Lessons Learned From the Battle of the Bulge

The Battle of the Bulge is a timeless battle study because of its historic value for students of modern-day operations, tactics and doctrine. This famous battle embodies many principles and tenets of the operational art of war as practiced by Napoleon, such as manoevres sur les derriers (envelopment and placing forces behind the enemy astride his lines of communications), as well as the German blitzkrieg tactics, that also relied upon envelopment and destruction. In the Ardennes, the Germans attempted to cut the Allied lines of communications and paralyze and disrupt Allied forces. What defeated the Germans were the combined arms defenses of St. Vith and Bastogne that put the German lines of communications in jeopardy.

The St. Vith battle traded space for time-time needed to establish a hard shoulder defense on the northern flank of the Bulge. The successful defense of the transportation hub of Bastogne drew German units into killing zones and set back the German timetable. In both battles, a light-heavy mix of forces was used effectively. In the north, infantry and airborne troops backed up the 7th Armored Division in its mobile defense of St. Vith. The successful fighting withdrawal of the 7th Armored Division bought time to organize a cohesive defense on the north shoulder of the Bulge. This upset the timetable for the German offensive and the German forces never regained their momentum; thus, the German conditions for success were never realized. In the south, the remnants of the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions, plus their organic artillery and some VIII Corps Artillery units, provided the mobile counterattack force and firepower support for the besieged troops of the 101st Airborne Division surrounded in Bastogne.

The defense of Bastogne showed how a light division, augmented with heavy forces and fire support, was able to withstand the attack of armor-heavy German forces. This example was used as part of the rationale for the development of the U.S. light divisions and to justify their usefulness in a NATO environment. As a testament to the importance of a heavy-light force mix in mid- to high-intensity combat, heavy-light force mixes have been de rigeur for the scenarios of the Army's Battle Command Training Program's computer-driven, command post exercise war games. They have also proved effective in Iraq.

The ability to see the battlefield, as in Napoleon's directed telescope, that marks a great commander, was demonstrated by Gens. Bruce Clarke, Troy Middleton and Anthony McAuliffe in deciding where to fight and how to do it. Middleton recognized that holding the key road junctions of St. Vith and Bastogne for as long as possible was necessary to defend against the German thrusts. By deciding to fight for these road junctions, Middleton determined the operational course of the battle. Clarke and McAuliffe did their part by recognizing the importance of their mission and by fighting superb tactical battles to hold those road junctions and delay the enemy.

Another officer who could see the battlefield and who had an excellent control of his battle space was Lt. Col. Creighton W. Abrams, who commanded the final thrust that relieved Bastogne. It was said, "Abrams, when he got into combat, knew everything that was going on. How he knew it, nobody knew, but he did. He knew where every tank was. He knew where every piece of equipment was, and he could command and move his outfit and always defeat the enemy in front of him. It was just that simple." He certainly had situational awareness and a common operating picture of what was happening.

While Middleton and his commanders were able to see the battlefield after the Germans tipped their hand, the German deception plan was exceptionally effective at the start of the offensive. The Allies were attempting to defend frontages in the Ardennes that caused each division to cover about 20 miles with unseasoned troops. Allied intelligence estimated that the Germans could counterattack with only a weak force. In fact, the Germans attacked with a 4-to-1 advantage, about the same as that used by Gen. Erich Ludendorff in the great final offensive on the Western front in March 1918. Tight German security had also worked against them, however, because it prevented German commanders from making detailed, well-prepared plans. A deception plan that had kept them in the dark until the last minute prevented German commanders from seeing through the battlefield to their proper objectives. Thus, the Germans were fatally delayed at St. Vith and Bastogne. The almost undetected massing of 36 divisions of Army Group B against 14 divisions of the U.S. First Army did not result in the complete breakthrough desired by Hitler's high command.

The Bulge was probably Dwight D. Elsenhower's finest hour as a commander. He was the epitome of a coalition commander-calm, in control and optimistic. He ordered American and British units from north and south to the Bulge to reinforce the defense and prepare for offensive action. He brought reinforcements from Great Britain and committed his strategic reserve of two U.S. airborne divisions. He ordered the communications zone combed for replacements to fill vacancies in the ranks of combat units caused by the German offensive. He motivated his subordinates, especially Lt. Gen. George S. Patton Jr., to go on an immediate offensive that rallied the Allies and rebuilt shattered morale. It was Ike's finest hour.

