Peru-Ecuador border conflict: Missed opportunities, misplaced nationalism, and multilateral peacekeeping

Palmer, David Scott

The Peru-Ecuador boundary issue is the oldest continuing border dispute in the Western Hemisphere. Furthermore, [it] has caused more trouble than any other in America.... baffl[ing] repeated attempts at settlement by direct negotiation and repeated efforts at mediation on the part of other friendly nations.... (McBride, 1949:1).1

In 1942, four such friendly nations brought Peru and Ecuador together, after a short but bitter war between them, to settle their differences once and for all by signing a treaty of "Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries," known as the Rio Protocol. These four countries were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States. Their representatives also signed that treaty, "as guarantors that the Protocol would be faithfully executed...." (McBride, 1949: 2-3). Nevertheless, because differences between the parties have continued to remain, almost 50 years later the guarantors find themselves still trying to ensure the "faithful" execution of that Protocol. This makes the Rio Protocol the longest-standing multilateral peacekeeping mechanism in the Hemisphere, if not perhaps in the world.

This article focuses primarily on the diplomatic efforts that have been undertaken, in accordance with the provisions of the Rio Protocol, to deal with the most recent outbreak of hostilities between Peru and Ecuador - from the time that the guarantor countries first began to respond to the appeals of the parties to this dispute (between January and March 1995) until commissions to handle the negotiations were finally established (between December 1996 and February 1997). These efforts represent the most serious, sustained attempts that the guarantors have engaged in since the 1940s to assist Peru and Ecuador in achieving a definitive resolution of their border problem. Given this focus, at least three sets of questions need to be addressed. First of all, why is the boundary problem so nettlesome and why hasn't the treaty yet been fully implemented? Second, what (if anything) has changed that might give these initiatives a greater chance for success after so many years of frustration and failure - and will it be enough? Third, what are the lessons that can be learned from the operation of the Rio Protocol mechanism, and will these have relevance for disputes in other parts of the Hemisphere? These questions will be addressed in the course of the presentation, analysis, and overall assessment.

A basic conclusion to emerge from the discussion is that, while there is still cause for concern, there is also reason for hope. On the one hand, given the long-standing nature of this dispute and the nationalistic feelings invested in its resolution, the historical legacy weighs heavily indeed on both parties, making any definitive determination any time soon very problematic. Furthermore, unanticipated events in both Peru and Ecuador, which fell outside the scope of the dispute itself, intervened to delay negotiations: in Peru, there was a hostage crisis, which included the foreign minister, that went on for some months; in Ecuador, there was the ouster of the president, which resulted in the resignation of that country's foreign minister and a member of its negotiating team as well. Consequently, a delicately balanced, but promising, timetable for entering into substantive negotiations was thrown off for several months. Even so, however, both Peru and Ecuador have managed to adjust positions of long standing and remain willing to discuss their differences; meanwhile, the guarantors are deeply engaged in the process of helping the parties to find a mutually acceptable solution.

RECENT BACKGROUND

The principal reason the dispute has been so difficult to resolve in recent times is that each of the parties espouses a position that diverges sharply from the other. These positions have less to do with any specific strategic or economic value associated with the areas in question than with a strong streak of nationalism. Ecuador believes that it continues to have sovereign rights to an area that Peru considers part of its own national territory. From the Peruvian perspective, any rights claimed by Ecuador were definitively relinquished via the treaty that terminated the brief war between Peru and Ecuador in 1941. This treaty - the "Protocol of Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries of Rio de Janeiro" - was signed by both parties, in January 1942, at the Third Consultative Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics in Brazil and ratified by their congresses the following month.2 Peru also maintains that Ecuador's rights were further circumscribed by the subsequent Braz Dias de Aguiar arbitral award, which was accepted by both parties in 1945.3 Ecuador, for its part, contends that its sovereign rights are based upon a combination of claims: (1) upon legal and historical precedents (in particular, on the concept of uti possidetis);4 (2) on its claim that the treaty was signed under duress; and (3) that it was impossible to execute the treaty because of certain anomalies of geography (see below). In the judgment of most specialists on the subject, Ecuador is considered to hold the weaker position, since the 1942 Protocol constitutes a treaty that is binding under international law and, consequently, supersedes the earlier, 19th-century application of uti possidetis to the frontiers of the newly independent states of Spanish America.

The Rio Protocol, which was drawn up and signed as World War II was beginning to wash the shores of the Western Hemisphere, provided for guarantor responsibilities that appeared rather modest at the time: i.e., (a) to help the parties to the conflict lay out, and mark, a boundary, and (b) to assist in addressing any disputes that might arise, if that was deemed necessary. The wording of the 1942 treaty is quite specific on this matter, in which it states that

[A]ctivity of the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile shall continue until the definitive demarcation of frontiers between Peru and Ecuador has been completed (Article 5).

It also specifies navigation rights for Ecuador

on the Amazon and its northern tributaries, the same concessions which Brazil and Colombia enjoy, in addition to those which may be agreed upon in a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation ... (Article 6). [Furthermore] ... any doubt or disagreement which may arise in the execution of this protocol shall be settled by the parties concerned, with the assistance of the representatives of the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in the shortest possible time (Article 7).

Continuing,

... the parties may, however, when the line is being laid out on the ground, grant such reciprocal concessions as they may consider advisable in order to adjust the aforesaid line to geographical realities (Article 9).

The document then goes on,

these rectifications shall be made with the collaboration of the representatives of the United States of America, the Argentine Republic, Brazil, and Chile (Article 9).5

These citations make clear that the Rio Protocol allowed for (1) the uncertainty of incompletely mapped terrain to permit adjustments in specific geographical situations (and anomalies) that might be found on the ground as demarcation proceeded, as well as for (2) navigation concessions on the Amazon and its northern tributaries, plus other possibilities within an additional bilateral treaty of commerce and navigation. Peru and Ecuador, as the parties to the conflict, are denoted as the powers that are ultimately responsible for its resolution, but the obligation of the guarantors to assist is also, and equally, explicit. In sum, the Protocol contains the legal provisions necessary to arrive at a solution to which both countries could ultimately agree.

Between 1942 and 1948, in fact, the Ecuador-Peru Boundary Commission, with help from the guarantors at several important junctures, was able to reach a definitive demarcation of over 95% of the border without incident and in accordance with the Protocol's stipulations. Various "technical problems" that arose during this process were referred to the guarantors, as specified by the treaty. Brazil, as coordinating guarantor, responded both quickly and effectively in the six cases that did arise and was able to find solutions acceptable to both parties in five of them - including the area of the Cordillera del Condor, between the Zamora and Santiago Rivers, under the Captain Braz Dias de Aguiar arbitral award of July 1945 (Krieg, 1986: 128-132; Peru. Ministerio, 1996a: 123-180).

However, an anomaly that was not foreseen in the treaty arose after a mapping of the region, carried out by the US Army Air Corps, was completed in 1946, and the surveys turned over to authorities of both countries in February 1947 (Krieg,1986: 132-137; also summarized in St. John,1996: 2-4). The aerial survey revealed that the height of the land that was to determine the border was not where the agreement had stipulated in one small section because of the presence of a previously uncharted river and a mountain spur. As a result, this section of the border was not marked. Thus, the newly elected government of Galo Plaza (1948-1952) in Ecuador ordered its demarcation team to cease activities in 1948. It is this area - the Cordillera del Condor and Cenepa River area, which totals about 78 kilometers (or 50 miles as the crow flies) of the Zamora-Santiago-Yaupi Rivers segment specified in the Rio Protocol - that has been the primary focus of tension and main locus of periodic outbreaks of hostilities ever since (see Map 1).

