half-inch ammunition, as well as large stocks of food and medical supplies. [35]

Logistics Decisions

Custer sized and equipped his force by evaluating his own capability compared to probable enemy capability and intent. Custer's decision to leave Gatling guns, sabers, and his own spare ammunition in the rear left little flexibility to adjust to changing conditions and new intelligence. Once engaged, both Custer and Reno sent couriers to the packtrain, requesting it make every effort to catch up. [36] Eventually the pack mules, which carried ammunition, were detached from the rest of the baggage train to speed their progress. In his careful time-motion analysis, Gray determined that the mules with ammunition arrived at the Benteen/Reno position on the bluffs at 5:19 p.m. The rest of the baggage arrived at its location 10 minutes later. The Reno/Benteen position was 4.5 miles from Custer's battlefield, easily another 30 minutes away. By 5:12 p.m. (7 minutes before the ammunition arrived at the bluffs), heavy firing had ceased at Custer's location. [37] While the newly arrived baggage was of great use to Bente en's and Reno's forces during their battle over the next 24 hours, it was clearly too late to support Custer. A clear pattern emerges. Custer continually lightened his force in order to achieve maximum speed. These decisions were based on his estimate of enemy numbers and intentions. By the time he realized these estimates were wrong, his force had been trimmed too much to respond to the changes. Even his own (relatively close) supplies were unavailable when he needed them because of his decision to close the distance with the enemy quickly. Being light and fast enough to keep pace with the Indian was only possible by becoming like the Indian, especially as it pertained to logistics. A traditional cavalry unit could not expect to remain in contact with its forward supply depots and keep up with the mobile Indian. Therefore, tradeoffs were made, capabilities jettisoned, and some useful weapons left behind. At the moment of battle, however, the attacking force lacked the resources to win; all of the benefits of speed achieved through being light were lost. Custer had caught up with the elusive Sioux but lacked the capability to deliver a lethal blow to his adversary or to defend his own force.

Issues for Today

The Services are shaping forces designed for rapid mobility and quick response--forces that can deploy rapidly and fight anywhere. To do this, there is a move toward lighter/faster forces. [38] Though they reduce deployment time and beddown footprint, lighter forces are more vulnerable. Is it then a clear either-or problem? Either we field large, heavy, slow forces, which can win, or we field small, light, fast forces, which may be in jeopardy? Clearly, there is a need for both kinds of forces. However, if arrival speed and rapidity of engagement are high priorities, there are factors affecting light, mobile forces that must be considered.

Unity Among Intelligence, Operations, and Logistics

Most analysts concur that the critical failure in Custer's defeat was poor intelligence of enemy strength. Consequently, decisions to split his force and move ahead of the packtrain left him with too few soldiers and not enough firepower. Intelligence of enemy capability and intent is critical in sizing the expeditionary force. To successfully plan and execute a rapid response package, the loggie must be brought in at the earliest stage of planning. Support not only must be tailored to the requirements of the warfighter but also must factor in enemy strength and intent. Intelligence is rarely 100 percent accurate. Many items of information needed to make operational decisions are not always available. In the absence of critical information, we need to build capacity into logistics that accommodates changing estimates of enemy capability. Logistics planning needs to include estimates of enemy capability to interdict supply and should calculate likely attrition. The intelligence, warfighter, and logistics comma nds need to constantly coordinate new information. If a decision is made to delete a weapon system or limit units to only a few days of supplies on hand, all three communities need to consider the implications.

"Call in the cavalry..."

In the West, the cavalry's mobility made it the force of choice. It could move quickly to a hot spot. However, there were instances when the cavalry was dispatched with disastrous results. Custer's defeat at the Little Bighorn is the best known, but there had been others. Only days before Custer's loss, Crook's cavalry was mauled near the Rosebud River. [39] Though Custer is credited with a victory at Washita, Major Elliot, his second in command, and a dozen troopers were surrounded and annihilated during that same battle. [40] There are circumstances that demand a mobile force. However, a light force may not always be the best solution. In some scenarios, we will need to take the time for heavy units to deploy. While Terry planned to use the cavalry to chase and pin down the enemy, he also planned to use infantry and artillery. He understood that the cavalry could be defeated if not properly supported.

