A case for howitzers in Afghanistan

In the last two years, the Army has fought unique enemies in unique terrain across the globe, and it has had to adapt to ever-changing battlefields--the contemporary operating environment (COE). For example, in Afghanistan, artillerymen started out fighting with and continue to fight with 120-mm mortars. Today, there also is an M119 105-mm battery in Afghanistan firing multiple rounds daily. The M119 is the indirect fire weapon of choice for range, lethality and accuracy in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

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The artillery has been largely successful with many of the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) it has had to develop to fight the War on Terror. In Afghanistan, A and B Batteries (minus) of the 1st Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment (1-319 AFAR), 82d Airborne Division, (and several batteries since) seamlessly transitioned into mortar platoons and fought with a new weapon system: the M120 mortar. The artillerymen of A and B Batteries each had one mortar platoon of four 120-mm mortars. In Afghanistan, one mortar platoon conducted combat operations while the other pulled security.

In OEF, C/1-319 AFAR was the first US artillery battery in Afghanistan. After C/1-319 AFAR deployed as a minimally manned and equipped howitzer battery without ammunition trucks, it had to adapt its standing operating procedures (SOPs).

The Army learned a lot in Afghanistan. Soldiers are adaptable and flexible enough to deal with a variety of nontraditional demands and succeed. The battery's TTPs also were successful: ammunition resupply without ammunition carriers, air assaulting M119s via internal loading in Chinooks and counterfire in urban areas against an enemy who used civilians as protection and time fuzes to remotely detonate rockets.

But we must learn from our mistakes. Not taking howitzers into Afghanistan from the beginning was a mistake. A small amount of additional airlift would have brought in howitzers that had twice the indirect firepower, were more accurate and had three times the range--a decided advantage for our infantry forces in Afghanistan, especially during Operation Anaconda.

Redlegs Manning Mortars. The 82d Airborne Division received its initial deployment order during the spring of 2002 specifying that the direct support (DS) artillery not be deployed with its infantry brigade. With the support of the division commander, the 82d Division Artillery (Div Arty) developed a plan to train artillerymen on the 120-mm mortar. The M120 is lighter, more maneuverable and quicker to emplace than the 105-mm howitzer, and so it was believed it would perform better in the rougher Afghanistan environment.

The M120 mortar already was being fielded to units in Afghanistan--only one additional mortar platoon's worth of equipment had to be deployed. The one platoon of four 120-mm mortars required fewer airlifts to deploy than the alternative M119 battery of six howitzers.

Training artillerymen on the 120-mm mortar instead of using the crews in organic mortar platoons increased the division's firepower. The organic mortar platoons would have followed the 75th Ranger Regiment's arms room concept in which soldiers switched between mortar calibers, depending on the mission. With the artillerymen in mortar platoons, the infantry could have all three calibers of mortars firing at once: 120-mm, 81-mm and 60-mm.

Why Take Howitzers. Although A and B Batteries performed exceptionally on the mortars in Afghanistan, it is fortunate the division persisted in requesting a 105-mm howitzer battery to deploy as well.

Although the M120 does not require a trailer and is, therefore, more easily transported, the 105-mm howitzer shoots nearly three times the distance of the 120-mm mortar and can hit targets closer to friendly forces with risk estimate distances (REDs) nearly half that of the 120-mm mortar. In addition, a mortar platoon only has four tubes while the howitzer battery has six. (See Figure 1.)

Despite concerns to the contrary, the howitzers in Afghanistan also have had an outstanding track record. C/1-319 AFAR met all its 24 in-position-ready-to-fire (IPRTF) times in its 13 combat missions from August 2002 to January 2003. The battery traveled thousands of kilometers by ground and air through unforgiving Afghanistan terrain and always was ready to support its infantry brothers with danger-close fires. The battery supported every mission called for from its forward operating base (FOB).

Since C/1-319 AFAR redeployed, C/3-319 AFAR, also part of the 82d Division, and other M119 batteries from the 10th Mountain Division have deployed to Afghanistan and have been just as successful in an environment that many believed was too rugged for artillery.

Interestingly, the M120's maneuverability advantage was never significant in Afghanistan. During Task Force (TF) Panther's combat operations in OEF, the combat mortar platoon arrived at the battlefield in the same manner as the howitzers, usually in the same convoy. The mortars missed IPRTF times because they had to continue on after the howitzers emplaced in order to get within range of the target. In fact, the infantry's preference for the firepower of the 105-mm howitzer led to C/1-319

AFAR's supporting all three infantry battalions as they rotated through combat operations. In addition, the howitzer battery supported more operations out of the FOB than any other TF unit.

