JTAC: MOA vs JTTP

During recent combat operations, a force multiplier has emerged on the battlefield in the form of ground-based terminal attack controllers (TACs). These individuals integrate US, allied or Coalition air power with ground unit fire and maneuver by controlling close air support (CAS) against enemy targets during joint combat operations.

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Recognizing joint TACs' (JTACs') importance during combat operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the services have tried to standardize the training and qualification of these individuals as well as increase the number of controllers in the arsenal. However, the services' ability to increase the numbers of JTACs to support all user requirements is encumbered by service parochialism and limited training resources.

During Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), air and ground commanders realized the need for these controllers to train and fight jointly to achieve tactical objectives. Dependent upon Air Force controllers by inter-service agreement, several Army ground unit commanders said they did not have enough JTACs to conduct terminal attack control in support of their forces.

In recent months, the Army has established the requirement for JTACs down to the company level vice the task force level now resourced by the Air Force.

In a 29 November 2004 Army-Air Force Warfighter Conference at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, the Air Force agreed to train Soldiers as TACs and recognized the requirement for JTACs down to the company level.

Although the formalized terminal attack control skill sets exist in the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, the Army needs clear joint skill sets in a joint training program to train Soldiers as JTACs to fill out the required numbers. The Army's choice for such training is Field Artillery 13F Fire Support Specialists who already are trained and qualified to call for and coordinate other joint fires and effects.

Drawing on the lessons from Bosnia and the Persian Gulf, the services continue to wrestle with how to produce, train and maintain combat-ready JTACs.

Efforts to resolve the JTAC training and manning issues has spanned six years. The 2003 revision of Joint Publication (JP) 3-09. 3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures [JTTP] for Close Air Support defined JTACs and identified their functions and responsibilities. As part of this ongoing effort, the services recently drafted a JTAC Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to better define the JTAC's training, qualification and currency requirements. Senior service staffs have signed the JTAC MOA, and we are awaiting implementation instructions from the Joint Force Command (JFCOM).

This article compares and contrasts the JTAC definition and capabilities listed in JP 3-09.3 with the training and certification process outlined in the JTAC MOA. Identifying the differences between doctrine and the MOA should facilitate the services' efforts in refining and synchronizing JTAC requirements.

Joint Doctrine and the JTAC. Although the definition of a JTAC exists in JP 3-09.3, the term is not yet defined in JP 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. JP 3-09.3 defines a JTAC as "a qualified (certified) service member who, from a forward position, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support (CAS) and other offensive air operations. A qualified and current joint terminal attack controller will be recognized across the Department of Defense as capable and authorized to perform terminal attack control." This definition from JP 3-09.3 GL-12 has been approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.

For a more detailed understanding of the JTAC's key duties and responsibilities, JP 3-09.3 includes a list. (See Figure 1.)

The JTAC may be external to the tactical air control party (TACP). Currently, TACs are found in the Marine Corps (forward air controller, or FAC), Air Force (enlisted TAC, or ETAC) and selected Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel from three service components: USAF Special Tactics, USN Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams and US Army Special Forces.

A single joint course for JTAC qualification training does not exist. TACs normally attend their individual services' schoolhouses.

JTAC duties appear similar to other fire support specialties. They must maintain situational awareness (SA), know the supported unit's plans and validate and execute targets of opportunity. The specialization that sets JTACs apart from their fire support counterparts is the skill sets associated with air strike control, which includes in-depth knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of air power and advising the maneuver commander how best to employ it.

JCAS JTTP stipulate that JTACs be able to control both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft in the application of CAS. When performing air strike control, JTACs must be able to incorporate laser designators and infrared (IR) pointers and generate precise coordinates for weapons using global positioning system (GPS) receivers and laser range-finders.

JTACs also coordinate and employ appropriate fire support coordination and airspace control measures and demonstrate proficiency with artillery and mortar calls-for-fire to mark CAS targets and suppress enemy air defenses. JTACs must be capable of employing digital TAC targeting systems being developed and fielded by the USMC and USAF. When fully fielded, these systems will help the JTAC reduce the probability of fratricide through increased SA, allow greater fidelity in battle tracking and, when coupled with compatible airborne systems, provide a conduit for the digital transfer of targeting data.

JTAC MOA. The baseline capabilities associated with JTAC must identify the joint skill sets or core competencies needed to plan and conduct terminal attack control in a joint environment--which is the next step.

