Light Force Modernization - Column

The FA Battalion in the JCF-AWE

In late August 2000, the 3d Battalion, 6th Field Artillery (-) (105-mm towed) with E Battery, 7th Field Artillery (155-mm towed) attached deployed to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, with the 1st Brigade Task Force, 10th Mountain Division to execute the Joint Contingency Force-Advanced Warfighting Experiment (JCF-AWE). The JCF-AWE was a combined Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Forces Command (FORSCOM) and Army Materiel Command (AMC) light force modernization experiment and an integral part of the Army's Transformation campaign plan.

The intent of the experiment was to gain insight into the execution-centric operations that are key to the Army's Transformation. Basically, the experiment applied the insights gained from heavy force experiments during the last several years as well as selected advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTDs) adapted to light forces to determine if similar improvements in lethality, survivability and force effectiveness could be achieved. Ultimately, the lessons learned from the JCF-AWE will serve as the foundation for light force modernization.

The experiment's basic hypothesis was: "If knowledge-based battle command capabilities gained through enhanced digital connectivity and new equipment exist across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, personnel and leader development (DOTMPL) areas during JCF operations, then JCF forces will achieve increases in lethality, survivability and operational tempo."

To this end, during the nine months preceding the experiment, units of the 1st Brigade Task Force (as well as the division assault command post) were fielded with a wide variety of equipment tied to the experimental objectives. The main focus of the experiment was on battle command, and the elements of the Army battle command system (ABCS) were key: the maneuver control system (MCS), the all-source analysis system (ASAS), the air missile defense weapons system (AMDWS), the combat service support control system (CSSCS) and the advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS). Additionally, more than 60 other initiatives addressing all battlefield operating systems (BOS) were fielded in the brigade task force.

This article outlines the JCF-AWE's operations and the performance of several systems relevant to the FA and discusses potential fire support enhancements for the light force in the near future.

FA Battalion Environment. For the direct support (DS) FA battalion, some key systems fielded for the experiment included the laser inertial automatic pointing system (LINAPS) Ml19 (digitized howitzer), the improved position and azimuth determining system (IPADS), the situational awareness data link (SADL) and Q-36 Firefinder radar to close air support (CAS) quickfire channel, and the naval gunfire interface (NGI). Although not a specific initiative, the Viper target locating system also was tested by the battalion's forward observers (FOs) during this experiment.

Additionally, the battalion's tactical operations center (TOC) was modified to include not only AFATDS (which recently had been fielded in the battalion), but also the MCS and ASAS, their associated light versions (MCS-L and ASAS-L), and a combat information center (CIC). The CIC is a four-flat-panel screen that receives a feed from the ABCS battlefield functional areas and displays this data in the TOC, essentially replacing the TOC's paper maps. Finally, and significantly, the battalion had more than 25 Force XXI battle command brigade and below ([FBCB.sup.2]) systems.

The experiment's driver was a typical JRTC Cortina scenario with the Cortinian Liberation Front (CLF) and Peoples Democratic Republic of Atlantica (PDRA) Army as the opposing force (OPFOR). The exercise framework included an initial entry mission followed by a counterinsurgency search and attack operation, a defensive mission against an enemy mechanized attack and an attack on a built-up area.

Experiment Operations and Systems. The key benefit of the ABCS equipment was to establish a clear tactical picture common across the task force. Each MCS in each TOC displayed the same tactical picture of friendly forces. This eliminated significant confusion on unit locations and control measures, ensuring all elements of the task force had the same reasonably accurate picture of the friendly situation.

Much of this information was received directly from [FBCB.sup.2] systems in near real time. Other information was fed into the system from MCS terminals across the task force. Although there was significant friction early in the experiment, each ASAS eventually displayed the tactical picture of the enemy situation, much as MCS portrayed the friendly situation.

Fused at the CIC in each TOC, each key command and control node shared the same situational awareness, and the task force was able to make well-informed decisions based on this common situational awareness. From a DS artillery battalion standpoint, this ABCS-derived situational awareness showed great potential for more effective planning, coordinating and executing fires in support of maneuver forces. Rapid clearance of fires--generally the most time-consuming process in getting fires into the fight on a nonlinear battlefield-notably were facilitated by this increased situational awareness. We knew not only where friendly forces were, but, just as importantly, also where they weren't.

Clearly, this capability has great potential for increasing our confidence in fighting with fires and minimizing the number of intervention points for fire mission process, ultimately leading to more timely fires with significantly reduced risk of fratricide.

