1st AD Hot Platoon in Iraq: POC to brigade FSE counterstrike drill

The acquisition is transmitted via the advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS) to the platoon operations center (POC). The fire direction center (FDC) quickly plots, verifies and computes the firing data. The fire direction officer (FDO) announces the fire order, which is sent via radio to the guns. Simultaneously, the platoon leader verifies the grid on his automated deep operations coordination system (ADOCS) computer, and the battalion fire control NCO (FCNCO) calls the brigade fire support element (FSE) via digital non-secure voice telephone (DNVT) to verify the acquisition.

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The Hot Platoon fires the mission within the two minutes allotted by the brigade commander, and the mortar is silenced with nine rounds of high-explosive (HE) ammunition.

ADOCS and DNVT were just two of the additional tools used by 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery (4-27 FA), 1st Armored Division (1st AD), during the battalion's final four months of its 15-month deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II. Although such equipment is not part of the table of organization and equipment (TOE) of a 155-mm howitzer platoon, they proved invaluable in our mission to provide fire support for the 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in Joint Operating Area (JOA) Iron.

This article discusses the use of non-doctrinal technology and personnel to enhance the lethality of the brigade FSE and Hot Platoon POC in counterstrike operations, maintaining the battalion's gunnery skills for counterstrike operations and Hot Platoon operations.

Brigade FSE to POC Counterstrike Drill. The counterstrike drill is perhaps one of the most common battle drills in the Field Artillery. An effective counterstrike battle drill is a well defined and rehearsed function in the tactical operations center (TOC).

But what happens when the FA battalion TOC is removed from the drill because it is functioning primarily as a maneuver TOC as the 4-27 FA TOC was during OIF?

In our case, the answer was to train, equip and man the brigade FSE and the POC to ensure that counterstrike operations were timely and effective. A brigade FSE or POC handling basic functions that were once the domain of a reinforcing (R) or direct support (DS) battalion FDC can be overwhelming, to say the least.

Based on several factors, such as the location of the DS battalion TOC, the location of the Hot Platoon and the superior connectivity between the brigade TOC and subordinate units, we chose to move these functions to the brigade FSE. It was, therefore, important to ensure the autonomous counterstrike battle drill in the brigade FSE became the same well defined and rehearsed event that it was in the DS battalion TOC. (See Figure 1.)

The brigade FSE became the primary facilitator of the sensor-to-shooter trail that allowed the POC to concentrate solely on the technical computations of the fire mission; the brigade FSE retained some of its traditional doctrinal activities, such as activating all fire support coordinating measures (FSCM) and facilitating the clearance of fires with the local task force commanders.

To support the rapid delivery of fires, the commander of 4-27 FA and the battalion operations officer established a command and control ([C.sup.2]) cell within the POC. The POC was manned by the battalion FCNCO and a battery platoon leader responsible for the overall mission of providing fires across the brigade sector. This was necessary because the firing platoon was collocated with another maneuver task force approximately 50 kilometers from the DS battalion TOC.

Communictions. The POC maintained two AFATDS; one was used solely as a back-up system. AFATDS helped to provide a common counterstrike picture across the brigade sector. AFATDS screens in the maneuver task force (TF) and brigade FSEs instantaneously displayed red (enemy) vectors throughout the BCT, enhancing each commander's ability to decide which assets (countermortar, air or ground troops) to use to attack targets.

AFATDS can communicate using the single-channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS) or a local area network (LAN) connection; in this case, the POC used both methods to communicate to higher (the brigade FSE) and lower (the gun line).

Initially, using the LAN was a challenge because of the POC's lack of familiarity with it; however, once the system was emplaced, it proved reliable and user-friendly. The LAN and SINCGARS were maintained by Soldiers from the battalion communications section.

The battalion provided the [C.sup.2] cell a DNVT to facilitate coordination with the brigade FSE and to enhance the cell's ability to control all fires in the brigade sector. The battalion also provided the [C.sup.2] cell an ADOCS computer to improve situational awareness by allowing rapid vector plotting with one-meter imagery accuracy.

Of the two systems, the DNVT had the most impact because it provided a direct link to the brigade TOC. It improved the POC's ability to understand the intent of higher headquarters and allowed for direct coordination.

To ensure both systems were operational on a continuous basis, the battalion TOC also provided a signal Soldier and coordinated with higher headquarters to troubleshoot any possible ADOCS software problems.

Brigade FSE and Fire Direction. The ability to control fires during the traditional counterstrike battle drill is, for the most part, the battalion FDC's responsibility. However, in this case, the battalion FDC served as a maneuver battalion FSE, and its duties were transferred to the brigade FSE.

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This non-doctrinal arrangement created a few issues in the early deployment of the Hot Platoon. The primary issue was the brigade FSE's lack of familiarity with the issuance of fire orders. This was quickly overcome by training the brigade FSE and encouraging cross talk with the firing platoon POC using the DNVT.

