Avoiding a relapse to attrition warfare

A recent report on a video presentation at the 23rd Army Science Conference demonstrated how the future combat system (FCS) vehicles might perform in combat. In the simulation, robotic sensors spot three enemy vehicles and immediately send the information via satellite to a naval vessel that launches missiles which destroy two of the targets. The remaining enemy vehicle was then knocked out by an Air Force fighter-bomber. With this enemy threat eliminated, the FCS cells (of three vehicles each) were free to move forward to look for other enemy positions that could be attacked by distant weapons platforms.

There is a major conceptual flaw in this depiction of future war common to much of the romance associated with precision strike technology. What is presented is an ultimate form of attrition warfare. Every enemy unit encountered is apparently to be destroyed by some exotic means before American units are to venture forth to carry out any type of maneuver. Indeed, there seems to be little envisioned need to maneuver on the battlefield, only hide until the smoke clears and then advance across the craters left by the bombs and missiles. With a weight limit of only 18 tons, there are real questions about the firepower and survivability of the FCS which might make such skulking tactics a necessity. The issue here, however, is whether this vision of war is a step backward to a slower, more grinding process that will not meet the operational and strategic needs of future conflicts.

Much of the evolution in weapons and doctrine in the 20th century has been devoted to overcoming the stalemate of the trenches in World War I. The western front in France from 1915-1917 was the ultimate example of attrition warfare as each side sought ways to smash through the defensive works built in depth from Switzerland to the North Sea. The attempt to destroy every enemy gun position, command post, communications network and bunker so that the infantry could advance led to massive applications of firepower limited only by the ability of factories to turn out shells. When high explosives proved inadequate, chemical weapons were used on a massive scale.

In preparation for the first assault on the French fortifications around Verdun in February 1916, the Germans stockpiled 2,500,000 artillery shells. The initial bombardment by 1,400 guns on an eight mile front lasted 12 hours, with periodic halts to determine what signs of life still remained in the French lines so that the guns could be redirected on these remnants of possible resistance. Yet no breakthrough was achieved. The two armies slugged it out for the next 11 months, firing between them some 40 million artillery rounds. Losses were heavy, the French suffered 543,000 casualties and the Germans 434,000, but neither army could be broken by bombardment.

When the British launched their attack at the Somme in July 1916, their artillery preparation lasted seven days, with 1,500 guns firing over 1,600,000 shells. Yet when the barrage lifted, the Germans crawled out of their deep bunkers and shot the advancing infantry to pieces.

Clearly, methods needed to be found that could get around defenses that could not be blown away. Airpower enthusiasts thought they had the answer: fly over the battlefield and strike directly at the society which the enemy army was defending. Attacks on the enemy homeland would allegedly win the war by destroying the will or means to resist. Aerial bombardment was supposed to wreck morale, especially if the enemy had no means to retaliate in kind or inflict visible losses on attacking bombers. History shows, however, that societies are far tougher than the air theorists thought. Robert Pape, in his 1996 book Bombing to Win, concludes, "In more than 30 major strategic air campaigns that have thus far been waged, air power has never driven the masses into the streets to demand anything." Air campaigns against the means of resistance, the enemy's economy or at least critical components of its defense industry or infrastructure, have also turned out to be more difficult than foreseen. Strategic bombing thus devolves into another kind of attrition warfare, with target lists becoming ever longer as planners search for the breaking point of enemy resistance.

War is about politics, and politics is about the governing of land and people. Enhanced sensors and precision-guided weapons may have greatly improved the efficiency of air operations-fewer sorties and bombs per target-but they have not overcome their basic limitations as an independent force. When the smoke clears, it still takes ground troops to consolidate a victory that really matters. In accordance with the concept of decisive warfare articulated by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, strategy must lead to the removal of the hostile regime whose ambitions threaten American security interests. That objective cannot be achieved from 10,000 feet in the air or from 20 miles off the coast.

