The Death Penalty and Globalization in Nigeria, the United States, and Europe
Silvia FedericiIntroduction
The most ominous social phenomena shaping the U.S. political economy in the 1980s and 1990s have undoubtedly been: (1) the mass incarceration of young proletarian men and women, mostly black and Hispanic, and (2) not only the return to the death penalty (after the moratorium of the 1972-1976 period) but the constant escalation in the number of executions.
There are now two million people in U.S. prisons--by far the largest prison population in the world in absolute terms. More than four million are on probation or parole. Almost four thousand are on death row, and one hundred persons are executed every year. Their numbers are likely to increase despite the growing momentum of the campaign for a new moratorium.
It is as if U.S. politicians, judges, and prison administrators had conspired to produce a tableau vivant of the "Great Confinement" and the "spectacles of the scaffold" that characterized the period of primitive accumulation in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries. The only missing element, the crowning of "King Death," was provided by the election to the presidency of George W Bush--the man who, as governor of Texas, signed more death warrants than anyone in the history of the country, and whose first message to the nation was the appointment of John Ashcroft--a staunch supporter of both capital punishment and the Confederacy--as the chief legal officer of his administration.
These developments have provoked many analyses connecting the restoration of the death penalty with either the country's legacy of racism, or with the unfolding of the neoliberal agenda, or, more specifically, with the general deterioration of workers' rights and living conditions. Only recently have the U.S. carceral (prison) regime and its return to executionism been attributed the to the structural changes which the present phase of economic globalization has brought about. [1]
In this essay, we investigate this connection. We argue that the correlation between the further global expansion of capital and the unleashing of a campaign of legalized state terror against the poor is not a phenomenon unique to the United States. In fact, it is the rule in many Third World countries that, in the 1980s and 1990s, have been affected by the debt crisis and consequently have been integrated into the global economy under the dictatorship of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). This is because, from a class viewpoint, globalization is a process of the internationalization of the labor market and, most important, a process of devaluation of labor carried on to the point of the enslavement of large sectors of the world proletariat. As such, it must rely on state-administered terror, as well as extra-judicial violence for its success.
We also argue that the use of legalized state terror has been especially prominent in the United States is a consequence of four related factors: (i) the planned increase of slave-like labor in the 1980s and 1990s at the core of the globalized U.S. economy, mostly achieved through the restrictions imposed upon immigration; (ii) the adoption of a neoliberal economic policy which deprives workers of rights (from employment and food subsidies to health-care and education); (iii) the institutional will to create new divisions within the U.S. proletariat, and to discipline the most rebellious sector of the U.S. citizen-population, black youths, leading to their disenfranchisement; (iv) the historic "American connection" between slavery and the death penalty that facilitates the construction of an apartheid society, justified now not by race but by the imputation of criminal behavior, although the victims of such policy are still primarily the descendants of the African slaves.
The U.S. political economy represents the fullest embodiment of globalization in its new forms, in addition to being the main engine propelling globalization worldwide. And, as such, it generates many connections and continuities. There is continuity, for example, between the mass incarceration of young black and Latino youth and the criminalization of undocumented immigrants going to the U.S., as well as the U.S. government's criminalization of Latin American farmers through the war on drugs. Similarly, there is continuity between the scores executed every year in the United States and the millions of deaths in both the Third World and the U.S. due to malnutrition, lack of health care, and the equally vast number of those killed at the hands of death squads or police.
There is nothing automatic, however, about these developments. Between global capital movements and the expansion of prisons and death rows stand the decisions of a political class trained in the imposition of slavery. Proof of the planned, strategic character of capital punishment in the U.S. is its contrast to Europe where, in the 1980s and 1990s, we have seen the launching, at the highest institutional levels, of a campaign against capital punishment and a tendency towards lesser penalties and increased prisoners' rights for citizens [2]
What accounts for this discrepancy? This is an important question, given the tendency in U.S. abolitionist literature to look at Europe as a model of juridical civilization and the embodiment of an unstoppable abolitionist world trend. In our view, however, this trust may be misplaced. True, the European Union (EU) has insisted on providing certain guarantees to its citizen workers, and, most important, it has made integration of other countries into its ranks conditional upon their abolition of the death penalty. However, this situation should not be taken for granted. The brutal treatment "Fortress Europe" is meting out to immigrant workers and the institutional promotion in many countries of a climate of xenophobia that instigates constant physical attacks against immigrants' communities is worrisome evidence that, in Europe too, the construction of an apartheid society is already well advanced. Thus, in Europe as in the United States, only the construction of an alternative to globalization, and specifica lly, the construction of a non-exploitative alternative to capitalism can fully dissipate the threat of legal murders.
