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  • 标题:Daily Press Briefing for January 7 -- Transcript
  • 期刊名称:US State Department Press Releases
  • 出版年度:2003
  • 卷号:January, 2003
  • 出版社:US State Department

Daily Press Briefing for January 7 -- Transcript

   Daily Press BriefingRichard Boucher, SpokesmanWashington, DCJanuary 7, 2003INDEX:

ANNOUNCEMENT

1-2 Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group Joint Press Statement

NORTH KOREA/EAST ASIA

2-8,11-12 Need for a Peaceful Resolution/ Support for Dialogue

3,10-11,16 Dismantling Nuclear Weapons Program/ International Commitments

4-5,15 Travel in the Region by A/S Kelly and U/S Bolton

6-7,9,12,14 Denuclearization of the Peninsula

7,10,13 Compliance with Obligations to International Atomic Energy Agency

8-9,11 South Korean Proposition for Security Guarantee

10-11 Non-aggression Treaty/ Export Shipments/ Future Meetings

13 Channels of Communication with North Korea

17 National Security Strategy

MEXICO

17,19 Negotiations on Water/ OAS Statement

ISRAEL/PALESTINIANS

17-18 Decision to Ban Palestinians from Attending London Conference

17-18 Decision to Close Three Palestinian Universities/ Loan Request

VENEZUELA/BRAZIL

19 Crisis in Venezuela/ Brazil Sending Oil to Venezuela

UNITED KINGDOM

19-20 Tony Blairs Speech/ Arrests of Terrorists with Chemical Weapons

COTE DIVOIRE

21 Possible UN Peacekeeping Force

DEPARTMENT

21 Secretary Powells Telephone Calls

HONG KONG

22 Extradition of Suspected Terrorists

KAZAKHSTAN

22 Journalist in Kazakhstan

TERRORISM

22 Reported Letter from Ayman al-ZawahiriTRANSCRIPT:

2:00 p.m. EST MR. BOUCHER:   Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.  I think we have just gotten to everybody the Joint Press Statement -- the Trilateral Coordination Group's Joint Press Statement from the US, Japan and South Korea delegations who have been meeting here today and yesterday.  If  I can, I would like to review it briefly for those who might not have had a chance to go through it yet, and then we can talk about that and other topics.

The Joint Statement says that the three delegations called on North Korea to eliminate its nuclear weapons programs.  They reiterated their intention to pursue a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the issues.  They stressed that North Korea's relations with the entire international community hinge on its taking prompt and verifiable action to completely dismantle its nuclear weapons program and to come into full compliance with its international nuclear commitments.

They expressed concern over recent steps taken by North Korea to lift its nuclear freeze and called on North Korea to undo these measures and not take any precipitous action.  They expressed strong support for the recent decisions by the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors.

The three delegations also stressed that there is no security rationale for North Korea to possess nuclear weapons.  The US delegation reiterated President Bush's statement that the United States poses no threat and has no intention of invading North Korea.

The delegations also reaffirmed the Basic Agreement between South Korea and North Korea and the Joint North-South Declaration on Denuclearization of the peninsula, both of which are premised on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The three delegations expressed their support for the South-North dialogue and the Japan-North Korea dialogue.  The US delegation explained that the United States is willing to talk to North Korea about how it will meet its obligations to the international community.  However, the US delegation stressed that the United States will not provide quid pro quos to North Korea to live up to its existing obligations.

The three delegations stressed that the elimination of nuclear weapons programs by North Korea would provide an opportunity to return to a better path leading toward improved relations with the international community.  And they agreed to hold the next round of trilateral consultations in the near future.  A little more detail in the actual statement that you have, I think, now to look at, but those, I think, are the essential points.

So with that as an opener, I would be glad to take your questions on this or other topics.

QUESTION:  How do these two days of talks change things?

MR. BOUCHER:  I think what you see in this statement is a review by the three countries who have been working together on North Korea issues for a long time of the elements that need to be seen for there to be a peaceful resolution of this.

This lays out the need for North Korea to come into compliance with its obligations, to eliminate its nuclear weapons program, to undo the measures that they have taken with regard to their nuclear reactors, but it also makes clear that there is no security rationale for the steps that have been taken.  It makes clear that we have no plans to -- and no intention to -- invade or attack North Korea.  And it makes clear that that the basic premises of the progress that has been seen on the peninsula need to be respected:  The Basic Agreement from 1991 and the Agreement on Denuclearization of 1992.  And it makes clear, finally, that the prospects of discussions and then of real progress in North Korea's relations with the outside world are there if North Korea is willing to abide by its obligations.

So what you have is, I think, the outline, the elements, the pieces brought together of saying that there is a way to solve this peacefully.  And in the view of this group, and we think, others in the international community, that these are the things that need to be done to solve this peacefully.

QUESTION:  Richard, it would appear from the two, I think, most important sentences in this statement, or the two most recent that you guys are now willing to talk directly to the North Koreans without them first coming back into compliance with their obligations.  Is that correct?

MR. BOUCHER:  That is correct.  I will remind what the President said yesterday.  He said we will have dialogue.  We have had dialogue with North Korea.  He said talking is one thing but we expect people to honor obligations.  In a somewhat more formal sense, I would say, that is what this statement does today.

QUESTION:  But, did, but -- am I not correct in thinking that prior to what the President said yesterday and what this statement says now, is that you had been opposed to any kind of dialogue until the North came into -- came back into compliance with its agreements?

MR. BOUCHER:  We have said all along we were opposed to any kind of negotiation.  We were opposed to paying again for the same agreements that have been reached before.  We were opposed to re-bargaining the bargain, -- and other phrases like that -- to make clear we are not going to negotiate to get North Korea to come into compliance.  And that remains the position.  We are not going to provide any quid pro quos for North Korea to live up to its existing obligations.  But North Korea needs to make clear that it will live up to its obligations, that it will undo the steps, that it will end these nuclear programs, and we are willing to talk about how North Korea can do that.