However, there is another interpretation of the dynamic between the parties which suggests that Ecuador has slowly changed its position regarding a final, complete marking of the boundary.6 This account draws from the McBride reports in situ to note that Ecuador was quite aware of the existence of the Cenepa River as early as 1943, when a joint party of the Ecuador-Peru Demarcation Commission followed the Cenepa to its headwaters.7 Subsequently, the account continues, Ecuadorean officials initiated a number of delays in the work of the Commission, which appear, with hindsight, possibly to have been initiated with an eye to finding some way of keeping open Ecuador's chances to access the Amazon in this sector.8

Whatever the actual motivations of the parties at the time, until hostilities broke out in 1995, Peru consistently maintained that the terms of the Rio Protocol, and of the Braz Dias de Aguiar arbitral award, were final, definitive, and not open to discussion. On the other hand, Ecuador had declared, from 1960 onward, that the Rio Protocol was null in international juridical terms due to the "inexecutability" of an essential segment of the agreement (Teran, 1996; Tobar Donoso and Luna Tobar, 1994: 282-286ff.). Clearly, the firmness of these positions markedly complicated the possibility of arriving at any final resolution of the border problem, even though the guarantor countries noted at the time that a boundary treaty, signed by both parties, could not be abrogated unilaterally by one of them; and, over the following two decades, they continued to give the issue their periodic attention, as stipulated under the Protocol, in response to several incidents (Krieg, 1986: 182-229).

Nevertheless, the problem continued to fester, and during the course of 1980 the stakes were raised. Ecuador deployed forces into areas within that small section of disputed boundary which was claimed by Peru. In January 1981, a series of serious incidents took place in what came to be called the Paquisha conflict; and Ecuadorean forces were quickly driven out of their outposts in the disputed area. Ecuador, given its position on the Rio Protocol at the time, called on the Organization of American States (OAS) to assist, while Peru appealed to the Protocol guarantors. The diplomatic solution that was worked out on this occasion, given Ecuador's objections, was to use the OAS as the international mediating instrument with "friendly country" members (the four Protocol guarantors) acting as its agents. These "friendly countries" oversaw a settlement in which the military forces of both parties moved to positions that each recognized as being within the other's territory. Even though the Protocol guarantors did succeed in restoring the peace within the rubric of the OAS, they were unsuccessful in helping the parties to resolve the dispute itself (Krieg, 1986: Epilogue, 266-335).

By the early 1990s, internal political dynamics had come to favor Ecuador, historically the weaker party in the border dispute. At the time, Peru was experiencing the most profound domestic crisis in its modern history. Successive elected governments had failed to deal effectively with the multiple challenges of (1) obligations to come up with high repayments on its foreign debt, (2) severe internal economic problems, and (3) a serious threat from the Maoist guerrilla group known as Shining Path (Palmer,1990: 5-8ff.). The president of Peru elected in 1990, Alberto Fujimori, was an untested political neophyte who inherited a mess: a totally bankrupt bureaucracy; an overall inflation rate, accumulated over the 5-year course of the preceding Alan Garcia government (1985-1990), of 2 million percent, which had impoverished much of the population; and an ongoing guerrilla war that had been destroying Peru's infrastructure and killing thousands of its citizens (by the end of 1990, the guerrillas had inflicted over $10 billion in direct damages - in a $40 billion economy - and engaged in political violence estimated as responsible for the loss of more than 23,000 lives).9 While Ecuador had its own political and economic problems at the time, these were, in comparison with Peru's, quite minor indeed.

Given these challenges on the home front, the Fujimori government pursued, from the outset, a regional diplomatic offensive designed to reduce the possibility of flare-ups along the border in order to be able to concentrate on its pressing domestic concerns. These initiatives included state visits to, and multiple conversations with, the presidents and high officials of Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile during 1991 and 1992. Of these countries, the most important was Ecuador, given the continuing disagreement over the boundary issue. After another minor infiltration (by Peru's military forces, in this instance) into the disputed area at Pachacutec in early 1991, the two foreign ministers -- Peru's Eduardo Torres y Torres Lara and his Ecuadorean counterpart, Diego Cordovez - met and attempted to negotiate a "gentlemen's agreement" that would establish a common security zone in the region.10 Even though this effort foundered, other efforts -- including a state visit by President Fujimori to Ecuador, the first ever by a Peruvian chief executive - were more successful. With the relaxation of tensions along the border, Peru was able to redeploy a significant portion of its military forces closer to the centers of guerrilla activity in pursuit of its counter-insurgency campaign against Shining Path, which was ultimately quite effective (Hollis, 1992).

Even though both Peru and Ecuador could maintain contact and diplomatic exchanges on matters related to the boundary dispute, the issue dragged on unresolved from the late 1940s onward and occasioned multiple incidents and skirmishes.11 However, such difficulties are only the most recent manifestations of a problem that is centuries old, suggesting that the most important explanation for the failure to reach an agreement may be historical. This seems to be one of those foreign affairs issues of such long standing that positions have tended to harden over the years, becoming less amenable to adjustment, so that the "grooves of history" channel the behavior of both parties into narrow, and all too predictable, lines. It is important, then, to lay out briefly the most salient aspects of the larger historical context in which the Peru-Ecuador boundary dispute evolved and the repeated efforts of third parties, prior to 1942, to resolve it.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The origins of this border dispute can be traced back to the is boundaries that were designated by the original Spanish colonial administrators: first between audiencias of the Viceroyalty of Peru, and then, under the Bourbon Reforms of the 1700s, between this established viceroyalty and the new Viceroyalty of Nueva Granada, which was carved out of its northern territories. With few exceptions, the borders of the Spanish colonial administrative districts passed through sparsely inhabited and/or jungle areas that were largely beyond effective reach of the authorities, who were located in the capital cities. For decades, if not centuries, the exact location of these borders was not of great import - they were all within the Spanish colonial domain, after all, and there were no significant resources of value to the Crown to be extracted from the territories around them. As a result, any more precise delineation of boundary lines appeared to be unnecessary and was not undertaken.

For many years after independence, this state of affairs continued in much of the region and for similar reasons. In retaining their colonial boundaries, by and large, under the principle of uti possidetis, few of the countries that were carved out of the various parts of Spain's former empire in the Americas had borders that traversed populated areas (James, 1959: 5-13). Furthermore, most of the new countries suffered from serious internal political challenges that absorbed their energies for decades. It was only after national political consolidation had taken place, over the latter half of the l9th century, and new resources - such as rubber, medicinal plants, and exotic woods - had become important commodities in international markets that serious efforts were made to establish any definitive demarcation of national boundaries. In the specific case of the border between Peru and Ecuador, the situation of an ill-defined frontier was further compounded by political events: first, by changes in the colonial administration that served to separate Ecuador from Peru, and second, by Ecuador's post-independence secession (1830) from the Confederation of Nueva Granada (Krieg, 1986: 14-15).

Efforts to get the borders sorted out go back at least to 1802 and include, over the years prior to the 1941 war and 1942 Rio Protocol, some 13 major initiatives, from the Cedula of 1802 to the Act of Lima of 1936 (see Historical Time Line). Each time an initiative was proposed it failed, sometimes because of changes in government or internal political turmoil, sometimes from the quite different perceptions of the parties involved as to what would constitute an appropriate settlement.

