Readiness: a commander's responsibility - Research Focus

Douglas A. Furst

The differences between a ready force and an ill-prepared one are the confidence, attitude, decisiveness, and endurance of the people.

Overview

Background

The purpose of the military, when not engaged in contingency operations, is to prepare for its wartime mission. This article focuses on a commander's role in facilitating the process of ensuring deployable squadron members are in a state of readiness. "As a commander or supervisor, you assume full responsibility for the accomplishment of your unit's mission." (1) Considerable research and analysis has been dedicated to the materiel and equipment aspects of readiness; this article emphasizes measures to prepare troops to achieve a mission-capable, readiness posture. The conclusion is a set of readiness-enabling factors and supporting comments to serve as a guide for commanders of mobility squadrons as they assume command and start defining priorities.

Air Force basic doctrine begins with this fundamental truth: "The overriding objective of any military force is to be prepared to conduct combat operations in support of national political objectives-to conduct the nation's wars." (2) The men and women who work for the military services direct their efforts, resources, and energies to accomplish this by training, organizing, and equipping forces to produce mission capabilities. These capabilities include the equipment, information, skills, supplies, strategies, tactics, plans, agreements, and knowledge that contribute to a squadron's designed operating capability (DOG). (3) This process of merging military technologies, resources, and troops into an able national instrument of power is the process of developing readiness. From a major command (MAJCOM) perspective, the Air Mobility Command emphasizes the readiness aspect of its mission as:

Today, more than ever, our nation needs rapid, flexible, and responsive air mobility. America's Global Reach promotes stability in regions by keeping America's capability and character highly visible. Joint military exercises display military capabilities and bolster U.S. ties with allies.

Humanitarian missions strengthen relations with recipient nations and show the watching world America's compassion. Projecting influence can be an effective deterrent to regional conflicts. Should deterrence fail, Global Reach allows for the rapid and decisive deployment of combat power. (4)

Figure 1 outlines the preparation process for executing America's military instrument of power.

This conceptual process traces the purpose of military preparedness as defined in the Promotion Fitness Examination under the general functions of the military departments. (5) Comparing the activities necessary to prepare forces for an appropriate state of readiness with what is actually done on a day-to-day basis, squadrons very easily can lose their readiness focus, if improperly led, by pursuing nonmission-essential objectives. Troops at the squadron level perform activities that support the priorities and focus of their commander. In oaths of office, officers swear to perform the duties they are about to enter, (6) and enlisted members swear to obey the orders of the officers appointed over them. (7) General W. L. Creech, former Tactical Air Command commander, said, "Leaders lead by example and set the tone." (8) Following this logic, if the commander fails to ensure the unit stands ready with adequate mobility and field survival skills, training, and experience, the troops deployed from that unit will risk facing contingency challenges without the adequate confidence, knowledge, and capability to succeed.

Commanders need a plan, a tactical set of readiness indicators pointed toward achieving an overall strategic state of readiness. This concept is the foundation for the strategic planning process: analyzing the mission, envisioning the future, assessing capabilities, performing a gap analysis, developing strategic goals, and formulating a plan. This article provides a series of readiness concepts developed by consolidating mobility-readiness-enabling factors. These readiness enablers provide new commanders an expert perspective for preparing an organization for contingency operations. They will help commanders with the first strategic planning step--analyzing the mission and assessing capabilities. (9)

Some officers learn to command effectively from extensive personal experience and deploying to challenging contingency operations while others build a good perspective from close mentoring. This article combines the benefits of both experience-building paths by pulling the expertise from many senior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO) who have been there, done that. It will help squadron commanders at the wing level determine the most important decisions in establishing the correct readiness focus.

A readiness posture determines how well an organization responds to a phone call at 1730 Friday afternoon from a MAJCOM execution cell requesting a 22-man package to deploy on verbal orders, within a few hours, to operate infield conditions in a cold and wet climate, at a classified location with a mode rate threat for an undetermined duration. Does your squadron adequately prepare your troops for this challenge?

How We Prepare

The challenging nature of this scenario reflects the unpredictable and volatile world we live in, as well as the nature of our job. Further, consider what occurs at a typical airlift wing on any given day. Based on personal experiences from the last 14 years, there would probably be activity involving many ongoing processes.

Home-station troops perform specialty skills such as transporting cargo and passengers on regular schedules between predefined channel locations, maintaining and protecting aircraft, importing and exporting supplies, shipping equipment and household goods, and flying training sorties to maintain aircrew proficiency. They perform not only their jobs but also additional duties--marching in the wing honor guard; serving on evaluation boards; performing details for the wing, squadron, or flight; attending wing and squadron meetings; and participating in public ceremonies. These activities are in addition to studying for the annual specialty skills knowledge testing, attending college classes at night, and taking professional military education courses. Very little of this activity prepares an individual to think mobility or maintain readiness.

Deployed troops perform specialty skills, the vast majority of the time living in hotels with minimal risk of criminal or terrorist threats. This experience fails to teach contingency situational awareness or the ability to survive and operate and communicates a false sense of security, which leads to complacency. Complacency leads to vulnerability in an actual contingency.

Wartime skills training is the least time-and-effort-consuming, as troops accomplish annual refresher training in chemical warfare, self-aid/buddy care, and weapons (M-16/M-9) and infrequently deploy for a few days in support of an exercise.

