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  • 标题:Shaking the third rail: Reforming Social Security
  • 作者:Neely, Michelle Clark
  • 期刊名称:Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis - Regional Economist
  • 出版年度:1996
  • 卷号:Oct 1996
  • 出版社:Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Shaking the third rail: Reforming Social Security

Neely, Michelle Clark

(PHOTOGRAPH)

U.S. politicians, policymakers and ordinary citizens are now talking openly about a topic that has long been taboo: altering the nation's Social Security system. Frequently called "the third rail of American politics"-touch it and you die-social security reform is an issue that prompts heated debates among its supporters and detractors. And although Social Security has been changed a number of times since its inception in 1935, the reforms being discussed today are much more substantial than those previously considered or undertaken.

And for good reason: It has become widely accepted that the long-term financial viability of the Social Security system is in doubt. Although the reasons are numerous, the key factor appears to be the enormous demands the aging of the baby boom population will place on the system early in the next century. To avert the financial crunch that most analysts see looming, a growing number of social security experts and policymakers are supporting the privatization of all or parts of the system.

Humble Beginnings

The U.S. Social Security system-formally Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) -was launched in response to the Great Depression, when the savings of a large portion of American families were wiped out. Even before the Depression, however, a number of policymakers recognized the need for government social insurance because of sweeping economic and demographic changes like increased urbanization and life expectancy, which threatened the traditional familybased support for the elderly.

Social Security was introduced as a fully funded program; workers and their employers were each subject to a 1 percent payroll tax on earnings up to $3,000. The taxes went into a fund to pay future benefits, which were based on an individual's lifetime contribution.

But in 1939, recognizing that Americans nearing retirement age would never be able to contribute enough to finance a socially acceptable retirement income, Congress made a number of changes to the program. First, benefits for dependents-spouses and children-were introduced. Second, benefits became based on average earnings over some minimum period, rather than total lifetime contributions. Finally, and most important, to finance benefits for the newly eligible, as well as higher benefits for workers close to retirement, the program was changed to a "pay-as-you-go" system. Under pay-as-you-go, payroll tax contributions from future retirees and their employers are immediately paid out as benefits to current retirees.

Other modifications have also been made over the years. Disability benefits were added in 1954. Workers not previously covered-farmers, the self-employed, certain government employeeswere added to the program. Per capita benefits and payroll taxes have been increased a number of times; the current payroll tax of 12.4 percent (employee and employer combined) is six times the original rate.l Benefits have been indexed for inflation. They are also subject to an earnings test and taxed if income exceeds a given level, which redistributes benefits across income classes. Workers can retire as early as 62, but receive reduced benefits before age 65. The maximum level of earnings subject to the payroll tax has also risen over time, and currently stands at $62,700.

Under the Social Security Act amendments passed in 1983, benefits will be reduced beginning in the year 2000, and the retirement age will gradually increase, reaching 67 by 2022. A trust fund was also established in 1983 to help finance future benefits. Payroll taxes in excess of what's needed to pay current benefits go into the fund and are invested in U.S. Treasury securities-the only investments permitted under law. The fund currently has a surplus of $496 billion, which is expected to increase sharply over the next 15 years because of a larger number of workers and higher payroll tax contributions.

The Coming Crunch

The Social Security trust fund was established because of an increasing concern among policymakers about what demographics would do to the system. The number of workers supporting retirees and the disabled has been declining for decades and is expected to keep dipping well into the next century as the huge cohort of baby boomers begins to retire in 2010. The baby boom generation, defined as those born between 1946 and 1964, numbers 74 million and accounts for about 30 percent of the U.S. population.

Compounding the problem is a continuing drop in the U.S. fertility rate and a continuing increase in life expectancy. The number of workers per supported retiree is expected to fall from about five today to 3.6 in 2010 and 2.4 in 2030.2 At that rate, according to the OASDI trust funds' board of trustees, benefits will exceed payroll tax income by 2012 and total income, which is payroll taxes plus interest income, by 2019. By 2029, the trust fund will be exhausted (see figure).3 Although benefits still will be paid because tax revenue will continue to be collected, most social security analysts believe, barring government borrowing to cover the shortfall, that either taxes will need to be raised, benefits will need to be decreased-or both-to meet system obligations.

Unhappy Returns

In addition to the solvency concern, reform advocates also bemoan the low financial returns to be received by current and future generations under the current system. To date, each generation of recipients has received a lower rate of return than the previous one-a trend that is expected to continue well into the next century. Early program recipients received far more in benefits than they paid in, enjoying real (after inflation) returns of more than 12 percent by some estimates. In contrast, baby boomers can expect a real return of about 2 percent.4

Why the declining returns? First, the program's initial retirees received full benefits-retirement, spousal, dependent and survivor-regardless of either the number of years they paid in to the system or the size of their contributions following the switch from a fully funded to pay-as-you-go system. Large increases in benefits and the introduction of cost of living adjustments in the 1970s also boosted returns for earlier retirees. There was even a period in the mid-1970s when benefits were overindexed for inflation because of a flaw in the indexing formula used.