Generally speaking, however, the nature of the obstacles to achieving a final resolution of the border issue changed over time, from events or developments external to the problem itself to domestic considerations, and/or constraints, of the country and government in power at the time. Furthermore, the dynamic of the periodic bilateral negotiations that did take place shifted over the years as well. Initially, the interactions were between two sovereign, equal "first cousins" who spoke the same language and were in no particular hurry to resolve a potentially divisive issue that appeared to be of only secondary importance compared with their other domestic problems. That gradually changed to a situation in which the principal parties were still sovereign but now estranged unequals, and in which the border question loomed much larger and more important to the smaller of the two. While Peru came to view the problem as one that called for definitive imposition, Ecuador saw the issue in terms of the possibility being offered for a creative expansion of relatively limited national capacity.

At various points, one or the other (or both) of the governments have perceived their border imbroglio as susceptible to resolution by outside mediation or arbitration.'2 When this was the case, and at different times, the United States and Spain have been the preferred outsiders. In the case of the United States, this dates back as far as 1827, when its declaration of willingness to assist took two years to arrive, by which time the dispute had already led not only to war but a settlement (Krieg, 1986:15). On at least four other occasions prior to 1941, the United States expressed its willingness to help resolve the problem in response to an initiative by one or the other party: in 1910, 1924,1934, and 1936-38 (Krieg,1986: 43-76 passim.). On the last of those occasions, the United States served as a neutral intermediary while the parties tried, in fits and starts and for months at a time, to work things out by themselves -- unsuccessfully - in Washington.

Meanwhile, and for some 20 years even before these 20thcentury commitments by the United States, Spain had been engaged in similar activities, with the same lack of success. In most cases, the failure of the 20th-century efforts at mediation or arbitration may be attributed, to a large extent, to the rising nationalism, and resultant large-scale popular protests, in both countries. With deep feelings of national pride aroused and at stake, the governments of both Ecuador and Peru consistently chose to put aside a significant, and longstanding, objective of their respective foreign policies in deference to the more immediate considerations of domestic political expediency. Another factor that appeared to influence the decision of Peru, in particular, not to pursue the mediating efforts by the United States in the 1930s was its perception that, at various critical junctures, Washington seemed to favor Ecuador in the discussions (St. John, 1996: 14).

The ultimate result of these multiple failures of external mediation or arbitration was the 1941 war between the aggrieved parties, in which the more recently and more fully reequipped Peruvian military won a quick and decisive victory. lb The subsequent territorial adjustments, however, were very modest and quite close to those put forth in the proposed negotiated settlement of 1936 (See Historical Time Line). 4 Their designation formed a core part of the Rio Protocol, the operative treaty since 1942 between Ecuador and Peru, with the "friendly services" of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States as guarantors.

THE 1995 CONFLICT

The precipitant factor responsible for the outbreak of serious military hostilities between Ecuador and Peru in January 1995 was Ecuador's gradual redeployment of military units, beginning in 1991, into the disputed territory east of the Cordillera del Condor along the Cenepa River. These units constructed three heavily fortified bases on high ground in the area at Tiwintza, Cueva de los Tayos, and Base Sur, complete with significant artillery emplacements and protected by thousands of land mines (see Map 2; the "Tallos" noted there should be Tayos, and La Montana should be la Montanita). Although it seems to be the case that Peru became aware of this redeployment, no effort was made to respond to the Ecuadorean initiative until mid- to late 1994, when local Peruvian patrols paid "friendly" visits to the Ecuadorean outposts to warn that they should withdraw (Ponce, 1995; Teran, 1996). Unlike the denouement of previous incidents, little diplomatic activity preceded the outbreak of large-scale hostilities on this occasion, which suggests that the militaries of both countries played a more significant role in the 1995 developments than had been the case heretofore, with a corresponding marginalization of their respective diplomatic communities.15

When Ecuadorean forces did not respond to this "friendly" warning, as one account has it, the local Peruvian forces took matters into their own hands -- first, by probing, in December 1994 and early January 1995; and then, by rushing into a confrontation in the jungle for which they turned out to be ill prepared (Ponce, 1995).16 Outmanned and outgunned, they suffered casualties and were forced to withdraw (26 January 1995). At this point, Peru mobilized its military forces and began to confront the already mobilized Ecuadorean military. However, the fighting was limited, quite specifically, to the area under dispute in the Upper Cenepa Valley. Over the course of the next 5 weeks, according to published reports, 100 to 300 casualties were inflicted, Peru lost 9 aircraft, and both governments expended an estimated $500 million between them.17 As best as can be told, Ecuador remained firmly in control of at least two of the forward outposts despite official announcements, published in Peru, that "there was not an Ecuadorean soldier left on Peruvian soil" (Oiga, 1995; Brooke, 1995a).

From a military standpoint, Peru suffered from significant disadvantages. Not only were its supply lines long, but they extended over remote and difficult jungle terrain, which made moving troops and supplies to the frontier exceedingly difficult. Ecuador, on the other hand, benefited from superior location, higher levels of military preparedness, and greater ease of resupply of its military outposts. Unable to win militarily or to force a military stalemate, Peru went on the diplomatic offensive to remove Ecuador's forces, via the guarantor countries, by declaring (13 February) a "unilateral" cease-fire and invoking, once again, their good offices (Peru. Embassy, 1995: 5). Even so, Peru broke this cease-fire almost immediately as its military forces persisted (largely unsuccessfully) in trying to eject the Ecuadorean forces from the bases they still occupied; in fact, most of the casualties that did occur took place during the last two weeks of February. By the end of that month, however, skirmishes between the opposing forces had wound down, for the most part. Although sporadic incidents continued for several months (at least 20 were recorded between May and September 1995), the peacekeeping process under the Rio Protocol had begun to move forward (Weidner, 1996: 14).

Peacekeeping under the Rio Protocol, January 1995 - February 1997

The rapid recourse to the Rio Protocol and the assistance of the guarantors was quite unexpected, given Ecuador's long-standing position of opposition to its validity. It was made possible by Ecuadorean President Sixto Duran Ballen's public request for an emergency meeting of the Rio Protocol guarantors to "inform them of the most recent border incidents ... [and to ask] these countries for help in resolving [them]" (FBIS-LAT, 1995c: 54). It was believed that President Duran and his civilian advisors made the decision to invoke the good offices of the guarantors out of fear that Peru had the military capacity to push Ecuador's forces out of their forward positions once again, as it had in 1981, and perhaps even take advantage of the situation to invade.18 Ecuador's foreign minister, Galo Leoro Franco, confirmed the position of his government that the Protocol was indeed in effect, adding only that "shortcomings" of the Protocol had been responsible for incidents in the past (FBIS-LAT, 1995b: 30). Ecuador's renewed willingness to work within the parameters of the treaty represents a significant shift back to the diplomatic position espoused in the 1950s: i.e., that the Ecuadorean government recognized the existence (vigencia) of the Protocol without accepting its validity (validez) due to the inability to execute (inejecutibilidad) one of its provisions (Luna Tobar, 1996: passim., esp. 9-15).

Peru immediately "acknowledge [d] and welcome [d ]" Ecuador's declaration and also requested a convening of the guarantor countries to ask for their cooperation (Peru. Embassy,1995: 4). Representatives of the guarantor countries met in emergency session in Brasilia, where they accepted the request. Shortly thereafter, they issued statements urging a cessation of provocations and the separation of forces; they also expressed their willingness to set up a mission to cooperate with Peru and Ecuador in finding a solution to the situation (Guarantor Countries, 1995c).