QUESTION:  So you're willing to go into a meeting with the North Koreans and say, "You have to do this, this and this."  And that's the extent of the dialogue that you're talking about?

MR. BOUCHER:  We are willing to talk to them about how they can meet their obligations.

QUESTION:  But isn't meeting their obligations just a simple question of halting the enrichment program and bringing the IAEA inspectors back?  I mean, isn't it obvious, or shouldn't it be obvious to the North Koreans what they have to do?  And are you saying that you're willing to go to the North Koreans and tell them face-to-face the same thing that you've been saying for the past two months, three months now, that they have to come into compliance?  I'm just trying to figure out what you mean by you willing to talk to the North Koreans about how they can meet their obligations.

MR. BOUCHER:  We have said before, and I think you see it in this statement, too. North Korea's relations with the entire international community hinge on its taking prompt and verifiable action to completely dismantle its nuclear weapons program and come into full compliance with its international commitments.  That is what we mean by North Korea meeting its obligations.  We are willing to talk to North Korea about how they can do that, about how they can promptly and verifiably dismantle the program and come into compliance with their obligations.

QUESTION:  But not, and I'll stop after this, you're not willing to talk to them right now about what benefits they may accrue by doing this?

MR. BOUCHER:  To some extent, we already have, in that when Assistant Secretary Kelly was in North Korea, he laid out for them what we called at the time "The Bold Approach," what we would still call the willingness to take a bold approach in our relations, to, as we say here, to follow a better path in the relationship.  And then he said that's not possible because you have this nuclear enrichment program.  So we are willing to talk to them about the overall picture, but once again, we are not willing to provide a quid pro quo for them to meet their obligations.  And really, North Korea has to be willing to meets its obligations for this to serve any particular purpose.

QUESTION:  Richard, if this dialogue begins and the North Koreans say they want to talk about, say, fuel deliveries and non-aggression pacts and this kind of thing, are you going -- how will you deal with such requests?

MR. BOUCHER:  Let's see what happens.  Let's see, first of all, whether they are prepared to promptly and verifiably dismantle this nuclear program.  Let's see if they are willing to undo the steps that they have taken vis--vis the International Atomic Energy Agency.  I am not going to speculate on what they may or may not say in some kind of dialogue with the United States before we know whether the basic issue of how North Korea will meet their obligations is going to be there. 

QUESTION:  Do you have any vision of what levels a dialogue might resume at?  Have there been any proposals around?

MR. BOUCHER:  I think it is premature to talk about that at this point.  We are willing to have a dialogue about how North Korea will meet its obligations, but we are not going to start getting ahead of ourselves in that regard, I think.

Betsy?

QUESTION:  Richard, can you say whether you all will send a notice to the North Koreans telling them of your willingness to talk and suggesting a venue and place?

MR. BOUCHER:  I do not know if there will be some kind of further communication.  As I said, these are the elements that we think can be brought together to make a peaceful resolution of the issue.  But it takes, from the North Korean side, a willingness to dismantle its nuclear enrichment program and to reverse the steps that it has taken in terms of its international obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency.  It is not just the United States or even just the US, Japan and South Korea who are united on this. The International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors got together and said again together what they have to do.  So for there to be a dialogue about how it will meet its obligations to the international community, North Korea needs to indicate they are prepared to do it. 

QUESTION:  Have you actually made that -- have you formally told that to North Korea or are you just relying on the media to send the message?

MR. BOUCHER:  Again, we have not yet.  Whether we will communicate this through the private channel or not, I do not know yet at this point.

Charlie?

QUESTION:  The statement is slightly vague as to the timing of the next set of consultations.  Will Assistant Secretary Kelly still go to Asia?   And if so, do you have any stops you can talk about?

MR. BOUCHER:  Assistant Secretary Kelly will be out in the region next week.  I do not have his exact itinerary yet.  He will be in Japan, Korea, China.  I think he is also going to Southeast Asia, Malaysia, Singapore, maybe other places.  So he will be out in the region next week. 

I think some of you may know the South Korean National Security Advisor at this point will be in Washington in the next few days, so we will be having further meetings with them.  We are continuing to have meetings with other governments involved.  The Secretary obviously discusses North Korea in his phone calls with foreign leaders. And then later this month, Under Secretary Bolton will be out in the region, as well.  So this is an ongoing process of very close cooperation and consultation with the Trilateral -- with Japan, Korea and the United States -- but also with other members of the international community. 

Nicholas?

QUESTION:  Can you say why, exactly, Under Secretary Bolton is going only a week after Assistant Secretary Kelly to the same places?  What's the difference in their missions? 

MR. BOUCHER:  Maybe two weeks after.

QUESTION:  I think that the 18th is --

MR. BOUCHER:  Yes, I do not know the exact dates for Under Secretary Bolton.  This is an ongoing process of consultation.  It has a lot of aspects to it.  There are diplomatic aspects, there are more technical arms control aspects.  I think, frankly, both he and Assistant Secretary Kelly will be addressing a lot of the same elements and I do not think I can make too fine a distinction on the trips.  It is just part of the continuing effort to consult closely, to work together with the allies.

Sunni?

QUESTION:  This statement says that the US stresses that the US will not provide quid pro quos.  Without using the characterization "quid pro quo," could you outline what is the US policy about Japan, South Korea, or the EU providing other aid or assistance to North Korea on a bilateral basis -- whether it be fuel, food, trade or anything else?