These benefit increases meant that fewer dollars began accumulating in the trust fund when it was set up in 1983. And the dollars that were accumulating were invested in low-yielding Treasury securities.

How Radical Reform?

Given the mounting concerns about long-term solvency and the low returns being generated under the current system, momentum is gaining for social security reform. The United States is not alone in this predicament. Most industrialized nations, as well as a number of developing countries, also face aging populations and declining fertility rates and are saddled with payas-you-go systems that redistribute income across generations and income levels. Reform efforts of various sorts have been launched in a number of countries, including Australia, Chile and Sweden.5 What these reform movements have in common is an effort to more closely link benefits with actual contributions. For example, Chile's movement from a pay-asyou-go system to one that's mostly privatized has been closely scrutinized and touted as a model for the United States and other nations (see sidebar).

In the United States, reform proposals that address the solvency issue and the benefits-contribution link are now being seriously contemplated. For example, Senators Bob Kerrey and Alan Simpson have introduced legislation that would increase the normal retirement age to 70 by 2029. More significantly, the senators have also introduced a bill that would direct a portion of payroll taxes to IRA-like personal investment plans-an approach that could be considered partial privatization of the system.

In its last several annual reports, the OASDI trust funds' board of trustees has forecasted that the system is failing the 75-year test for actuarial balance, which is the difference between annual income and annual costs, summed over the next 75 years. Every four years, an advisory council is appointed to review these forecasts and comment on policy issues related to Social Security. The council appointed in 1994 has tackled the imbalance issue and is expected to issue its policy recommendations by year-end. The council's stated goal was to bring the system into actuarial balance, while preserving its popularity, by minimizing benefit cuts and payroll tax increases.6

Although council members could not unanimously agree on one plan, the three drafted share two common features. First, each proposes a way of bridging the gap between benefits and income by raising taxes, trimming benefits, taxing benefits, gradually raising the retirement age or requiring mandatory private saving. Second, to address the low returns generated on workers' contributions, each plan has provisions for directing some portion of these savings into the stock market. The council notes that even after adjusting for risk, the stock market outperforms the bond market over long time horizons, a phenomena economists call "the equity premium."7 One substantial difference among the plans is the degree to which they move Social Security away from a pay-as-you-go system toward a fully funded one. According to economist Ed Gramlich, a University of Michigan economics professor and head of the council, these plans can be described as follows.

The Maintain Benefits Proposal

The objective of this proposal is preservation of the current system. To meet this objective, benefits would be subject to tougher tax treatment, and a portion of the OASDI trust funds would be invested in stocks. Currently, above certain income thresholds, 50 percent to 85 percent of benefits are taxable, with tax revenue divided between the OASDI and Medicare trust funds. Under this first proposal, however, all benefits in excess of previously taxed contributions (payroll tax payments) would be treated as taxable income, and all of that tax revenue would eventually be diverted to the OASDI funds. One controversial aspect of this tougher tax treatment is that it forces current retirees-who are receiving higher returns than future generations will receive-to pay for some of the system's actuarial imbalance.

The other provision of this plan would permit the OASDI trust funds to gradually hold up to 40 percent of their assets in stocks, a move that would be expected to raise the overall return on the portfolio by nearly 50 percent. The shift from government securities to stocks is a controversial one. Some analysts have expressed concerns about whether the equity premium will hold up; if it doesn't, the Social Security system would have new financial and credibility problems. Another concern is over government involvement in the stock market. A 40 percent investment in stocks would tally about $1 trillion, or one-seventh of GDP. Although the plan calls for the OASDI trust funds to hold passive investments, like index funds, there are still fears about political meddling in the management of these sizable accounts.8

The Individual Accounts Proposal

The primary objective of this proposal is to scale back benefits to eradicate the long-term actuarial deficit in the program. To accomplish this, three steps would be taken. First, the normal retirement age would gradually be raised. Second, the ratio of benefits to contributions for highwage workers would be scaled back. Third, and most important, this plan would create mandatory individual savings accounts equivalent to 1.6 percent of payrolls.9 Although these accounts would be held in the Social Security system, individuals would direct their contributions to specific investments, choosing from among five to 10 index funds of stocks, bonds or both. The accumulations in these accounts would be packaged as an annuity and added to regular benefits at retirement.

The establishment ot individual accounts would represent a radical departure from the current system, which is basically a defined benefit program that also partially redistributes income from high- to low-wage earners.lo Under this second plan, the system would be part defined benefit and part defined contribution. Because the individual account contributions are a fixed percentage of payroll, high earners would automatically accumulate more income than low earners, assuming the same investment choices.

Proponents of this plan cite several advantages, including decentralized decision-making, an increased sense of "ownership" of retirement funds because of the partial funding, and

Copyright Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Oct 1996
Provided by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights Reserved

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