Beginning with the meeting in Brasilia (January 1995), the peacekeeping process may be divided into three stages: (1) a military stage, during which the guarantors would help to end the fighting and stabilize the military situation on the frontier; (2) a procedural stage, during which the guarantors would assist the parties in pursuing discussions, at the ministerial level, to articulate and specify the outstanding points of disagreement; and (3) a substantive stage, during which the guarantors would help to initiate negotiations between the parties for resolving the dispute. To guide their activities throughout the process, the guarantor representatives announced they would be governed by 5 central principles:

1. To maintain unity of purpose;

2. To ensure military support for diplomacy;

3. To remember that the parties must lead;

4. To use the law; and

5. To keep their sights high.19

The basic document that has provided the framework for pursuing the objectives of the guarantors and for observing these principles is the Itamaraty Peace Declaration, signed by both Peru and Ecuador, as well as by the guarantors, in Brasilia on 17 February 1995. Of its 6 provisions, 5 are related to military aspects of the conflict, including establishment of a guarantor military observer mission to oversee the implementation of the agreement. The sixth provision deals with the diplomatic aspect, pledging initiation of discussions between Peru and Ecuador to find a solution to the problems once compliance with [the other five] had reestablished sufficient mutual confidence (Brazil. Itamaraty, 1995).

Ending the Fighting

Even though the Itamaraty peace agreement had been signed by both parties to the dispute and by representatives of the guarantors, serious armed confrontations continued to take place in the area along the disputed section of the border. Thus it proved necessary for the parties to reaffirm their commitment in Montevideo, Uruguay, on 28 February 1995, when representatives of all the countries involved had gathered for the inauguration of the president of Uruguay. Only after this second declaration did the hostilities cease, which then permitted the guarantors' proposed Ecuador-Peru Military Observer Mission (MOMEP) to be organized and begin to carry out its duties.20

The next steps needed to accomplish the military stage of the peacekeeping process could now begin: i.e., the separation of forces, withdrawal from the disputed area, and establishment of a demilitarized zone. Over the next several months, the MOMEP field mission was able to fulfill these tasks despite several serious problems that emerged along the way (Weidner, 1996a).21 The separation of Ecuadorean and Peruvian forces began by the end of March, and the withdrawal of military units from the disputed area was completed (with MOMEP verification) by mid-May. A meticulously drawn demilitarized zone of 528 square kilometers was subsequently outlined, entering into effect in early August 1995 (Marcella, 1995: 1-2). By October 1995, the meetings in Brasilia - of diplomatic representatives of Ecuador and Peru and the guarantor countries, and of Peru's and Ecuador's military representatives with MOMEP - could express "particular satisfaction" with the progress that had been made (Guarantor Countries, 1995a).

Establishing Procedures

As the first -- military -- stage of the peace process drew to a satisfactory conclusion, the second, or procedural, stage could get under way. This stage began with meetings held in Lima (Peru) and in Quito (Ecuador) early in 1996 for the purpose of initiating discussions on their differences and of setting up the procedures to be followed in future substantive negotiations. At this point, the guarantor representatives hoped that enough momentum could be generated to work out a solution before Ecuador's national elections, scheduled for 7 May 1996, took place. Thus, on 17-18 January 1996, the two foreign ministers -- Ecuador's Galo Leoro and his Peruvian counterpart, Francisco Tudela - met in Lima, together with the representatives of the guarantor countries. As anticipated, this meeting focused on procedural matters, with

accords ... on continuing the peace process, the site of the discussions, the structure of the delegations, the confidential nature of the talks, the role of the guarantor nations, and the need to extend the operation of MOMEP (Reuters, 1996).

On 22-23 February, the parties met again, this time in Quito, to continue their discussions on procedural matters. However, before this second meeting, still others had taken place in the interim: (1) by military representatives of Peru and Ecuador in the disputed area (10-11 February) to discuss a possible non-aggression pact and avoidance of an arms race; and (2) by the parties to the dispute and the guarantors in Brazil on the first anniversary of the cease-fire. The parties agreed to create (a) a bilateral commission to oversee arms purchases and (b) a joint military working group to promote security and stability in support of the diplomatic negotiations; they also agreed to adopt measures designed to lower the risk of troop clashes along the border.

As an outcome of these first meetings, the parties took the significant and historic step of setting down, for the first time, in writing, their remaining substantive differences concerning the boundary, and then exchanging their lists.22

For Ecuador, these included the following:

1. Partial inexecutability of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol due to the absence of a watershed between the Zamora and Santiago Rivers; plus free access to, and Ecuadorean sovereignty over, the Maranon-Amazon.

2. Boundary demarcation problems: (a) the Cuzumaza-Bambuiza/ Yaupi sector [Ecuador claims this ridge is not part of the Cordillera del Condor because of differing rock composition] ;23 and (b) the Lagartococha-Guepi sector. [Ecuador claims a problem here due to an issue of international law stemming from the Braz Dias de Aguiar arbitral award.]

3. Problems produced by the intersecting of the rivers by the survey lines [identified as three areas in the Pastaza, Tigre, and Curaray river sectors]; problem on the Napo River in the YasuniAguarico sector.

4. The Zarumilla Canal (Ecuador. Ministerio, 1996a). [This is a blockage issue: too much silt blocks the flow of water through the canal.]

For Peru, the substantive differences were as follows:

For Peru, as Ecuador knows, the phrase `enduring resolution of the substantive differences' means completing the demarcation of the boundary line as established in Article 8 of the Protocol of Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries subscribed to in Rio de Janeiro on January 29, 1942, in conformity with its complementary provisions and with the Award of the Brazilian Arbiter Captain Braz Dias de Aguiar.

In addition, for Peru, there were two sections of the border where demarcation differences could be found:

1. In the Lagartococha sector: The source of the Lagartococha River-Guepi River.

2. In the Cordillera del Condor: (a) between the boundary marker Cunhuime Sur, point D noted in the Dias de Aguiar Brief (on the Cordillera del Condor from the point along the Zamora-Santiago height of land where the spur juts out) and the boundary marker November 20; and (b) between the boundary marker CusumasaBumbuisa and the confluence of the Yaupi and Santiago Rivers (Peru. Ministerio, 1996b). [Peru claims that this ridge, running adjacent to the Santiago River, is part of the Cordillera del Condor.]

As the process proceeded, however, tensions mounted amid claims and counterclaims of overflights, troop movements, and incursions into the demilitarized zone. It proved impossible to meet the guarantors' ambitious goal of moving to the substantive stage of discussions before the May 1996 national elections in Ecuador. Nevertheless, representatives of the parties to the dispute and the guarantors continued to meet and try to work out procedures to be followed: in Buenos Aires (Argentina) on 18-19 June, and in Santiago (Chile) on 28-29 October. The goal of the meetings was for the parties to work out a specific procedural framework, acceptable to both, that would increase the chances to make rapid progress on resolving the differences once the substantive discussions began in the meetings projected to be held in Brasilia (Brazil).24

In this the parties and the guarantors were successful. At the Buenos Aires meeting, Peru and Ecuador were able to agree on the procedures to be followed in Brasilia, with the difference that, should any disagreement arise, Peru would accept a definitive arbitration by the guarantors, while Ecuador held out for arbitration by an outside "eminent personage" (Guarantor Countries, 1996b). According to participants, the going got very tough at the Santiago meeting. Nevertheless, after all was said and done, the parties did agree on the following key points:

1. Substantive discussions to begin before the end of 1996;

2. Discussions to cover all impasses and remain "continuous" until final resolution;

3. Partial understandings to be final only after agreement on all points;

4. The parties to specify points of agreement and disagreement on each impasse;

5. Guarantors to propose procedures for definitive resolution of those points of disagreement that the parties did not succeed in resolving directly themselves (Guarantor Countries, 1996a).

Getting to Substantive Discussions

While circumstances that were beyond the control of any of the participants intervened to throw off the timetable, two major stumbling blocks remain to be overcome. One is procedural. Can a mechanism be found, such as some form of outside party review, to ensure resolution even if the parties cannot agree? The other is substantive. Both the Peruvian and the Ecuadorean lists of remaining differences contain one point that does not appear to be negotiable.