The German offensive also put great strains on the Allied coalition leadership. On December 20, Eisenhower reluctantly put Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery in charge of U.S. troops in the northern part of the Bulge salient. This caused discontent among many senior U.S. generals (Omar Bradley and George Patton in particular) and it was politically unpopular in the United States. The issue was not resolved until Eisenhower brought Montgomery to heel by threatening to have one of them (Eisenhower or Montgomery) replaced. We know who won that confrontation. Unity of command survived under Eisenhower and the march to the Rhine continued after the Bulge had been reduced.

The fog of battle, both literally and figuratively, had a great influence upon the campaign. Foggy weather hampered Allied air interdiction, close air support and reconnaissance. The speedy arrival of the 101st Airborne into Bastogne and the aggressive defense of that town with meager armored forces gave the impression of more strength than was really there. Roadblocks covered by infantry and armor, and artillery fire delayed the advance of the XXXXVII Panzer Corps long enough for McAuliffe to set up the defense of Bastogne.

The Germans had counted on Otto Skorzeny's commandos and Freiherr von der Heydte's paratroopers to wage an effective rear battle along the Allied lines of communications. This was not to be because of poor planning that wasted those forces in ineffective skirmishes against superior forces. Neither of the forces knew the correct picture of the battle once they were inserted and they fell victim to a fog of battle of their own.

As the 101st Airborne Division Artillery commander, McAuliffe recognized the importance of massing artillery fires to stop the German attacks. From the central position of encircled Bastogne, McAuliffe was able to concentrate all his artillery units (initially as many as 11 battalions and 130 tubes) against the German armored and motorized attacks that attempted to penetrate all around the Bastogne perimeter. Harassing fire was rarely used by McAuliffe. He fired his artillery in heavy concentrations that produced results arid made the Germans think that McAuliffe was confidently relying upon ample stocks of supplies. Air support during the periods of good weather was also effective against the Germans.

McAuliffe bracketed their work with his artillery concentrations. The synergistic effect of brave infantrymen, massed artillery and close air support was why Bastogne held. The Allied air superiority forced the Germans to resort to night attacks, but the American artillery was still effective against them.

McAuliffe also recognized the importance of infantry and he tasked Brig. Gen. Gerald J. Higgins, the assistant division commander and an experienced infantryman, with ensuring that troop dispositions supported his defense plans. As one might expect, that was an endless task that did not come with a regular sleep plan. Higgins correctly predicted the before dawn attack on Christmas Day by elements of the 15th Panzergrenadier Division and he made sure that the strongest and freshest troops, paratroopers of the 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment and glider infantrymen of the 327th Glider Infantry Regiment, were ready in the area of the attack.

Almost 60 years have taken their toll on the veterans of the Ardennes fighting. Most of the principal commanders in the Battle of the Bulge are gone now. Those who remain still have vivid memories of December 1944. To young soldiers of today, the heroic defense of St. Vith and Bastogne is something they read about in unit histories or learn during staff rides to the Ardennes battlefields if they are lucky enough to go on one. A cottage industry has grown up among professional military historians and history buffs sponsoring these tours.

In recent years, both German and American veterans' groups have made regular pilgrimages to the Ardennes. They meet and exchange glances and stiff courtesies at the monuments and cemeteries. Only later over a few drinks does the soldiers' camaraderie really show through.

The Belgian countryside has recovered from the destruction of two Allied liberations in 1944 (the initial one in September and the last one in December) that were far worse than the damage inflicted by the Germans in 1940. The Belgians are tolerant of Americans, respect them and freely welcome them into their country. They know the value of Churchill's "ever-famous American victory."

By Lt. Col. Thomas D. Morgan

LT. COL. THOMAS D. MORGAN, USA Ret., was commissioned in Field Artillery from the U.S. Military Academy. He holds an MPA from the University of Missouri and a master's degree in history from Pacific Lutheran University in Tacoma, Wash.

Copyright Association of the United States Army Dec 2004
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