Air power increasingly short of smart moves

AFTER more than 50 days of Nato airstrikes in the Balkans, it is a sobering thought that at this stage the war in the Gulf was over. Yet, no two wars are ever the same, and not only is Yugoslavia not another Iraq, this is not another Gulf war. Not least among the differences, as Friday's attack on the village of Korisa showed all too tragically, is the presence of innocent civilians amidst the targets.

The paradox is that, having started in an almost half-hearted fashion, Nato commanders may now be running short of suitable targets. This was always likely to be a problem in a conflict with no great troop concentrations to smash, and in a country which, by European standards, is not heavily industrialised. At Korisa, the presence of a single armoured vehicle and some artillery pieces was sufficient to attract an attack.

While there is no doubt that modern aerial warfare is now far more consistently accurate than at any time in the past, there is still a huge gap between image and reality. Despite the use of advanced technology in the Balkans, poor visibility, in particular low cloud, hindered operations at the outset. One of the most advanced combat aircraft available, an F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighter-bomber, was shot down recently by Serb anti-aircraft defences while supposedly more vulnerable aircraft managed to survive. The armed attack helicopter, seen by many as offering a significant advance in battlefield capability, combined with the ability to be deployed so much more quickly than old-fashioned tanks and artillery, took a long time to arrive in the area. When it did, just 24 out of the US Army's total force of 500 Boeing AH-64 Apaches were sent, and two of these crashed shortly after their arrival on April 20. Bad weather soon turned their base into a sea of mud. The Apaches have still not seen action, because of fears that the Serbs may have significant numbers of anti-aircraft missiles ready and waiting. In fact, there were far too few of the right aircraft in the right place at the outset. It seems that Nato's political leadership expected success from a few sorties by strike aircraft, backed up by the use of cruise missiles, including submarine-launched Tomahawk missiles fired from HMS Splendid, for the first time from a non- American warship. During the first 24 hours, there were just 50 sorties by Nato aircraft, compared with 2000 during the first 24 hours of the Gulf war. No less important, during the Gulf war, Iraq could see that air power was backed up by a massive ground force waiting to advance after air forces had broken Iraqi resistance. The outset of the campaign on 24 March, saw the RAF withjust eight Harrier GR7s for operations over the Balkans from their base in Italy. Often described as bombers, the GR7 version of the Harrier is a ground-attack aircraft. These were later joined by another four Harriers and eight Tornado GR1 interdictors - bombers. So far, Nato air power has now managed almost 20,000 sorties. These have destroyed 29 out of 31 bridges across the Danube. Intelligence sources maintain that the Serbs have lost more than 70% of their fuel stocks and more than half their ammunition, while more than a hundred tanks and artillery pieces within Kosovo itself have been destroyed. Fuel spilt into the Danube from damaged oil refineries and storage tanks is threatening an ecological disaster downstream. This is the stage in most conflicts where ground troops need to be deployed, with the support of air power. Continued use of air power on its own in such circumstances is at best wasteful, and at worst means that more and more unsuitable targets are attacked, with an increased risk of heavy civilian casualties. Given the difficult terrain of Kosovo, use of ground forces would need the back-up of large numbers of armed helicopters, such as the Apache. Unfortunately, the troops are not in place, and the absence of good seaports close to the border with Kosovo, for the movement of heavy equipment and supplies, will make the deployment of a substantial ground force difficult. This presents Nato with the stark choice of a break in the bombing, allowing time for reconstruction, or continued attacks, with the risk of further collateral damage. Meanwhile, stocks of weapons, especially smart weapons, are falling to dangerous levels.

Copyright 1999
Provided by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights Reserved.