Shedding more light on the man in the dark

Lt. Col. Robert R. Leonhard's article in the February issue, "Shedding Light on the 'Man in the Dark,"' prompted the following comments by Capt. Robert Bateman and Col. David Fastabend and the author's response.

The "man-in-the-dark" analogy is overly simplistic. It is sufficient for short essays, but it could be useful for far more. The man in the dark could help the Army community reach a fuller understanding of the competing theories of war and provide a common basis for discussion on related topics. Before that might happen, however, we need to refine the man in the dark. I suggest four scenarios based on this analogy.

Analogies such as this one are important because they are inherently easier to understand and, in this case, familiar to a large percentage of the professional population. The original analogy offered by B.H. Liddell Hart has lasted this long for a reason-it is simple, familiar and easy to manipulate to demonstrate a point. "Simple," "familiar" and "easy" are hardly adjectives applicable to the Army's doctrinal writings. No wonder we so often revert to analogies.

The first problem with Liddell Hart's original analogy is that it did not go far enough. Two men in a dark room searching for each other with outstretched arms describes the action up to the point of contact, but then the tale falls flat. Inadvertently, Liddell Hart describes the situation leading up to the type of fight that is anathema to his professed beliefs in the superiority of the indirect approach.

Consider this: what usually happens when two men finally come to grips? More often than not one man takes hold of the other, pulls him in close and attempts to throw him to the ground. Of course, by then the second man has a good grip as well, and both crash to the ground. This equates to the close fight as envisioned in current Army doctrine.

Each man then attempts to destroy his opponent. Because of the close grip and the physical limitations imposed by lying on the ground, neither does very well, but both are expending energy at a tremendous rate. Victory usually then goes to the stronger. Eventually he will break free, stand and kick his opponent in the head until the fight is complete. This continuation of the man-in-the-dark analogy describes attrition-based warfare.

An alternate scenario based on two men in a dark room might propose that one is a trained boxer. When this skilled fighter feels his opponent with an outstretched hand, he immediately follows with lightning-quick jabbing attacks. His training, agility and physical prowess allow him to attack faster than his opponent can react. Yet his opponent might even the odds if he can charge and begin to grapple with the boxer. By changing the conditions of the fight, the fighter with less training might neutralize his opponent's superior boxing abilities. Equate this example with the North Vietnamese tactic called "hugging the belt," which was used to neutralize superior U.S. firepower during the Vietnam War.

A third scenario places a martial artist in the room. This might be akin to putting a Napoleon on the battlefield. The strength of both comes from their sense of self and their ability to move much faster than their opponents. Recent theories in psychology suggest that there are many different types of intelligence, one of which is kinesthetic, characterized bv a heightened self-awareness, a natural knowledge of the exact specifications of one's body and abilities combined with the ability to perfectly calculate the position of all parts of the body in time and space. This sense of self combined with physical training permits the world-class athlete to perform acts of incredible dexterity, agility and coordination.

How does this theory of intelligence apply to Napoleon? Perhaps Napoleon's greatest strength was an ability to know the locations and strengths of all forces under his command at nay given moment. It appears that he could visualize the terrain and superimpose a mental picture of his forces over that terrain. His raised level of awareness and the speed he required of his men allowed his to mass troops at the places and times of his choice. This analysis of the genius of Napoleon must be tempered by the realization that in the end he, too, resorted to grappling. Of course, the salient point is that by virtue of his speed and self-knowledge he often managed to be a 300-pound man in a dark room with an 80-pound adolescent.