From a generic perspective, there is concern that preparedness for deployed operations does not have much priority in day-to-day life and may not meet the necessary readiness level. Without an external impetus to generate training scenarios, human nature tends to lead to readiness entropy at the minimal requirement. General Ronald R. Fogleman, former Air Force Chief of Staff, stated, as a commander, "You are responsible for everything your unit does." (10) The reason readiness degrades is twofold: it is a proficiency level with a shelf life requiring refresher training and exercising to maintain currency, (11) and it incurs a cost in both effort and budget. The total resources available to pay these costs are finite and compete with many conflicting priorities. Because readiness is perishable, it is necessary to train--ideally at the time an individual loses the abilities to perform the skills but not constantly so as to expend all the time, money, and energy of a squadron.

Why We Prepare

The point to addressing mission readiness in relation to the time spent in wartime-skills training is that--without the challenge and regular exposure to wartime situations, experiences, and environments--troops risk losing their perspective on what it takes to quickly deploy, survive, and endure high-tempo operations in the field; in other words, getting soft. Tactical Air Command Manual 2-1 points out:

The pace of modern high-intensity war will not allow time to polish skills, develop new procedures, new techniques, and new organizational structures as the crisis develops or after hostilities begin. Hence, training for aircrews, training for the battle staffs, and training for our maintenance people [and all other troops deployed in the contingency environment] must be as realistic as possible. (12)

This attitude is an intangible concept yet critical to mission effectiveness. Future readiness needs are clearly emphasized in the following statement from Air University:

These will he fight-anywhere, fight-anytime wars, where anywhere and anytime will largely be defined by the enemy. The battlespace will be characterized by sudden and awesome lethality. The outcome will be determined in large part by the readiness of US forces to engage the enemy. (13)

Losing sight of readiness distracts and distorts an individual's perspective of why one is wearing the uniform and degrades the ability to identify and address threat activity. As a result, the individual will fail to react automatically with the skills needed to rapidly mobilize; establish operations in an austere environment; and sustain a safe, effective, and reliable capability to fight. The cost of not being ready could be catastrophic.

The United States may be faced with an adversary who seeks to offset advantages the United States has by using asymmetric means and threatening the use of chemical or biological weapons, information attacks, terrorism, urban warfare, or anti-access strategies. As a result, America must quickly seize the initiative from the aggressor. Military capability that is vulnerable to preset time lines risks attack of those time lines. Delay in decisively and quickly halting an enemy may force a difficult and costly campaign to recover lost territory. (14)

This issue of personnel readiness warrants study and focus. The concept is complex and involves many factors: technical job knowledge, an acute understanding of how to operate in the contingency environment, and an ability to give and receive direction and orders. Readiness also extends beyond these factors to encompass less direct aspects such as maintaining physical fitness and ensuring personal family affairs are in order. Figure 2 captures the relationships between the concepts associated with building readiness and the outputs resulting from it. It is a tool to visualize what readiness does in relation to the troops, the commander, and the mission. The inputs on the left characterize the actions taken to prepare for readiness. (15) The feedback process in the lower right corner identifies the assessment of readiness. Finally, the righthand block captures the impact of readiness. The (+) and (-) can be read in the following terms, "As the level of readiness increases, there is a corresponding positive (i n the case of 1+]) correlation with the speed of deployment."

Cost of Failure to Prepare

Failure to stand ready results in a breakdown of emotional and physical performance, which ultimately reduces mission capability. To prevent history from repeating itself, all airmen, soldiers, and sailors should understand why 2,400 men and women died on 7 December 1941 at Pearl Harbor when the radar technician saw and reported the warning of a potentially massive attack: "a larger number of planes than he had seen before on his [radar] scope." (16) Lieutenant Kermit Tyler, upon receiving this message in the Fighter Information Center, failed to respond in any way, to inquire further, or report the observation up the chain of command and took no defensive actions. Leadership failed to ensure an appropriate level of readiness.

Troops do not achieve readiness by performing day-to-day job skills and attending annual refresher training. More specifically, if they are focused year after year on peacetime operations and steady-state environments within a wing, their attention will probably focus on minimizing costs by optimizing efficiency. On the other hand, the focus in war is effectiveness: achieving the mission while minimizing the loss of people or equipment. (17) The attitudes, goals, and perspectives of efficiency and effectiveness are different; both efforts are important but must be understood in the proper perspective. Priority decisions between the two objectives require different preparation, focus, and training.

Efficiency is necessary given the realities of the post-Cold War environment that is characterized by the American public's desire to benefit from a peace dividend, which translates to reduced military spending. The National Campaign for the Peace Dividend resolved:

We, the People, believe that the United States of America should remain the world's strongest nation, but we find current levels of military spending to be unnecessary, unwarranted, and excessive. We direct our representatives in the Federal government to begin an orderly long-term program to substantially reduce military spending to levels more in keeping with the close of the Cold War and with our national economic capabilities. (18)

Yet, effectiveness to conduct military operations at all times is critical to maintaining the national military objective of a credible deterrence. Effectiveness is the ability to perform the mobility readiness challenge, but it becomes vulnerable when overtasked. Figure 3 clearly conveys the concept of overtasking as a result of increased workload with fewer people.

