Information management legislation in the last quarter of the 20th century: A records management disaster

Several important pieces of information management legislation have been enacted by the U.S. Congress during the last quarter of the 20th century. Both the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 and the National Archives and Records Administration Act of 1984 were passed in expectation of improving the Federal government's information handling practices. Yet there have been unintended consequences resulting from the implementation of both laws. In this article, the author looks behind the scenes and examines the unfortunate effect each act has had on the governmentwide Federal records management program. Revolutionary changes are recommended.

On October 3, 1977, the Commission on Federal Paperwork issued its final report to the President of the United States. The report said, Information Resources Management is the answer! It did not state what the question was.

The essence of the Information Resources Management (IRM) concept is that information is a resource that should be managed in the same manner as other resources, such as personnel, money, oil, or copper. Given that information is ethereal in nature, lacks intrinsic worth, and is not consumed in its use, the concept is totally without validity. It was, nevertheless, immediately embraced as gospel throughout the public, private, and academic sectors of our society.

It has been almost twenty years since the IRM concept came into being. These days one does not hear it referred to very often because, as is the way with most managerial concepts that prove not to work, it has been supplanted by a newer theory that is also not working. Yet unlike other concepts (Economic Order Quantity, Management by Objectives, and Zero Based Budgeting spring to mind) which have come and gone with little lasting damage, IRM left an injurious legacy-the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT RATIONALE

Managerial concepts do not usually result in legislation-and for good reason. One cannot legislate good management any more than one can legislate morality. Occasionally, however, forgetting where the road paved with good intentions leads, the notion is tried. In the case of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (PRA-80), the rationale was essentially twofold:

to minimize the Federal paperwork burden on the public; and

to establish uniform Federal information policies and practices.

On the surface, it is impossible to argue with either motive. To be against reducing a public paperwork burden is tantamount to being against peace, and to espouse nonuniform policies and procedures for some 200 Federal agencies is to advocate chaos. But if one goes beyond the surface, one uncovers some interesting facts: First, there was already legislation in place to handle the public burden issue; and second, the policies and procedures mandated were based on an erroneous concept-IRM. As we examine these facts, we will see that from a records management perspective, PRA-80 was not only unnecessary, but also disastrous.

THE PUBLIC BURDEN

Initial work for the PRA-80 was begun in the late 1970s as a result of the work done by the aforementioned Commission on Federal Paperwork. For those who may be wondering about the word "paperwork," keep in mind that prior to the mid-1980s electronic recordsexcept for large mainframe computer tapes and disks-were all but unheard of. The Commission had a broad charter to examine Federal records management practices and one of the areas it investigated was "public use reporting." Federal records management programs traditionally have been based on the life-cycle theory of records management. Reports management is an integral element of those programs and public use reporting is the term used to describe the process of collecting information from the public (i.e., individuals, businesses, and state and local governments).

The Commission found that over the years public use reporting had grown substantially. The "public burden" (the amount of time and money necessary for the public to respond to the government's requests for information) had therefore grown as well. A 1973 study by the General Accounting Office (GAO), which serves as the investigating arm of Congress, documented the cost to the American taxpayers to be in excess of $43 billion per year.

For over three decades there had been legislation on the books that had been enacted expressly to reduce the public burden. The Federal Reports Act of 1942 made it clear that the government's collection of information should have a minimal impact on the public. That Act assigned responsibility for managing public use reporting to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which was supposed to act like a junkyard dog to protect the public's interest.

After the enactment of the Federal Reports Act of 1942, OMB issued Circular No. A-40 outlining a procedure for the control of public use reporting. Federal agencies were aware of Circular A-40 and knew that proposed public use reports had to be cleared through OMB prior to being disseminated for information collection. As OMB circulars are policy directives and carry the force of regulation within the Federal government, there was no question about compliance. And yet, with a $43 billion annual cost, the "public burden" had clearly gotten out of hand. The question, of course, was why.

A "POLITICAL" ANSWER

The Commission on Federal Paperwork was not the first inquiring body to examine the records management practices of the Federal government. As far back as 1810, the Quincy Committee was established for just that purpose. Over the years, a series of committees or commissions was chartered (1877, 1887, 1905, 1910, 1947, and 1953), each one lasting a few years, reporting its findings, and making recommendations to alleviate the problems found.