MR. BOUCHER:  I think we have made clear we are not asking for economic sanctions, for example.  On the other hand, it has also been quite clear from those governments themselves, and from our contacts with those governments, that North Korea's relationships and many of those anticipated benefits are affected by the fact that they are now taking steps that would re-nuclearize the Korean peninsula.  So, I think if you track the progress of those various relationships and the statements that people have made, you will see that the truth of the matter that we explain in here. That, if I can find the sentence again, "elimination of the nuclear weapons programs by North Korea would provide an opportunity to return to a better path and that the North Korea's relations with the entire international community hinge on us taking prompt and verifiable action to completely dismantle its nuclear weapons program."  That is a point that has been made by the Europeans, by the United States, now by these three countries together, and I think by many others.  The facts bear this out, that North Korea's anticipation of benefits, of the benefits of new relationships, that those things are not forthcoming as long as North Korea is taking these steps to develop a nuclear program.

Betsy?

QUESTION:  Richard, they will have to renounce their nuclear program before things like the oil shipments from the US would continue or recommence?

MR. BOUCHER:  I think that is getting pretty far ahead of us.  The first thing is that they have to indicate that they are willing to abandon these nuclear programs, to end these nuclear programs in a visible and verifiable manner; and we would be prepared to talk to them about that.  Then as things proceed, we will see what else that might lead to if -- but, I have to stress, we are willing to have a dialogue; we are not willing to pay again for agreements and obligations that have been reached already.

Let's go back to the front row now.  George and John?

QUESTION:  Do they have to express a willingness to end them, or do they have to end them?

MR. BOUCHER:  They have to end the programs for anything real to happen.  Let's put it that way.

QUESTION:  (Inaudible).  Now we're getting confused.  Are you saying that for these talks to begin they have to show a willingness to end these programs, they have to come out with some kind of statement saying we are willing to end these programs?

MR. BOUCHER:  I do not know how they might do that, Jonathan, but we are willing to talk to them about how North Korea can meet its obligations to the international community.  We cannot talk about that subject on our own if we are going to have a dialogue with North Korea about how North Korea's going to meet their obligations.  They have to be willing to talk about how they are going to meet their obligations.

QUESTION:  Well, I would think you'd want to talk about them now.  I mean, you could feasibly sit down and talk about, you know,  (inaudible).  I mean, are you setting a precondition for these talks now?

MR. BOUCHER:  We are saying that we are willing to have a dialogue on the issue of how North Korea can meet their obligations.  What -- how they might indicate that, we will just have to leave to them. 

QUESTION:  But am I correct in presuming that inherent in that statement that we're willing to have a dialogue about how they might meet them is the fact that they don't have to meet them before you talk to them?   

QUESTION:  (Inaudible).

QUESTION:  (Laughter.)  Yeah, but that's a --

MR. BOUCHER:  We are willing to talk to them about yes, you are right, Matt -- yes, you are right.

QUESTION:  Because before, I mean, you know, ever since November, the position --

MR. BOUCHER:  No, no.  I do not think that is the correct characterization of since November, but yes, it is clear that there would be discussions about how North Korea would meet its obligations even before they had finished meeting their obligations.

Yes, Nicholas?

QUESTION:  You talked yesterday, about the Security Council.  Would you want such talks to begin, or the first round of them to take place before the case goes to the Security Council?  Do you think that's, that might help?

MR. BOUCHER:  Well, I do not know that the case will go to the Security Council.  What the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors said yesterday is they have to undo the steps that they have taken on an urgent basis.  They have to cooperate urgently to reverse those steps and were they to do that, there would be no reason to go to the Council.

QUESTION:  You mean think these talks might help prevent  the issue going to the Council?

MR. BOUCHER:  The goal is not to bring an item or not to bring an item to the Security Council.  The goal is for North Korea to reverse the course its set out upon, both in terms of nuclear enrichment, and in terms of breaking its obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency.  We are willing to talk to North Korea about how they can do that.  That is the process that we and others in the international community are engaged in.

Terri?

QUESTION:  Do you consider that any different from the comments that you've made previously that we're willing to listen?  North Korea can talk to us anytime we want -- anytime they want through the New York channels?  I mean, is this really different from what you've said or do you feel that this statement is just expressing, perhaps, more willingness than you had previously?

MR. BOUCHER:  I do not think I want to try to characterize it.  I say this is a position -- this is the position of the United States Government -- that we are willing to talk to North Korea about how they can meet their obligations.  I think it is quite a clear statement.  It is an indication of our willingness to resolve this peacefully.  It is an indication that we are willing to discuss how North Korea can meet those obligations.  But it does adhere to one position that we have had, to the same position that we have had, that we are not going to renegotiate the terms, renegotiate or pay again for North Korea to live up to obligations it has already undertaken.

QUESTION:  Does it indicate that you might make the first phone call this time?

MR. BOUCHER:  That we might what?

QUESTION:  The US may make the first call or whatever method you take, whereas before you were just waiting for North Korea --

MR. BOUCHER:  Well, we have expressed our willingness to talk about these things.  I have expressed it now.  I was asked if we are going to find some other way of conveying that privately.  I will have to check on that, but certainly we have expressed our willingness to talk about these things. 

QUESTION:  That was the US.

MR. BOUCHER:  We will see how North Korea reacts.

QUESTION:  It's an unconditional offer to talk to North Korea?

MR. BOUCHER:  It is an unconditional offer to talk to North Korea about how it can meet its international obligations.

Yes?  Charles?

QUESTION:  Fine, whatever the reason, whatever the topic of conversation is that you've made clear you're not in there to bargain, but it's an unconditional offer, isn't it?  They don't have to freeze their program before you talk to them?

MR. BOUCHER:  We just sort of did ten minutes of that, and I think my answer before covered it.

