Jayhawk: The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War

Jayhawk: The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by Dr. Stephen A. Bourque, Department of the Army, Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 2002, 514 pp., $52.00

JAYHAWK is an in-depth look at Operations Desert Shield and Storm from the formation of modern maneuver strategy through deployment, campaign planning, and execution. JAYHAWK examines command and control of large unit organizations and the application of untested doctrine through exhaustive planning, training, and execution. Dr. Stephen Bourque recounts an honest and revealing portrayal of the challenges of modern war facing commanders, mixed with candid accounts of senior commanders, and provides his analysis of modern warfare. JAYHAWK chronicles the validation of the then-untested AirLand Battle Doctrine developed over the two decades since the failures of the Vietnam War. Moreover, Bourque establishes that the Persian Gulf War was a validation of the U.S. Army's training program.

Bourque takes readers deeper than they have ever gone inside major combat operations. He delivers the inside details of U.S. Army doctrine as it was being exercised, making readers feel they are learning as well as being entertained. Linking doctrine to application, JAYHAWK is a gem of clarity and coherence.

Bourque is a retired armor officer (a Desert Storm veteran of the 1st Infantry Division and U.S. VII Corps) and a history professor. He is the well-published author, chronicling armor operations in the Persian Gulf War with articles appearing in ARMOR, Middle East Journal and the Quarterly Journal of Military History. A historian by trade, Bourque has done his research and has portrayed modern warfare with its constraints in geography, scope, weapons, and effects. His firsthand experiences as an armor officer form the valuable base for his writing.

JAYHAWK is a meticulous exercise in source documentation. Based on a wealth of primary and secondary sources, Bourque exhaustively uses briefings, plans and orders, staff journals and chronologies, situation reports, interviews, after-action reviews, training manuals, government and commercial books and manuscripts, and journal articles to tell the tale of the victorious exploits of the U.S. Army in the Persian Gulf. Despite its extensive documentation, JAYHAWK is a remarkable easy read.

JAYHAWK is not only a detailed record of major combat operations, but provides candid after-actions review, exposing the fissures of command and control during large-scale unit operations. To his credit, Bourque admits that JAYHAWK, though extremely comprehensive, would not detail individual battles that ensued. Fortunately, this does not detract from his stated themes of complex operations, old-fashioned soldiering, initiative, and complex command and control.

JAYHAWK achieves its goals of expounding on the trials and successes of large-unit command and control. Bourque depicts the command and control procedures of each major command of VII Corps, ranging from the 1st Infantry Division Commander, Major General Thomas Rhame, commanding his division from the turret of a M1A1 Abrams, to VII Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Frederick Franks' regular command visits to his subordinate commanders in his Blackhawk helicopter. The time and space challenges of fast-moving armored warfare exposed fissures in command and control capabilities, but validated the principles of the orders process in clearly communicating a commander's intent and the importance of regular face-to-face communications between commanders.

Training programs at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, and Reforger exercises in Europe enabled battalion and brigade commanders to be proficient at movement of their headquarters. However, few headquarters above the brigade level have conducted such large-scale maneuvers since the Korean War. JAYHAWK reminds us that when preparing for future operations, we should not focus on how we could do better what we have already tried to do.

Bourque's thorough writing is so strong that readers feel they are there. I personally began reading JAYHAWK during our deployment to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom II. It was vividly striking how much of what Bourque details about the VII Corps' deployment to Operation Desert Shield mirrors my own experiences deploying the headquarters company of an armor task force as an executive officer. I recall reading the chapter on port operations and onward movement only after our own advance party and port debarkation operations in Kuwait. I had the utmost desire to kick myself in the "4th point of contact" for not studying VII Corps lessons learned beforehand.

JAYHAWK is essential reading for all who would understand the dramatic application of the then-untested AirLand Battle Doctrine and the trials and successes of large-unit command and control.

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