Nigeria in the 1980s and 1990s: Executions and Structural Adjustment
The existence of a strong correlation between the death penalty and globalization was brought to our attention while we were employed as lecturers at two universities in southern Nigeria between 1983 and 1987. At the time, Nigeria was experiencing its version c globalization that, in a few years, would be applied to scores of debtor nations in Africa and other Third World regions. In response to failed development plans, rising external debt, and international monetary manipulations (brought on by the rise in the value of the dollar in the early 1980s), the country was facing a potential recolonization at the hands of international agencies and multinational corporations the price for escaping economic bankruptcy.
In exchange for new loans and rollovers, and in the name of bot economic recovery and making Nigeria attractive to foreign investment, the IMF and the World Bank were in fact urging the Nigeria government to adopt a liberalization and privatization policy that would allow for major takeovers of the nation's assets by foreign business and the drastic cutting of the cost of labor. Markets would have to be opened to foreign products; land tenure would have to be placed on a private basis; wages would have be frozen, while currency devaluations would send the prices of basic commodities sky high; and all public services (health care, education, transport) would have to be defunded and/or privatized. To top it off, Nigerians would have to reorganize their production on an export-oriented basis to gain the foreign currency to pay for the debt. No wonder many spoke of recolonization. [3]
These structural adjustment measures were not fully introduced Nigeria until 1986. However, prior to their application and surely preparation for it, the military government adopted its homegrown structural adjustment by massively retrenching government employees and launching a campaign of physical and legal intimidation against unions and workers in the name of a "war against indiscipline." Surprise raids were conducted in the work places to check workers showed up in time; levies were exacted at roadblocks for dubious public works; and fines and arrests were applied to a vast range of infractions, including displaying the flag in inappropriate places. With the introduction of Decree 20, promulgated in July 19 the number of capital offenses was increased from three to twenty, so that mass public executions soon started to escalate, while the summary executions of "armed robbers" by the police also became the norm.
Who were those sentenced to die? A day-to-day analysis of the lists of the condemned, carried out over a period of four years, made it clear that the executed were the laid-off teacher, the factory worker, the expropriated farmer, the unpaid cop, the student who could not pay his increased school fees. Their crimes were often nothing more than stealing a bag of seed, or a car, or snatching some crates of beer with a machete, the universal tool of the Nigerian proletariat.
Already by the mid-1980s, then, the connection between the advance of multinational capital in Nigeria and the escalation of executions was quite evident. If any doubts remained, these were to be dissipated in 1995 when, with the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the eight other activists of The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, the Nigerian Government tried to stem the resistance to Shell Oil's environmental devastation of Ogoniland--a resistance that was giving all the populations of Nigeria's oil producing areas the courage to organize against the oil companies, while educating the country to the dangers of globalization. But few perhaps realized, among those who mourned the death of Saro-Wiwa, that in the months preceding his execution, in fact, just between July and September 1995, seventy-five armed robbery convicts--average age eighteen to thirty--were also executed in the prisons or stadiums of Nigeria, contributing to the year's total of eighty-six. [4]
Nigeria has not been unique, among Third World countries, in its use of the death penalty as a weapon to break proletarian resistance to the austerity measures and expropriations required by globalization. We still do not have the kind of study that Chomsky and Herman conducted in the 1970s, in which they powerfully correlated torture rates with rates of foreign investment in the Third World. [5] Nor do we have yet a satisfactory table correlating executions with cuts in wages and services, loss of lands and job, and epidemics. However, even a cursory look at the map of the Third World countries subjected to the IMF-World Bank regime would deliver a stark image of the deterioration of human rights following adjustment, and the increase in the number of executions, always organized with a maximum of spectacle to terrorize the population. In late 1989, Roger Hood, an expert on the international aspects of the death penalty, noted a trend towards the expansion of the scope of the death penalty throughout the fir st decade of structural adjustment to include economic crimes and drug trafficking. This trend was especially apparent in African, Asian and Middle Eastern countries where the application of structural adjustment was buttressed with the adoption of Sharia Law (Islamic Law) as, for example, the Sudan and Pakistan. [6]
The Death Penalty and Globalization in the United States
On returning to the U.S. in 1987 we were struck by the increase in the number of executions since we had left. In 1983, there were five executions a year, by 1986 the number had risen to twenty-five. Immediately, we saw many parallels between Nigeria and the United States with respect to capital punishment and globalization, though the political rhetoric was different. Instead of the "war against indiscipline" and "structural adjustment," there was "get tough on crime" and "Reaganism."