Choosing Time, Place, and Pace (or, the closer you get to the enemy, the closer he is to you!)

Building an airbase has historically been a very slow process. Doctrine and strategy, force size, and national objectives have been sifted annually. Basing decisions flowed from strategic policy. Generally, airbases were sited out of harm's way. Buildup and stockage took months, even years. Responsibility for defending the airbase has sometimes been contentious. The means and methods of airbase defense have been inconsistent during the fixed-base era. As the Air Force moves toward expeditionary air forces, it will need to decide which units will provide base defense. Selection of airbase sites will also bring new challenges. Speed and current (rather than potential) support capability may move units to places that have exceptional operational capability but shortfalls in base defense and logistics support. Bare and semibare bases will need to be selected not only for operational capability but also for defense feasibility and logistics supportability. We have grown accustomed to NATO-like bases with full supp ort capability. But in parts of the world, the number of suitable bases is limited. While a light combat force may fit well at a selected location, the required base defense and engineering units may make the total package anything but light. The closer the base is to the enemy, the more urgent the defense solution.

On Hand Versus on Time

A critical component of expeditionary warfare is assured supply. The amount of stuff required on hand must be balanced with the amount of stuff that can be delivered on time. Determining how much of each will always be difficult. During Desert Storm, there were isolated incidents of the enemy's surrendering to unmanned aerial vehicles. In other conflicts, enemies have fought to the last man. The enemy's will-to-fight factor affects the rate of expenditure and the requirement for on-hand stuff, especially munitions. Historically, we have been unable to reliably calculate the number of bombs it takes to deter or halt an enemy. Custer believed the weapons and ammunition carried by each trooper were sufficient. After all, each man had not only the bullets he carried on his person but also reserves in saddlebags. There was enough Army firepower within a 50-mile radius of Custer's position to wreak havoc on an unlimited number of Indians. But it was not available where needed. Custer's own reserves were diminished, first, by his decision to position himself in advance of his packtrain and, subsequently, by Indians chasing off the horses. If a unit will deploy with only 3 days of supply today, for instance, what is the backup plan if the lines of supply are cut during those 3 days? With regard to critical supplies, such as munitions and fuel, what rates of expenditure are likely to achieve the goals, and are there sufficient quantities on hand for the moment and the future? Security of on-hand supplies also has a cost. Custer committed 20 percent of his force to defend his own packtrain. These men were desperately needed warfighters. Establishing and protecting support in an expeditionary mode will require initial planning and continual tuning as conditions change.

Weapons of Choice Plus Flexibility

As Custer chose to leave behind Gatling gun batteries and sabers, so must the modern expeditionary commander leave behind some capabilities. Selection of weaponry from a list of possibles will be difficult. The decision will need to be rooted in enemy capability and intent. It will also be affected by the availability of those weapons and their deployability. Air Force planners have rarely been faced with selection of only one or two types of weapons, fuses, and delivery options, but rapid-response forces will have fewer options. Light forces will need to be carefully shaped to maximize lethality. Decisions, like Custer's--to leave the sabers behind--need to be made after considering any potential changes in enemy strength and intent.

Quality of the Force

In the 1879 inquiry, several eyewitnesses stated that fire control was poor. Many of the men fired their weapons rapidly, often without aiming, reducing effectiveness and ammunition. [41] Custer's unit was like others in the Army at the time. There was a high percentage of recruits, and many soldiers had no combat experience. [42] The rate of ammunition consumption was related directly to the quality of the force. Parallels exist today. Many aircraft maintenance areas are undermanned. There is a shortage of experienced technicians. Experienced seven- and nine-level troubleshooter numbers have also decreased. An experienced specialist might use only one widget to accomplish a repair while an inexperienced one might use two or maybe even three. A less experienced/trained force will affect consumption of support and warfighting materiel. Is the 3-day package sized to well-trained technicians? It is interesting to speculate, for instance, what Custer might have accomplished at the Little Bighorn with troopers fro m the 7th Michigan Brigade, his Civil War unit. It is possible that a unit with greater discipline, fire control, and battle experience might have had sufficient ammunition to repel the Indian counterattack. More experienced troopers might not have allowed their horses to be stampeded. Each factor (quality of the force, experience, operational capability, enemy intent, and so forth) is linked to the others. Under ideal conditions, with overwhelming force, weaknesses may remain hidden. The expeditionary force may surface weaknesses that did not affect large force packages.

