"Proactive Artillery" for Fast, Responsive Fires - Interview with Lieutenant General James T. Hill - Brief Article - Interview

Q The FA is grappling with how to make fires more responsive and clearance of those fires more timely in today's fight. From your perspective as a recent commander of the 25th Infantry Division [(Light) at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii] and a current corps commander, what should we focus on to fix the problems?

A To make fires more responsive, the Field Artillery needs to focus on changing the mindset of Field Artillerymen. Let me explain.

The Army already has the technology to make fires fast and effective. As a division commander, I had AFATDS [advanced FA tactical data system] next to the analyst in my ACE [analysis control element]. AFATDS could send a target digitally directly to the firing unit--sensor to shooter.

In my corps TOC [tactical operations center] during Yama Sakura [joint and combined exercise in Japan], AFATDS was next to feeds to the UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] and JSTARS [joint surveillance and target attack radar system] with digital reach back to the analyst at Fort Lewis. We could pick up a target on ELINT [electronic intelligence] and cross-cue it to the UA V and JSTARS and confirm it as an enemy target--three intel assets. The AFATDS operator then typed in and fired the target digitally. So the Army has the digital technology, and it only will get better.

The challenge is to change the mindset of the artilleryman. At the platoon, company and battalion levels, a fire supporter's entire job is indirect fires. Period. And if his FA unit isn't shooting fires or he isn't calling for mortars, then it's most likely his fault.

For example, when I was a platoon leader and company commander in the middle of a firefight in Vietnam, I never turned to my fire supporter and said, " need fires!" I never had to.

When the enemy started shooting at us and I was trying to determine what was going on, a fire supporter with a radio crawled up beside me and said, "Sir, the rounds are going to impact over there. Where do you want them shifted to?" I didn't have to think about artillery until I had fires on the ground and began moving them around.

That does not happen routinely today. As the FORSCOM [Forces Command] DCSOPS [Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations], I sat in on the monthly discussions between the FORSCOM commander and the Combat Training Centers. At the JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana] in the first five days of engagements, which is the search and attack phase of the rotation, if an FA unit shot indirect fires in about 20 percent of the engagements, it was considered a very good unit. I have seen units at the JRTC that used indirect fires in 10 percent of the engagements or less. While my numbers may not be exact, the point is indirect fires are not employed as often as they should be.

Now, that's an artillery problem. If I am the maneuver commander involved in a firefight, thinking about 1,000 things, and I have an artillerymen right next to me whose sole job is to think about artillery, then he ought to be screaming in my ear, "Artillery! I'm going to put the rounds right here. Where do you want them shifted to?"

The artilleryman has to be proactive. When things get hot, he is standing right next to the commander and knows what's going on-he canclear the fires. He doesn't need to wait for his infantry or armor commander to tell him what to do. Proactive Artillery--that's the way it used to be and needs to be again.

When the 2d Brigade of the 25th Division went to the JRTC, I gave the brigade's DS [direct support] artillery battalion commander proactive artillery guidance. His criterion for successfully completing his mission was to use indirect fire, artillery or mortars, in at least 50 percent of the engagements. He was proactive and shot about 75 percent of the engagements.

The low percentage of indirect fires shot in engagements adds to a technological dilemma at the JRTC. Because the infantry commander does not get the same effects in simulation at the JRTC as he would on a real battlefield, he uses direct fire and maneuver to try to defeat the enemy. The problem is that on the real battlefield, he can't maneuver without indirect fires--if he does, he will die.

We need to fix the indirect fire effects simulation at the JRTC--and at the NTC [National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California]. When we do, the maneuver commander will have a better appreciation for indirect fire effects. But the lack of proactive and, therefore, responsive fires is still the artilleryman's problem.

To some extent, we've slowed fires down with restrictive ROE [rules of engagement] and fear of fratricide. But, again, I think it's the artilleryman's job to clear fires--he knows as much as the commander knows--and doctrine should reflect that. It's the artilleryman's job to be proactive.

At the corps level, I take a hard look at numbers of rounds fired per mission. I turn to my FSCOORD [fire support coordinator] and ask him if he's shooting enough rounds. If your job as a Field Artilleryman is to shoot rounds, well then, shoot them--don't wait for the maneuver commander to force the issue.