QUESTION:  All right, then the second thing is, what happened to the South Korean proposition for security guarantee.  Was that discussed during the talks? And I don't see it in the statement.  Maybe I missed it but I don't think it's there.  Is that correct, that it was discarded by the three?

MR. BOUCHER:  I think you have seen statements from the South Koreans themselves, that they did not come here to offer to mediate.  If you read the statement, you will see it is three delegations --  the three delegations, the three delegations, the three delegations.  I think it is abundantly clear that the three of us are together, and the fact that we are together with the rest of the international community in addressing these issues and addressing the elements that need to be brought together that can be brought together to resolve this peacefully.  It is not really a question of mediation.  What happens to issues of security guarantees, as we say in the statement, we reiterated President Bush's statement that the United States poses no threat and has no intention of invading North Korea. 

The three delegations also reaffirmed some of the fundamental bases for the progress that have been made -- based on a denuclearization of the peninsula.  That is the basic agreement between North and South Korea and the Joint Declaration on Denuclearizations.  So all those elements, I think, address the security questions that you have been interested in.

QUESTION:  It must have been a quick meeting.  First of all, I didn't ask about mediation.  I though South Korea was suggesting one way out of this crisis was to have an exchange of the security of assurance from the US in exchange for a freeze.  I don't see it in the statement, so I assume that proposition, even if it was brought up was not adopted by the three governments.  Also, I don't see a repetition which sort of leaves the door open,  I don't see a repetition -- again, but it was a quick reading, we were under the gun because the briefing came right after the statement.  I don't see a repetition of the US not willing --

MR. BOUCHER:  I am sorry for briefing. 

QUESTION:  No, it's all right.  That's the way it goes.  No, it would have been easier if there had been some space between the statement.  That's another matter.

I don't see anything in the statement about the US -- about the three dismissing the proposition of a non-aggression treaty.  So is that still something the US rules out?

MR. BOUCHER:  Barry, as we have said, the issue of aggression is not the issue.  It is not a question.  We reiterate in here. I think if you went back and read the 1991 Basic Agreement, if you went back and read the 1992 Joint Statement on Denuclearization -- and I would highly recommend them all to you -- that you would see that those fundamentals of the progress that has been made on the Korean Peninsula deal with these issues of security based on denuclearization.  And that remains fundamental.  The three countries endorsed those again and stressed their strong support for those again and said that remains the basis for making any progress here.

QUESTION:  Just one, and I'll let it go.  I was just trying to see, '91 apart and '94 apart, although they're part of the picture, I was trying to see how much of what the administration has been saying in the last few days appears and is echoed by the statement and how much has been --

MR. BOUCHER:  No, I think --

QUESTION:  -- put on a slow burner,

MR. BOUCHER:  Barry, I think you want to see how much of what you have been writing for the past few days.  I think what I have been saying --

QUESTION:  No, no. You have been talking about a non-aggression treaty.

MR. BOUCHER:  No, I have not.

QUESTION:  We just report it.  The US has ruled out a non-aggression treaty --

MR. BOUCHER:  Barry, read my transcripts. 

QUESTION:  -- and we dutifully report it.  And now, where'd it go?   Where did your opposition go, your objections go?  US objections?

MR. BOUCHER:  Read the transcripts, then, before you write a story, I would suggest.  I have not discussed a non-aggression treaty.

Joel?

QUESTION:  Do you insist and expect that the North Koreans to end their export shipments such as the conventional scud missiles and also to put a cap on their troop buildups? 

MR. BOUCHER:  The issues that we have identified previously as needing serious discussion between the United States and North Korea certainly remain key issues.  They are issues that were part of the approach that we were willing to take with North Korea to discuss those issues in the context of other improvements in the relationship.  So that kind of progress remains possible but it only remains possible if we can see North Korea verifiably dismantle these nuclear programs and return to compliance with its obligations to the international community and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Okay, in the back?

QUESTION:  But this offer, does it have the expiration date?  When do you want to wait until the willingness and the talk will yield anything?

MR. BOUCHER:  I do not think we can give a particular date to it.  We will obviously be looking to see how North Korea responds and what they say -- either in private or in public --  what they are willing to do.  But I think as we made clear with the International Atomic Energy Agency Board, the international community expects North Korea to meet its obligations to stop taking steps that violate its commitments and to reverse the steps that it has taken already,  so we are looking for that kind of cooperation urgently and I would say that applies that is certainly something that we supported.

QUESTION:  And just to follow up here, and it said to eliminate the nuclear program.  That means they have to basically not just freeze what they have now; they have to destroy the facilities now? 

MR. BOUCHER:  We have said all along that they need to promptly and verifiably dismantle these programs.  That means getting rid of the materials and equipment that are used to enrich uranium.

Yes? Mr. Ogata?

QUESTION:  Did you talk about the schedule of the next KEDO Executive Board meeting and did you talked about the future KEDO operation at this meeting today?

MR. BOUCHER:  I do not know to what extent that was discussed, frankly.  I think it was a topic to come up, but obviously the KEDO Executive Board will have to deal with that when they meet.  I am not sure when they will meet at this point.

Sir?

QUESTION:  Yes, back to the security issues.  Can you say at least that the South Korean delegation brought up some kind of new idea or new approach to facilitate solution?

MR. BOUCHER:  There was not a particular package proposed, nor mediation proposed.  The goal, I think, of all the delegations getting together was to talk about the different elements that could lead to a peaceful resolution of this.  And so the United States, the South Koreans, the Japanese all got together and discussed various elements that could lead to a peaceful resolution of this.  And that is where the South Koreans certainly contributed , but others -- all of us -- did as well. 

Betsy?

QUESTION:  Richard, can you say why the US changed its prior stated goal of not talking to them until they had dismantled?