Combining Forces--Joint and Allied

The Indian scouts attached to Custer's overland force were among the best in the Montana and Wyoming area. However, they were not Custer's own scouts. He had not worked with them before and had not established confidence in their ability. [43] As a result, he did not act on their assessment of enemy strength being much higher than 1,500. He also did not believe they had located the main Sioux village, though several of the scouts told him they had seen rising smoke and a large herd of ponies. Immediately prior to battle, these untried scouts were his only source of intelligence. This was not a formula for success. Expeditionary forces will deploy to places where few previous treaties and agreements exist. Possible hot spots may take them to places where military-to-military exchanges have been few and allied exercises have been infrequent. Expeditionary forces will be faced with unfamiliar terrain, bases, support, contractors, ports, infrastructure, and local sources of information. There will be language dif ficulties. Like Custer, the on-scene commander may have little time to build relationships with local forces and agents.

Effectiveness Versus Efficiency

The goal of modern logistics is to precisely calculate requirements by modeling past consumption and deliver the right amount of stuff to the point of use a little before it is needed. The optimum solution is to shoot the last bullet at the last enemy, on the last day of the war. The problems in this approach arise, not from inability to construct accurate consumption models, but from difficulty blending enemy capability and action into the model, as well as other variable wartime factors. The light, mobile force seems to promise dollar savings. It is important that, while we move the military toward a higher ratio of light-to-heavy forces, the desired efficiencies do not undercut effectiveness. This is a tension that shaped Custer's force, one Americans will debate in each new generation. How much is too much? Can we ensure victory with fewer forces and dollars? Which numerical ratios and formulas best capture combat effectiveness and budgetary efficiency?

This dialog from Robert Vaughan's historical novel Yesterday's Reveille cleverly portrays this tension, as expressed in Custer's time.

Congressman: "The yearly cost for keeping the Seventh Cavalry--including all pay, allowances, food, and equipment-is one million, two hundred and thirteen thousand dollars. Last year, there were two hundred and seventeen hostiles killed. That means it is costing the United States five thousand five hundred eighty-nine dollars and eighty-six cents to kill each Indian....Now I ask you, General Custer, do you consider this an effective utilization of Federal money?"

General Custer: "Mr. Congressman, if you consider the Seventh Cavalry to be nothing but bounty hunters, then I would agree that too high a bounty has been placed on the head of each Indian. If, on the other hand, you regard the Seventh as a peacekeeping organization, then I would ask you to turn your figures around. There are approximately three-quarters of a million men, women, and children in the Department of the Missouri who were not killed last year. I ask you, sir, if you consider the lives of these American citizens to be worth a dollar and sixty-three cents apiece?" [44]

Conclusion

These issues, and others, must be analyzed as we attempt to shape light, mobile forces and doctrine to accommodate political, demographic, and military realities. We would be wise to consider similar periods in our national and military history. Custer's expeditionary force was remarkably mobile and light for its day. His lightness, though, reduced lethality and margin for error. Our responsibility is to learn from Custer's successes and duplicate them, understand his mistakes and correct them.

Colonel Bereit is a former commander of the Air Force Logistics Management Agency.

Notes

(1.) Gregory J. W. Urwin, Custer Victorious, East Brunswick, New Jersey; London; and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1983, 44.

(2.) W. A. Graham, The Story of the Little Bighorn, Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 1994, 8.