From the Peruvian list, resolving the problem means "to complete the demarcation of the border as established ... [by] the Rio Protocol." Ecuador's list, on the other hand, includes the assertion that the Rio Protocol is "partially inexecutable," and that Ecuador must have "free and sovereign" access to the Maranon-Amazon. Peru is believed to have communicated to the guarantor countries its unwillingness to negotiate these points.25 In effect, both parties have adopted, for public consumption at least, a non-negotiable position in one critical respect, a situation that appears to leave the guarantors with very little room for maneuver in helping the parties to achieve a really definitive resolution to their long-standing dispute.

Even so, the guarantors have made greater progress to date than at any time since the mid-1940s. Why is this the case? Several factors are at work.

First, the guarantors have taken their responsibilities seriously. They are committed to doing everything they can to get the problem solved once and for all, and they have been prepared, thus far, to devote the energies and resources necessary to that end.

Second, the composition of the guarantor party includes highlevel professionals who are both well regarded by their peers and taken seriously by the disputing parties themselves.

Third, the guarantor representatives reportedly bring complementary, compatible skills and personalities to their discussions. Even though the United States appears to be the guarantor most interested in a rapid resolution and Brazil the most willing to let the diplomatic process work at its own pace, all are reported to bring less of their respective countries' own independent foreign policy agendas to the table than has sometimes been the case in the past. In addition, the guarantors have developed a positive, reinforcing rapport, which often enables them to move forward as a single, unified body in their interactions with the disputants.

Finally, both Ecuador and Peru have their own reasons for being amenable to outside assistance in this round of negotiations. Peru seems to believe that the guarantors will favor its interpretation, based on international law, as to the most appropriate solution, while Ecuador appears to see some real possibility that a third-party judgment may come to favor its position as an outcome of the negotiating process.26

It is an axiom of multilateral peacekeeping, or peace-restoring, initiatives that no definitive solution is possible unless the parties involved are willing to allow the other participants to help them find one. The sticking point for Ecuador is "free and sovereign" access to the Amazon; for Peru, it is demarcation of the remaining section of the border. Until this impasse is resolved, the guarantors cannot complete their mission. Substantive discussions, which include the officially designated negotiating commissions of both Peru and Ecuador, began in Brasilia on 15 April 1997. The effectiveness of these discussions may be aided by their prior agreement to deal with the less difficult points of difference first. If these less thorny impasses can be successfully overcome, this may help to build a positive momentum conducive to resolving the major differences as well.

In order to surmount this most significant impasse, several proposals have been floated among the parties and the guarantors which address these concerns. One suggestion involves commitment to a final border demarcation in the Cordillera del Condor area, along with the simultaneous establishment of free ports and/or towns on both sides of the border, possibly just north of the Morona River (see Map 3). These ports or towns would enjoy mutual free access and would include the construction of an all-weather road between them. Another would provide for the establishment of an international park and forest preserve in the disputed area, which could be jointly administered by the parties. Other alternatives include (1) submitting the impasse to an outside party, agreed upon by the guarantors, for arbitration; or (2) less ambitiously, recognizing the inability to reach final resolution at this time and, thus, maintaining a MOMEP-type military mission until circumstances become more auspicious.27 To facilitate these negotiations, some consideration is being given to creating a role for international financial institutions - like the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, and/or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) - in which the parties might be offered some sort of financial incentive, such as debt reduction or financial aid.

In the final analysis, and as the Protocol makes clear, the parties themselves will have to decide how to resolve their dispute. Nevertheless, the guarantor countries play a vital role in the process. Without the involvement of the representatives of the United States, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina in all stages of the diplomatic process, and without MOMEP on the military side, it is unlikely that a permanent solution to Latin America's longest-running, most intractable border problem will be found. With their participation, settlement becomes a real possibility.

CONCLUSIONS

At this stage of the process, the answer to the central question raised in the introduction as to whether any formula can be found that will help the multilateral mechanism of the Rio Protocol work out a permanent solution to the border dispute, is "perhaps." Significant progress has been made, and all participants have been working diligently to resolve the problem once and for all. Even so, significant obstacles remain. The last mile in a marathon is usually the most difficult for all the runners.

Unfortunately, once again events in each country, having nothing to do with the Rio peacekeeping process, have developed to disrupt these efforts, albeit temporarily, and halt the momentum that had been generated up to December 1996. In Peru, the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA) guerrilla group seized the residence of the Japanese ambassador to Peru, in Lima, taking hostage a number of high-ranking officials who had been invited there for a social gathering. This operation took place on 17 December 1996, just days before the substantive discussions were due to begin in Brasilia (20 December). Among the hostages was the Peruvian foreign minister, Francisco Tudela, who had been a central figure in the peacekeeping process on behalf of Peru from the very beginning of this latest conflict with Ecuador. At the same time that Peru was still struggling to resolve its hostage crisis, the elected president of Ecuador, Abdala Buca, was voted out of office (6 February 1997) by his country's congress on the grounds of "mental incapacity." During his 6 months in office, Bucaram had not only committed Ecuador to finding a peaceful resolution of the border dispute, but had also managed to establish a good rapport with his Peruvian counterpart, Alberto Fujimori. In fact, in January 1997, Bucaram had been the first Ecuadorean head of state in history to make a state visit to Peru. Although these events - the hostage crisis in Peru and the ousting of the president in Ecuador - upset the timetable, they did not derail the process completely. Both countries, and the guarantors, remained committed to moving forward to resolve the dispute, scheduling the meeting of the countries' respective negotiating commissions with representatives of the guarantor countries in Brasilia on 15 April 1997.

Even though Ecuador and Peru have yet to find a mutually acceptable resolution to their problem, it may still be appropriate to note, for the record, a number of lessons that can be learned from the experience of the multilateral peacekeeping and peacemaking process under the Rio Protocol. These include the following:

1. Specific procedures for getting to peace will not only vary with the particular circumstances of each case, but will also reflect the larger context at the time. The Rio Protocol was fashioned just as World War II was reaching the Western Hemisphere, so the United States, in particular, was very anxious to resolve the dispute as quickly as possible. At the time, in 1941, the response to the Ecuador-Peru border conflict was but the latest of several examples of ad hoc multilateral peacemaking and peacekeeping initiatives in Latin America in the 1920s and 1930s, and thus seemed very appropriate in that context.

2. The invariable goal in conflict situations within, or between, states is to fmd a peaceful resolution. It is neither desirable nor necessary to insist upon some particular mechanism to get the job done. The parties involved can pursue whatever approach they think might work. When it was drawn up, the Rio Protocol seemed to offer a reasonable, mutually satisfactory way of resolving that dispute, even though it included the component, novel at the time, of continuing involvement by the guarantors.

3. While many recent multilateral peacekeeping initiatives have tended to focus on internal conflict, there are a number of border disputes, in the region and around the world, that are unresolved and contain the potential for breaking out into open conflict. A multilateral mechanism designed to concentrate on prevention, via good offices and mediation, might well be able to avert the long, complex, and expensive denouement that characterizes the Ecuador-Peru case.

4. The dynamics of interaction among the parties within the multilateral mechanism is crucial. The historical record of outside efforts to help resolve the Peru-Ecuador dispute suggests that breakdowns are, at least in part, the consequence of problems that reside within (or among) the "friendly powers" themselves - from personality clashes to national agendas -- above and beyond the need to provide straightforward assistance to the parties.