MR. BOUCHER:  Once again, we were very careful to say we are not going to negotiate this.  And we are saying again today we are not going to provide a quid pro quo for them to come back to their obligations.  We have always said that there are channels of communication open.  We have been explicit in this today that we are willing to talk to them about how they can meet their obligations.  But we are not in any way prepared to offer a quid pro quo any more today than we were before.

QUESTION:  Richard, you seem to be trying to defuse this problem in a way that the administration was not doing, say, a month ago.  And I'm wondering if there is any attempt to try and take this off the front burner of sort of the world stage because the US is more interested in having Iraq higher up on the agenda? 

MR. BOUCHER:  The United States is interested in resolving this issue, is interested in resolving the problem of the nuclearization of the peninsula by North Korea, is interested in resolving the problem of North Korea violating its commitments to the International Atomic Energy Agency.  We are interested in resolving that problem peacefully.  From the beginning, we have stated our goal was a peaceful resolution and that, I think, has been said here -- just about every day for the last several months.  That was said a couple of months ago. When was it? November 9th -- the last Trilateral Coordination Group meeting in Tokyo.  So I think we have had a consistent policy of looking for how this can be resolved peacefully.

What you have here through the work of the United States, Japan and South Korea is a development of those ideas as we have consulted and worked with our allies and friends so that we are now in a position to lay out some of the pieces that are necessary to resolve this peacefully.  I think you see more progress in terms of outlining that and more progress in terms of how we would like to see it proceed.  But obviously, we cannot do this alone.  It is going to take North Korea's willingness to dismantle these programs for any of this to come about. 

Sir?

QUESTION:  Before the TCOG meeting today, as you said, the United States would not negotiate with North Korea, and also, they seemed reluctant to even talk to North Korea.  I'm just wondering if South Korea and Japan, what role did they play or did they present any arguments that helped convince the United States that they should reopen talk or be willing to talk with North Korea?

MR. BOUCHER:  I think we have always supported throughout this time the dialogues that South Korea has had with North Korea, the Japanese have had with North Korea, that others have had with North Korea, as a way of making clear to North Korea that it had to meet its obligations.  We ourselves never ruled out contact.  What we have ruled out is negotiating again for obligations that North Korea made and needs to abide by.  That remains the case today.

We have got more on this?  Steve?

QUESTION:  What can you tell us about whether there was any discussion at the meeting today on who should, if any, make contact with North Korea next?  And secondly, whether there was any discussion about what role Russia and China might play in the ensuing dialogue or multi-party dialogue? 

MR. BOUCHER:  I think as you say, there is support for the dialogue that Japan has, that South Korea has, with North Korea.  I think there will be probably different contacts from different countries.  We are taking steps to make sure that the allies and friends who are also interested in North Korea are briefed.  We have a meeting this afternoon with representatives of China, Russia, the European Union, Australia, Canada.  Is that the whole list?  Let me make sure I did not leave anybody off.  China, Russia, the Europeans, Australia, Canada. 

This afternoon, the three heads of delegation -- US, Japan and South Korea -- are going to meet with them, with their representatives in Washington, to keep them up to speed and abreast of what we have been thinking.  So we are continuing to work with other governments.  I know you have seen South Korea has had people out in Moscow and Beijing as well.  So there is a lot of work going on with other governments, as well, and I am sure there will be a variety of contacts of people with North Korea.  But which one might happen first, I do not know at this point.

QUESTION:  Sorry.  Can you just explain a little bit more about that meeting that you just described?  What ambassador is coming in and hearing --

MR. BOUCHER:  We decided after the trilateral meeting was held -- because it was so important to us to continue our coordination with other governments -- that we would invite these countries to bring some representatives into the State Department and the three heads of delegation will sit down and sort of brief them on our discussions and confer with them on various steps that people were taking.  So I think in some cases it is the ambassador.  I think the Chinese ambassador.  I am not sure if the others will be ambassadors or senior embassy representatives.  But they will have senior people in here this afternoon to talk. 

QUESTION:  Can I get clarification on what you just said?  It seemed to imply that South Korea and Japan are, because they have this ongoing dialogue, are the next ones to get in touch with North Korea.  Do you mean to suggest that?

MR. BOUCHER:  There are a lot of things ongoing.  I was asked earlier whether we would be getting directly in touch with North Korea to appraise them of the positions in this statement.  I said I would check on that.  I do not know whether we will use our channels of communication to do that.  I am sure that other governments -- including some of those we might talk to this afternoon -- may have meetings scheduled or not scheduled at this point.  So, I don't know who the next contact with North Korea will be, but certainly we are making our position clear here.  The position can be made clear by others, as well, in their contacts.  I think the entire international community has made clear that North Korea needs to come into compliance with its obligations, and that point is being made again and again.  The point that North Korea's relations with the international community hinge on its abandoning its nuclear programs and reversing the steps that they have taken is a point that is being made again and again.  So the point is clear.  The question is, what is North Korea going to do?  How is North Korea going to react -- whether publicly or in private?  And that is what remains to be seen.

Elise?

QUESTION:  When you say you're willing to talk to the North about how it's going to meet its obligations, what does that mean?  I mean, what are the talks going to entail?  You're going to help them set up a schedule on how they can get inspectors back in?  You're going to tell them exactly what they need to do?  Are you going to give them a list of things you'd like to see?  Or, I mean, they claim that they had to do this because you suspended the fuel shipments.

MR. BOUCHER:  Well, that is not true.  I mean it is true that that is what they said, but that is not any particular reason to do this.  The energy factors are minimal, if at all.  But, what we mean is what we say is that they need to promptly and verifiably end the nuclear enrichment program. They need to reverse the steps they have taken with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and we are prepared to sit down to talk to them about how they can do that, how they can meet their obligations.  That involves issues about how to do it verifiably.  That involves issues of the steps that need to be taken.  It may involve issues of, you know, the other possibilities or things that need to be done.  But, at this point, let's see, first and foremost, how they react.  Let's see, first and foremost, if they are indeed willing to come back into compliance with their obligations.

