Take your best shot - Paul Thibault of the Board of Commissioners of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania

How County Commissioner Paul Thibault beat the machine with "bullet votes" and shrewd targeting tactics

In addition to running against two strong opponents who had party organizational support, Thibault would also have to face what he called the "cruel arithmetic" of the Lancaster County Commissioner's election.

Lancaster County is a growing community of 450,000 people in the agricultural southeast corner of Pennsylvania. Long a strong bastion of conservatism, Republicans have dominated local politics for over a century.

County government is led by a three-man Board of Commissioners who are elected in November from among the two candidates nominated by each party in the primary. Voters may vote for two candidates in both the primary and general elections, assuring minority party representation.

In February of county election years, the 400-member Republican County Committee meets to endorse candidates. It is a significant endorsement, carrying with it the support of GOP elected officials, party financial support and precinct organization. Traditionally, that endorsement has been the end of the GOP nominating process: unendorsed candidates usually drop out, and the party-backed candidates go on to easy victories in May and November.

In 1995, however, a college history professor and County Treasurer named Paul Thibault challenged GOP leaders by seeking the Republican nomination for Commissioner despite being denied the committee's endorsement. The party had instead endorsed two incumbents for the posts, one of whom had been in office for 16 years and was vulnerable on numerous fronts.

Although political pundits and the media dismissed his campaign as unwinnable, Thibault won that race in what the Lancaster Intelligencer Journal called "a stunning upset."

In 1999, party leaders signaled that they would again deny Thibault their endorsement in his re-election bid, setting up a primary campaign that would be the closest and most expensive in county history.

The Thibault campaign team knew that while they would now have the advantages of incumbency on their side, they would lack what was perhaps the greatest asset of their 1995 campaign: an unpopular opponent who proved an easy target for comparative advertising.

Instead, Thibault would face Jere Swarr and Pete Shaub - two agreeable, first-time candidates who enjoyed a broad base of support within the party, and who lacked the political baggage that had burdened Thibault's previous opponent.

As the race started coming together in January, most observers (and some members of the candidate's Kitchen Cabinet) reasoned that winning re-election would be easier than the 1995 upset. The Thibault consultant team, however, did not underestimate the challenge. In addition to having to run against two strong opponents, Thibault would also face what he called the "cruel arithmetic" of a Commissioner's race.

Since he was running on his own against an endorsed two-candidate ticket in a race where each voter would cast two votes, it would be possible for the candidate with the most individual support to still lose the race. In fact, even if 66% of voters showed up the polls to vote for Thibault, he could still lose. (If on the first vote Thibault received 66%, Shaub 17% and Swarr 17%, and then Thibault's 66% split their second votes evenly between Shaub and Swarr while Shaub and Swarr's voters gave their second votes to each other, the final outcome would be Thibault 33%, Shaub 33.5% and Swarr 33.5%.)

Thibault's survey research validated that fear: he held an astonishing, nearly three-to-one lead over either opponent as voters' first choice, but the race narrowed to almost even when voters' second choices were included.

Since initial polling also indicated nearly equal voter support for Shaub and Swarr, the lose-with-66% scenario was a real fear. Unless one of the endorsed candidates pulled away from the other, Thibault would be faced with the need to not only keep the support of a plurality of voters, but to convince enough of those voters to cast "bullet votes" so that he could withstand the anticipated second vote deficit.

To accomplish this goal, the Thibault campaign had to take on not only their two opponents, but the powerful Republican County Committee as well. Tactically, Thibault would need to earn the endorsements of 100 elected Republican officials, build a 1,000 man volunteer army, and raise a $200,000 war chest.

These goals were ambitious for a local campaign. In fact, no prominent GOP elected official had ever backed an unendorsed candidate for Commissioner; no candidate for Commissioner had ever built an organization of more than about 100 volunteers; and no Commissioner candidate had ever raised over $45,000.

The first challenge was to convince political leaders and the business community that Thibault could win despite the party's snub. While the Thibault campaign knew internally that the "cruel arithmetic" of the race would likely produce a close outcome, building momentum demanded that they focus publicly on Thibault's strong first-vote support.