It is a fascinating exercise to read the reports of these investigatory bodies. Indeed, one who is naive about the innermost workings of the bureaucracy might read them and conclude that there was some mysterious force that controlled Federal government operations. From the Quincy Committee on, no individual, office, or agency was ever reported to be responsible for the conditions that were found to exist. Time after time it was noted that more records were kept than were necessary, procedures were overly complex, filing systems were illogical, there was an inadequate use of technology, etc. Since there had to be some reason for the conditions, the usual ruse was to blame the situation on ambiguities in existing legislation. The Commission on Federal Paperwork followed its predecessors well. Both the Federal Records Act of 1950 (amended in 1976) and the Federal Reports Act of 1942 were deemed to be inadequate.

All laws are worthless if they are not enforced. The Federal Reports Act of 1942 was no exception. The fact is, OMB had done a terrible job of enforcing the Act and of managing public use reporting. Management of a reports program requires more than issuing a procedural order, maintaining a ledger with a list of continuous numbers, and rubber stamping "approved" on the request forms. Reports analysis involves asking questions such as:

Why is the information needed?

Can it be obtained elsewhere or in a less onerous manner?

Can it be obtained from fewer respondents (i.e., will a sample suffice)?

Can exception reporting be utilized?

Is the report really necessary at all?

Had the Public Use Reports Program been managed as mandated by the Federal Reports Act of 1942, and in accordance with sound records management principles and practices developed by the National Archives in the 1940s and '50s, there is no way that the public burden would have reached $43 billion by 1973. The legislation was not inadequate; the junkyard dog had simply been asleep.

Nevertheless, PRA-80 was drafted to accomplish what the Federal Reports Act of 1942 had not. This time, however, the legislation mandated that a specific organization be established to manage the program within OMB-the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs-OIRA.

There was nothing wrong with the idea of establishing OIRA, but legislation was not required to do it. The government has thousands of offices that have been created to conduct its business and very few of them have been specifically mandated by law. The theory was that by having OIRA legitimized in this manner it would have more clout and respect than would otherwise be the case, and it would therefore be better able to perform the mission of reducing the public burden. Had this theory been correct, there would have been no reason for the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 some 15 years later.

UNIFORM POLICIES AND PRACTICES

OMB is responsible for far more than just public use reporting. Whenever legislation is passed that affects the operation of the Federal establishment, OMB, as the management arm of the government, is supposed to take the lead in explaining how the legislation is to be implemented. In this instance, because the parts of PRA-80 dealing with uniform policies and practices were vague, and because it was realized that policies and practices were at the heart of any information management effort, it fell on OMB to issue direction. In 1985-five years after PRA-80 was passed-OMB issued Circular No. A-130.

Generically titled, "Management of Information Resources," Circular No. A-130 deals almost exclusively with information technology. Anyone reading the document would immediately understand why it took five years to produce. Including the appendices, it is 50 pages longsingle spaced-and epitomizes everything that has ever been wrong with government directives. It contains philosophical platitudes:

"b. Government information is a valuable national resource. It provides citizens with knowledge of their government, society, and economy-past, present, and future; is a means to ensure the accountability of government; is vital to the healthy performance of the economy; is an essential tool for managing the government's operations; and is itself a commodity often with economic value in the marketplace." convoluted language:

"...Agencies shall:

(1) Establish multiyear strategic planning processes for acquiring and operating information technology that meet program and mission needs, reflect budget constraints, and form the bases for their budget requests;. .."

and gratuitous trivialities:

"...The Archivist of the United States shall:

(1) Administer the Federal records management program in accordance with the National Archives and Records Act;.. "

Records management was included in PRA-80 because, as previously explained, reports management is a records management function. But the wording of the Act was so ambiguous it could be interpreted as requiring that far more than just public use reporting be controlled. The Act stated that records management practices and programs were to be "integrated with the information policies being mandated." Because the information policies were ultimately those established by OMB through Circular No. A130, the records management function in the Federal government was subsumed into IRM.

WHAT IS IRM?

If one were to walk into any junior high school, select several students at random, and ask the question, "What is information?", one would get some sort of a logical response. Some might say that information was data; some might say that information was knowledge; and some might even say that information was words or symbols that convey meaning. But in no instance would any 12-year-old with a normal mental capacity say that information was equipment.