In what way is capital punishment tied to globalization in the United States? In answering this question some preliminary considerations are helpful. First, there has already been a long historical connection between capital punishment and globalization, broadly defined, in the United States. For the extensive use of capital punishment in the United States has accompanied the development of a global economy, whose main support and manifestation was the slave plantation system. This deep connection throughout U.S. history between capital punishment and slavery was not broken by "emancipation", which never truly liberated the slaves nor abolished slavery, but simply displaced it into the prison system. [7]
The "peculiar" history of the death penalty with respect to the descendants of the former slaves is indicative of this fundamental tendency of the American system to reproduce slavery and an apartheid society, as means to keep workers divided and check the former slaves' demands. From the beginning of Jim Crow to the Great Depression, this terror machine, in which executions and lynching were used interchangeably, formed the foundation of the "worse than slavery" system known as the convict lease system that (ironically) rebuilt the infrastructure of the southern states after the Civil War. [8]
This history of enslavement and apartheid is quite evident in the long-term statistics concerning the death penalty. For what has most been punished with death has been the transgression of racial hierarchies and divides. From the end of the Civil War until the 1960s, rape was a capital crime in many states, and more than 90 percent of those executed were black men convicted of raping white women. More generally, if all executions for capital crimes are considered, then of the 4,458 executions between 1930 and 1999, 2,201 were of blacks and 1,971 of whites. [9] That is, about 50 percent of those executed in this period were black while the black population in this period was about 12 percent. But we know, from David Baldus' study in Georgia, that there was a 4.3 times greater likelihood that the convicted person would get the death penalty if the victim was white.
The near enslavement of black Americans buttressed by the death penalty was seriously challenged only with the civil rights and Black Power movements in the 1950s and 1960s, in whose wake capital punishment too was, for the first time, suspended nationally with the Supreme Court's ruling on Furman v. Georgia in 1972.
The Black Power movement was a watershed in U.S. history, in the same way as the anti-colonial movement was for Europe, both changing the course of U.S. and European capitalism, and undermining not only one of the most profitable sources of wealth but also a division of labor that effectively divided workers internationally. More than that, both the Black Power and the anti-colonial movements had a ripple effect which empowered other sectors of the U.S. and world proletariat--above all the wageless (women, students, farmers)--to demand better living conditions, less work, and a more egalitarian distribution of wealth.
It was in response to these rebellions and the onset of economic crisis in the 1970s that a new phase of globalization was launched (at home and abroad) which first was masked as local initiatives (Reaganism, Thatcherism, shock therapy, the Chicago boys, etc.). In the 1980s these localized reactions were pointing however to an international strategy aimed at restoring capital's command over labor and relaunching the accumulation process globally. Its main features in the United States included a very sharp decline in real wages, the attack on welfare rights, price hikes on basic commodities, and the transfer of capital and labor-intensive manufacture abroad, so that within a few years entire communities were out of work and desperate.
Was it a coincidence, then, that by 1976--after only a four year moratorium--the death penalty was resumed, despite the fact that all the problems which had led presumably to the moratorium, beginning with its racial bias, were still fully present in its administration? Here we must first dispel the assumption that the death penalty and mass incarceration were a response to popular demand. In reality, at all points, both were initiatives that came from above. As is now well documented, an immense effort involving the media and right-wing foundations was undertaken to create a siege mentality whereby individual crimes would be identified as the number one cause of insecurity, at the very time when capitalist planning and institutional politics were in fact waging the most concerted attack since the Great Depression against the conditions of living of the U.S. work force. [10]
Chronology is also important. The death penalty crept back into the country together with Reaganomics and the deindustrialization of Detroit and the Northeast industrial belt. It came together with the transferring of Chrysler and other auto plants across the border, the boarding up of Akron, Ohio, the migration of the auto-proletariat--the holders of the highest and most secure wage in the U.S. working class, to the South and West, and the simultaneous migration of many U.S. companies to Mexico, the Philippines, or the newly developing Free Export Zones and off-shore production areas of the Third World.