A proper balance between readiness and operations tempo (OPSTEMPO) does not occur naturally but requires deliberate planning, readiness proficiency monitoring, and responsive training. Commanders determine when to perform in-house training, push for wing exercises, and request time to stand down the forces. This balance of OPSTEMPO, real-world mission needs, and readiness levels is a critical equilibrium to consider. (20) It cannot result from a preprogrammed checklist because every command situation is different. Therefore, a set of guidelines or commander heuristics may prove helpful in making these tradeoff decisions to maintain balance.

Research Question

Research for this article centered on the commander's role and perspective on readiness and the resulting impact of a leader's actions on the unit's degree of effectiveness in performing its wartime mission. This equates to the following research question: How does a commander most effectively measure, track, interpret, and affect the personnel readiness of a squadron? The key words in this question are measure, track, interpret, and affect. Answering this question will provide useful insight to new commanders when preparing their units for mobility readiness.

Research Objectives

To adequately answer the question, the research built on itself through four distinct phases.

* An operational definition of readiness from literature, regulations, doctrine, and experts was developed.

* Current readiness-evaluation processes from the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), Mission Essential Task List (METL), and Expeditionary Operational Readiness Inspection (EORI) are aggregated, and deficiencies in effectively providing timely pertinent readiness feedback were identified.

* A commander's readiness tool, in the form of a short top-level guide--Mobility Personnel Readiness--Enabling Factors: a Comprehensive Guide for Commander--was prepared.

* Results were submitted to the Air Mobility Command (AMC) to augment its new commander training program during the AMC Inspector General's readiness blocks of instruction.

Investigative Questions

Personnel readiness is an intangible concept that does not have concrete, black-and-white characteristics. This research broke down the readiness concept into further detail by attempting to answer investigative questions.

* What is readiness?

* What methods are useful to measure readiness?

* What factors enable readiness?

Scope and Assumptions

Not all active-duty, wing-level squadrons mimic the activities outlined in the day-to-day description. Many squadrons, such as the air mobility operations groups and United States Air Forces in Europe combat readiness groups, perform deployment readiness preparation actions daily while in garrison; this article is not written for them. Similarly, flying units deploy as their primary core competency and rarely endure operating and living in field conditions for long periods. (21) This research is scoped primarily to focus on support squadrons that deploy infrequently.

Literature Review

Introduction

Most literature on military readiness centers around weapon systems' mission-capable rates, based on spare parts, repair supply levels, and available spare assemblies such as engines, radar systems, and line-replaceable units. This partial focus is a funding justification process that requires considerable analysis in Washington. (22) The people side of readiness is a concept mostly discussed in aggregate terms of recruiting rates, career-field manning strengths, and top-level training statistics on how many have achieved a 5, 7, or 9 skill level in their specialty. Very few articles specifically address the critical components of personnel readiness, such as how an organization develops attributes in deployable members that enable them to perform the mission in a contingency environment. (23)

Define Readiness

Readiness is a concept with different meanings for the different Services, MAJCOMs, career fields, and ranks. The most common definition focuses attention on the facets captured in SORTS. The following three definitions converge on similar aspects:

* United States Code, Title 10. "The Military Departments are responsible to recruit, organize, supply, equip, train, service, mobilize, demobilize, administer, maintain, and provide facilities for wartime readiness." Readiness could then be considered the result of doing the above activities. (24)

* Readiness. The ability of forces, units, weapon systems, or equipment to deliver their designated outputs. This includes the ability to deploy and employ without unacceptable delay. (25)

* Ready. a: Prepared mentally or physically for some experience or action; b: Prepared for immediate use; willingly disposed. Readiness is the noun form of ready. (26)

The problem with these perceptions of readiness is that, for people receiving a short-notice deployment order, their perspective of readiness is far more detailed than the first two definitions. Because our systems are designed and proven to get to the fight, readiness does not seem too complex, but it is the capability to perform under austere conditions and the ability to sustain deployed operations that truly embody the effect of readiness. Therefore, these definitions are a good start, but they require a more comprehensive explanation.

Perspectives on Readiness

All uniformed members with a wartime specialty skill should have a mobility attitude and an expectation of performing their mission in a contingency scenario. After Desert Shield/Storm, Army Lieutenant Colonel Stevenson made the following statement about deployability:

Perhaps the lessons regarding deployability can best be summed up by noting that deployability is a basic requirement of soldiering, much like being able to qualify with one's individual weapon or being able to don a protective mask within the required time. Commanders at all levels would do well to insist that no soldier who is permanently nondeployable be permitted to remain on active duty. (27)

As Colonel Stevenson implied, deployability and the ability to perform military operations in field conditions are a military core competency built on skills. To best understand readiness, it is helpful to explore challenges and experience from historical major contingencies.

Logistics Lessons Learned from Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) is a tremendous source of information on the impact of problems with personnel readiness. (28) JULLS confirms many of the concerns mentioned previously about troops deploying without medical and on-the-job training records, training, equipment, or sufficient preparation. Many of these problems were attributed to exercising artificially, which failed to adequately test capabilities or build the comprehensive set of skills needed to succeed without incurring unnecessary costs. "Mobility simulations did not reflect actual mobility movements. People were unprepared to mobilize. Equipment was shorted. Bags were not ready. Wills and powers of attorney changed." Additionally, JULLS highlighted the significant problems encountered with personnel who were not filling a mobility position but deployed anyway; these people experienced the most emotional and performance problems as a result of inadequate preparati on. JULLS also identified the positive value of deploying units as a unified team as opposed to the common practice of piecemealing units together.