Q In recent years, the Army has had trouble retaining young officers. What advice would you give Army leaders who have immediate impact on or first-line contact with these young officers to develop and retain them in the force?

A I tell lieutenant colonels that the day before they took command of their battalions they were senior members of the Army, but the day after, they were senior leaders. There is a difference. As senior leaders, they have greater responsibility for molding young people.

As a division commander, I made it clear to my battalion commanders that one of their METL [mission-essential task list] tasks was developing and mentoring lieutenants--not just showing them how to do their jobs, but also beginning to instill in them Army values--the professional ethics of selfless service and commitment to duty. And commanders do that by really talking with them and setting the example.

If Army leaders routinely work 16 hours a day, that sets a bad example. A leader can't work 16 hours every day without micromanaging something--he certainly isn't delegating. When the lieutenant sees his battalion commander working himself to death and not having any fun while doing it, then why would the lieutenant aspire to be like him?

Young people are going to walk away from that...or, at least, work 16 hours a day to make more money than they can in the Army. The Army has to be more personal--deal with people as people and not as part of "the machine."

The lieutenants and captains who stay in the Army most likely have worked for battalion commanders who are professionals, but who aren't workaholics, don't micromanage and have fun.

Q As the corps commander for deploying the Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) at Fort Lewis (initial operational capability, or JOC, currently projected for FY03), you face some challenges. Understanding the IBCT is optimized for SSCs [small-scale contingencies] and not intended for MTWs [major theater wars] without augmentation, if the brigade were deployed in an SSC that was escalating rapidly toward MTW-like operations, how would you support the brigade, for example, resupply Class V for the brigade's organic indirect fire. its FA and mortars?

A That's a tough question. There's no one answer. Our actions would be situationally and politically dependent.

First, if a situation goes "south" for a deployed IBCT, it will have all the resources the US military can muster and probably many allied resources. We would begin covering the IBCT immediately by bringing in additional combat power and supplying whatever the brigade needs.

Most ammunition is not moved by air but by roll-on/roll-off ships that would be parked off shore to resupply and extract the IBCT, if necessary. Our Logistics Community is going to have to be innovative to resupply the IBCT, a force designed to be rapidly deployable and highly mobile with minimum organic logistical assets. However, to augment the brigade when things get hot, the "long pole in the tent" remains strategic airlift for the foreseeable future.

Second, we should have warning signs that the SSC is deteriorating--enemy troop build ups, political posturing, escalation of conflict, etc. The US should make the political decision to start moving combat power to the IBCT when the warning signs begin and before things get too hot. Again, strategic airlift is critical.

Q The IBCT Organizational and Operational Concept (O&O) lists proactive counterfire as one of the FA battalion's mission. Why is this mission so critical and is the brigade structured to accomplish this mission?

A Although General [Eric K.] [Chief of Staff of the Army] was talking about tanks when he made this comment, it applies--soldiers survive on the battlefield in one of two ways: they either take the first-round hit and survive, or they don't get hit. And, clearly, if we can find and kill the enemy artillery before it can shoot at us, then we won't have to take artillery hits. This is especially critical for the IBCT designed to fight in dismounted infantry operations.

The initial brigade at Fort Lewis is uniquely structured to find the enemy's indirect fire systems. The RSTA [Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition] Squadron, with its scouts and TUAVs [tactical unmanned aerial vehicles], works with the FECC [fires and effects coordination cell], which serves as the counterfire headquarters and tasks the Firefinder radars--all to target enemy systems.

Through its division or corps link, the brigade has access to other national surveillance and targeting assets to help in the effort. (The IBCT is designed to deploy with either a division or corps headquarters; it was never intended to operate by itself.)

Finally, the very nature of IBCT combat operations helps protect it from enemy indirect fire. The infantry's IAV [interim armored vehicle] won't be a Bradley fighting vehicle; it will be a mobile, agile troop carrier designed to get the infantry out onto the battlefield rapidly for dismounted operations. The IAV will be difficult for the enemy to target, as all rapidly moving targets are.

Q At the JRTC, mortars rarely get into the fight; and at the NTC, mortars are used less than they could be. Mortars have shorter ranges, less accuracy and fewer munitions options than cannons. Are mortars sufficient to be the primary close support and indirect fire system for the IBCT?