Although all three batteries certified on the required Infantry Mortar Leadership Course (IMLC) tasks in the allotted two weeks, they encountered issues when using the mortars in the field. For example, Charlie Battery was practicing hipshoots when it realized it could not support a target that was well within the mortars' maximum range. Unlike a howitzer that can shoot any target within its maximum range immediately upon emplacement, a mortar can't reach certain ranges until the baseplate is seated firmly into the ground--either by shooting rounds or digging it in with a shovel. Until then, the mortar tube cannot reach its maximum elevations and, therefore, cannot reach the targets associated with those elevations.

What did help A and B Batteries fight with mortars was the similarities between the systems in gunnery and fire direction. It was easy for the gunners in the battery to switch to the M120's sight and aiming procedures. Similarly, although a plotting circle is normally used, the fire direction center (FDC) could use the same chart it used for howitzers to compute manual solutions for the mortars. The mortar ballistic computer also was easy for the FDC to learn, especially because it accounts for fewer nonstandard conditions than the ballistic computer system.

One of the primary concerns about taking artillery into Afghanistan seemed to be a lack of available airlift. Initially, the artillery howitzers weren't allowed to deploy in order to save airspace. With the support of the division, the 82d Div Arty "sold" higher headquarters on the concept of deploying the smaller 120-mm mortar platoon that would not take much additional airlift room to give the division more indirect firepower.

Once the Div Arty sold the idea of the 120-mm mortar platoons, it then argued that taking a minimally manned and equipped 105-mm artillery battery only would require slightly more airlift.

The 120-mm mortar platoon (provisional) that deployed to Afghanistan took six high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), 26 personnel and 4 quadruple containers, requiring just less than one C5 (or one and one-half C17s) to airlift them. (1) (See Figure 2.) In order to deploy Charlie Battery (minus) with eight HMMWVs (six prime movers, an FDC and a battery operations center, or BOC), six howitzers, a generator, seven quadruple containers and 44 personnel, it took two C17s (or a little more than one C5). Using almost the same airspace as a mortar platoon, the division could have had an M119 battery (minus) with 50 percent more firepower and three times the range.

Even after the division was able to send one firing battery, higher's guidance did not allow it to send the battery fully equipped. To deploy a battery with ammo trucks (everything except the supply light medium tactical vehicle and a couple of miscellaneous HMMWVs) only would have required three C17s. With two C5s, the entire battery could have deployed.

While these airframes are twice that of a 120-mm mortar platoon, it still only would have taken one and one-half more C17s to bring in an entire battery, significantly increasing firepower, range and ammo-carrying capacity and allowing the howitzer battery to conduct 24-hour and split-battery operations.

According to the air loading personnel, by the time Charlie Battery deployed into Afghanistan, there were enough aircraft available to at least piecemeal the battery's extra vehicles into theater. Further, there was enough space for all battery personnel to be air lifted into theater. During deployments to and from Afghanistan and in five months of moving around in country, the battery never flew on a full aircraft--either by weight or seat limit.

The 10 more personnel needed to fully man the battery would not have impacted the support requirements in theater. There never was a lack of water or meals ready to eat (MREs) at the firebase.

Yet, the number of personnel the battery was allowed to deploy was limited, decreasing its capabilities. The battery had the minimum number of people needed to man howitzers without taking into account advanced party procedures, security or other battery functions. In essence, to provide security on the battery's position, the battery had to pull crews from its howitzers.

Combined Joint TF 180 (CJTF-180) decided to have two howitzers with prime movers remain in another location without their C/1-319 AFAR crews. So the two sections of personnel supplemented the manning of the other four howitzers, and C/1-319 AFAR had enough people to secure its position. This is the only way the battery was able to support combat operations with all four howitzers.

Carrying Ammo Without Ammo Carriers. Because the ammunition carriers were left at Fort Bragg, the battery was limited in the number of rounds it could bring for an operation. The battery only could carry 120 rounds internally--30 rounds per howitzer. These 30 rounds had to be mixtures of high-explosive (HE) rounds with Charge 8, rocket-assisted projectiles (RAP), smoke and illumination rounds to provide a 6400-mil capability and support multiple objectives. This meant the battery only could fire one battery-six before running out of ammunition (on the average).