The brigade FSE gave the POC a counterstrike-specific fire order that supported the brigade commander's intent for fires and the OIF rules of engagement (ROE). The initial confusion in the POC was quickly alleviated when we provided a standard fire order to the POC.

When non-doctrinal arrangements are made to accomplish the mission, leaders must look for and isolate the points of friction, such as this one. The [C.sup.2] cell was instrumental in reducing this type of friction throughout this nonstandard mission.

Gunnery Training for Counterstrike Readiness. During combat deployments, we must find ways to train so our core skills do not atrophy. The battalion had scheduled a week of gunnery training per battery at Butler Range east of Baghdad. Each firing battery took a week off from its normal mission of patrolling in Baghdad to train specifically on artillery tasks at the section level (Table VII).

The gunnery training at Butler Range was essential for our Soldiers and our ability to quickly retrain an entire battery to provide counterstrike operations; this was a requirement in combat shortly after the division was extended in theater to fight Muqtada al-Sadr's militia. Some of the basic skills addressed were AFATDS operations, gunnery trouble-shooting procedures, calibration, muzzle velocity variation (MVV) management and direct fire. We used these skills (except for direct fire) in combat operations during our 120-day extension.

During the extension, the 4-27 FA Hot Platoon fired 35 counterstrike missions, 15 harassment and interdiction fires, and many battlefield preparation fires. However, perhaps the most important fires were the calibration fires conducted during the early part of the extension. The calibration data gave us the ability to verify the MVV for each powder lot and contributed greatly to our accuracy.

The 1st AD Division Artillery (Div Arty) also provided a meteorological (Met) team to supply the platoon and radars the current Met data. Because the Met team was on the forward operating base (FOB) with the Hot Platoon and radar, it coordinated with them daily. In fact, the Met section chief provided an invaluable service in training the entire [C.sup.2] cell in the use of Met. He tracked Met trends, helping to determine the Met schedule for the entire sector. Finally, he provided the status of Met supply consumptions weekly to help determine our long-range planning factors.

Hot Platoon Operations. The basic counterstrike drill involves the radar, processing cell and shooter. This did not change as we refined our brigade-to-POC counterstrike battle drill. However the tasks that fall within the drill were changed to meet the environment and the threat.

The ability to clear fires quickly and accurately proved to be the first hurdle for both the brigade FSE and the [C.sup.2] in the POC cell. For the first few weeks, every call-for-fire (CFF) received from the radar sensors (Q-36 or Q-37) was sent to the POC to rehearse the entire process. However, once the mission times decreased, the brigade FSE began to filter the number of missions sent to the POC.

The filter used to determine what missions were transmitted were established by the 1st Armored Division Target Production Section (TPS) that continually updated the measures based on the current threat. The filter criteria are listed in Figure 2.

During the many rehearsals the standard for the POC was to send each mission to the gun line in a do-not-load (DNL) status. This safety factor allowed for the easiest transition from an acquisition to a confirmed target. However, the POC crew drill remained, essentially, the same. (See Figure 3.)

The addition of the DNVT and ADOCS proved invaluable in the missions where uncertainty or confusion had replaced the normal operating procedures. The DNVT provided the most direct link and had a positive influence on our ability to shoot artillery in sector.

Finally the platoon leader established cross training between his gun line and the POC. This training allowed his Soldiers to make great strides in understanding the platoon's systems.

Overall, the use of artillery in sector during 4-27 FA's deployment to Iraq was successful. However, our greatest accomplishment was training future leaders to be flexible and use technology, allowing the artillery to remain the King of Battle in unique situations.

* Range from point-of-origin (POO) to point-of-impact (POI) has been
  determined.
* Impact of the round fell within the forward operating base (FOB).
* Human intelligence (HUMINT) confirmed the impact.
* POO was not in a no-fire area (NFA) or near a known structure.

Figure 2: The brigade FSE filtered the missions sent to the Hot Platoon
POC based on these criteria.

1. The mission enters the POC digitally via AFATDS.
2. The fire direction officer (FDO) and fire direction NCO (FDNCO)
   confirm the general target data.
3. The FDO, who issued a fire order, plots the target data on a map.
4. The mission is computed, verified and sent to the gun line.
5. The gun line is given the voice fire command, "Do not load" (DNL).
6. The gun line reports "Ready-to-Fire" to the brigade FSE.

Figure 3: Hot Platoon POC's Crew Drill

By Sergeant First Class Robert M. Castillo

Sergeant First Class Robert M. Castillo is a Project Officer in the Army's CounterStrike Task Force, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. In his previous assignments, he was Fire Control NCO (FCNCO) for the 1st Armored Division Artillery in Germany and deployed with the Div Arty in Operation Iraqi Freedom II. He also served as FCNCO for the 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery (4-27 FA), in Baumholder Germany; Operations Sergeant for 2-320 FA, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) at Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Fire Direction Observer/Controller (Wolf Team), National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California; FCNCO for 3-29 FA, also in the 1st Armored Division, and Fire Direction Chief, 1-7 FA, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Fort Drum, New York.

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