A The brigade, which often will be deployed in urban and populated areas, has a lot of mortars for the close fight. But the artillery is part of the brigade at the insistence of infantrymen who said in the beginning that artillery is the indirect fire weapon of choice.

Now, having said that, mortar ranges, munitions, accuracy and FDC [fire direction center] capabilities have improved tremendously since I came into the Army in 1968. But as an infantryman, I would not want to go to an SCC, much less a war, without artillery. The Field Artillery is an indispensable part of warfighting in any part of the spectrum of conflict.

Q The IBCT will have the lightweight 155-mm howitzer (LW 155) with the towed artillery digitization (TAD) package and the medium tactical truck as its prime mover vice the IAV. (TAD gives the LW 155 Paladin-like capabilities, such as on-board self-location and afire control system.) Given the way the IBCT is expected to fight, is there a significant risk associated with the maneuver force being supported by towed artillery?

A There's always some risk associated with having artillery less mobile and agile than the force it supports. But the question is, is there significant risk, and the answer is, "No." The brigade is designed to fight in a 50-by-50 kilometer area, and the LW 155 will be able to range targets in that area of operations. Depending on the mission, even if the brigade were deployed in an MTW, the answer is still, "No, we will not incur significant risk."

In my opinion, the day will come when we will put a tube on the IAV chassis, I suspect a 155-mm tube, to ensure the brigade's indirect fire can move as rapidly as its infantry. The 155-mm IAV could have all the Paladin-like capabilities of shooting rapidly from different locations and moving quickly about the battlefield--I have had industry reps tell me it's possible, given time and money.

Q What advantages does the FECC bring to the IBCT?

A The FECC at Fort Lewis pulls together all the fires and effects from lethal and nonlethal assets for the commander for faster, more efficient targeting. And as the FECC is positioned inside the brigade TOC [tactical operations center], it can rapidly and coherently synchronize fires and effects with maneuver and determine the best assets to employ against targets. It is a tremendous step in the right direction.

In the future corps FECC, I would be able to take full advantage of the FECC's civil-military operations capabilities, including its Nonlethal Cell [information operations, civil affairs, legal, intelligence, electronic attack and psychological operations]. At that level, I could focus the cell's assets on certain areas to quell unrest or solve problems that could stop conflict before it got started--even add a PAO [public affairs officer] or perhaps bring in a non-governmental agency, such as the Red Cross, as relevant.

I have experimented with synchronized civil-military operations in my corps TOC on an ad hoc basis. In my role as JTF [Joint task force] commander, CINCPAC [Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Command] has given me the mission of "Consequence Management" for the Pacific. In my TOC, I had fire supporters with their communications assets and skills coordinate my civil-military operations and organize relief efforts. I don't have a special staff to do all that, so a corps FECC would give me the resources to synchronize my assets and focus lethal and nonlethal effects in different directions.

The FECC at Fort Lewis is just the beginning. We're going to have to work through and shape these ideas into fires and effects procedures for the Objective Force. But there's no doubt that in future operations, civil-military operations will have to come together in a coherent manner. We're going to have to be multiple disciplined--be able to switch gears rapidly from nonlethal to lethal operations or coordinate both in the same area of operations.

Q What message would you like to send Army and Marine Field Artillerymen stationed around the world?

A Field Artillery is the greatest killer on the battlefield and will remain so in the future. The infantryman holds the ground and ensures victory. But he won't be able to do that unless he has indirect fire superiority. So the artillery is the architect of victory.

Be proactive--go for it!

Lieutenant General James T. Hill became the Commanding General of I Corps and Fort Lewis, Washington, in September 1999. His previous assignment was as the Commanding General of the 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, the same division in which he served as the Assistant Division Commander (Support) and, simultaneously, as the Deputy Commanding General of the Multinational Force and Deputy Commanding General of US Forces in Haiti in the UN mission in Haiti. He also served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of Forces Command (FORSCOM) at Fort McPherson, Georgia, and previously, as Chief of Staff of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky, the same division in which he commanded the Always First Brigade in Southwest Asia during Operations Desert Shield and Storm. He commanded the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, part of the 25th Division. In addition, he commanded three companies: one in the Always First Brigade while in Vietnam, one in the 3d Ranger Regi ment at Fort Benning, Georgia, and the third in the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, Fort Hood, Texas.

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