Training for the commander's intent - Letters - Letter to the Editor

Dear Sir:

It is often stated that the minimum we need for tactical success is the mission statement and the commander's intent. When the enemy does not cooperate with our plans and the fog of battle has set in, it is vital that leaders use these two pieces of information to accomplish the task. Leaders who can react quickly and decisively to rapidly changing situations are crucial to our organization. Those who are only capable of inflexibly following the plan will often find themselves on the losing side. This concept was reinforced this summer as I watched sophomore cadets at the U.S. Military Academy conduct maneuver training. Those squads and platoons that possessed leaders with initiative and an understanding of the commander's intent succeeded while others failed. In my experience, company-level and below training emphasizes execution of the plan. This is a deficiency that should be remedied, if possible. I propose a guide for planning this type of tactical training.

An example of 'plan-oriented' training is the platoon lane training that my mechanized infantry battalion conducted in Germany. This training consisted of three platoon lanes, each with a different mission focus. The lanes consisted of a platoon defense of a battle position, a platoon hasty defense, and a platoon attack. Do not misunderstand me; the training provided some excellent lessons and a rare opportunity to maneuver the platoon. However, the training failed to test leaders' ability to react to the unexpected. In all scenarios, the intelligence on the enemy was flawless and the enemy performed exactly as expected. The only requirement was for leaders to execute the plan to standard. Certainly this was enough of a challenge for some depending on the level of experience involved. However, we can and need to do better.

Training should be conducted to emphasize execution of the commander's intent. The way to do this requires only a slight modification to our current lane training doctrine. Leaders and units can receive a mission, conduct troop-leading procedures, and begin execution of the mission. The modification comes when the enemy is not in templated positions, is on a different timeline, or is using a different direction of attack. For example, a unit finds that the enemy is not in the templated position and must adjust the objective's location because the commander's intent was to destroy all enemy vehicles in sector. Also, the unit is defending a battle position and the enemy is attempting to bypass this defense. Now the leader must change posture and move his defense to prevent enemy penetration of the phase line in accordance with the commander's intent. With these changes, we force the leader to react to a different environment than he had expected. If he possesses a firm understanding of the mission and the commander's intent, then he will react appropriately and emerge victorious. If not, then an AAR can be conducted and the unit re-cocked with yet another spin on the enemy situation. The idea is to engrain in the leaders that the plan is a good structure for their operations but it must not hinder mission execution.

Training is often constrained by land, money, time, and available personnel resources. This may force units to conduct plan-oriented training. However, if the resources are available, then intent-oriented training should be conducted. The amount of land required for this type of training will probably be larger. The boundaries of the lane need to be sufficiently wide to allow a leader and/or the OPFOR to react or maneuver in a rapidly changing environment. The amount of time needed to train a unit will probably increase as well. This is due to both the need for retraining and the amount of time it will take leaders to develop fragmentary orders. The bottom line is the way the lanes are resourced and planned will change slightly.

Despite the ease of the transition to this new model, we cannot abandon the old model completely. There is definitely value in the old methodology. Units need the structure of the old lanes when key leaders have turned over or a large period of time has lapsed since the last training event on this mission. Units and leaders need to ramp up to the new level competence before beginning intent-based training--envision the old system as the crawl and walk phases and the intent-based training as the run phase.

In conclusion, we want leaders who can react and apply doctrine appropriately in nondoctrinal situations. The only way to realistically prepare leaders for this task is to place them in these situations during training. I believe that if we can get to this intent-based training method, we will more effectively prepare our leaders and units for mission accomplishment.

CPT PAUL MAXWELL

U.S. Military Academy

West Point, NY

COPYRIGHT 2003 U.S. Army Armor Center
COPYRIGHT 2003 Gale Group