Letters To The Editor

Where's George Bruchmueller?

The July-August 2000 History edition of the magazine was terrific. Particularly impressive is "Fire Support at the Battle of Kursk" by Captain Thomas J. Weiss II--very deserving of first place in the US FA Association's History Writing Contest. Concentrated with General [Retired] John M. D. Shalikashvili's interview ["Army in Transition: Keep Your Eye on the Ball"] and Colonel Richard P. Formica's letter ["Proud and Disciplined: 2-15 FA in Bosnia"], we strike at the very heart of our greatest challenge in the near future: Sustaining competency in our core fire support tasks while coping with a myriad of other missions.

GEN Shalikashvili rightly points out the missions of "peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and military-to-military outreach" and how they are "in addition" to our primary task of warfighting. And COL Formica extols the virtues of the "proud and disciplined" Field Artillerymen of 2-15 FA fulfilling one of those "additional" missions "relearning the age-old mission of building peace in a war-torn land." You could probably pull that same line from the Field Artillery Journal in May 1950 with an observation from war-torn Japan.

When you read each of these pieces and then focus on the Battle of Kursk, you ask yourself, "Where is the American George Bruchmueller?" What does he look like today? In five years? Ten years? Look no further than your unit TACSOP [tactical standing operating procedures] and count the number of pages you have on fire missions of attack, defend and movement-to-contact. You certainly won't find the details of Bruchmueller's three phases of fire support. And, unfortunately, peacekeeping won't "write" those pages--it will delete them.

For those great soldiers from 2-15 FA, executing this additional mission to a high standard, their opportunity to practice fire support, the heart and soul of our warfighting tasks, is forever lost--displaced by the wave of peacekeeping future. Even more disconcerting is the loss of leader experience. From section chief to battalion commander, these future leaders in higher positions will lack experience in the warfighting skills most essential to our Army and our nation. Blanket our Army with this experience and tomorrow's "George Bruchmueller" will be the master of base camp security, not a fire planning genius.

All of us must understand the ramifications of these additional missions-- that they atrophy our warfighting skills and dilute the tactical experience of our leaders. To embrace them as our future almost certainly is to welcome another hard chapter in America's First Battles.

Fortunately, our Army's senior leaders continue to fight for resources to increase combined arms training at the task force level to keep the fighting edge to our combat forces keen. This will allow our leaders to gain experience in synchronizing fires with maneuver. With that as our primary focus, who knows, maybe George Bruchmueller will return--this time in a US Army uniform.

LTC Gary H. Cheek, FA

Senior Fire Support Trainer

NTC, Fort Irwin, CA

Response to "Proud and Disciplined: 2-15 FA in Bosnia"

I read with very mixed feelings the letter from Colonel Richard P. Formica published in July-August. While I applaud Colonel Formica in his public praise of 2-15 FA's "proud and disciplined" attitude toward its nonstandard mission in Bosnia, that mission and the apparent neglect of the battalion's need for standard mission training are very disturbing.

The fact that (1) a Field Artillery battalion was selected to perform a task totally unrelated to its wartime mission (and one that, certainly, does not require anything near the level of technical capability possessed by such an organization) and (2) the battalion was, apparently, not exercising the key parts of its organization--i.e., FISTs [fire support teams], cannon crews and FDCs [fire direction centers]--in its wartime mission tasks is an indictment of leadership up and down the line.

Field Artillery skills are perishable. It is absolutely essential that they be maintained.

We should be praising soldiers. But we also should be strongly criticizing poor leadership decisions.

COL (Retired) Gregg H. Malicki, FA

Moline, IL

Response to "The Practical Application of Army Values"

I would like to respond to values article [by Captain Patrick D. Quinn III] that appeared in the September-October edition. In the final comments of the article, the author clearly articulates his view, claiming that upholding the greater good is sufficient as a simple answer to every ethical and moral dilemma one may face. Unfortunately, he says there is no one simple answer.

The Answer--Not Outcomes of Actions. That there is an answer is sure, and that it is not "upholding the greater good" is also sure. I would like to argue that the claim of "the greater good" as a measure of moral worth or guide for action is implausible and that there is a better way.

To evaluate a possible action in terms of upholding the greater good is to look at the outcomes of the action--call them the consequences of the action. The consequences of an action are evaluated from a certain point of view, be it individual or cultural.

If this view were correct, 1LT Brox could have determined the greater good was to help 1LT Rash clear the Bedouins more quickly or even shoot a camel or two to expedite the process for his soldiers to commence training. This obviously seems counter-intuitive and contradicts Army values, such as integrity and respect. A moral theory that allows two contradictory actions the same moral permissiveness is implausible and not adequate to serve as a basis for action.

"Rightness" of Will. Another problem generated by this view is that it doesn't account for "rightness" or "wrongness" of the will, the intent of an action, to determine moral worth.