QUESTION:  Richard, I thought I had grasped this, but now I think -- now I'm confused again.  As far as I can tell now, what's on the table, what you've put on the table here in this document is not that different than what Kelly went to Pyongyang with in October.  Am I correct?  The only thing that's changed is that since that visit by Kelly, the North Koreans have taken these additional steps, I guess by throwing out the IAEA inspectors.

What you have right here is basically what the two sentences that everyone is going to concentrate on, is basically the same strip that Kelly went over there with, which is we had been prepared to go ahead with this bold approach, but we can't, now, and we will not be able to in the future unless you come back into compliance with the Agreed Framework.  It seems to me that now the only difference is that the North Koreans have violated a whole bunch more agreements in between.  So it's their position that's changed, not yours, since October.  Is that correct?

MR. BOUCHER:  Well, certainly the steps that they have taken since October, particularly with regard to monitoring cameras and the existing nuclear facilities, have been steps in the wrong direction.  We have made that clear.  The international community has made that clear. 

Our willingness to discuss how to promptly and verifiably end the enrichment program, how to reverse those steps in the wrong direction is stated clearly here.  I do not know if it was stated in quite the same terms when Assistant Secretary Kelly was in North Korea.  But what is different is Assistant Secretary Kelly, having consulted, obviously, all along the way with others.  But here you have a statement by three countries together, perhaps the three most important countries in terms of North Korea.  It is a statement, a sentiment that we think, is widely shared by the international community -- by China, Russia and others.  And I think the international community is looking for a peaceful solution to this.  And we are laying out here how a peaceful solution can be found.

QUESTION:  But the offer, if one can call it that, that's on the table now is not really any different than what it was in August.  And that is, get into compliance with whatever you're violating, in that case, and back then it was just the Agreed Framework, but get into compliance with that and this golden road can open up before you.

MR. BOUCHER:  Well, that is only part of the picture, the other picture is we are willing to talk to you about how you can get in compliance. 

Charlie?

QUESTION:  Richard, before this statement was issued and agreed upon and later issued, were the Chinese and Russians consulted or was it run by them?

MR. BOUCHER:  This particular statement, I do not think so.  Certainly we have been in active discussions with those governments.  I do not think they will find anything here that is too surprising.  I know we have had contacts through our embassies, for example, in China and Russia.

Barry?

QUESTION:  We spoke about their programs and then Matt got specific again, the enrichment program, and you want them to reverse what they did to disguise what they're up to.  I don't know why Iraq comes to mind as a parallel, but it's an actual parallel.

MR. BOUCHER:  I do not know either, Barry.

QUESTION:  Well, by the way, with Iraq, when you answered Betsy's question, how you prefer a peaceful resolution here, that's also your stated preference with Iraq.  The difference here is your not threatening force as you do with Iraq.  But that's just an observation.  Do you want them to disarm?  They're supposed to have two atomic weapons.  Is it sufficient for these three countries that they stop, that they permit their monitoring again, and they end the enrichment program, or do you want them to disarm?  Because when you use the word "programs," it's -- I understand, but it doesn't really explain explicitly what it is the US is asking them, urging them to do.

MR. BOUCHER:  The specific instance that Assistant Secretary Kelly raised when he went to Beijing was the nuclear enrichment program -- to Pyongyang, sorry, and Beijing afterwards, or before.  Anyway, when he went to Pyongyang, was the nuclear enrichment program.  The specific instance that has been addressed by the International Atomic Energy Agency is obviously the steps that North Korea has taken subsequently in terms of abandoning, dismantling the monitors.  But I think we have -- and those are the things that we do need to address.  Those are the specific obligations that North Korea has that they have violated and that they need to return to compliance with.  But, I would have to say at the same time -- and you see this because we do cite the commitments that North Korea has made with regard to the denuclearization of the peninsula -- and we three countries have stressed the importance of those.  That remains as part of the agenda, as well.  I do not know if I can try to piece it together any better than that.  We need to talk about all these things, about how North Korea can be brought back into compliance with its obligations.

QUESTION:  Woops, there's one other thing.  Proliferation has been a big concern.  Did that get a serious airing here?  Is there any approach, any consensus on how to cap that?

MR. BOUCHER:  Well, I was asked before -- the question about missiles, about conventional forces.  In all those issues, the proliferation concerns remain.  Part of the agenda that we think needs to be discussed in what we proposed as serious discussions, the President said a year and half ago; bold approach Jim Kelly said when he was in Pyongyang.  Those issues remain on the table and need to be addressed -- need to be addressed in the context of any improvement in relations.  Other governments that do have a dialogue with North Korea also have issues that need to be addressed.  But getting back to the point where we can address those issues where we could expect to make progress in those relations for all of us depends, as we say here, on North Korea eliminating these programs. 

QUESTION:  Do you have any indication that North Korea has questions about how it should meet its obligations to the international community?  I mean, you've said before that it's perfectly clear what they have to do, they have to dismantle, blah, blah, blah.  Why would you have to tell them that again?

MR. BOUCHER:  I think we have always said to do so in a prompt and verifiable manner and talking to them about how they can achieve that is obviously something that may be useful and that we are willing to do.  But again, let's see how they respond to our willingness to talk about this.  Let's see how they respond to the three countries here getting together and saying, "this is the way to solve this peacefully."

QUESTION:  And that response will come only after you -- the US makes its, makes the overture directly, right?

MR. BOUCHER:  I do not know.