[FBCB.sup.2]. In terms of situational awareness, the [FBCB.sup.2] systems were definitely a "hero of the battle." The [FBCB.sup.2]s used for this experiment were ruggedized laptop computers mounted in vehicles or in static TOCs that provided consistent real-time visualization on a moving map display of similarly equipped systems in the maneuver box. Using the enhanced position location reporting system (EPLRS) as the main communications link, [FBCB.sup.2]s were invaluable in maintaining situational awareness for the battalion. Battery advanced parties, main bodies and resupply convoys were easily tracked from the TOC's (or any other node's) [FBCB.sup.2].

The communications functions in the [FBCB.sup.2] are as simple to use as a commercial email system. The [FBCB.sup.2] facilitates sending and receiving situational reports and other key information without tying up voice communications nets.

On at least two occasions during the experiment, the [FBCB.sup.2] feed was used to clear fires significantly quicker than would have been possible without them. There were some range and battery life challenges with the dismounted counterpart of [FBCB.sup.2], called the dismounted soldier system or (DSS), but

the DSS shows great potential for battle tracking and facilitating getting fires into the fight quickly.

AFATDS. This system already has been fielded across many units in the Army; our task was to integrate AFATDS with the other ABCS equipment. Although there were some software-based challenges, the battalion's soldiers and outstanding contractor supporters rapidly worked through the overwhelming majority of them. Significantly, of all the ABCS equipment, AFATDS best withstood the hot and humid conditions at Fort Polk.

Digitized Howitzer. In terms of specific initiatives, the digitized howitzer was a great success story of the experiment. Two systems were supplied by the British with A Battery, 3-6 FA, using one throughout the rotation. The LINAPS kit potentially gives light howitzers a Paladin-like capability, eliminating the requirement to lay the gun with an aiming circle or gun laying positioning system (GLPS) or establish an aiming point with aiming posts or a collimator.

The LINAPS kit is mounted on the howitzer and provides on-board positioning, aiming and communications. Firing data is still computed by the battery fire direction center (FDC), but the LINAPS' smart display replaces the M137 sight system.

The smart display shows the computed deflection and quadrant as well as the gun's current tube deflection and quadrant. With this data displayed, the gunner traverses and elevates or depresses his gun tube and lines up one set of cross hairs with another on his data display to lay his gun on the correct data--no leveling of bubbles and cross refinement required.

Significantly, throughout the experiment, gun times on the LINAPS gun were consistently nearly twice as fast as any other gun in the battery. This system shows great promise for improving the responsiveness of fires.

NGI. The naval gunfire interface initiative also shows great promise for enhancing our ability to employ joint fires. One of the biggest historical challenges with employing naval gunfire has been establishing and maintaining communications with the supporting platform. NGI puts these platforms into the tactical internet, and the AFATDSNGI link resolves these communications challenges and makes naval gunfire available to any observer who has a target within range of a supporting platform.

This capability is especially significant in light of the Navy's continued commitment to perform the naval gunfire mission and the potential development of the DD2l naval surface fire support platform.

SADL. The SADL to Q-36 link to create a CAS quickfire channel was another success with positive implications for employing joint fires. Certain Air Force squadrons have been flying SADL-equipped F-16s for several years. In the experiment, supporting F-16s received the "Blue Feed" (friendly force locations) through the SADL link, significantly enhancing the aircrews' situational awareness and mitigating the fratricide risk.

Q-36-CAS Quickfire. The Q-36-CAS quickfire link was tested successfully during the experiment. This link (which was coupled with the SADL feed) enables a Q-36 radar section to transmit a hostile mortar acquisition directly to supporting CAS aircraft--in effect, permitting rapid counterfire from an aerial platform. With SADL-equipped aircraft available, there is no requirement for a tedious "talk on" to the target, and the Blue Force can engage enemy indirect fire systems faster.

Although the experimental objectives were focused on the Q-36-SADL interface, this same process can be applied to any tactical situation, potentially simplifying the employment of CAS on any battlefield while minimizing the risk of fratricide.

Viper. This target location system deserves special mention. The Viper system hooks a Leica eye-safe laser range-finder to a PLGR, enabling the operator to determine a very accurate target location in a few seconds (plus or minus 10 meters). Our soldiers found the Viper simple to operate and easy to maintain.

This system shows great promise for filling a critical gap in how we equip our FOs and can significantly increase our confidence in target location. It has the potential to enable first round fire-for-effect missions in most situations as well as reduce the risk of fratricide caused by poor target location.