I think most would agree that SFC Jenry did the right thing by returning to correct the duty log. But what if the reason SFC Jenry approached the commander was not due to a feeling of duty or integrity but because he wanted the commander to think he was a great NCO or solely to avoid non-judicial punishment? Would we still say that his action was right, that it had moral worth? This example is different from the first in that the consequences are the same but the moral permissiveness of the action seems to be different.

Once again, this contradiction renders the notion of "the greater good" as a measurement for moral action implausible and contradictory to already established and defined Army values.

Being a Good Soldier. A better way to think about applying Army values is not to focus immediately on the action, or doing something but, rather, to focus on the actor, the being. The question, as Aristotle saw it, is not, "What shall I do?" The question is, "What shall I be?"

Army values are FM 22-100's [FM 22-100 Army Leadership] definitions of virtues selected to represent what it is to be a "good" soldier. If what we are can be thought of as our character, then others become familiar with our character through witness to our actions. The "being" is clearly linked to the "doing."

As a battery commander, I often spoke about the believability of behavior. This is critical for leaders and is, I believe, the implicit part of Army values training. When posed with a moral dilemma, you must ask first what kind of soldier you want to be. To be a good soldier means pursuit of and adherence to the virtues determined necessary to be a good soldier, as currently defined by the seven Army values [loyalty, duty, respect, selfless-service, honor, integrity and personal courage].

Had 1LT Brox determined he wanted to be a good soldier, to pursue the virtues that define a good soldier, he could have stopped 1LT Rash immediately. At least he could have said something to him following the incident. He also could have decided to demonstrate loyalty, bearing true faith and allegiance to the US Constitution, the Army, etc. He also could have decided to demonstrate respect, to treat the Bedouins and their property as they should be treated.

Crawl-Walk-Run Training. Through learning about the virtues of a good soldier, the Army values, the inclinations to behave toward the virtues can become custom or habit. Learning often begins with understanding simple concepts.

Once accomplished, these concepts can be brought together and the difficulty level increased. Eventually learning takes place and the learning can be applied. When applied to military training, this technique is called the crawl-walk-run methodology.

The Army's values training is conducted the same way and starts with understanding concepts and definitions. This is the only way we can, according to the article, "conduct effective values training for the wide diversity of ethical, religious and cultural backgrounds we have." The Army's current approach to teaching Army values is perfectly acceptable, arguably more effective than any program outside military circles.

The Army is crawling, beginning with the understanding of concepts and definitions. The thing to keep in mind, however, is that the crawl phase of this training never ends. Units get new soldiers throughout the year, and training for them must start at the beginning.

The walk and run portions of values training take place as soldiers progress in their careers and are precisely the reason there is a perceived "zero defects mentality" for adherence to Army values. If I am correct and the virtues represented by the seven Army values are the measure of a good soldier, then what better reason do we have for letting someone go than failure to be a good soldier? Surely we don't want "bad" soldiers, do we? Can a character flaw be corrected? Can values be retrained?

Fail at what it is to be a good soldier, not just a poor decision maker but a soldier with genuine character deficiency, and despite manpower shortages, I have no problem letting him go.

Army Values "About Right." I believe the definitions of virtue that describe a good soldier, the Army values, are about right. That is to say they quite accurately describe those traits we want all soldiers to adhere to, not for a measure of the moral worth of their specific actions but as a measure of character, a measure of being a soldier.

The Army values as currently taught and enforced are perfectly acceptable. The crawl-walk-run methodology of training applies to all mission-essential task list [METL]-related training activities--why should it not also apply to values training?

The virtuous character traits we want in soldiers and the morality they represent are not subjective. Morality is not a meat grinder. You can't throw all the facts of a situation into the press of a moral theory and expect an answer as to how to behave. You must focus on character, on what it is to be a good soldier.

Will we always get it right? Some of us won't. We are soldiers and we are human. Some may choose incorrectly, choose to do the right thing for the wrong reason or just choose the wrong thing. People sometimes run red lights and stop signs. That doesn't mean that they are ineffective for controlling traffic. It just means we need to pay more attention to our driving or, in this case, our behavior. We just need to get better at it.

CPT Brett E. Kessler, FA

Student, MA in Philosophy University of Colorado, Boulder

Response to "Fire Support at the Battle of Kursk"

As a history teacher and an FA NCO, I look forward to your History edition [July-August]. However, I must point out an inaccuracy in Captain Thomas J. Weiss's article. When he discusses the Bruchmueller doctrine, he states it was tested against the "Red Army" in 1916. Later he states the Germans employing this doctrine "savaged the Soviets....as early as 1916, Soviet fire support plans began to closely imitate those of Bruchmueller."

As the Russian Revolution didn't occur until March 1917 (on the Western calendar) and the Bolsheviks did not take control until November 1917, until at least 1918, there was no "Red" Army, and the Soviet Union was not formally proclaimed until 1922. While the Czar's army may have learned from these tactics and some of those same officers may have carried the lessons to the Soviet Army, a continuous connection seems tenuous.

CSM Robert F. Donahue, FA

2-355 USAR, Wichita Falls, TX

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