And yet the management of information-or Information Resources Management-as it has been defined by "practice" in government, corporate, or academic offices for over twenty years, revolves around the acquisition, operation, and maintenance of automated data processing and telecommunications "equipment"-rather than being focused on the information itself!

The reasons for this anomaly are many. I have dealt with some of them in previous articles. I have suggested, for example, that the entire office automation craze that began in the 1970s was little more than a huge scam perpetrated by technology manufacturers and vendors. I have suggested that the switch from a manufacturing-based economy to an information-based economy has resulted in our having offices filled with people who produce nothing. I have even suggested that because white collar support functions have grown to the extent they have over the past half century, organizations have completely lost sight of their reason for existence, and that what used to be considered as mundane administration is now classified as the organizational mission. But there is yet an additional reason. It has to do with the human condition and the fact that people who do not understand (or don't want to deal with) a broad issue find some lesser sub-element within that issue that they can understand (and are willing to deal with), and they focus on that.

A simple example will put the issue into perspective: Suppose there are five employees in an organizational unit, four of whom function satisfactorily and one who is practically incapable of doing much more than breathing. At a management meeting, the employees' supervisor mentions the problems he is having and suggests that it might be time for some action. The director, who is well known for not wanting to face any problem, let alone one having anything to do with personnel, responds to the supervisor's statement by saying, "Yes, action is necessary; let's review and rewrite all the position descriptions."

Needless to say, rewriting the position descriptions will not solve the problem. Everybody in the meeting knows it. But nobody in the meeting wants to deal with an adverse personnel action, so rewriting position descriptions is an ideal way to pretend to be dealing with the issuewithout really dealing with it at all. Position descriptions are totally understandable things on which to focus; they are at least tangentially related to the subject of personnel; and they can be manipulated without consequence. The position descriptions will get rewritten-and the problem employee will stay firmly in place.

A similar thing, on a slightly more gargantuan scale, happened with IRM. There is, and (as can be seen from the series of commission reports dating back to 1810) always has been, an information management problem in the Federal government. However, the legislators in Congress and the managers in OMB couldn't understand or didn't want to deal with the problem. So a solution that couldn't possibly solve the problem was conjured up and implemented.

Information technology equipment is like a position description. It is understandable; it is at least tangentially related to the real issue; and it can be acquired and manipulated without consequence. If the charge of conscious problem avoidance seems overly harsh, there is one additional fact that should be considered: Neither PRA-80 nor OMB's Circular No. A-130 contains a definition of IRM! When legislation is passed and legislative guidance issued, and nowhere is the subject defined, then suspicion is not only warranted, it is essential.

ADDITIONAL LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS

When the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act was passed in 1949, the National Archives, which had been an independent agency since its inception in 1934, was renamed the National Archives and Records Service (NARS) and placed within the newly-formed General Services Administration (GSA). To say that it was not a happy union would be to understate the case substantially. GSA was responsible for Federal property and supplies, and the archivists, naturally, had a difficult time considering their historical documents in that light.

In the early 1980s, after the politics of the Watergate scandal cast a serious doubt that an Archivist of the U.S. reporting to an Administrator of General Services could maintain the nation's historical integrity, a concerted effort was made by the historical/archival community to have the National Archives designated as an independent agency. The effort proved successful. Passage of The National Archives and Records Administration Act of 1984 (unofficially called the "Free NARS Act"-an example of the esteem in which GSA was held) was heralded as an almost miraculous victory by the historians and archivists. The battle, however, was not won without casualties. Records management was sacrificed.

To understand the nature of the sacrifice, one must understand something of the relationship between "archives" and "records management." Although records management was equal in the NARS title, it was always a stepchild to those running the agency. The top level managers never seemed to be able to grasp the idea that unless you managed records while they were current, you would not have them later on so that they could become archival. Although the NARS Office of Records Management's pioneering efforts in the information field in the 1950s and '60s are legendary, there were times when its accomplishments seemed to be achieved despite the archives side of the house, instead of in harmony with it. Therefore, when the archivists were asked to relinquish a portion of the records management program as part of the price of independence, they not only paid it, they paid it willingly.

