3ID COLT employment in OIF

It was 24 March 2003, and the 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Reconnaissance Troop, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), was less than 100 kilometers from Baghdad. The day started with high winds and progressed into a shamal (sandstorm), reducing visibility to less than 100 meters. Ground surveillance radar (GSR) teams began to receive acquisitions of what appeared to be an unknown enemy force coming our way.

With visibility becoming limited, the level of security heightened, so the combat observation lasing team (COLT) pulled back into a tighter formation and established a hasty defensive position. The COLT platoon was task organized to the brigade reconaissance team (BRT), which also consisted of two scout platoons and two GSR teams. This was one way of integrating the COLTs and the BRT during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The COLT established observation posts (OPs) and manned all crew-served weapons, getting ready for whatever was coming.

As before morning nautical twilight (BMNT) approached, visibility continued to increase as the first spot reports were sent to the brigade fire support element (FSE). During the next two hours, visibility improved to almost three kilometers, and the COLT platoon began to acquire Iraqi reconnaissance elements.

Within the next two hours, the COLT destroyed two T-55 tanks, three BMPs and two technical trucks with Saddam Fedayeen fighters by employing indirect fire support from the 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery (1-41 FA).

Much has been written and discussed about how to employ COLTS most effectively--many battles have been fought at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, with COLTs task organized or not. Do the COLTs operate as an autonomous platoon? Are they attached or under the operational control (OPCON) of the BRT or some combination of both?

This article describes the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) the 3d Division developed in support of OIF based on its NTC rotation and reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) into Iraq for major combat operations (MCO). The division employed the TTPs during combat operations with much success.

The Plan. After NTC Rotation 03-02, the 3d Division changed the way it employed the COLT platoon. Previously, the COLT platoon was OPCON to the BRT but worked as a separate platoon. The new plan called for integrating the COLTs into the scout platoons--in essence, giving each scout section a COLT, providing the BCT commander a more direct form of fire support for the BRT.

The integration began shortly after the division arrived at Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait. TTPs and standing operating procedures (SOPs) were developed and trained. The concept for the integration was simple: integrate highly trained forward observers (FOs) with highly trained scouts, providing additional force protection and the capability to provide the brigade commander with timely, accurate and lethal fires.

The division broke the two scout platoons down into three sections, including a command and control ([C.sup.2]) section with two vehicles per section. Integrating a COLT into each scout section increased the section's vehicles from two to three.

In movement formations, the COLT vehicle positioned behind the lead scout vehicle of that section. This enabled each COLT to call-for-fire in the event of contact with enemy forces. The COLT gave each scout section an indirect fire support capability and gave the BCT commander "eyes forward" for early warning of enemy troop movements to shape the battlefield with indirect fires.

Integrating a COLT into the scout section provided the BRT a complementary effect: the scouts became another set of "eyes" for the acquisition of high payoff-targets (HPTs), and the COLTs made each scout section more lethal with the means to call-for-fire.

Using this TTP allowed the COLT platoon to make the most of the platoon leader's [C.sup.2] nodes, provide line-of-sight analysis for OP locations and expertise on the capabilities and limitations of fire support, and help clear fires and process fire missions. It also gave the troop commander a dedicated fire support officer (FSO)/fire support NCO (FSNCO) to synchronize artillery and close air support (CAS) in his scheme of reconnaissance or maneuver.

As part of RSOI in Kuwait, the scouts fielded the long-range acquisition scout system (LRASS). LRASS allowed each scout section to positively identify and engage targets out to 10 kilometers and observe targets out to 20 kilometers. The COLTs' ground/vehicular laser locater designator (G/VLLD) only could identify targets out to five kilometers and observe targets out to 10 kilometers. The LRASS enhanced COLT operations, virtually doubling the target acquisition range.

