Warrior ethos--alive and well in Naval Aviation

Having just completed another stint in the Arabian Gulf flying Operation Southern Watch missions from USS George Washington while in CVW-17, I thought I'd share my impressions of Naval Aviation in this operation. During my recent time in theater, I did nothing special or different from any other strike fighter pilot over the past year and a half. I was mission commander for one Response Option Strike in Southern Iraq and took part in others. I also spent three weeks at the Joint Task Force South West Asia (JTFSWA) Headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia as CVW-17's Liaison Officer.

The carrier battle group brings the predominant striking force into theater. Due to savvy procurement priorities of strike weapons, Navy TACAIR has a unique offering of JDAM, JSOW, and SLAM-ER precision weapons which are not currently available from other TACAIR assets.

But the biggest asset we bring into theater is the Naval Aviation Culture.

That culture includes work-ups prior to the wing's deployment. They constitute a challenging process that keeps us away from home and family. Given the complexity of the force we deploy with, this is necessary. The work-ups create an extremely competent fighting force - a force that has lived, eaten, slept, partied, worked, and sweated together for over a year by the time we arrive on station. End result: we work extremely well together. This is apparent when comparing the ship/ air wing team to land-based assets that haven't worked together, are on different deployment cycles, and are operating from separate countries.

This familiarity - this team work breeds another benefit, flexibility. Naval Aviation is the epitome of flexibility. It's part of our culture and we take pride in it. In my stint at JTFSWA, during many mission tasking changes, package adjustments, and contingency operations (CONOPS) planning, it was obvious the "boat" simply does not say "no." Other theater assets were unable to undertake certain taskings for a number of reasons - crew rest and turnaround times, for example. Not once did I have to say "no" to a tasking. If it were at all feasible, we would do it.

We - the ship/air wing team - can change directions almost instantly. If we need to delay a strike package due to weather or tanker support, one quick phone call to the ship and a "99" call on the "squawk box" and the launch is delayed. If fighter support and Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) units can't get airborne due to blowing sand at their airfields ashore, we can rapidly reconfigure the wing's strike assets to handle their functions.

Our approach to strike planning is a key attribute. During training at NSAWC Fallon, Nevada strike leaders and strike teams are presented simply with a "Commanders Intent." Subsequently, we must execute a large-scale strike 48 hours later. To prepare, we ask and answer basic questions: What are the targets - the aim points (Designated Mean Point of Impact - DMPI)? What weapons should we use? How many aircraft are needed for the strike? All air wing assets are at our disposal but we must figure anticipated constraints relative to deck loading and tanking.

This planning mindset is enforced throughout the work-up cycle prior to deployment and during CONOPS planning en route to each theater we might enter.

Operational tasking is closely controlled, down to specific DMPIs and the type/amount of ordnance. Much of this results from the political reality of "Military Operations Other Than War" we encounter today. Meanwhile, we must know the rules of engagement and push our philosophy to the limits of those rules. To the chain of command we stress the need for "headquarters" to provide the tasking but for the air wing to execute the planning. If the air wing provides sound targeting and weaponeering plans it will earn the confidence of the theater commander.

I am a Naval Aviator and a product of our culture, and therefore am rightfully proud of our accomplishments. However, I also understand and respect the approaches other organizations take. The USAF, for example, fluidly incorporates units from the USAF Reserve, and Air Guard into theater to cover requirements. This does not lend itself to the level of flexibility that the carrier air wing possesses, but it does efficiently utilize all their units and does so without the price of the extensive work-up process.

In the joint environment, it is our responsibility to understand and respect the differences of the other services and to work with them. We must explain our culture, our approach, our attributes and limitations. Our successes will speak for themselves.

The Naval Aviation Culture is far from perfect. At times we may be reluctant to integrate with other forces. Moreover, our people pay a price for flexibility of operations. Navy personnel work extremely long, hard hours to achieve and maintain the carrier/air wing team's flexibility. Therefore the desired flexibility should not be achieved at the cost of debilitating our treasured work force.

The Naval Aviation Culture conveys a fighting spirit, certainly not unique to Naval Aviation, but it is a prevailing characteristic. Naval Aviators do not seek violence in the form of air strikes, but we want to be a part of those strikes if they occur. While at JTFSWA a USAF A-10 pilot told me, "Anytime there is even a whiff in the air of potential bomb dropping, the Navy is falling all over itself to be a part of it." We could not have received a better compliment. We are here to participate, to take charge and to execute the mission. The warrior ethos is indeed alive and well in Naval Aviation.

LCDR Morley is currently a Department Head in VFA-83, flying FlA-18 Hornets. The squadron is homeported at NAS Oceana, Virginia.,

Copyright Association of Naval Aviation Fall 2000
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