5. In the Rio Protocol context, the challenge of multiple points of coordination, clearance, and setting of agendas has considerably complicated the diplomatic process. This particular arrangement has involved 4 guarantor governments, the 2 parties to the conflict themselves, plus 5 embassies in each of the 6 countries; altogether, this has made for extraordinarily complex dealings and inevitable tensions in the course of pursuing interactions among up to 34 individuals and their staffs. While the maze of points of contact is truly daunting, the fact that the main responsibility for dealing with the most recent situation has been placed in the hands of the designated guarantor representatives makes matters more manageable. It also provides a lesson for other initiatives designed to foster peacekeeping and peacemaking: keep it simple!

6. As experience from other attempts at conflict resolution reminds us, final resolution is highly dependent upon the willingness of parties concerned to find a satisfactory balance point upon which they can agree. Herein lies the nub of the Ecuador-Peru border dispute conundrum. Each approaches the situation from a different perspective and with a different ultimate objective. In this case, a dogged insistence on achieving the maximum goals can only sow the seeds for future confrontation. Both sides, of this and other conflicts, can expect to resolve the problem only if each is willing to compromise in areas not vital to objective national interests. In the Ecuador-Peru case, the Rio Protocol does contain elements that are conducive to such a compromise.

7. Although neither party can yet see its way clear to reach a final agreement on the border imbroglio, both have exhibited great restraint on each occasion of armed conflict. While forces have been mobilized all along the border, actual fighting has consistently been restricted to the small sections in dispute. This suggests the low likelihood of any full-scale confrontation in the future, whatever the excessive rhetoric of the moment, and helps make both parties open to outside assistance, in this case, under the established mechanism of the Rio Protocol.

The parties have faltered in their efforts on several previous occasions, and they could in this instance as well. For both Ecuador and Peru, the emotional content of the dispute is high and the weight of history heavy even though there are various signs to suggest that both really want to get this problem behind them. Nonetheless, the multiple opportunities missed in the past give pause. Not only have bad timing, public protests, changes in government, and unanticipated events all gotten in the way before, but have again in the course of the most recent discussions.

However, the fact that this latest example of awkward timing postponed possible closure on this dispute, at least for a time, does not suggest that the multilateral mechanism created by the Rio Protocol has failed to be a significant peacekeeping instrument over the years. The treaty and its procedures have served to restrain both parties to the dispute in several ways. For one, they have provided Ecuador and Peru with an alternative to all-out war. On those occasions when armed violence did break out or border incidents have occurred, one or another of the Protocol's multilateral variations has served to limit their spread and helped to restore a more normal situation.

Furthermore, the fact that the Protocol managed to settle most of the boundary in the 1940s has helped both countries to exercise considerable self-restraint in practice by offering - when frontier problems threatened to escalate and despite inflammatory rhetoric the option of confining military activities to the small, undelineated portions of the border and their immediate surroundings. For example, over the course of this latest outbreak of hostilities, the very availability of the Protocol offered Peru a preexisting, multilateral mechanism by which that country could work through not only its belated public recognition of the border problem with Ecuador, but also its need to get together with Ecuador for discussions, assisted by the guarantors.

Explaining why this particular dispute has been so difficult to resolve has multiple components, at least two of which merit closer attention. One relates to the nature of the political process in each country. Although the axiom that democracies do not go to war with each other may be generally true, it does not help much in understanding the Ecuador-Peru case.28 Most Latin American countries have not had stable democracies over the years. Yet most have not waged war on each other, at least not in the 20th century. At the time of both of the most serious recent outbreaks of hostilities, as well as at the time of the 1941 war, both these countries had elected civilian governments.29 In both 1981 and 1995, public opinion - as expressed through parties, labor unions, and a free and open press - put additional pressure on government leaders and representatives in both Peru and Ecuador to take an uncompromising position. Also at those times and for a variety of reasons, the relations between civil and military authorities were quite complicated. Because elected governments were anxious to stay that way, they were willing to meet the demands of their respective armed forces to carry out their military missions in the manner they saw fit.

Such pressures tend to exacerbate an already problematic situation and make any negotiated settlement even more difficult to achieve. It may be argued, then, that democracy has complicated, rather than eased or prevented, the conflict for both Peru and Ecuador by contributing to interactions that have tended to harden positions rather than to help elected leaders find the balance points for a settlement. When this is the case, fervent expressions of nationalism can, and often do, serve as a vehicle of domestic political advancement for those out of power and as a means of survival for those in charge.

However, such a polarizing dynamic may also favor some form of "friendly country" assistance, and here the role of the guarantors can be significant, even critical. Given their commitment and the respect they have been accorded (by both parties) in controlling the denouement of the 1995 conflict so far, the guarantors may yet be able to find a way through the thicket of conflicting aspirations that is acceptable to each side. In this context, democracy within the countries can actually be an ally because it legitimates the role of the political leadership in both countries and empowers them to make decisions which they believe to be in the best interests of their respective nations. The guarantors, in the role ascribed to them by the Protocol, can then provide positive reinforcement for these decisions, as well as serve as lightning rods for opponents on either side and, by so doing, provide further credibility for the elected officials themselves.

The other component worthy of closer attention, which contributes to an understanding of why it has been so difficult for Peru and Ecuador to reach a final settlement, is what might be called the "weight of history." The origins of the border dispute go back to the Spanish colonial period and include repeated, if fitful and ultimately unsuccessful, initiatives for resolution over the entire trajectory of both countries' histories as independent nations: governments changed at critical moments, popular reaction constrained negotiators, outside mediators or arbiters sometimes had their own agendas, or the two governments failed to share the same sense of urgency at the same time. The longer the dispute festered without resolution, the more nettlesome it became.

As we all know, however, history is not immutable. Changes can and do occur over time. One source of change is in the populations themselves, which become more aware and informed, and thus less susceptible to manipulation, over time. For example, polls suggest that a significant plurality of Ecuadoreans wishes to see the dispute resolved peacefully and is not irrevocably committed to a territorial settlement. Another basis for change could be the presence, at a critical juncture, of political leaders who are sufficiently enlightened and firm in their convictions to make the decisions needed to get the problem resolved without sacrificing the legitimate interests and needs of their countries. Both Ecuador and Peru have been evolving in both of these areas, and both seem to be closer to that critical threshold of decisionmaking than at any time since the 1940s. The continuing good offices of the guarantors at this particular juncture may provide just the additional impetus necessary to help the parties resolve their long-standing dispute once and for all.

HISTORICAL TIME LINE: ECUADOR-PERU BORDER DISPUTE

1542 Francisco de Orellana Expedition to the Mouth of the Amazon from Cuzco and Muti via the Napo River.

1717 Separation of Viceroyalty of Nueva Granada (which included Audiencia of Quito) from Viceroyalty of Peru (voided in 1723 and reestablished in 1739).

1802 Cedula of the King of Spain separating most of the transAndean territory from the Viceroyalty of Nueva Granada and the province of Quito and transferring it to the Viceroyalty of Peru.

1822 Battle of Pichincha (May 22), securing independence of Ecuador (as part of Gran Colombia).

1823 Joaquin Mosquera, commissioned by Simon Bolivar, concludes boundary treaty with Peru establishing borders on the basis of uti possedetis as of 1809, but not ratified by congress of Gran Colombia.

1824 Battle of Ayacucho (December 9), securing independence of Peru.

1827 First request for United States mediation, by Peru's foreign minister. Accepted, but belated arrival (1829) renders moot.

1829 Battle of Tarqui. Forces of Gran Colombia defeat Peru. Rights to Guayaquil reaffirmed.

Treaty of Guayaquil, establishing borders as "the same as the former Viceroyalties of Nueva Granada and Peru before their independence." Not executed due to separation of Ecuador from Gran Colombia on May 13, 1830.