The Way Ahead. Throughout the experiment, ABCS as a battle command enabler definitely showed great potential for increasing light force lethality, survivability and operational tempo. From a fire support perspective, the ability to more rapidly clear and initiate fires and the targeting advantages gained through the ABCS common situational awareness clearly improve lethality. Similarly, the common situational awareness and integral targeting tools can enhance survivability by more rapidly engaging enemy high-payoff targets (HPTs) before the enemy can affect our operations and is especially effective when initiating proactive counterfire. Finally, the ABCS clearly has the potential for enabling execution-centric warfare, letting us maintain a tempo of operations that would not be possible without the increased situational awareness the ABCS provides.

One clear potential is an FO can rapidly send his fire mission through the tactical internet and, based on the increased confidence in friendly locations and the ability to avoid fratricide, his mission will be processed with an absolute minimum of intervention points (if any). We were not "there" yet for this experiment, but we were close.

There are, however, some areas in which we can improve to enhance lethality and survivability even more as well as increase our operational tempo. AFATDS is already integrated into the force and performed well throughout the rotation, but reducing the number of keystroke and menu processing requirements can significantly improve operator speed. We also believe that if a touch screen, voice-recognition capability were built into future AFATDS upgrades, it would speed up operator processing times significantly.

Throughout the experiment, fire missions were generated by voice and only entered the digital network at the first AFATDS node, generally a battalion fire support element (FSE). The battalion worked hard to get the hand-held terminal unit (HTU) into the fight with the FOs and company fire support officers (FSOs). But in the "heat of battle" in a dismounted fight, it proved unrealistic for an FO to punch a fire mission in digitally when it was much quicker to send the mission by voice.

We believe a lightweight voice-recognition system for the FO would significantly enhance the responsiveness of fires across the BOS by getting the fire mission into the system digitally at the origin. This system coupled with the tactical internet already described would significantly increase the probability of FOs getting fires into the close fight quickly without having to relay through multiple stations with the inherent risk of miscommunications and delay.

In terms of situational awareness, the [FBCB.sup.2] rapidly could be integrated and used effectively across the force today. By this initiative alone, the Army could enhance the force's lethality, survivability and operational tempo. [FBCB.sup.2] also should be fielded to Army aviation elements, providing the commander a good situational awareness over all his force--on the ground or in the air.

The DSS shows great potential and, once the system's battery and range challenges are overcome, could be an integral part of how we visualize the battlefield and get fires quickly into the fight. The system is especially significant for a dismounted force.

Additionally, a fully functional interface between AFATDS and AMDWS, coupled with Army aviation equipped with [FBCB.sup.2] will enhance our ability to manage Army airspace command and control ([A.sup.2][C.sup.2]) With the situational awareness provided by [FBCB.sup.2] helicopters and the air picture feed from AMDWS, commanders could deconflict surface-to-surface fires and aircraft more rapidly and accurately.

Finally, although not tied directly to ABCS, we must get our FOs a simple, reliable target locating system. The AN/ GVS-5 and mini eye-safe laster infrared observation set (MELIOS) were steps in the right direction but are anachronistic with the technology available off-the-shelf today. The ability to accurately, quickly and confidently determine a target's location would exponentially enhance our getting fires into the fight-and, just as importantly, increase the maneuver forces' confidence in indirect fires. Without a simple, lightweight target locating system, discussions about getting fires into the close fight are academic.

Throughout the experiment, the ABCS common tactical picture reduced uncertainty and built confidence within not only the DS FA battalion, but also the brigade task force as a whole. The purpose of being DS is to get effective, timely fires into the fight for the supported brigade. ABCS helps commanders accurately visualize the battlefield and initiate action to fight the combined arms team--and it provides the clear potential for enabling commanders to do that better than ever before.

In this time of Army Transformation, the fire support insights gained through the JCF-AWE demonstrate potential for more effectively planning, coordinating, synchronizing and executing fire support across the spectrum of conflict.

Lieutenant Colonel Vance J. Nannini commands the 3d Battalion, 6th Field Artillery, the direct support battalion for the 1st Brigade Task Force, 10th Mountain Division, in the Joint Contingency Force-Advanced Warfighting Experiment (JCF-AWE) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. Previously, he was the Deputy Fire Support Coordinator and Chief of Information Operations for the 10th Division during its mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of the Stablization Force (SFOR). He was a Brigade Fire Support Officer (FSO) and the S3 of the 2d Battalion, 320th Field Artillery, both with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

Colonel Arthur M. Bartell commands the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) Artillery at Fart Drum, New York, and participated in the JCF-AWE at Fort Polk. In his previous assignment, he was the Senior Fire Support Observer/Controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk. He commanded the 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery (reflagged during his command as 3d Battalion, 6th Field Artillery), 10th Mountain Division, participating in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti.

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