It was essential to have contingency plans in place in case an operation required heavy firing. The battery prerigged A-22 bags with ammo before leaving the FOB. These A-22 bags were either loaded in one of the TF's light-medium tactical vehicles traveling on the mission or placed near the airfield for TF aviation assets to fly in as emergency resupply. If the rounds had been needed, there would have been a delay--but at least the ammo ultimately would be available.

TTPs for Internal Loading Air Assault. Soon after arriving, the battery conducted its longest air movement from Bagram to Khowst slung under CH-47s operated by the 18th Airborne Corps' TF Shark--more than 200 kilometers. Because the 82d Division has no CH-47s, the supporting aviation unit at the FOB was elements of TF Corsair with CH-47s from the 101st Aviation. Although TF Shark slung load M119s on a regular basis, TF Corsair would not because of hazards caused by the higher elevations of the area. (See the map on Page 12.)

This affected the battery's ability to conduct rapid insertion missions. Charlie Battery worked with the aviation personnel, however, to perfect techniques to internally load a howitzer into the body of a CH-47. The howitzer was driven next to the CH-47, unloaded by section personnel and rolled to the tailgate of the helicopter. With the help of the CH-47's winch system, the section personnel guided the howitzer into the body of the helicopter. A piece of plywood was used underneath the towing pindle of the howitzer as it was pulled with the winch.

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The technique took significantly more time at the pickup and landing zones than sling loading would have, which limited the howitzers' movement into areas that could not be secured.

Internal loading allowed the Chinooks to be more maneuverable and move more quickly when they flew the howitzers to position areas and smaller firebases in the adjoining regions. In addition, this technique disguised the fact that a howitzer was being positioned on a firebase, an advantage when surprise was essential to the success of the infantry's mission.

TTP for Counterfire in Urban Areas. Another challenge for the TF in Afghanistan, which will continue to be a challenge in the future, was developing TTPs to counter an elusive indirect fire threat in an urban environment. The most dangerous threat to allied forces in Afghanistan was the 107-mm rocket. From nearby villages, the enemy regularly shot rockets at elements of the TF stationed in Khowst, including C/1-319 AFAR and the 1-319 AFAR radar; one impacted in the middle of the firebase.

The enemy often used homemade time fuzes to launch a rocket remotely. In most cases, by the time the rocket ignited, no one was at the launch site. In addition, the launch sites were often close to urban areas, which increased the risk of collateral damage if the TF responded with counterfire.

These situations highlighted the advantage of having observers in the area to confirm what was on the ground. The radar is a very useful tool for giving the counterfire battery an accurate grid location of launch sites or enemy position areas. However, the radar cannot determine whether or not the launch site is in the middle of a town square or if the enemy is still in the area. Before executing a counterfire mission, the question was whether or not the possible collateral damage was worth neutralizing the threat with lethal artillery fire.

To counter the threat in Afghanistan, the TF developed techniques to send patrols out to the area in lieu of automatically sending counterbattery fire to grids acquired by the radar. An Army aviation quick-reaction force (QRF) could sweep the area quickly and identify and personnel still on the ground. Aviation and infantry patrols in an area after a rocket attack also resulted in some captured enemy personnel.

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The TF experimented with shooting illumination rounds as part of its counterfire SOP. Shooting illum had advantages and disadvantages. The advantage was that it immediately alerted the enemy (if he was still present) that we knew where he was and could rain indirect fire on him if he didn't stop. The disadvantage was that it also gave the enemy a chance to escape before a patrol reached the area. Shooting illumination never seemed to decrease the amount of indirect fire incidents at the FOB while aggressive patrols did.

Operation Anaconda. Even with the difficulties the howitzers encountered after deploying, it was worth sending them. The six M119A2 howitzers from C/1-319 AFAR saw 13 months of combat operations while sustaining more than 95 percent operational readiness in extremely harsh terrain. They would have been valuable indirect fire assets for Operation Anaconda, had they been in country.

On 1 March 2002, Operation Anaconda began as elements of C/1-87 IN exited from the back of their CH-47 as it touched down in the Shah-e-Kot Valley and started looking for places to set up planned blocking positions. Almost immediately, small-arms fire started coming from al Qaeda fighting positions dug into the mountainsides around the landing zone. A 120-mm mortar section on the valley floor was only able to shoot 16 rounds before it started receiving small-arms fire. Soon after, mortar rounds came in as well, sending the mortar team running. (2)

Without an artillery battery to support them, the infantry was left without an effective indirect fire support asset.