The MOA contains actions designed to standardize the training of JTACs throughout the services, US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and other DoD agencies. The MOA also provides a detailed outline of the JTAC certification and qualification process. It further outlines the JTAC joint mission task list (JMTL) that provides guidance to develop an academic training syllabus for certification and unit appraisal for maintaining qualification. The MOA breaks down the JTAC JMTL into eight specific duty areas that have associated sub-tasks. (See Figure 2, Page 20)

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During initial certification training, candidates must conduct a minimum of 12 fixed-wing Type 1 or Type 2 controls. (See Figure 3, Page 20 for the definition of the types of CAS control.) Four of these controls must expend live or training ordnance. One of the 12 controls must be conducted at night.

After completing the academic syllabus and associated live controls, each candidate receives a comprehensive evaluation, either at the associated schoolhouse or home unit, to obtain certification. JTACs retain their qualification as long as they successfully complete their recurring evaluations and maintain the minimum control requirements of six Type 1 or Type 2 controls within the past six-month period.

The MOA also provides for the creation of a standardized JTAC evaluation folder (training jacket). This folder will document the individual's certification, qualification and currency status. JTACs must keep their training jackets up to date and, most importantly, log the specifics each time they conduct terminal attack controls. They may have to present their training jackets to unit commanders, range control personnel and (or) designated representatives before conducting terminal control operations.

JTAC Shortfalls. The MOA and JTTP fall considerably short of addressing some important areas.

Rotary-Wing CAS. While JP 3-09.3 provides extensive information on the special considerations of rotary-wing CAS, the MOA does not require a JTAC to control rotary-wing CAS in either initial or continuation training. This approach may not support current and future requirements for rotary-wing convoy escort and CAS applied in very close proximity to friendly positions.

More specifically, not providing or requiring rotary-wing CAS training stands in stark contrast to the following extract from JP 3-09.3 V-48: "It's likely that a JTAC using rotary-wing CAS will be marking and engaging targets within 100 meters of his own position, within Danger Close parameters. Historical studies prove that 90 percent of all urban engagements occur where friendly and enemy forces are within 50 meters of each other and that urban engagements using supporting arms occur with less than 250 meters between the same."

The omission of rotary-wing CAS controls is an example of the difficulty in developing and supporting a joint standard. While it is clear that rotary-wing CAS training is necessary to grow a more versatile JTAC, not all services unilaterally can support their own training. The Marines and Army have plenty of rotary-wing assets to train their JTACs, yet the Air Force and Navy do not.

It should stand to reason that the Army that lacks fixed-wing attack aircraft and the Air Force and Navy that lack rotary-wing attack aircraft could work out a sortie exchange to satisfy the needs of all three services. As the program continues to grow and evolve, consideration should be given to a future requirement for rotary-wing CAS training.

Urban CAS. Yet another shortfall between the JTAC MOA and 3-09.3 is a lack of training on how to plan for and control CAS in an urban setting. Urban CAS is addressed at length in JTTP but is nowhere to be found in the JTAC JMTL. The JMTL is described in the MOA as: "... instrumental in developing a schoolhouse academic syllabus for JTAC certification and for unit appraisal for maintaining JTAC qualification."

Every future conflict will have its own set of enemy, terrain and weather considerations, but one can say with a high degree of certainty that JTACs will face some form of urbanized terrain in the next conflict.

Training Resources. Herein lies another problem in institutionalizing the JTAC program: training resources. The nation's range infrastructure is vast and capable but not necessarily for JCAS training. A cross check of the JMTL and the ranges in the continental US capable of supporting training quickly shows there are only a few places capable of running a JTAC through his paces in a realistic, combat-like environment that includes urban terrain. These are our service combat training centers. Yet the services will be highly dependent upon home-station ranges to keep their JTACs current as required by the MOA.

The services and the DoD range managers must take a hard look at their ranges to improve their ability to support the JTAC program. Sufficient airspace for many types of fighters, live-ordnance impact areas and laser employment are all factors that must be considered to support JTAC training.

Joint Conditions and Standards for JTAC Tasks. While the MOA provides a core JMTL for training and certification, it does not provide conditions and standards for each task. As a result, each of the services trains to JMTL tasks differently in its respective JTAC training courses.

The MOA permits a new trainee to complete initial certification requirements using Type 2 vice Type 1 control techniques, which are considered more demanding by seasoned controllers. Under this MOA, ground combat forces could be supported by JTACs who received certification without being exposed to all the types of controls they are likely to be called upon to perform in combat.