(3.) Urwin (particularly testimony of men who served with Custer during the Civil War), Chap 12, 265-286. During the early years of the Civil War, the Union cavalry had been notoriously ineffective, poorly trained, and poorly led. However, by 1863, under the tutelage of Sheridan and Pleasonton, the Union cavalry had improved dramatically. By the end of the war, Custer's units had won numerous battles.

(4.) Jay Monaghan, Custer: The Life of General George Armstrong Custer, Boston and Toronto: Little Brown and Company, 1959, 314.

(5.) Urwin, 73-82.

(6.) Monaghan, 240-242.

(7.) Graham, 96

(8.) Graham, 12-13 and 114-117 This letter contained the written instructions to Custer, which were recorded after the meeting aboard the Far West. While some latitude is granted, it is clear where each of the forces were to move.

(9.) John S. Gray, Custer's Last Campaign, Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1991, 205 and 229.

(10.) Gray, 228, 251, 272, 338. These time and motion study charts are an extremely precise calculation of movements during the last hours of Custer's attack.

(11.) Gray, 238, and Graham, 29.

(12.) Robert M. Utley, Cavalier in Buckskin, Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988, 182-183.

(13.) Graham, 27 and 96.

(14.) Utley, 183.

(15.) Gray, 212, 226, 244. There is great variance in numbers. Low estimates, before the march up the Rosebud, were 400-800. As signs of many trails joining increased, so did the estimates. One scout estimated as high as 2,500 on the morning of the 25th, Custer felt that. regardless of the number, the Indians would flee when they saw his column advancing and his troops could whip any number of Indians. See also, Graham, 33-34. Graham's book was researched and published the closest to the actual events. He talked to eyewitnesses, and he estimates the actual number of warriors to be 4,000!

(16.) Graham, 36-48.

(17.) Graham, 51-61.

(18.) Gray, 357-361.

(19.) Utley, 185-191.

(20.) Graham, 23,24.

(21.) Gray, 133.

(22.) Gray, xiv-xv.

(23.) Gray, 102-104

(24.) Gray, 152-158, These pages contain a copy of the final report from the 1879 court of inquiry. It delineates the actions of each primary officer and concludes each acted properly and under orders.

(25.) Utley, 42.

(26.) Utley, 45-46, 168.

(27.) Utley, 45-46, 50, 52, 53.

(28.) Utley, 45. A major shot and killed himself in a fit of delirium tremens during the 1867 summer campaign. Alcohol abuse was not limited to the enlisted troops.

(29.) Graham, 117-118.

(30.) Graham, 112, and Gray, 170. The guns were usually transported in wagons but could be disassembled and carried on mule packtrains. Custer chose neither option. He told Terry the guns might embarrass him. He also declined the offer of additional mounted troops. Apparently, Custer felt his own trooper's firepower was sufficient. It is interesting to note that Reno had carried the guns with him on his scout up the Rosebud earlier in the month. He had injured almost a dozen mules in the process. See Gray, 175 and 202.

(31.) Utley, 174. The famous Anheuser-Busch painting of "Custer's Last Stand" is flawed in this detail, as it shows Custer with a saber in his hand, a weapon he did not have available, Utley, 102.

(32.) Gray, 132-133.

(33.) Utley, 201-204, and Gray, 127.

(34.) Monaghan, 309. In the last day of pursuit, Custer advanced with 800 troops and only a few wagons with tents and food. The cavalry could move quickly with less supply support for about 2 days, then needed to return to the supply wagons.

(35.) Utley, 167-168.

(36.) Graham, 49, 53, 54.

(37.) Gray, 272-273 and 301.

(38.) US News and World Report, Cover Story, 18 Sep 00.

(39.) Utley, 178.

(40.) Utley, 68-69.

(41.) Graham, 150-152.

(42.) Graham, 117-119.

(43.) Gray, 200-201.

(44.) Robert Vaughan, Yesterday's Reveille, An Epic of the Seventh Cavalry, New York: St Martin's Paperbacks, 1996, 201-202.

COPYRIGHT 2000 U.S. Air Force, Logistics Management Agency
COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group