1830 Pedemonte-Mosquera Protocol, establishing the Maranon as the boundary between Ecuador and Peru, but never ratified by congresses.

1832 Pando-Noboa Treaty, recognizing present boundaries "until an agreement fixing the boundaries is concluded." Ratified by both parties.

1859 Peru occupies Guayaquil in war with Ecuador.

1860 Treaty of Mapasingue, by which Ecuador recognizes territorial claims of Peru under the Cedula of 1802, but canceled by congresses of both countries in 1861.

1887 Bonifaz-Espinoza Treaty, by which Ecuador and Peru agree to submit their boundary dispute to the arbitration of the King of Spain, ultimately unsuccessful.

1890 Garcia-Herrera Treaty, which reaches a compromise on the borders by drawing a boundary approximating territories traditionally under the jurisdiction of each country. Ratified by Ecuador, but not by Peru. Ecuador revoked in 1894.

1904 Valverde-Cornejo Protocol, reviving Spanish king arbitration option, which produces recommendations provoking popular protests in both countries and shift from arbitration to mediation, and from Spain to the United States.

1910 United States mediation efforts, expanded to include Argentina and Brazil, ultimately propose Arbitration Tribunal at the Hague, which Peru accepts, but Ecuador does not.

1924 Ponce-Castro Oyanguren Protocol, by which parties to meet in Washington to negotiate, submitting remaining differences to the United States president for arbitration. Delayed, then accepted by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1934, and pursued beginning in 1936.

1936 Act of Lima, reaffirming commitment to 1924 agreement, maintaining boundary status quo "without recognition of territorial rights" in the meantime.

1936-38 Inconclusive negotiations between parties in Washington, with good offices of the United States and efforts to expand to multilateral good offices by the Chaco War mediators.

1941 Peru-Ecuador War (July-September), resulting in a decisive defeat for Ecuador.

1941 Rio Protocol (January 29) treaty of "Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries," signed by Peru and Ecuador, with the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile signing also as "guarantor" countries, approved by congresses of Peru and Ecuador on February 26.

1942 Binational Ecuador-Peru Demarcation Commission formed (June) and deployed to the field to place the border markers. Technical differences submitted to guarantors for resolution in 1944 and 1945. Western boundary differences resolved.

1945 Braz Dias de Aguiar submits arbitral decision on eastern boundary differences.

1947 U.S. Army Air Force, having completed aerial mapping survey, turns over maps to parties (February).

1948 Ecuador Foreign Ministry (September) orders its members on the Demarcation Commission to stop work in the Cordillera del Condor, "since the map showed that there was no single watershed...."

1960 Ecuadorean president Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra declares, "The Rio Treaty is null" (August).

1981 Outbreak of hostilities between Ecuador and Peru (January) in the disputed Cordillera del Condor area, mediated through the OAS by "friendly countries" (the guarantors).

1991 New border incidents, which produce the "gentleman's agreement" between the foreign ministers of Ecuador and Peru, quickly disavowed by Peru.

1992 President Alberto Fujimori makes first official visit ever of a Peruvian head of state to Quito (January), followed by two more trips during that year.

1995 Major outbreak of hostilities in the disputed border area (January), producing a call by both parties for the good offices of the guarantor countries under the Rio Protocol.

Source: Drawn, through 1981, from Krieg (1986); subsequent developments taken from newspaper accounts.

RECENT HOSTILITIES TIME LINE: ECUADOR-PERU BORDER DISPUTE

1995

January 9,11 Exchange of fire between Peruvian and Ecuadorean military patrols.

January 24 Ecuador recognizes Rio Protocol and asks guarantors for assistance.

January 26 Peru welcomes Ecuador's declaration and also asks aid of guarantors. Serious outbreaks of hostilities commence.

January 31 Guarantors meet in Brazil, invite Peru and Ecuador to participate, and both accept.

February 5 Peru accepts guarantor cease-fire proposal, Ecuador does not.

February 13 Peru declares unilateral cease-fire, which Ecuador accepts.

February 17 Parties sign Peace Accord of Itamaraty along with guarantors, but fighting continues.

February 28 Hostilities formally end with acceptance of both parties of the Montevideo Declaration, reaffirming validity of Itamaraty Accord.

March 10 Agreement on procedures signed in Brasilia by guarantors and parties.

March 30 Separation of Peruvian and Ecuadorean forces begins.

April 30 Forces of both sides largely withdrawn from disputed area (90%).

May 3-13 Withdrawal of all units from disputed area, with MOMEP verification, except for designated concentration points.

July 25 Establishment of a demilitarized zone by MOMEP, "without affecting the territorial rights of the parties to the conflict."

August 4 Entry into effect of a 528-square-kilometer demilitarized zone.

October 5-6 Meeting in Brasilia of guarantor country officials with vice ministers of foreign relations of Peru and Ecuador, expressing particular satisfaction with progress.

November 17 MOMEP declaration noting satisfaction with progress in achieving a security accord for direct coordination between Peruvian and Ecuadorean military forces and with the absence of incidents.

December 27 Brief border incursion by Ecuador forces, protested by Peru.

1996

January 2 Peru expresses opposition to Ecuador's plan to acquire planes from Israel (K-Firs), with approval by a guarantor country, the United States, because of USmade engines.

January 17-18 Lima meeting of Peru and Ecuador, with presence of guarantor representatives, to cover procedures for continuing search for a peaceful solution.

February 22-23 Quito meeting of Ecuador and Peru, with guarantors, to advance the process, including agreement to submit list of remaining substantive differences in achieving an accord.

March 6 Public release of the lists of remaining differences. Peru wants final drawing of the boundary line; Ecuador continues to note the inapplicability of the protocol to one area and requests sovereign access to the Mara6n - Amazon. Parties agree to continue discussions in the near future, under the auspices of the guarantors.

June 18-19 Buenos Aires meeting of Ecuador and Peru to continue procedural discussions, with the presence of guarantor representatives.

October 28-29 Santiago meeting of Ecuador and Peru to complete procedural discussions, with the presence of guarantor representatives. Plan to meet in Brazil to begin substantive talks on December 20, 1996 postponed -first by the hostage crisis in Lima in mid-December, and then by the replacement of Ecuador's president by the congress on February 6, 1997.

1997

April 15 Official negotiating commissions designated by Peru and Ecuador meet with guarantor representatives in Brasilia to implement the Santiago Agreement of October 29 by beginning substantive discussions on remaining impasses.

Source: Marcella (1995), Weidner (1996), and newspaper accounts.

NOTES

1. The report by George McBride was never published in English despite Professor McBride's repeated efforts to obtain the State Department's permission to do so. However, a Spanish translation, by Ernesto Yepes, of the McBride report was recently published, in 1996: Mito y realidad de una frontera: Perb, Ecuador 1942-1949 (see Yepes, 1996).

2. The full, official English translation of the Protocol may be found in Krieg, 1986: Appendix I).

3. The result of submission by Peru and Ecuador to the guarantors of differences that arose in demarcating the border under Article 8 of the Protocol (Peru. Ministerio, 1996); details discussed in Krieg (1986: 128132).

4. This is the international legal principle of "as you possess, so you will possess." As applied to Latin America, the administrative frontiers of the Spanish Empire became the international frontiers of the newly independent countries. However, there are two schools of thought related to this principle - de jure; i.e., the new boundaries should follow the lines on the map of the colonial boundaries, whether or not the territories encompassed had been occupied; and de facto; i.e., the new boundaries should be based on physical possession of the territory within the colonial boundaries. Ecuador interprets this principle on the basis of the first; therefore, Ecuador holds that its international boundary should follow the administrative borders of the Viceroyalty of New Granada, of which it was a part, and which includes a large portion of present-day, northeastern Peru (Tobar Donoso and Luna Tobar,1994: esp. 51-59; see also a more general discussion in Ratner,1996: 590-624).

