Yes Virginia, issues and images both count in politics - gubernatorial race in Virginia - The 1993 Virginia Governor's Race: Results from an Exclusive C&E Post-Election Poll

Democrat Terry's aggressive advocacy of gun control and her relentless attacks on the NRA clearly backfired. In the end, Allen was viewed as being better able to handle the crucial crime issue.

The Virginia gubernatorial race provided us with fascinating insights into the use of issues in elections, based on the results of our post-election survey.

The contest set Democratic Attorney General Mary Sue Terry, who began the race with a substantial lead, against Republican George Allen, son of the legendary football coach and a former member of Congress. Allen defeated Terry November 2 by a wide 58-41 percent margin.

Over three-fourths of Allen voters said they voted "for" Allen while 19 percent of them said their vote was more of a vote "against" Terry. On the other side, Nearly 70 percent of Terry supporters said theirs was a "for" vote and 24 percent said it was an "against" vote.

Terry focused on gun control, abortion, public education, and opposition to the religious right. Allen campaigned on change, tougher parole, family values (Allen is married with children, Terry is single), and a move away from the policies of incumbent Democratic Governor Doug Wilder.

Terry attacked Allen for his opposition to abortion rights and his refusal to support a five-day waiting period for handgun purchases. She also tried to tie Allen to Religious Right leaders such as Pat Robertson and the GOP's nominee for lt. governor, Mike Farris.

Allen's strategy was to link Terry to the unpopular Democratic regime, using Wilder and his nemesis, U.S. Senator Chuck Robb, as foils. Allen hit the "Robb-Wilder-Terry" link so often that Terry joked in one TV spot that her real name was "Mary Sue" not "Robb Wilder" Terry.

Based on our post-election survey, we found that 84 percent of Allen's voters made up their minds before the last week of the election, 12 percent decided during the final week, and 4 percent on election day. For Terry voters, it was 75, 15, and 10 percent, respectively. In absolute terms, the 16 percent Allen vote deciding in the final seven days still broke the late deciders in his favor and widened his lead.

Allen had a commanding lead in the Richmond area and won handily in the Tidewater and Tri-City regions. But, he also led in Northern Virginia. Previous Democrats owed their victories to big margins in the northern region. While Terry failed to achieve her goal in virtually every area and among all voter groups, her failure in the North was the death blow.

When there's a lopsided victory like this one, one is tempted to say that the loser did almost everything wrong and the winner did almost everything right. But there were important political forces at play, and they are instructive not only for Virginia but across the nation.

Favorable Images

Almost three-fourths of all voters (74 percent) viewed Allen favorably while only 42 percent were so disposed toward Terry. Allen's unfavorable score was a low 20 percent, while Terry's was 54 percent. Across categories like gender, religion, and region, Allen's favorability ranged between 67 and 94 percent. Terry, by contrast, broke 50 percent only among voters aged 65 and over (53 percent).

Allen was viewed favorably by 94 percent of Republicans, 71 percent of Independents and 46 percent of Democrats. By comparison, Terry was viewed favorably by three-fourths of Democrats, 52 percent of Independents, and a scant 18 percent of Republicans. White voters rated Allen 78/19 and Terry 38/58. Black voters had opposite views: Terry scored 79/17 and Allen was pegged at 38/40. Blacks were the only group in which Allen's favorability ratio sloped negatively. Of blacks who reported their gubernatorial choice in our survey, 15 percent voted for Allen. By region, Allen did worst in the North, which also gave Terry her highest favorable, 46 percent.

Favorability Rating

                             (PERCENTAGE)
                           FAV         UNFAV           NET

George Allen               74           20             +54
Don Beyer                  59           27             +32
NRA                        48           43              +5
Mary Sue Terry             42           54             -12
Mike Farris                42           45              -3
Chuck Robb                 40           51             -11
Pat Robertson &
Christian Coalition        36           50             -14
AFL-CIO                    35           35               0
Doug Wilder                34           62             -28
Business PACs              26           22              +4

Robb and Wilder were not in a position to help Terry. Wilder had a two-to-one negative rating, with the highest unfavorable score of anyone measured in the survey (62 percent). Robb was only a little better off with a 51 percent negative (which was actually lower than Terry's 54 percent negative). On the other hand, Don Beyer, the Democratic lieutenant governor who was re-elected November 2 with 54 percent of the vote, received a strong favorability ratio (59/27) second only to Allen.