Desert Storm Readiness Example. The Army's 141st Signal Battalion was a poignant example of how readiness factors affect mission effectiveness. (29) The unit stood down its readiness posture in an equipment upgrade transition. Old equipment was sealed and turned in, no longer serviceable or available. The new system had not arrived; therefore, the unit was not mentally or operationally prepared to perform its wartime mission. They deployed to Operation Desert Shield on 24 December 1989, requiring a significant spike in last-minute activity to retrieve all the old equipment, pack all available spare parts, and prepare a group of people who had considered this transition time as nondeployable. This example emphasizes the importance of Crating accuracy when reporting a unit's status.

Also related to personnel readiness was exercise experience. The unit was prepared by weeklong exercises, but these short exercises did not prepare them for the desert. Short-term child care plans and an inordinately high number of pregnancies (plus soldiers who turned up pregnant in theater) indicate a lack of emotional preparedness and personal understanding of what it means to be a member of the military. Commanders can have an impact by ensuring realistic training and propagating a mobility mindset where all activities in peacetime track with a connection to the contingency mission.

Commanders may not eliminate all situations like the ones experienced by the 141st, but they can directly mitigate the problems that reduce the military's ability to perform its mission.

Relation of Readiness to Leadership. For years, senior leaders have emphasized readiness as the top priority and used it to justify funding new equipment and spare parts. Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan discussed his fiscal year 2000 priorities:

Our Air Force men and women and their commanders have done gre at work keeping control of readiness declines despite heavy tasking and tough fiscal constraints. Nonetheless, the mission-capable rates have declined. The. .. three readiness priorities are people, equipment, and the training to employ them. (30)

He said if he "could put a bubble around this that enables it all to happen, it would be leadership." He goes on to say that the essential component of readiness is "the confidence in their capabilities to do what we ask them to do, and that involves equipment, training, and leadership." (31) The readiness challenge is further exacerbated with increased OPSTEMPO. The force today is manned at a level that is 33 percent below what it was 10 years ago, and the relative deployment workload exceeds 400 percent of what it was. This OPSTEMPO affects all personnel, deployed and at home station, as the base unit continues its mission with fewer people. After enduring this environment, all ranks and career fields respond with high numbers leaving the service at the earliest possible opportunity. This emphasizes the importance of protecting leave and recovery periods after deployments as justification for dropping readiness assessments when needed to give troops a chance to achieve some form of control and balance. (32)

In August 2000, the Washington Times reported comments on military readiness: "Equipment wore out. Spare parts dried up. And personnel, weary of months overseas, quit." This report discussed recruiting and retention issues as results of low readiness situations and discussed possible causes. It described the 1980s as a time of the finest military ever with unmatched esprit de corps as a result of strong military support and growth. It emphasized the need for adequate military funding and the importance of communicating the value of the troops to the nation. Finally, it discussed the Marine Corps and why it was the only service achieving its recruiting goals. It again came down to leadership and motivation. The Marines promised competence, status, and team integrity. These values and status attract recruits. (33) Leaders at all levels can learn from the Marines rather than focusing on how much they can give in financial compensation. The findings of this research support this position.

Importance of Realistic Combat Training. A 1995 report on combat training emphasized the need for training forces how they will fight. It described this training "not as a luxury, but a necessity," justifying continuation of the 50+ major joint and combined exercises around the globe each year despite their high cost. The focus of these exercises is to "arm our people with experiences that emulate actual combat in its most demanding phases." The report cautioned our leaders to avoid diverting money from readiness to contingency operations late in the fiscal year to balance budgets; this practice prevents new personnel from building experiential knowledge that has no equal in the classroom. Direct experience does translate to action at bare-base deployment locations that require standing up an operational airfield and overcoming interservice and host-nation challenges. (34)

Family and Readiness. In 1997, the Washington Consulting Group report on the influence of family factors on individual readiness, retention, and job commitment determined that certain demographically grouped servicemen had significantly more difficulty deploying and performing the mission because of family concerns. In particular, members with families, female members, and younger members required the most attention as they coped with short-notice, deployment operations. The most adaptable groups, those who responded efficiently and effectively with a minimum number of conflicts, were the older, more experienced members; this finding emphasizes the value of mentoring by the senior NCO corps. The study described ways to minimize the problems by focusing on preparing members and their families by fostering communication between the deployed serviceman and spouse, educating spouses to take over money issues, augmenting child-care services, and providing employment assistance. Most important, it emphasized the ne ed to communicate the squadron support network to the spouses and that the commander and first sergeant are available to help. (35)

Commanders must recognize that readiness is not simply a training issue, as SORTS would suggest. It is, therefore, necessary to look beyond SORTS to assess a unit's readiness and consider other factors. As the Washington Group research indicated, the most significant causal factor for absent-without-leave actions during Desert Storm was family problems. (36) This is a deployed mission-capability issue that requires definite top-down attention to maximize opportunities and minimize risks.

Readiness Evaluation Tools

SORTS. This is a Department of Defense (DoD)-wide readiness tracking and evaluation system designed to communicate unit readiness data to the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assist course-of-action decisionmaking during crisis situations. (37) The Air Staff watches readiness closely, with respect to the ability to perform certain missions, to mitigate periods of vulnerability.