In this context, incarceration and the death penalty signaled the reversal of the War on Poverty now turned into a war against the poor. It represented not only the state's dismissal of any responsibility for poverty and racism; but the criminalization of the poor, and in particular the criminalization of the black proletariat and the politics of Black Power. By the early 1980s, in fact, the U.S. government consciously adopted a policy whereby black youth would have little choice but to either work directly under its control, literally under its gun, by joining the army and becoming a material instrument of globalization, or go to jail.
This was a turning point of great importance in terms of both globalization and the return of the death penalty. First, because no "downsizing" of the power of the U.S. and international proletariat would have been possible had the most combative and radical part of that proletariat in the United States not been destroyed and vilified. It was no accident, then, that the truly historic ruling was passed in the case of McClesky v. Kemp (1987), which unambiguously legalized racism in U.S. juridical procedure. In this case the Supreme Court admitted that the statistical evidence was consistent with racial discrimination in death penalty cases but still refused to overturn it.
It is important to add that through the incarceration and execution of black youth the United States launched a challenge not only against the black revolution in the United States and its demand for reparations, but also against the anti-colonial struggle abroad--in Africa above all, where anti-colonialism had always counted for its success on a powerful Africa-American movement in the United States. By the mid 1980s, however, the U.S. political elite (not just the right) had embraced a re-colonization policy whereby past exploitation and enslavement not only would no longer count as a tide for reparations, but would instead be openly used as a means for further oppression. The massive incarceration of African Americans served in no small measure to put on them the blame for their continuing poverty and also provided a model for a similar treatment of the former colonial subjects in Africa.
Could Africans have been told that they, not colonialism, were to blame for the poverty in which they were plunged by IMF-World Bank policies, had a vibrant black movement existed in the United States reminding the world of the still open account black Americans and Africans have with the heirs of slavocracy?
Could an army disproportionately staffed by blacks have descended on Panama, Grenada, and later Somalia if the concept of self-determination and Black Power still had had any currency in the United States and had not, instead, been vilified in the war against drugs or the war against crime, which shifted the image of the black youth from that of the militant to that of the hunted criminal, and which portrayed black self-determination itself as criminal enterprise?
The death penalty clearly has many other political uses for the globalization agenda. First, it is a political weapon against revolutionaries. The case of Mumia Abu-Jamal is indicative here. Like Joe Hill, and Sacco and Vanzetti, Mumia is on death row while embodying a movement that has been identified as the major threat to the status quo and his case is supposed to teach a lesson to others aspiring to this role. In this sense, capital punishment plays the role that political assassination has played in other countries (death squads of Argentina, El Salvador and Guatemala) or in other times in the United States (the COINTELPRO). [11]
Second, the death penalty is crucial in the reconstruction of an apartheid society, by instilling in people the belief in the existence of two categories of human being--or better, a belief that some are not human at all. It literally constructs the image of people who cannot be rescued or rehabilitated and consequently who have lost all rights, since their humanity is gone (if they ever possessed it). The most important power of any capitalist political project is its ability to create divisions and hierarchies within the working class. The problem for capital is equality among workers, which might produce unity against their exploiters. This was a wisdom learned early on by capitalists in the Americas who, though tempted to treat all "servants" as not-fully-human robots, realized that they had to differentiate "servants" into a wide variety of types (especially racial and sexual) to keep them from forming insurrectional associations (as in Bacon's rebellion) [12]
The death penalty has been an active force of division and not a passive reflection of popular views on justice. It has created the bogus sense of the animalistic and/or demonic enemies within, who by the simple fact that they inhabit death row, become in the popular imagination objects of ultimate blame and legitimate extirpation. It therefore exonerates capital and the state from responsibility for the most devastating of crimes (e.g., environmental hazards and workplace accidents) and for the social conditions that stimulate crimes committed by proletarians [13]
Third, the death penalty is a crucial pillar of mass incarceration and the attendant use of prison labor for the state's consumption or private profit. The large-scale use of slave-like forms of labor in the prisons inevitably leads to resistance, and the sanctioning of the death penalty makes it possible to punish prisoners in rebellion, as in Attica in 1971. For the administrators of the plantation prison economy, it is only logical to assume that in the final analysis the only control they can impose on long-term prisoners is the ultimate penalty: death.
How to Account for Europe?