To make the point, the campaign team circulated survey data demonstrating Thibault's first-vote advantage. Approaching a group of leaders that included the retired CEO of the county's largest employer, the Chairman of the State House Appropriations Committee, the former Chairman of Gov. Tom Ridge's campaign committee, and Thibault's fellow County Commissioner, the Thibault team successfully made the case that Thibault could indeed win.

Together with a committed ensemble of grassroots leaders, this core group would meet and exceed every goal: they earned endorsements from 111 GOP elected officials, recruited a team of over 1,000 active supporters, and raised over $215,000.

The ground team, led by Campaign Manager John Schaller and staffed entirely by volunteers, put forth a sophisticated earned media effort that enabled Thibault to receive hundreds of positive media references throughout the campaign. They also coordinated volunteer efforts to deliver more than 5,000 yard signs throughout the county and process over 180,000 pieces of voter mail, almost entirely in-house.

While the fundraisers and volunteers were gearing up, the Thibault team was also testing a number of potential messages in a benchmark survey. There were several potent issues, but three jumped out as motivating the Thibault base: fighting crime, preserving open space, and delivering on low-cost government. The poll also revealed that the single most important issue among undecided likely voters was "proclaiming my Christian conservative values."

Since Thibault base voters and the undecideds were motivated by decidedly different issues, the campaign decided to forgo television in favor of an aggressive, extremely targeted direct voter contact program tailored to different geographic and demographic subgroups. Key among these were voters who must at some point be convinced to cast just one vote for Thibault.

After further research, including a detailed, comprehensive voter-ID process, the campaign team designed eleven different pieces of voter mail and five different phone scripts.

The first piece of mail, sent to every likely voter, was an uplifting biography that told Thibault's compelling personal story. The next eight mailers and two phone calls addressed key campaign issues, with the mailing universes for each determined by voter-ID results augmented by gender and geographic data from the poll.

Of particular importance to the campaign were two pieces of "values" mail. Since Thibault's opponents had been attacking his conservative credentials, it was important to reassure the largely undecided universe of pro-family voters that Thibault shared their values. Rather than concede those voters to Shaub and Swarr, Thibault took his message directly into their homes and made his opponents fight for every vote.

The final advocacy piece, designed to stand out amid a flood of last minute campaign mail, was a recap of key issues and the Thibault record.

By election day, every likely voter had been reached with a Thibault advocacy message at least six times.

Nine days out, the campaign began what would prove to be the single most critical part of the Thibault strategy: convincing supporters to bullet vote on election day. The message was delivered in a memorandum to key supporters; in speeches by the candidate and designated surrogates; in paid newspaper ads; through earned media; and in GOTV calls to favorable voters.

While the move brought predictable criticism from party officials and Thibault's opponents, the message got out.

Four days before the election, a Thibault anti-crime mailer that included a photo of black and white gang members drew criticism from the minority community. The sincere concerns of black ministers were addressed immediately by Thibault, and it was clear to everyone that the photo had been misinterpreted.

Two days later, however, Thibault's opponents attempted to exploit the issue by publicly questioning the campaign's motives. But the attacks backfired. Republicans voters saw the charges as reckless and unfair, and now had a reason to vote against Shaub and Swarr.

When the numbers came in on election night, it was clear that bullet votes had made the difference. Thibault was nominated with 24,449 votes - just 611 behind Pete Shaub and only 1,894 votes ahead of Jere Swarr. At least 10,000 people had bullet voted, and Thibault had won by less than 2,000 votes.

Jesse Yescalis is a past executive director of the Republican Party of Hawaii and is currently a Regional Finance Director for the National Republican Senatorial Committee, He served as general consultant and strategist to the Thibault campaign.

Chris Wilson is President of Wilson Research Strategies, a Republican polling and strategy firm. He served as pollster to the Thibault campaign.

COPYRIGHT 1999 Campaigns & Elections, Inc.
COPYRIGHT 2000 Gale Group