5. The Articles are found in the official English translation of the "Protocol of Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries between Peru and Ecuador," reprinted in Appendix I of Krieg (1986).

6. From a 10-page commentary based on US government documents compiled and made available to the author by a Peruvian diplomat and student of the problem who prefers not to be named.

7. There is also a report of the Joint Boundary Commission about the trip, provided to the author by William Krieg; see Montezuma and Proano (1943).

8. McBride's 1949 report speculates upon the meaning of these delays in a manner that closely anticipates subsequent Ecuadorean policy. William Krieg, however, believes Ecuador was genuinely surprised by the map anomaly and speculates that the field report (of 27 October 1943) might have

become lost in Ecuador's military bureaucracy (Krieg, 1996). A US government specialist on the topic (who wishes to remain anonymous) believes that Dias de Aguiar did not know how far up the Cenepa went or he would not have repeated the error of the Protocol (in his report).

9. For a detailed discussion of Peru's parlous national security situation as of the early 1990s, see Palmer (1993: 259-318).

10. The "agreement" was never consummated, because Peru denounced it immediately as giving rights to Ecuador in territory Peru considered to be its own, and Peru's foreign minister lost his job; see also St. John (1996, 10-11) Bonilla (1995).

11. A total of 18 displays (or actual use) of force took place from 1950 through 1994 (Mares, 1996-97: Table 2, 104).

12. Both mediation and arbitration involve the good offices of an outside party or parties acceptable to the disputants who try to find a solution to the problem. In mediation, each disputant decides whether or not to accept the proposal offered; in arbitration each disputant agrees beforehand that it will accept the outside party's or parties' proposal.

13. For a detailed discussion of the 1941 war in English, see Wood, 1966: 255-342.

14. Drawing from Krieg (1986) and others, Marcella notes that The signing of the Protocol verified the Status Quo Line of 1936 [Act of Lima, see Historical Time Line] signed ... by Ecuador and Peru, minus the [net] loss to Ecuador of only 5,392 square miles (Marcella, 1995: 6).

15. A lament of several career diplomats, both Ecuadorean and Peruvian, who were interviewed by the author.

16. Other accounts differ from that of Ponce. According to one, fighting started with an attack by Ecuadorean helicopters on a Peruvian outpost 4 kilometers from the border (Peru. Embassy, 1995: 3). According to yet another report, from a US diplomat and specialist on this case, no military initiative of such significance would have been carried out without explicit orders from the Peruvian high command.

17. According to one report, the conflict was costing each side $10 million per day (Brooke, 1995b). Ecuador's finance minister, Modesto Correa, announced that the direct cost of the undeclared war up to March 1 for his government was "approximately $250 million" (1995a: 54). While published accounts of total casualties on both sides noted between 200 and 300, interviews with Peruvian and Ecuadorean military authorities put the figures much higher, between 1,000 and 1,500 (Bonilla 1995; Mares 1996-97).

18. Observation by one of the key participants in subsequent discussions during an interview with the author; see also the confirming discussion in Mares (1996-97: 26-27).

19. From material provided by Ambassador Luigi Einaudi, US Guarantor Representative, in an interview with the author (Einaudi, 1997).

20. For a detailed account of the MOMEP mission, see Weidner (1996a or 1996b).

21. The diplomatic significance of the MOMEP mission and its members' interactions with representatives of the Ecuadorean and Peruvian military cannot be overemphasized. In spite of multiple obstacles, substantive progress was made on the military side of the situation even as the civilian side struggled with procedural issues. The early achievements of MOMEP provided the multilateral peacekeeping process with much of its momentum in 1995 and early 1996; accomplishments which Weidner presents in some detail. Updating Weidner, but very much reinforcing the above observations on the significance of the military mission for the peacekeeping process, was the presentation by Col. Leon Rios (1996) at the conference on "Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Lessons from the 1995 EcuadorPeru Conflict," held at the North-South Center of the University of Miami in December 1996.

22. This is the author's translation of impases subsistentes, a linguistic innovation by the guarantors in the Declaration of Itamaraty which permitted both Peru and Ecuador to get beyond the legalisms of their individual interpretations. The author owes his appreciation for this observation to a key participant in the early diplomatic discussions, as expressed in a letter (dated 22 August 1996) to the author.

23. This and following explanatory information in brackets was provided to the author by two US government analysts who have followed the conflict closely.

24. For background information on these points and others related to the peace process and the role of the guarantors, as well as for the provision of copies of various relevant documents, the author is indebted to Ambassador and US Guarantor Representative Luigi Einaudi (1997) and to his Special Assistant, Lynn Sicade (1996).

25. From the viewpoint of one Peruvian career diplomat, the main obstacle to arriving at a definitive resolution of the boundary problem is the fact that it has become so politicized over time, with a corresponding underemphasis on its juridical parameters -- specifically, the formal boundary treaty (Rio Protocol) and an arbitration decision (the Braz Dias de Aguiar Award), both of which were accepted by Peru and Ecuador and almost completely executed. From this perspective, then, the final, and definitive, designation of the border in the areas where it is not yet demarcated requires nothing less than the application of the international legal instruments that

established it in the first place. Therefore, and still in this view, Ecuador's position constitutes (1) a continuing violation of international agreements now in effect and (2) the principal source of the recurring bilateral conflicts.

26. These observations are derived from various interviews, by the author, with several of the participants in the process plus observations by analysts, all of whom prefer not to be mentioned by name.

27. These observations come from the same sources as those in note 26, with the same non-attribution qualification. Significantly, however, both parties provided some of the same proposals independently to the author, which suggests the possibility that points of balance may yet be found.

28. See, among others, Huntington (1991) and, in a more qualified sense, Mansfield and Snyder (1995: 89-95). For the specific case of the Ecuador-Peru dispute, see the discussion in Mares (1996-97).

29. Marcella discusses this at some length (1995: 8-13) and concludes, with Mansfield and Snyder (1995), that partial or nonconsolidated democracies of the types present in Ecuador and Peru are different from the stable, mature democracies on which the "no war" proposition is based.

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David Scott Palmer is Professor of International Relations and Political Science at Boston University, where he also served as the Founding Director (1991-1994) of its Latin American Studies Program. He is the author of many published works on Peruvian politics, Latin American insurgencies, military regimes, redemocratization, and civil-military relations. His most recent book, of which he is both editor and contributor, is THE SHINING PATH OF PERU (St. Martin's Press, 1994).

An earlier draft was presented at the international conference on "Multilateral Approaches to Peacemaking and Democratization in the Hemisphere," which was held at the North-South Center of the University of Miami, 11-13 April 1996. The author is grateful to several careful reviewers of this and subsequent versions, particularly Luigi Einaudi, Jane Marchi, Fred Woerner, Tommie Sue Montgomery, Eduardo Ponce, Ricardo Luna, Edgar Teran, Luis Quesada, Fernando Flores,Jose Boza,Jaime Barberis, Jason Whitmire, Adrian Bonilla,James Buchanan, Javier Ponce, David Hardick, and Gabriel Marcella. The author also thanks those participants among the parties and the guarantors who gave their time so willingly in conversations and interviews to explain their positions and concerns, as well as to provide many key documents. The comments and critiques of all have been extremely helpful, but the author alone is responsible for any errors or omissions that remain. Maps are courtesy of the US Department of State, redrawn by the North-South Center Press. Graduate assistant Kirsten Smith provided valuable research assistance. Translations of sources in Spanish are the author's.

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