Squadron commanders collect data on manning strengths, broken down by specialty codes and levels of training in each code, as well as equipment status. This is the primary means of collecting data on who is available and ready to execute a wartime tasking. The final assessment is a C-level rating from Cl (fully mission capable) to C5 (fully incapable). The final assessment is a subjective decision by the squadron commander, based on insight beyond the objective numbers. SORTS has sustained considerable criticism about its accuracy, ambiguous and unenforced reporting standards, and usefulness. (38)

Some commanders perceive the commander's assessment as a reflection of their leadership and, therefore, may tend toward a higher readiness rating than warranted. The US Special Operations Command manager for the Joint Operation Execution Planning and Execution System (JOPES) estimated in 1996 that up to half the SORTS data that support JOPES was outdated and inaccurate. The report concludes that SORTS "is largely distrusted and ignored at the national and joint user levels." (39)

Further, SORTS fails to capture more important aspects of readiness, such as field experience, family situation, skill proficiency, physical fitness, and attitudes of the troops which impact their ability to deploy, survive, and operate in contingency environments. In spite of these limitations, commanders must fully understand the message their SORTS reports communicate and also build other readiness assessment feedback systems to adequately evaluate the capability to deploy and sustain deployment taskings.

Mission Essential Task List (METL). A squadron-level METL contains the primary wartime tasks that support the contingency mission defined in the squadron's DOC statement. The METL includes mission-critical tasks taken from the Air Force Mission Essential Tasks, which is a portion of the overall DoD system of the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). The UJTL contains tasks that support joint force commanders, the ultimate customers of the Services. This nested system of tasks is designed to help units focus training, exercises, manning strength, budget decisions, and organization toward achieving readiness for their wartime roles. Figure 4 captures the nesting of tasks from tactical to national strategic levels.

The METL provides a conceptual framework for squadron commanders to not only direct the unit but also monitor the status of readiness in these various mission areas. Units record METL status in a stoplight chart (green, yellow, or red) for each taskable deployment team. This allows MAJCOMs to monitor aggregate tasking capabilities, with visibility down to each deployable unit. Since units create their own METL elements, each squadron differs on what tasks it supports. For this reason, it is not possible to evaluate the shortfalls between the readiness elements and existing METLs and identify areas of concern for squadron commanders.

METLs are a relatively new concept to the Air Force, whereas the Army derives almost every action in conjunction with a METL. As the Air Force inspector generals (IG) move away from relying on SORTS and incorporate more evaluation of METLs and the capability aspect of readiness, units will need to ensure their troops understand and incorporate METLs into day-to-day business. In their current form, METLs do not provide timely feedback to squadron commanders on readiness assessment. They are refined annually and used as reference points during budgeting, new programs, manning reviews, and readiness inspection assessments. METLs are important, but they are not a viable way to track personnel readiness.

IG Exercise and Expeditionary Operational Readiness Inspection. The AMC Inspector General traditionally performed operational readiness inspections (ORI) by tasking a wing to execute large-scale deployments, demonstrating its ability to deploy and forward deploy as a measure of readiness and the ability to survive and operate in austere conditions. The current approach to inspecting readiness incorporates performance on real-world deployments and the evaluation of expeditionary concepts that typically combine portions of unit type codes (UTC) into rainbow units. This approach intends to reduce time away from home and evaluation operations as performed in actual contingencies.

The data collected from the evaluation of units are stored in a database called RUBICS (readiness UTC-based indicators for commanders) Cube, which combines a commander's semiannual assessments and the results of the IG exercise and EORI, based on a unit's ability to perform its METLs for each UTC. The combined assessment develops a multidimensional matrix of results, forming a three-dimensional cube or four-dimensional series of cubes that highlight problem areas from a top-level perspective and allow drilling down and viewing the details of problems. This approach provides useful information to commanders for a more continuous readiness assessment, as opposed to a readiness surge every ORI cycle. (41) Unfortunately, since inspections occur infrequently, the IG exercise and EORI process also fail to provide near real-time readiness status information

Despite the promise and capabilities of these feedback mechanisms, if they are designed too theoretically or are too narrowly focused to Omit the intangible aspects of individual readiness, they will also fail, as SORTS has failed, to capture certain critical aspects of true mission readiness. This concept emphasizes the need to ensure training and preparation experiences of the troops are captured and reflected in the METs. General Ryan emphasized METLs with the following statement:

Air Force organizations are authorized and encouraged to expand on the lower-level tasks in order to express their mission-specific requirements. This final detailing provides the necessary flexibility for major air commands, numbered air forces, and units to develop accurate and organization-specific Mission Essential Task Lists, which will identify the organization-specific essential tasks that must be performed to designated standards under specified conditions. Through this task assurance process, a commander will have the tools and indications to provide a continuous picture of the overall mission performance health of the organization. Careful application of the AFTL and METL approach will ensure our wings stay mission-healthy, our headquarters stay focused on the critical and important tasks, and we remain the most respected Air Force in the world. (42)

JRAPIDS

The Joint Readiness Assessment, Planning Integrated Decision Support System (JRAPIDS) was a 1996 research study for the Chief of Staff of the Air Force that explored concepts and control capabilities necessary to support future operations as defined in Joint Vision 2025. The study described deficiencies in a SORTS-based readiness assessment system, which relies on subjective judgment with limited ability to extrapolate useful information on capabilities at the unit, joint force, and national level. (43) These limitations result from the process SORTS uses to capture a monthly snapshot that is based on a subjective interpretation of personnel, supplies, and equipment and fails to consider how these variables change. Therefore, to provide decision support for the future, DoD leaders require a dynamic system that automatically updates as personnel and equipment status aspects change.