When the Army first tested its air assault procedures in the jungles and mountains of Vietnam, it quickly learned to prep landing zones with artillery fire before bringing in infantry by air--a tactic that applied to forces in Operation Anaconda. At the very least, a battery should have been in place before H-Hour in the Shah-e-Kot Valley to support on-call targets that might arise in the fluid environment of an air-assault mission. Just like the maneuver units in Vietnam, C/1-87 IN could have used the howitzer's firepower as it took small arms and mortar fire on the landing zone. Unfortunately, higher headquarters required the 101st and 10th Mountain Divisions to leave their howitzers back in the states.

C/1-319 AFAR conducted a string of operations just west of the valley six months later, easily reaching its position areas. There is no question that a howitzer battery, if it had been in country, either could have been pre-positioned before the infantry air lifted into Anaconda or brought in on the first lift afterward. The artillery battery would have been out of range of the small arms and mortar fire and more available than air support for on-call missions.

Although the Air Force was very effective on a number of occasions during OEF (the Army never should "leave home" without it), one infantry unit was without air support for nearly 24 hours during Operation Anaconda because its tactical air control party (TACP) was absent. In other cases, the al Qaeda escaped into cave complexes whenever they heard the aircraft approach, making targeting them by air support difficult. Air support, although often the right weapon at the right time, cannot do it all--including the job of the land force commander's own all-weather artillery.

While it is impossible to go back and replay the battle during Operation Anaconda, it is reasonable to assume that supporting artillery would have saved infantry lives.

Senior officials were willing to leave artillery out of OEF initially because they thought the artillery took up too much airlift space--that they could replace the artillery's firepower with mortars and air support. Operation Anaconda proved otherwise.

These officials thought howitzers couldn't perform in the rugged, mountainous terrain. C/1-319 AFAR's operational record as well as the records of the batteries that followed Charlie Battery have shown otherwise.

In OEF, 1-319 AFAR manned mortars and developed howitzer battery and mortar TTPs to deal with the unique enemy and terrain. It moved its howitzers by ground and air all around Afghanistan and fired them accurately in support of combat missions--giving the infantry greater range, lethality and accuracy than the mortars.

Field Artillery is the maneuver forces' all-weather, land-based firepower--the Army never should leave home without it.

                Max Range    RED for Max Range and
Weapon System   (Meters)   .1% Incapacitation (Meters)  Maneuverability

M120 120-mm         7,200            400                HMMWV/Gator
Mortar
M119A2 105-mm      20,000            235                Towed by HMMWV
Howitzer

Legend: HMMWV = High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
RED = Risk Estimate Distances

Figure 1: Comparison of M120 Mortar and M119A2 Howitzer. Although the
M120 does not need a trailer and is more transportable, the M119 has
almost three times the range and can be fired almost twice as close to
friendly forces as the M120. In addition, the M119 can shoot at low
angles.

Deploying Package             Personnel  Tubes   C17 (or) C5

120-mm Mortar Platoon            26        4     1.5      1
105-mm Minimally Manned and      44        6     2        1.2
Equipped Battery
105-mm Fully Manned and          61        6     3        2
Equipped Battery

Figure 2: Airlift Requirements for a Mortar Platoon as Compared to a
Battery (Minus) or an Entire Howitzer Battery

Endnotes:

1. All airframes computed by Sergeant First Class Frank Luedtke, the S3 Air for 1-319 AFAR during deployment and redeployment to/from Afghanistan.

2. Ann Scott Tyson, "Anaconda: A War Story," Christian Science Monitor (Boston: Christian Science Publishing Society, August 1, 2002), 1.

Captain Joshua D. Mitchell was the Fire Direction Officer (FDO) for C Battery, 1st Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment (C/1-319 AFAR), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and deployed to Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) II. Currently, he is deployed to Iraq as the Battalion FDO for 1-319 AFAR in Operation Iraqi Freedom II. In other positions with 1-319 AFAR, he was the Executive Officer for C Battery and the Fire Support Officer for B Company, 2d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment. He holds bachelor's degrees in Biomedical Engineering and Mathematical Sciences from Johns Hopkins University. He was a Distinguished Graduate of his Field Artillery Officer Basic Course and the recipient of the Gunnery Award at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

By Captain Joshua D. Mitchell

COPYRIGHT 2003 U.S. Field Artillery Association
COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group