The National Archives and Records Administration Act of 1984 divided the governmentwide Federal records management program into two separate parts. The new National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) would be responsible for "adequacy of documentation," and GSA would be responsible for "efficiency of operations." The split was a functional abomination. Under the best of circumstances it could not have worked. Circumstances, unfortunately, were far from the best.

MANAGERIAL MANIPULATION

The "efficiency of operations" segment of records management was not something that was foisted off onto GSA managers against their will. Quite the contrary, when it became apparent that NARS was going to be set free, officials within GSA fought long and hard to get a part of the governmentwide records management program. Those in the Federal records management community have long wondered why. Given the events that have transpired during the past dozen years, there is, unfortunately, only one logical explanation. GSA wanted the positions that went with the function.

Managers everywhere engage in empire building, so GSA's desire for positions was not unusual. What was unusual in this particular case was the scope of the conquest and the way in which it was able to be effected. Almost all of NARS' highly trained records management professionals were transferred to GSA. The rationale that was used to justify the transfer was the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980!

PRA-80 (and subsequently OMB Circular No. A-130) mandated that the IRM concept be implemented within the Federal establishment. GSA was already responsible for information technology and therefore became responsible for IRM implementation. Since IRM was to include records management, GSA said that it needed records management personnel to do its job.

What the "job" was, of course, was open to some debate. Because GSA managers saw IRM as nothing more than information technology, records management was pushed into the background. Within one year after their arrival at GSA, onethird of the transferred NARS employees had been reassigned to functions outside of records management. Within five years, fewer than half were still actively working in the records management program. By the end of 1996, through reorganizations and reassignments, the number had shrunk to zero.

Records management within NARA fared only slightly better. The split left the new agency with only a handful of employees to provide governmentwide program guidance and oversight. If previous agency heads had been ambivalent about the records management function, those who followed between 1985 (when the "Free NARS Act" took effect) and 1995 were positively antagonistic to it.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT REDUX

Had PRA-80 been passed and forgotten about, one could perhaps understand how it was possible for GSA to neglect records management's "efficiency of operations" to the point of disappearance. Congressional oversight of the governmentwide records management program has always been cursory, and splitting the function into two parts would make it that much easier to ignore. The exact opposite, however, was the case. The legislation kept resurfacing. Congress amended PRA-80 by enacting the Paperwork Reduction Reauthorization Act of 1986. The amendment provided additional funding for OIRA and, attempted (for the first time) to define IRM. The Act stated:

"...the term `information resources management' means the planning, budgeting, organizing, directing, training, promoting, controlling, and management activities associated with the burden, collection, creation, use, and dissemination of information by agencies, and includes the management of information and related resources such as automatic data processing equipment..."

The definition is interesting. If one wants to make the case that records are information (and one can hardly make any other case), then IRM would encompass records management, and it would naturally follow that whatever agency had responsibility for IRM (in this case GSA) would have responsibility for the governmentwide records management program. Yet despite the definition, there is not one mention of records management in the entire amendment (which dealt primarily with information technology funding and acquisition), and both GSA and NARA continued with their joint custody.

Perhaps we need to look at OMB Circular No. A-130 again for interpretation and guidance. This time, however, we can look not at the 1985 version, but at the 1993 revision, which is based not just on PRA-80, but on its 1986 amendments as well. Even longer than the original, the 1993 revision does, indeed, mention records management. It defines the terms "records" and "records management" (using the definitions from the Federal Records Act of 1950 as amended) and enumerates the responsibilities of Federal agencies regarding records management as follows:

"...Agencies shall:

(a) Ensure that records management programs provide adequate and proper documentation of agency activities;

(b) Ensure the ability to access records regardless of form or medium;

(c) In a timely fashion, establish, and obtain the approval of the Archivist of the United States for, [sic] retention schedules for Federal records; and

(d) Provide training and guidance as appropriate to all agency officials and employees and contractors regarding their Federal records management responsibilities."

Of course, such verbiage is pure fluff, as is the rest of the document where records management is concerned. It is one thing to issue a directive that requires x-form be completed by y-date, and it is quite another to say that documentation should be "adequate," that retention schedules should be established "in a timely fashion," and that training and guidance should be "as appropriate." Since "adequate," "timely," and "appropriate" are all completely subjective terms, the reality is that agencies are responsible for doing only what they feel like doingwhich might be nothing at all!