At the moment when U.S. prisons are bursting and are the sites of multiple executions, not only has the death penalty been eliminated in all of Europe, but the EU is conducting an international campaign against capital punishment, as it has made the abolition of the death penalty a condition for membership. Wishing to join the EU, twenty former socialist nations have, in varying degrees, abolished the death penalty during the last decade, so the balance between executionist and abolitionist nations has dramatically changed in favor of the latter. The EU has also modified its extradition laws, now refusing to extradite convicts to the U.S. when the charges against them carry the death penalty. Why has globalization not triggered a return to the use of the death penalty here? Is Europe a counterexample to our theory?
To answer these questions, it is important to note the different histories of Europe and the U.S. with regard to slavery, and the difference in the balance of power between citizen-workers and the state. While the United States maintained an apartheid regime into the 1960s and, after the hiatus of the 1972-1976 period, reconstructed it, in Europe the defeat of fascism in the 1940s has worked so far as a protection against the return to enslavement and executions, even in the presence of the globalization of the labor market
Even today, the connection between Nazism, slavery, and the death penalty is deeply engraved in the consciousness of the older generations of Europeans. No recent regime has ever used capital punishment as systematically as the Nazis did as a means of internal and external colonization. Roughly twelve thousand juridically sanctioned executions took place in Germany between 1933 and 1944, adding to the extermination of perhaps more than ten million Jews, communists, homosexuals, prisoners of war, and the mass murder of civilian and military captives in the battlefield.
It was in reaction to the defeat of Nazism, that Western European countries became abolitionist after the Second World War, the lead was taken by Italy and West Germany, the two countries where the state had most dramatically lost any legitimacy as arbiter of the citizens' life or death.
A further factor in Western European post-war abolitionism was the spread of socialist and communist politics both internally and on their borders which caused the West European governments to redefine themselves as defenders of human rights, and even uphold their condemnation of capital punishment as an indictment of totalitarianism.
There are other factors, however, to be considered to understand why the pace of abolitionism has quickened in Europe in the era of globalization. Workers are stronger in Europe, and, to gain popular assent, the powers that be have had to promise their citizens membership in a higher polity, ensuring a more prosperous and secure future and more respect for human rights, compensating for the loss of national sovereignty and for lessened representation.
In this sense, the softer penal regime adopted by the EU for its citizen members is the juridical complement of a what purports to be a different, neoliberal model of globalization, as expressed by the 1989 European Community (EC) Charter of Fundamental Social Rights:
Each worker has the right to adequate social protection and, irrespective of his status and the size of his enterprise, to be entitled to an adequate level of social security benefits. Those unable to enter of re-enter the labor market and without means of subsistence are to receive sufficient resources and social assistance in keeping with their particular situation.
Other provisions included the right to an annual leave, to freedom of movement in the European Community (later the EU), the right to strike, equal treatment for women, and the right to know the hazards of the workplace.
In reality, many of these rights are purely print on paper. In the 1990s under the pressure of the internationalization of capital and competition, work conditions and the conditions of representation have deteriorated--leading to an increase in unemployment, especially among youth, precarious jobs, and a weakening of collective bargaining rights. Still, most countries of the EU have held back, in different degrees, from embracing the type of social Darwinism (survival of the fittest) that characterizes economic politics in the United States. Citizen workers in Europe are making demands (such as retirement at fifty-five, and the thirty-five hour work week) that would be inconceivable in the United States.
This more humane "social deal" (including the abolition of the death penalty) has more to do with the strength of the EU workers than with the humanitarian disposition of EU political class. It is also true that the cost has been the imposition of severe restrictions on legal immigration, which is now practically non-existent. The other face of the increased guarantees for its citizens has been the development of "Fortress Europe," which has involved not only the strengthening of control at the external borders of the EU, but the introduction of draconian anti-immigrant legislation including deportation without notice, the creation of detention centers for those entering illegally, and the imposition of severe restrictions on access to citizenship. These measures have not stopped immigration, but they have produced a situation of mass illegality and created a two-tiered society characterized by the presence of a large, growing population of the excluded, which is bound to tear many European countries apart, t hough it is convenient for employers who can thus impose differentiated economic treatment on their workers.
Already the criminalization of immigrants has made the latter vulnerable to physical attacks by right-wing groups that, especially in Germany (but not exclusively), have escalated in the 1990s and usually gone unpunished. Meanwhile, in Italy the Coast Guard has the right to push back approaching immigrant boats into the open sea even though this has already resulted in many deaths.