The JRAPIDS proposal focuses on the readiness output capability of the total force, as opposed to the SORTS approach of tabulating the numbers and conditions of the available resources. This approach requires emphasis on the force efficiency, effectiveness, and flexibility as primary drivers of force management. It identifies some good, time-relevant considerations such as:

* Readiness for when? How long to [maintain a] ready [state]?

* Readiness for what? Ready to perform what tasks?

* Readiness for where? Ready for what theater or combat environment? (44)

This concept of military readiness coexists with another concept of sustainability. A team with adequate readiness, capability, doctrine, and training proficiency to mobilize, deploy, set up operations, and execute for 5 days has a capability limitation if the needed mission duration is 90 days. Therefore, the critical measure for assessing mission readiness must consider and report on sustainability as well. (45)

JRAPIDS explores the need to understand readiness in terms broader than SORTS allows and requires commanders to emphasize preparing forces and equipment in terms of the outcome capability to most efficiently make priority and funding decisions according to the importance of these outcomes. JRAPIDS would fulfill the decision support shortfalls created by SORTS and provide a better understanding of force capabilities, which is a much more pertinent factor of interest than the microanalysis of manning, training, and equipment.

Conclusion

Coverage of Desert Storm experiences and SORTS shortfalls round out the position that the intangible aspect of mobility readiness has valid implications, yet our tracking systems fail to give corrective actions to prevent uniformed members from deploying with inadequate preparation.

Implementation: A Commander's Role in Readiness

Do essential things first. There is not enough time for the commander to do everything. Each commander will have to determine wisely what is essential and assign responsibilities for accomplishment. He should spend the remaining time on near essentials. This is especially true of training. Nonessentials should not take up time required for essentials.

General Bruce C. Clarke (46)

Introduction

The concepts discussed throughout this article are useless unless implemented. There exists a short period of opportunity, when an officer takes command of a deployable squadron, to set the tone and communicate priorities. During the first few months of command, troops will observe and interpret the priorities, degree of resolve, and commander's commitment and, based on these observations, respond accordingly. If commanders enter this position of responsibility with a series of vectors pointing toward building up to and achieving readiness, they will better serve the combatant commanders by providing the forces and capabilities required in times of contingency. The key to success lies in the actions new commanders take within the first few months.

Readiness Defined

Readiness to deploy and sustain deployed operations is the mental and physical ability to effectively, reliably, and safely respond to a deployment order to carry out the contingency commander's intent. This capability-based definition incorporates further details such as accomplishing the deployment within the unit's DOC statement, in the prescribed timeframe, with the appropriate team, equipment, and supplies and carrying out the mission for the necessary duration with the ability to respond flexibly to changing scenarios and requirements. This type of readiness is not a product of attending annual refresher training or filling the square in achieving a 5- or 7-skill level. This type of readiness results from experience, teamwork, attitude, and persistent effort to overcome weaknesses. A commander's role in achieving this readiness product involves understanding the deployed environment and what it takes to survive and operate.

Of all the readiness-enabling factors, the first two, establishing a mobility mindset and exercising with intensity, were recommended by experts two times more often than the third and subsequent factors. Based on this observation, commanders ought to place proportional emphasis on these two. The other five factors could be considered best practices and operational suggestions on how to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the deployment process.

It is this collection of seven factors and their supporting details that culminate this research. Before applying them to your squadron blindly, consider the fact that no two squadrons are identical. To lead effectively, it is necessary to know the unit. There is no better way to gain this insight than to deploy. This firsthand perspective will shorten the learning curve and help a commander relate to the needs of future teams.

Implementation Suggestions

When the dust settles after taking command, commanders face a steep learning curve as they drink from an information firehose. This part of the process is unavoidable, but to prevent reaching a plateau of mission status quo, the research supports taking the following steps to develop and maintain a healthy understanding and perspective of personal readiness.

* Deploy on a UTC tasking to experience a firsthand account of contingency operations.

* Review the squadron DOC statement, UTC tasking requirements, historical trip reports, and SORTS reports to develop a conceptual mission perspective.

* Review what the squadron does to prepare individuals for these challenges and how the commander tracks these preparation processes.

Existing tracking and evaluation procedures were discussed earlier emphasizing the fact that SORTS and METL fail to provide reasonable feedback. None of the systems track outcomes, except IG assessments, but a commander requires current readiness status frequently to adequately command. Therefore, commanders either remain in the dark and let readiness run on autopilot in a reactive mode or develop an understanding of readiness status blindspots and internal processes to overcome this shortfall and respond proactively as the environment changes. Since the challenge of readiness involves the feedback process and current methods exhibit limitations, the following discussion explores a commander's role in squadron exercises as a form of periodic readiness feedback.