The need has been to replace ground battles of attrition based on firepower with what the Germans called battles of annihilation based on maneuver. The last year of World War I saw both the Germans and the Allies using new tactics and weapons that sought to restore mobility to the battlefield. Infiltrating infantry and primitive tanks were used to penetrate defenses, avoiding strong points while advancing on rear areas. Major enemy units would be enveloped and forced to either surrender, attempt breakouts at disadvantageous odds or be wiped out one by one in isolated pockets. Annihilation would not be the result of the physical destruction of every enemy soldier and weapon, but by the disruption of the enemy's forces which destroys their ability to hold ground or maintain cohesion during combat or movement.

One of the constants in military history from ancient times to the present is that the real destruction of an army occurs when it is forced to retreat. As Napoleon said of retreats, "The loss of life is often greater than in two battles." When the enemy is surrounded by rapid maneuver as well as subject to vigorous pursuit, he can be annihilated as a fighting force. The majority of his soldiers will end up as prisoners rather than casualties, and the bulk of his weapons and equipment will be abandoned rather than engaged in any shootout. The great encirclement battles on the Eastern Front in World War II, and during the Normandy breakout, are the ultimate examples of this approach, as were Gen. Douglas MacArthur's landing at Inchon in Korea and Israel's counterattack across the Suez in 1973.

The maneuver-based campaign can also be much quicker than one based on attrition. The year 1918 saw a shift in artillery tactics from days of saturation bombardment to a few hours of intense shelling. The objective was no longer to destroy every enemy position-a tactic to which defenders had adapted by digging deeper or by executing temporary withdrawals-but to disorient and stun defenders just long enough for assault units to overrun them.

The ability of defenders to adapt to lengthy air bombardment is similar, and not limited to adapting to artillery attack on the front lines. The longer an air campaign runs against strategic targets, such as communications networks and supply lines, the more time the enemy has to adapt and find alternative ways to send messages and supplies. Loss of communications and the disruption of logistics are most crucial during a period of intense ground combat when there is a need for a coordinated response and stockpiled supplies are being exhausted or overrun. Airpower, like mobile artillery, is most useful in support of a ground offensive rather than as an independent striking arm.

Airpower and precision strike must be seen as vital parts of the larger ground battle of annihilation, not as a substitute for it. Airpower is needed to help protect the flanks of rapidly advancing armored and mechanized units, and for providing on-call fire support for their lead elements. The number of kills racked up by the bombers is less important than their shock effect in disrupting enemy deployments and slowing enemy reactions so that friendly ground units can pin, envelop and rout opposing forces.

Desert Storm saw 34 days of air strikes as part of an attrition campaign against the Iraqi army and in particular the Republican Guard. The aim was to reduce the combat effectiveness of Iraqi units by 50 percent through bombardment. The inherent difficulty of making such an assessment has provoked endless arguments as to how effective air strikes had been prior to the launch of the ground offensive.

What is clear, however, is that it took only four days for the Army and Marines to annihilate the Iraqi army and most of the Republican Guard through rapid maneuver and close combat. The so-called "Hail Mary" flanking movement by the XVIII and VII Corps not only bypassed the entrenched Iraqi frontline infantry divisions, but brought overwhelming strength to bear against Iraq's armored reserves and Republican Guard.

Given the delicate diplomatic environment that will surround most future uses of American military power, it will not be politically attractive to engage in weeks (or months as in Kosovo) of aerial bombardment before decisive action can be taken to bring a conflict to a victorious conclusion. The need for the rapidly deployable FCS, as well as for airmobile Stryker brigades, expanded amphibious groups, enhanced prepositioning of heavy units and faster sea transports, stems from the fact that only ground troops can bring fire and maneuver together to win America's wars.

WILLIAM R. HAWKINS is senior fellow for National Security Studies at the U.S. Business and Industry Council Educational Foundation in Washington, D.C.

Copyright Association of the United States Army Mar 2003
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