This, of course, fits in perfectly with the incorporation of records management into IRM. When the management of information is confused with the management of the technology that creates, stores, and manipulates the information, and when the technology is all that managers want to deal with, records management gets lip service-if it gets anything at all.

ONE MORE TIME: THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT OF 1995

Figuring, perhaps, that the third time would be a charm, Congress passed the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA-95). The Act redefined IRM and incorporated some additional language to strengthen OIRA's ability to deal with the public burden. To ensure that its guidance was up-to-date, OMB issued yet another revision to its Circular No. A-130 in 1996. While the control of public use reporting may now be one of the most highly structured and regulated programs within the Federal government, the question must be asked, "What about records management?"

PRA-95 notwithstanding, IRM is a dead concept. It has been replaced in the lexicon of those who speak acronym by IT (information technology). In fact, in February, 1996, Congress passed the Information Technology Management Reform Act which, in some instances, specifically modifies the language of PRA-95. But if IRM is dead, does that mean that Federal records management-as a part of IRM-is dead as well?

On a micro level, the answer is no. Federal records are still being created, maintained, and disposed of by agencies to a greater or lesser extent as they deem appropriate. Agency records managers are generally dedicated souls who, in some instances, have worked independently to keep their records schedules current and to bring their recordkeeping systems into the modern age.

But on a macro level, the answer must be yes. Certainly, governmentwide records management leadership is non-existent. GSA has abandoned its part of the program and, although NARA continues to make a pretense of being interested, the fact remains that it has gone for almost a decade without producing a significant records management guideline.

If one wished to go far out on a limb, one might suggest that as goes the Federal records management program, so goes records management as a profession. The Federal government has always been an innovator and a leader where records management was concerned. Without innovation and leadership, can any profession survive?

ENSURING A FUTURE

It may be the supreme irony in the history of records management that the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, the National Archives and Records Administration Act of 1984, the Paperwork Reduction Reauthorization Act of 1986, and the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 were all enthusiastically supported and endorsed by professional records managers. In the long run, many of them may be seen as having cheered at the signing of their own death warrants.

It does not have to be that way. It is not too late for remedial action. What is needed, of course, is a group to formulate the remedy and see that its provisions are implemented. Who better than the records management community?

To right the wrongs perpetrated by the aforementioned acts, the following should be considered:

The National Archives and Records Administration Act of 1984 should be abolished. New legislation should be enacted establishing the National Information Administration (NIA) to replace NARA.

NIA should be made up of two equal units-the Office of Archives, headed by an individual who must be a Certified Archivist (CA), and the Office of Records Management, headed by an individual who must be a Certified Records Manager (CRM). NIA itself will be headed by an Administrator who is either a CRM or a CA and who will be appointed for a period of four years. If an archivist is appointed for the initial term, then a records manager must be appointed for the subsequent one and vice versa. To achieve programmatic balance, the appointments will always alternate in this manner.

NIA should be responsible for issuing guidelines and regulations for the creation, maintenance and use, and disposition of all Federal information. The term "information" should be defined so as to limit it to that which is captured in reproducible form and is needed for conducting business.

All NARA employees and functions should be transferred to NIA. All records management functions and all positions transferred to GSA in 1984 should be transferred to NIA.

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 should be abolished. Portions of the Act dealing with public use reporting should be incorporated into the new NIA legislation referenced above. The public use reports management function in OMB should be transferred to NIA and placed in the governmentwide records management program.

At first glance, the proposal might seem outrageous. Yet it is really not that radical at all. As far back as 1955, the Second Hoover Commission recommended that a Paperwork Management Service be established separate from the Archives. That is radical! As we have proven for almost 12 years, separation, of any type, is a terrible idea.

The information management legislation of the last quarter of the 20th century has been a records management disaster. One law is based on the erroneous assumption that information is synonymous with media and machines, and another focuses on separating the inseparable-dividing the archives and records management functions. If the situation were not so serious, it would be laughable-George Orwell collaborates with Lewis Carroll.

If we are to cross the threshold to the 21st century successfully, this all must change. We must recognize that papers, films, and magnetic disks are not information. We must recognize that personal computers, COM cameras, and optical disk readers are not information. And we must understand that it is within records-and ultimately within the records that become archives-that information is to be found.

Copyright Association of Records Managers and Administrators Inc. Jan 1997
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