This situation can only deteriorate, since the economic and often military devastation of vast regions of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, arising from imperialism in its new "globalizing" clothes, has created a situation whereby millions of workers are now pressing at the doorstep of Europe, refusing to accept the starvation deals that the EU, the U.S., the IMF and the World Bank have forced or seduced their governments to accept. Not only are people from North and West Africa--Malians, Senegalese, Nigerians, Magrebians--coming, but also Kurds, Yugoslavians, Russians, Albanians, and Chinese.
Inevitably this situation will produce more tensions, since the refusal of legal entry creates a situation of clandestinity that can be easily manipulated by politicians and the media (as in the United States) to feed the image of aliens coming to take scarce resources. It encourages xenophobic fears, producing more tensions that might eventually affect the rights of EU citizens themselves and bring the return of the death penalty. It is a worrisome sign of what may lay ahead that some European politicians have welcomed U.S. police officials who are touring Europe selling their zero tolerance--mass incarceration--executionist penal and policing policies to their counterparts.
Conclusion
Abolitionists who look to Europe as being more "civilized" than the United States miss the point. In reality, the death penalty could return with the continuation of the climate of social tension generated by current immigration policies and a widening of the gap between citizens and immigrants. These reversals have occurred before in European history. In Italy, fascism serves as a precedent. Mussolini brought back the death penalty after it had been abolished in 1889, following a skillful campaign designed to increase a sense of panic among the people. Will the Italians and other Europeans be able to oppose similar attempts in the present neoliberal climate?
One result of the international perspective presented here on the connection between globalization and the death penalty is that those organizing around human rights, especially the abolition of the death penalty, in the United States, Europe or the Third World must join with the anti-globalization movement. For as long as social-economic life is characterized by a universal competition and workers accept the triage mentality whereby not everyone can come on board," the door to a repeat of thanatocracy, in its traditional or contemporary U.S. mode, is wide open.
Silvia Federici teaches political philosophy and international studies at Hofstra University in Hempstead, New York. She is the editor, with Joseph McLaren and Cheryl B. Mwaria, of African Visions: Literary Images, Political Change, and Social Straggle in Contemporary Africa (Greenwood Puhlishing, 2000).
George Caffentzis teaches philosophy at the University of Southern Maine. He is a member of the Midnight Notes Collective, and was co-editor, with the Collective, of Auroras of the Zapatistas: Local and Global Struggles in the Fourth World War (Autonomedia, 2001). With Silvia Federici and Alidou Ousseina he is co-author of A Thousand Flowers: Social Straggles Against Structural Adjustment in Africa Universities (Africa World Press, 2000).
Both were members of the Radical Philosophy Association's Anti-Death Penalty Project from 1995 to 2000, and are coordinators of the Committee for Academic Freedom in Africa.
Notes
(1.) John M. Sloop, The Cultural Prison (Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1996); and Jeffrey Reiman, The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison (New York: Macmillan, 1990).
(2.) Elliot Currie, Crime and Punishment in America (New York: Henry Holt, 1998).
(3.) See Julius O. Ihonvbere, Nigeria: The Politics of Adjustment and Democracy (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994) and Tom Forrest, Politics and Economic Development in Nigeria (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995).
(4.) Committee for the Defense of Human Rights, Newsletter 6, (September 1995), 1-2.
(5.) Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1979).
(6.) Roger Hood, The Death Penalty: A World-Wide Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 35-41.
(7.) George Caffentzis, "After Such Knowledge What Forgiveness?: Foucault, Racism, and the Death Penalty," in Steve Martinot, Radical Philosophy Today, vol. 2: The Problems of Resistance (Amherst, NY: Humanities Books, 2001).
(8.) David Oshinsky, Worse than Slavery (New York: The Free Press, 1996).
(9.) Lee Bernstein, "Capital Punishment and the Limits of American Citizenship," in Joy James, States of Confinement (New York: St. Martins Press, 2000), 16; U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States 2000, Table N, 374.
(10.) Christian Parenti, Lockdown America: Police and Prisons in the Age of Crisis (New York: Versa, 1999).
(11.) William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995).
(12.) Theodore Allen, The Invention of the White Race, vol. I (London: Verso, 1994).
(13.) Reiman, op. cit.
(14.) J.T. Addison and W.S. Siebert, "The Social Charter of the European Community: Evolution and Controversies," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 44, No. 4 (1991), 597-626.
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