Army doctrine and organizations are designed to create synthetic Napoleons. That is, Napoleon, operating without a staff (in the modern sense) personally collected intelligence, conducted terrain analysis, planned operations and issued orders. He was, quite literally, the brains behind the operations. As we cannot clone new Napoleons, we attempt to replicate his abilities through the use of staffs. Today, technology may be changing the traditional organization of commander supported by staff controlling a few subordinate organizations that have their own commanders and staffs. Col. Leonhard suggested that the new technology the Army is using to enable information warfare might allow the man in the dark to turn on the lights. This extension of the base analogy starts in the right direction by bringing the analogy forward; however, it is an oversimplification that does not highlight the true situation. Even with the incredible advances in information technology, the man in the dark cannot turn on the lights. A better description would be to suggest that the man now wears night-vision devices while the opponent continues to grope about blindly.

I suggest this modification to Col. Leonhard's vision because I incorporate the limiting factors that current doctrine places on us. The current hierarchical system requires that the vast information acquired and used must still be forced through a series of central "brains" (headquarters). The inherent limiting factor on any single headquarters is the ability to process this information rapidly and accurately. Thus, at any single instant it is impossible for the commander, whom the headquarters supports, to see the entire room, as Col. Leonhard suggests is the case when the lights are on. There is just too much data to be processed simultaneously; therefore, data are processed, presented and internalized sequentially.

What is the effect? In the man-inthe-dark scenario it equates to the use of night-vision devices. We can see perfectly, but along a narrow field of vision. We have not turned on the lights, but we have developed tech nology that allows us to see while our opponent cannot. How shall we proceed from this position?

There are two courses, both of which are legitimate improvements. The first is an evolutionary process requiring no dramatic changes to current doctrine. Instead, we attempt to work within the current structure, but make it more capable by creating more efficient headquarters at all echelons. Increased efficiency equates to nightvision devices with a wider field of view. Thus, we still have the single man in the dark room, but he can view more of the room at any given moment. An alternative to this is to use multiple sets of night-vision devices on multiple men. Given that the size of the "man" is limited (by Congress), each of the men is proportionately smaller. However, all are equipped with their own night-vision devices and can operate in concert. What are the benefits of this proposal? Simply that while the one man is armed with one large bat, capable of tremendous power in any swing, he is limited to a single swing of his bat over time X. Of these swings he will fail to connect some percentage of the time, say 50 percent. Multiple smaller men swinging smaller bats might produce a dozen swings. Of these, 50 percent still miss over time X, but 50 percent connect. Moreover, of those 50 percent there might be some specialization. Some of the multiple smaller men are better with an underhand swing and strike at the opponent's center of gravity. One solid hit there and the game is over.

To provide yet another analogy, consider recent advances in supercomputing. What drives the largest and fastest computers yet devised? Is it a single huge processor capable of untold numbers of sequential calculations in an instant? No, it is the construction of thousands of normal speed processors strung together and working in a coordinated manner to complete tasks simultaneously.

How does all of this relate to the real world? Much of that depends on writers of doctrine and the upper echelons of the Army. In concrete terms, however, perhaps we might experiement with some radical designs.

To enable multiple men in the dark requires very real changes to force structure. One level of the current command structure must be dissolved, possibly two.

I suggest that we experiment with a structure that has no brigade headquarters and, possibly, no battalion headquarters. In other words, we should throw the span of control theory right out the window. Allow a division headquarters to loosely control 36 to 42 individual companies. Radical?

To be sure, but it is this type of adjustment that we should consider as we move into a new era. Concentrate the technical ability to widen the field of view or turn on the lights at a single headquarters-the division, for example. At the same time, allow 42 companies to operate according to a single vision, in coordination with each other, without restrictive control from above. Removing the brigade and battalion as tactical headquarters ensures that there is just too much for the division to micromanage. With digital technology and information warfare, companies could operate quickly and effectively in a self-coordinated, dynamic manner.

It is a vision. Perhaps it is the wrong vision. Ideas like this can develop and flourish, however, when we all use the same analogy. Eventually one of will ring true.

CAPT. ROBERT BATEMAN is a graduate student at Ohio State University His next assignm.t is at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y, where he will be teaching military history.

Copyright Association of the United States Army Apr 1997
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