Exercise Options. Since readiness proficiency is a perishable capability, it requires periodic refresher training. One relatively simple way to comprehensively track field experience currency while conducting refresher training is to set deployment currency shelf lives and execute realistic in-house exercises as needed. The research indicated that how exercises are conducted is just as important as having them at all. The following suggest how to implement an in-house exercise program.

* Select a standard UTC team to deploy a few miles from base to set up a portion of a bare-base operation and execute a specific aspect of the mission.

* Ask new senior airmen and staff sergeants to lead younger airmen in accomplishing certain objectives such as setting up communication systems and materiel-tracking systems and performing operator maintenance and troubleshooting on vehicles, aerospace ground equipment, and materiel-handling equipment.

* Challenge the team to work through difficult scenarios experienced by teams during IG exercises and contingencies.

* Mentor and discuss operational risk management concepts and how accidents could have been avoided.

* Throughout the exercise, expose the participants to role playing with rules of engagement, law of armed conflict, communications security, entry control-point procedures, and antiterrorism measures.

There are many other field-survival skills that challenge teams, but the point of this discussion is assessing no-notice capabilities. After performing this type of training assessment a few times, commanders can develop a fairly accurate sense of how prepared the squadron remains as a whole. All these training actions ought to carry with them realism, a sense of urgency, and a challenge to push members beyond their comfort barriers and build a new sense of confidence and capability. It is this confidence that provides force multipliers when truly needed.

The officers, senior NCOs, and commanders play critical roles in the success of using an exercise as a readiness-building and assessing opportunity. This role comes down to participating actively and monitoring exercise progress. The research heavily endorsed the importance of the commander's being involved and refraining from the temptation to simulate events. As this research indicates by the number one readiness-enabling factor, mobility attitude is the most critical aspect. The commander sets the tone that leads to attitude. If the troops recognize that commanders care about readiness and expect all members to reflect their priority, they will most likely respond accordingly.

The research attempted to ascertain what truly enables personnel readiness and how a new commander should best focus energies to maintain an appropriate mobility posture.

Conclusions

This research began with the intent to address an important leadership problem seen in many operational squadrons from 14 years of personal observation. As a result of human nature and the shortfalls inherent in the current readiness-reporting systems, commanders often experience increased emphasis on home-station, day-to-day activity rather than ensuring all members of a squadron are prepared to deploy and operate on short notice in all conditions. Since readiness is a capability and not a tangible asset, it is difficult to proactively track and manage. Squadron commanders respond to challenges and projects given to them by group and wing commanders to propagate peacetime base-level activity whose fundamental mission is to organize, train, and equip forces. If taken to an extreme, squadron members expend limited resources on home-station priorities, which come at a cost to readiness.

As airmen go through basic training, they experience setting up a bare-base operating location and austere living conditions to provide an understanding of what they could be expected to perform. As they leave and are handed the Airman's Manual, they begin their first assignment with only an artificial understanding of how to survive and operate in true contingency conditions. Commanders, officers, and senior NCOs share the responsibility of replacing inexperience with ability-substantiated confidence through robust processes that monitor true readiness and consistently challenge outdated or ineffective skills and equipment with realistic exercise and training programs. By doing so, they will continue to make it happen, whatever aspect of it the National Military Strategy expects them to do. In doing so, they will continue to evolve as the constantly changing world continues to age and make obsolete the skills of yesterday. It is this effort of leaning forward that truly and effectively enables readiness.

This top-level look at the seven readiness-enabling factors provides a framework from which to compare how well an existing squadron prepares troops for contingency operations. It is the author's intent that this type of analysis and emphasis continue as standard operating procedures as MAJCOMs prepare new commanders for the challenges they will face.

The differences between a ready force and an ill-prepared one are the confidence, attitude, decisiveness, and endurance of the people. The costs run deeper than combat survival but consider family stability and retention of experienced troops to propagate the capabilities only achieved after years of training and exercising. Commanders make a difference by the priorities they communicate. This research challenges all who command to take a close look at readiness preparation.

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Table 1

Seven Enabling Factors for Personnel Readiness


Establish a contingency/mobility mindset.     Commander's
Exercise with intensity.                      emphasis

Standardize mobility processes.               Best practices
Hold individuals accountable.
Train core tasks and mobility skills.
Create a sense of status for mobile ready.
Evaluate using your most experienced troops.

Notes

(1.) Department of the Air Force, Air University (AU)-2, Guidelines for Command, Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, May 1995, 3.

(2.) Department of the Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, [Online] Available: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/pubfiles/af/dd/afddl/afdd1.pdf, Sep 97, 7.

(3.) Lt Col David M. Snyder, USAF; Maj Penny J. Dieryck, USAF; Maj Wesley W. Long, USAF; Maj Thomas G. Philipkosky, USAF; Lt Comdr Ronald Reis, USN, Joint Readiness Assessment and Planning Integrated Decision System: Combat Readiness and Joint Force Management for 2025, Apr 96, research paper presented to Air Force 2025 [Online] Available: http://www.au.af.mil/au/2025/volume1/chapO5/vlc51.htm, 2.

(4.) Department of the Air Force, Air Mobility Command ... Providing America's Global Reach [Online] Available: http://www.transcom.mil/missions/amc.html, 27 Sep 99.

(5.) Department of the Air Force, Air Force Pamphlet 36-2241, Promotion Fitness Examination, Vol I, US Government Printing Office, 1 Jul 99, 25.