Farris, the Republican candidate for lieutenant governor, equaled Terry's favorability (42 percent) and was rated unfavorably (45 percent) by fewer voters than was Terry, Robb or Wilder. Pat Robertson and his Christian Coalition received lower ratings (36/50) than Farris.

While Republicans elected a governor and Attorney General, incumbent Democrat Beyer survived the challenge by Republican Farris. If one is to argue that the election result was motivated by a rejection of the Democrats or by a "throw the bums out" sentiment, the survival of Democrat Beyer poses a problem. It may be argued that Beyer won only in contrast to his Religious Right opponent, who's hard conservative positions on social issues no doubt left many voters feeling he was not a mainstream Republican, but a radical alternative, regardless of party.

Viewed in this context, the Beyer anomaly may be explained away. In the final analysis, the November election was a major defeat for the Democratic party in Virginia. It was also a personal defeat for both Terry and Farris, two candidates who ended the race with high negative ratings for very different reasons.

Issue Importance and the Candidate Best Able to Handle the
Issue

                         IMPORTANCE              CANDIDATE BEST
                         (PERCENTAGE)            ABLE TO HANDLE
                                                 (PERCENTAGE)

                         VERY   SOMEWHAT   NOT   ALLEN   TERRY

Crime                     79       16       4     59      27
The Economy               71       21       5     63      21
Public Education          68       24       7     52      36
Control Govt. Spending    66       25       6     63      19
Taxes                     55       31      11     60      22
Gun Control               51       32      15     48      37
Abortion Rights           51       27      18     38      41

The Issues

Crime, the economy and public education led the list of issue importance. Next in line were government spending, taxes, gun control, and abortion rights.

Except for abortion, voters felt Allen was best able to handle all the top issues. Even on abortion, sentiment was closely divided -- 38 percent picked Allen and 41 percent his pro-choice opponent. On gun control, Allen led Terry 48 to 37 percent, despite the fact that Terry targeted this issue and allocated a substantial portion of her well-funded media campaign to attacking Allen's opposition to gun control and his support from the National Rifle Association.

It is obvious from the survey results that Allen benefited from concern about lawlessness and violence. His emphasis on punishment and parole gave him a strong anti-crime posture. Democrat Terry's aggressive advocacy of gun control and her relentless attacks on the NRA clearly backfired. In the end, Allen was viewed as being better able to handle the crucial crime issue by a large 59 to 27 percent edge.

In Virginia, even though the NRA has its share of enemies, it still maintained a net favorable image (by five points) even after fierce attacks from the Democratic ticket. With 54 percent of the electorate claiming to be gun owners and with 48 percent rating the NRA favorably (larger than the 35 percent who rate organized labor favorably and the 26 percent who rate business PACs favorably), the NRA is in a strong position to offset criticism by mobilizing its large membership.

Take northern Virginia, traditionally a Democratic stronghold, where the NRA rates the poorest (34 favorable/59 unfavorable). But even in this region, Allen was perceived as being better able to handle crime by a considerable 54 to 29 percent margin over Terry.

By going after both the NRA and the religious right, Terry aggravated two constituencies which, on election day, swung against her in massive numbers. Allen carried pro-NRA voters by a 34 percent margin and Born Again Christians by 40 points.

Even though both candidates used negative ads extensively, Terry caught the brunt of the backlash. More than twice as many Virginians tagged Terry with running the "dirtiest" campaign than Allen (33 to 15 percent).

After all is said and done, four key factors controlled the election's outcome:

First, Allen was successful in building a highly favorable personal image while his opposition was ineffective in doing the same;

Second, Allen was seen as being better able to handle all of the salient issues except for one, abortion;

Third, Terry got the worst of both worlds from her affiliation with the Democratic Establishment and, in particular, with Gov. Wilder. Wilder failed to turn out the same heavy black vote for her that was critical to his election four years earlier, and his unpopularity was a major drag on Terry's appeal; it wiped out her ability to run as an agent for change.

Fourth, Terry's attacks on the religious right and the NRA seem to have been counterproductive, in that they may have inadvertently mobilized a higher opposition turnout without gaining enough added support from the other side.

The post-election poll used in this analysis was conducted on November 3, 1993. The sample included 505 voters who had cast ballots in the Virginia gubernatorial race. The margin of error was +/-4%.

The survey and analysis were directed by Joe E. Walker, a Democratic pollster who has conducted public opinion surveys in over 600 elections throughout the South during the last 25 years. The telephone interviews were conducted by Communications Center, Inc. based in Louisville, Kentucky.

COPYRIGHT 1993 Campaigns & Elections, Inc.
COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group