Joint Fires Training. Finally, the JTAC MOA falls short in its initial JTAC qualification training by not requiring trainees to control and integrate attacks by multiple fire support assets--artillery, mortars, naval surface fires, rotary- and fixed-wing CAS. The JTAC's ability to execute calls-for-fire, mark CAS targets and suppress enemy air defenses is absolutely critical to JCAS execution.

Under the proposed MOA, a JTAC can achieve qualification without demonstrating these combat skills. Again, this seems in direct conflict with JP 3-09.3.

Joint doctrine is evolving for CAS, and the standardization of JTAC training and certification outlined in the JTAC MOA is a major step forward for the services. However, the differences between the JTAC definition, tasks and capabilities required by joint doctrine and the provisions of the JTAC MOA are significant. These differences reaffirm much work is yet to be done in the services' quest to adequately train and sustain enough JTACs.

While the MOA is a significant first step, the services and joint staff should consider reassessing the JTAC program after its inception to address critical JTAC training and certification requirements, such as rotary-wing, laser and AC-130 gunship controls and the integration of live artillery or mortars for marking and SEAD.

A joint training standardization team or working group should be formed to develop tasks, conditions and standards for JTAC training that reflect the skills and capabilities outlined in JP 3-09.3.

The services have achieved much in this critical JTAC mission area, but they should not wait another six years before realizing true joint standardization in JTAC training and certification.

The TAC must:
1. Know the enemy situation, selected targets and the location of
   friendly units.
2. Know the supported unit's plans, position and needs.
3. Validate targets of opportunity.
4. Advise the commander on the proper employment of air assets.
5. Submit immediate requests for close air support (CAS).
6. Control CAS with the supported commander's approval.
7. Perform battlefield damage assessment (BDA).

Figure 1: Terminal Attack Controllers (TAC). The TAC is the forward Army
ground commander's CAS expert. TACs provide the ground commander
recommendations on the use of CAS and its integration with ground
maneuver. They are members of tactical air control parties (TACPs) and
perform terminal attack control of individual CAS missions. (Information
taken from Joint Publication 3-09.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures for CAS, Appendix 11-10--(b), Page 32.)

1. Plan, develop and assess CAS requirements in support of the ground
   combat maneuver plan.
2. Plan CAS and suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) missions in
   support of the ground combat maneuver plan, based on knowledge of the
   enemy situation: ground order of battle and air defense posture.
3. Conduct target analysis relative to CAS to make weaponeering
   recommendations for employing CAS in support of the ground combat
   maneuver plan.
4. In preparation for CAS, advise the ground maneuver element commander
   on the proper employment of CAS assets in support of the ground
   combat maneuver plan.
5. Plan and coordinate CAS missions in support of the ground combat
   maneuver plan.
6. Request CAS missions in support of the ground combat maneuver plan.
7. Provide terminal attack control of CAS missions in support of the
   ground combat maneuver plan.
8. Conduct post-strike assessment for BDA and follow-on entry into the
   targeting process.

Figure 2: The Joint Terminal Attack Control (JTAC) Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) Eight Specific Duty Areas

Type 1
Used when risk assessment requires TACs to visually acquire the
attacking aircraft and the target under attack.

Type 2
Used when the TAC desires control of individual attacks but assesses
that either visual acquisition of the attacking aircraft or target at
weapons release is not possible or when attacking aircraft are not in a
position to acquire/mark the target prior to weapons release/launch.

Type 3
Used when the tactical risk assessment indicates that the CAS attack
imposes a low risk of fratricide.

Figure 3: Types of Terminal Attack Control

The Joint Close Air Support (JCAS) Joint Test Team, part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is based at Eglin AFB, Florida. It is chartered to investigate, evaluate and improve the operational effectiveness of US JCAS. Its work has an impact on joint doctrine, JTTP, training and standardization, equipment and interoperability. The team currently is being transitioned to JFCOM to expand its focus beyond JCAS to joint fire support.

The JCAS Joint Test Team welcomes questions and comments. Readers can contact the team at osd.jcas@eglin.af.mil. The team's website is https://jcas@eglin.af.mil/university/html or telephone number is DSN 872-4089 or Commercial 1-850-882-4089. Readers can fax the team at DSN 872-9117.

By Colonel David R. Brown, USAF

Colonel David R. Brown, USAF, is the Director of the JCAS Joint Test Team, Eglin AFB. In his previous position, he was the Deputy Commander of Detachment 2 of the Air Force Operations Test and Evaluation Command, also at Eglin. Among other assignments, he commanded the 82d Aerial Targets Squadron, Tyndall AFB, Florida. He is a Command Fighter Pilot with experience in F-4s, the F-117 and F-106s.

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