(6.) Air Force Officer Oath of Office [Online] Available: http://sun.vmi.edu/hall/oath.htm.

(7.) Air Force Enlisted Oath [Online] Available: http://www.luke.af.mil/protocol/oath_e.doc.

(8.) AU-2, 2.

(9.) Department of the Air Force, Air Force Quality Institute, Air Force Handbook 90-502, The Quality Approach, 1 Aug 96, 20-25.

(10.) AU-2, IX.

(11.) Snyder, et al, 10.

(12.) Department of the Air Force, TAC Manual 2-1, Tactical Air Operations, 15 Apr 78, 10-2.

(13.) Lance A. Glasser, Today's Technology Begets Tomorrow's Military Readiness, [Online] Available: http://www.au.af.mil, ARPA Press Release, 1 Feb 95.

(14.) AFDD 1, 42.

(15.) Capt Danny Halt, USAF, Professor, Air Force Institute of Technology, diagram developed in personal interview, Mar 01.

(16.) Navy Court of Inquiry, Joint Congressional Committee Exhibit No 146, 446-460, question 30 [Online] Available: http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/radar/24 Jul-19 Oct 44.

(17.) Author's interview with Lt Col Norcross, USAF, TALCE commander, Dec 00.

(18.) National Campaign for the Peace Dividend [Online] Available: http://www.fas.org/pub/gen/mswg/ncpd and further emphasized by the Bonn International Center for Conversion [Online] Available: http://www.bicc.de/budget/budget.html.

(19.) Department of the Air Force, USAF Posture 2000 [Online] Available: http://www.af.mil/lib/afissues/2000/posture/postur_2000.pdf, 7.

(20.) USAF Posture 2000, 8.

(21.) Author's interviews with C-130 navigator and C-130 pilot, Jun 01.

(22.) Author's telephone interview with SAF/XOOA, Readiness Division, Pentagon, Sep 00.

(23.) Individual and Family Readiness for Separation and Deployment: Results from the 1992 DoD Surveys of Officers and Enlisted Personnel and Military Spouses, Washington Consulting Group, DMDC Report No 97-003, Apr 97.

(24.) Department of the Air Force, Evaluation Report on the Status of Resources and Training System, Office of the Inspector General Evaluation Report, Arlington, Virginia, DTIC: ADA371536, 15 Mar 96, 7.

(25.) Snyder, et al, 2.

(26.) Merriam-Webster, Collegiate Dictionary for the entry readiness [Online] Available: http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary.

(27.) Lt Col Mitchell H. Stevenson, USA, Desert Shield/Storm Logistics, US Army War College, 15 Apr 93, 4.

(28.) Maj Stephen J. Hagel, USAF, et al, Air Force Desert Shield/Desert Storm Logistics Lessons Learned, Air Force Logistics Management Center Final Report: LX19912097, Maxwell AFB, Gunter Annex, Alabama, Mar 92, 23-24, 41.

(29.) Lt Col Donald E. Fowler II, USA, The 141st Signal Battalion Experience in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: Combat Was Different from Training and Doctrine, US Army War College Study Project, 12 May 93.

(30.) F. Whitten Peters, Secretary of the Air Force, Air Force Policy Letter Digest, [Online] Available: www.af.mil/lib/policy/letters/p199-02.html, Feb 99, 2

(31.) Peters, 3.

(32.) "Interview with Gen Charles T. Robertson, Jr," Mobility Forum: The Journal of the Air Mobility Command's Magazine, Jan/Feb99, Vol 8, Issue 1, 7.

(33.) Rowan Scarborough, "Readiness Is Not Improving," Washington Times, 28 Aug 00 [Online] Available: www.ebird/dtic.mil/aug2000/ e20000828readiness.htm, 3.

(34.) Dr Sheila E. Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force, "Maintain Combat Readiness," FY96 Joint Posture Hearing Statement Presented to Congress, www.afmil/lib/afissues/1995/sec3.html, 1995, 4.

(35.) Individual and Family Readiness for Separation and Deployment: Results from the 1992 DoD Surveys of Officers and Enlisted Personnel and Military Spouses, Washington Consulting Group, Bethesda, Maryland, Apr 97, Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), ADA324054, 1-4.

(36.) Individual and Family Readiness for Separation and Deployment: Results from the 1992 DoD Surveys of Officers and Enlisted Personnel and Military Spouses, 3.

(37.) Evaluation Report on the Status of Resources and Training System, DTIC: ADA37 1536, Office of the Inspector General Evaluation Report No 96-086, Arlington, Virginia, 15 Mar 96, 2.

(38.) Evaluation Report on the Status of Resources and Training System, 4 5.

(39.) Evaluation Report on the Status of Resources and Training System, 7 17.

(40.) Department of the Air Force, AFDD 1-1, Air Force Task List, 12 Aug 98, 12.

(41.) EORI Message 310815Z AUG 99.

(42.) AFDD 1-1, Cover Statement.

(43.) AFDD 1-1, 3.

(44.) Snyder, et al, 9.

(45.) Snyder, et al, 2.

(46.) Department of the Army, Field Manual 25-101, "Mission Essential Task List Development," Chap 2 [Online] Available: http:// www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/25-101/fm251_3.htm.

Major Furst is commander, 354th Transportation Squadron, 354th Logistics Group, Eielson AFB, Alaska.

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