QUESTION:  Is that what you're saying or --

MR. BOUCHER:  I do not know how and when they might respond publicly or privately at this point.  We will just have to see.

Okay, on this? Sir?

QUESTION:  Do you view the situation by North Korea as an attempt to gain center stage through their twisted logic?  (Laughter.)

MR. BOUCHER:  I will leave that for the commentators.  You guys can write that depending on your wont. 

Are we still on this?  Yes?

QUESTION:  I have a question on this North Korea crisis.  A few months ago, of course, the White House announced the launching of this, as part of the National Security doctrine, this preemptive strike notion which, you know, people in every crisis that has occurred, especially in the case of North Korea, but also in the case of Iraq that the US has been, you know, adamant in insisting that they want to find a solution to these problems through negotiation, through discussion, through working together with our allies,  doesn't the North Korea situation really underline the lack of wisdom in this kind of a doctrine which maybe even had caused confusion among a certain number of people given the amount of times you have had to reiterate that the United States is not about to attack North Korea?

MR. BOUCHER:  I am not going to comment on how the press reported on the National Security Strategy.

Okay, he had first dibs.

QUESTION:  On Mexico and the negotiations for water, I wonder if you can tell what is going on with these negotiations that are taking place even now?

MR. BOUCHER:  No, I cannot.  Is there something new on water?

QUESTION:  No, there have been negotiations since yesterday.

MR. BOUCHER:  Good.

QUESTION:  Very strange that you don't know.

MR. BOUCHER:  It is important.  I will do my part.  I will have to check on that for you.  I was not up to speed on that one.  Sorry.

QUESTION:  Can we go to the Middle East?

MR. BOUCHER:  Yes?

QUESTION:  Thank you.  Yesterday, you offered us a very nuanced position on the Israeli decision to ban the Palestinians from going to the London conference.  I'm wondering if your -- if you still regret that events have led you to the point where Israel has felt that the need to do this or if you now actually regret the Israeli decision to do so or maybe feel even stronger -- more strongly about it?  And also what you have to say about the decision by Israel to close three Palestinian universities.

MR. BOUCHER:  I will check on the universities question.  I do not have anything to say on that at this moment.  I would stick by what we said yesterday.  The Secretary did express his regret to Foreign Minister Netanyahu.  As you know, the British have proposed to hold a meeting on Palestinian reform.  We have supported that.  We support that idea.  We think it is very important to proceed on Palestinian reform.  The British, as you know, have been in touch with the Israeli Government about this, about holding this meeting.  We have been in touch with the British, but we have also been in touch with the Israeli Government.  The Secretary talked to the Foreign Minister yesterday.  And we will continue to work closely with both sides and try to see how we can move forward on this issue of reform.

QUESTION:  Again, (inaudible) regrets.  Can you clarify what he regretted?

MR. BOUCHER:  I cannot.  I cannot try to nuance that one for you.  The fact is, we are talking to the Israeli Government about this.  We think the idea of a conference is a good one and the Secretary has talked directly to the Foreign Minister.

QUESTION:  You think the idea of a conference next week in London is a good one and you would like for it to go ahead?

MR. BOUCHER:  We have welcomed the British proposal.  We would like to see their proposal go ahead but we will just have to see if it does or not.

QUESTION:  Just asking for explanation on what you said yesterday, not asking you to nuance further.  Did he regret that the Israelis took this action, or did he regret the incidents that happened that led the Israelis to make this decision?  Did he regret that the Palestinians weren't being allowed to go?  Or did he regret the things that had happened that led the Israelis to make this decision?  Or both?

MR. BOUCHER:  Both.

QUESTION:  Okay.

MR. BOUCHER:  He regretted, as I said yesterday, he expressed his regret that events had led us to this point.  That is a whole number of things, and I am just going to stay with that now.  There is no more -- one cannot start to dice it any further.

QUESTION:  Do you have anything to say on Israel's request here and at the White House yesterday for additional loans and other assistance with the argument that, you know, their resources are strained by preparations for a possible Iraqi attack?  Is it an open issue?

MR. BOUCHER:  I do not have anything new on this at that point.  I would not expect us to be able to react that quickly to specific dollar figures or requests.  So we have had discussions with the Israelis and I am sure we will continue and discuss it with them as we consider what we can do.

Okay?

QUESTION:  Two questions.  Has the United States seen the nearest tragedy that President Lula is doing with Venezuela -- helping in the oil industry.  He's going to start in any way to  solve the crisis in Venezuela.  Do you have any opposition to Brazil doing things like that with his friend Hugo Chavez?

MR. BOUCHER:  I am not quite sure what you are referring to as "things like that."  I think we, and others, share an interest in seeing a peaceful resolution of events in Venezuela.  We have continued to be in touch with other governments about it, about the situation in Venezuela.  We have continued to support the efforts of the Secretary General of the OAS.

QUESTION:  What I am talking about is Brazil sending oil to Venezuela.

MR. BOUCHER:  That was last week, right?

QUESTION:  Yeah, you have any --

MR. BOUCHER:  No, I do not have any particular comment on that. 

QUESTION:  Richard, Tony Blair in an otherwise supportive speech said he thought the United States perhaps wasn't listening to its friends enough.  What's your response to this criticism to such a close ally?

MR. BOUCHER:  I think I would look at the whole speech in its context.  I am not going to try to parse it for you or react to one sentence.  I would note that the Secretary listened to Jack Straw twice this morning already, so we will make sure we do our part.

QUESTION:  On Mexico and Venezuela.  Secretary for Foreign Relations of Mexico Jorge Castaneda expressed yesterday that his government, the Government of Mexico would suggest that Venezuelan Government would respect more the Division of Institutional Democratic Powers.  What's the take of the US Government in relation to this statement?