Execution. On 20 March, the BRT scouts and COLTs were on OPs ready to observe the initial artillery rounds of OIF. At 2000 hours, the ground war began with the COLTs and BRT scouts observing the first artillery rounds as they destroyed enemy OPs along the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. (See the map on Page 23.)

During the next 48 hours, the division pushed north, and the BRT reconnoitered routes for the BCT. The first missions fired in direct support of the BCT occurred when the BRT entered the town of As Samawah. The BRT moved along two routes with the remainder of the BCT.

As the BRT/COLTs maneuvered through the town, they were ambushed. While breaking contact, a COLT called for an immediate suppression mission followed by a fire-for-effect mission on a bunker complex, destroying the bunkers and 25 enemy soldiers, thus validating the TTP.

After breaking contact, the BRT/COLTs conducted a forward-passage-of-lines with Task Force 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry (TF 2-7 IN). The BRT continued to reconnoiter Route Jackson through the southern portion of As Samawah.

For the next several days, a fully integrated BRT/COLT unit provided security and screened the BCT's front line of troops. It also provided observation for the assault on the town of Al Kifl. A COLT team and scout section called for 300 artillery rounds to support the BCT's seizure of a vital bridge across the Euphrates River.

As the BCT continued its attack, the BRT and COLTs received a task organization change, attaching them to TF 2-7 IN for its attack to destroy enemy forces on Objective Hannah around the town of Al Mussayib on the Euphrates River about 65 kilometers south of Baghdad. The integrated COLT and BRT destroyed two technical vehicles and several air defense weapons and killed more than 40 enemy soldiers--many enemy soldiers abandoned their fighting positions and fled.

The Integration. Integrating COLTs into the BRT proved successful in several areas, but it had its challenges at times. Based on the need to maintain the initiative throughout OIF, the increased security for the individual COLTs was extremely beneficial. It proved worth-while when screening the BCT's northern flank at Objective Raiders less than 100 kilometers from Baghdad when the threat of a counterattack was most likely.

Another advantage to integrating the BRT and COLTs: whenever the BCT made enemy contact, indirect fires could be placed upon the enemy, thus keeping the main effort from becoming decisively engaged.

Although the integration was very successful, there was one major disadvantage to the COLT and BRT relationship that became apparent during combat operations. Being attached to the BRT meant that when the BRT became OPCON to other units or another BCT, the brigade commander lost control of his most highly trained and maneuverable FOs-releasing control had to be a conscious decision. A task organization change would have resolved this problem, but without additional force protection, the COLTs most likely would have been ineffective.

Integrating the COLT platoon into the BRT was effective during 23 days of combat in OIF. The complementary effect each had on the other wreaked havoc on the enemy.

We don't advocate giving up the COLT platoon to the BRT in all situations. There are many TTPs on how best to employ the COLTs in different combat scenarios.

Yet in OIF, with more observers and a better force protection, the Field Artillery used the eyes of the COLT and proved, again, the Field Artillery is the greatest killer on the battlefield.

By Major Benjamin M. Matthews and Captain A. J. Seidensticker

Major Benjamin M. Matthews is the Executive Officer of 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery (1-41 FA), 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia. During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), he was the 1st Brigade Combat Team Fire Support Officer (FSO), also in the 3d Division. His previous assignments include serving as Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General of the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas; and Commander of A/3-82 FA, Assistant S3 of 3-82 FA and Task Force FSO for 1-5 Cav, all in the 1st Cavalry Division. He holds an MA in Human Resource Management from Webster University, Missouri, and is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Captain A. J. Seidensticker served as the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3d Division, Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) Platoon Leader throughout OIF. Currently, he is a student in the Field Artillery Captain's Career Course at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. His previous duties include serving as a Firing Battery Platoon Leader in C Battery and Battalion Reconnaissance and Surveillance Officer (RSO) and Company FSO for C/2-7 IN, all while assigned to 1-41 FA. Captain Seidensticker is a graduate of the Illinois Institute of Technology with a BA in Biology.

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