MR. BOUCHER:  I think you will see elements of that expressed in the Organization of American States statement.  On the subject of Venezuela, we are looking for a peaceful, democratic solution that respects the democratic institutions of Venezuela. 

One of the people the Secretary has been talking to about the situation in Venezuela is Foreign Secretary Castaneda.  They spoke again today about the situation down there.

Okay, Joel?

QUESTION:  [inaudible]

MR. BOUCHER:  What?  I do not think they talked about the water issue today.  I promised to check on that.  I will check on that. 

QUESTION:  Okay, because this is a very important issue for the United States and important --

MR. BOUCHER:  No, it is important to us.

QUESTION:  -- President said.

MR. BOUCHER:  The President, himself -- and we all remember the meeting that began, water, water, water -- agua, agua, agua.

QUESTION:  Did you know that a meeting is taking place --

MR. BOUCHER:  I already said that.

QUESTION:  Down boy...

MR. BOUCHER:  I offered to check.  I have to apologize for not knowing about every, single meeting that we have in this building, but the fact is we have a very broad diplomacy and sometimes people do things that I don't know about.

Okay, same topic?

QUESTION:  As a follow-up, did they talk about oil?  The possibility of supplying --

MR. BOUCHER:  No.  They really talked about the diplomacy of it -- how to support the efforts towards a peaceful resolution.

Yes, Joel?

QUESTION:  Richard, any response to the arrests this morning in London of apparently five to six terrorists found with chemical weapons and with -- do you think that this was in an effort to disrupt a conference which obviously was canceled for next week in London between the PA and the Israelis?

MR. BOUCHER:  I have not seen any link to this other Palestinian conference.  I think that is being affected by other decisions, but in terms of what the British did in the arrests -- obviously we are always in close touch with the British on law enforcement, intelligence and other matters.  I do not know of any particular US role in this event, and I think any information on it would have to come from the British Government.

Jonathan?

QUESTION:  Richard.  Ivory Coast.  Things don't seem to be going particularly well with the French intervention.  There have been suggestions that perhaps a UN force might be the way to go.  Do you --

MR. BOUCHER:  We do not think that a UN force is the way to go.  We do not think that a UN peacekeeping force is necessary or appropriate at this time.  We point out the Economic Community of West African States has exercised responsibility towards mediating this conflict.

Since September, the October 17th cease fire, which the regional organization brokered between the Government of Cote D'Ivoire and the Mouvement Politique de Cote d'Ivoire rebels remains in place, albeit fragile. 

The heads of states of the member countries have also agreed to deploy a regional force to monitor the cease fire and the advance elements of that eco-force began arriving last week.

We have been providing some support to them, as well.  In addition, there is a strong French military presence in a buffer zone between government and rebel forces at the request of the Economic Community of West African States, and we understand that those troops will remain in Cote d'Ivoire and provide eco-force.

Finally, I think I would note that we strongly support the French initiative to host a conference of Ivorian political leaders in Paris later this month and a regional summit at the end of the month.  We believe that this initiative offers an excellent opportunity to achieve a peaceful, political resolution of the conflict.

QUESTION:  Do you mean that the force is in place, in other words the eco-force and the French forces, you believe, are sufficient to meet the needs of the situation?  Is that --

MR. BOUCHER:  Well, first we believe the parties need to abide by their ceasefire and there are actually two new rebel groups that emerged in late November.  They need to adhere to a ceasefire, as well.

But first, the parties need to adhere to a ceasefire.  Second, people need to pursue a peaceful resolution.  Third, we are supporting the deployment of these West African troops who are arriving in greater numbers now.  And, as I said, the French are also playing an important role not only diplomatically but also militarily, and we think with that combination of factors, that a UN peacekeeping force is not necessary at this time.

QUESTION:  Could you list his phone calls, please?  Have you done that?

MR. BOUCHER:  Not really.  Today it has been Foreign Secretary Straw.  He talked briefly to Nelson Mandela, Foreign Secretary Castaneda, Ecuadorian Foreign Minister Nina Pacari.  He has been in touch with a variety of ministers and others over the course of the last several days.

QUESTION:  Did you say Straw twice today, again?

MR. BOUCHER:  Yes.  I think they talked a couple of times yesterday, as well.  I do not have the full list, but he has been in touch with Secretary General Kofi Annan, as well, a number of times in the last few days.

QUESTION:  What was he talking to Nelson Mandela  about?  Burundi?

MR. BOUCHER:  Nothing.  I am not going to get -- (laughter) -- nothing particular, I was going to say.  I do not think I can characterize phone calls.

QUESTION:  I've got a couple.  Did you get anything on the Hong Kong extraditions that you said you were going to look into?

MR. BOUCHER:  Yes, we did.  The Hong Kong authorities arrested three people at our request.  At a hearing held in Hong Kong on January 6, the fugitives, who have been indicted in US District Court in San Diego on charges relating to drugs and terrorism, consented to their surrender to the United States from Hong Kong.  The United States requested the surrender from Hong Kong pursuant to the agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Hong Kong for the surrender of fugitive offenders that was signed on December 20, 1996, and which entered into force on January 21, 1998.  We are waiting for Hong Kong authorities to provide the authorization for the surrender of these three fugitives.

QUESTION:  Did you guys have -- what did you make, if anything, of this letter purporting to come from Ayman al-Zawahri yesterday, sent to an Egyptian lawyer?

MR. BOUCHER:  I do not have any way of confirming whether it is or not.  Certainly this sort of inflammatory rhetoric has been seen before in al Qaida communications.  But I don't think I can confirm whether it is his letter or not.

QUESTION:  Are you guys following at all the trial of this journalist in Kazakhstan?

MR. BOUCHER:  I am not quite sure who you are talking about but we have talked about journalism in Kazakhstan before and I think the answer is probably yes.

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