Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security

Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security, ed. by Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001. 545pp. $28.95 (paper).

Is there a "civil-military gap," and if so, does it matter? Soldiers and Civilians attempts to answer both questions, with mixed success. Unfortunately, political agendas occasionally intrude, sometimes damaging the credibility of the arguments. The data employed in the survey, performed by the Triangle Institute for Strategic Studies and entitled "Survey on the Military in the Post Cold-War Era," were thoroughly analyzed but not always from the most advantageous perspective. The survey was based upon a questionnaire (which appears as a Technical Appendix) submitted to senior and middle grade officers as well as certain segments of the civilian population. It is unfortunate that it was not also submitted to senior enlisted personnel, the "backbone" of the armed forces, for their perspective might very well differ from that of the officers. Various elements of the civilian population were also interviewed for comparison with the views and opinions of the officer groups. Because of timing it would not have been practical to compare the results of the military survey with the responses of populations in the red and blue counties illustrated in the famous (some would say infamous) 2000 election map. Given the deep divisions in American society today, one suspects that the attitudes of military personnel would strongly correlate with the civilian populations of the "red counties" and the conclusions may have been quite different. Some evidence scattered through the text tends to support this conjecture in that the officer corps appears to be recruited mainly from the red counties. If it does stand up, it would account in part for the "Republicanization" of the officers (and enlisted personnel as well).

Some of the authors attribute the gap to the "Republicanization" of the armed forces, especially the "Republicanization" of the South. Is this a reasonable explanation or is something else at work? Reference to the nature of "self-ordering systems" may provide an answer. Any social system with strong "feedback," government, business, volunteer or otherwise, will spontaneously organize to advance its perceived interests. Following the Vietnam War the Democratic Party has, with a few notable exceptions, done little to advance the welfare of service personnel. Hence, to the extent that they voted, they did so out of a sense of self-protection as well as concern with the national defense. Former President Jimmy Carter is a case in point. Despite his naval education and training, he was noted in the services for his (possibly apocryphal but widely accepted in the services) statement that "pay was not a problem when I was in the Navy and I don't see why it is now." It is a pity that the self-ordering mechanism, well understood in physical systems, is ignored in the social science realm especially since its recognition goes back as far as the Scottish Enlightenment.

Some of the suggestions to close the gap are downright bizarre. In the concluding chapter, the editors propose that some middle grade to senior officers be acquired directly from civilian life ("lateral" acquisition). While such was very occasionally done during World War II for specific civilian skills that were needed in the armed services, can one imagine today bringing in a university professor as commanding officer of an Aegis destroyer, or a Marine or airborne battalion? It boggles the mind. Another proposal would abolish the service academies (and possibly ROTC) as presently operated and train all officers at the post-graduate level for no other purpose than to close the gap. That they would even attract the type of people they have in mind is extremely doubtful because of "self-selection." Moreover, if one is simply fearful that regular service officers are out of touch with society in general, the reserves and National Guard provide an excellent connection. Indeed, the "total force" concept, if not abused, provides a nearly seamless connection between the armed forces and the civilian world, not only the reservists and their families, but employers and friends.

Despite these criticisms, the book does have its strengths. The next to last chapter entitled "The Unequal Dialogue: The Theory and Reality of CivilMilitary Relations and the Use of Force" by Eliot A. Cohen is almost worth the price of the book. The author does two things of great value: he takes the reader on a tour of the military-civilian relations of Lincoln with his generals in the American Civil War, of Clemenceau with his marshals and generals in World War I, and Churchill with his generals and admirals in World War II. Through these examples, Cohen demonstrates that a civilian leader who works hard at overseeing and dealing with his military subordinates, even in the absence of appreciable military experience, can have a powerful influence on the course of events in war. In this vein Cohen disagrees strongly with Samuel P. Huntington about the argument that actual operations should be left to the military chiefs while the civilian politicians concentrate on general strategy and war aims. Actually, in today's high technology environment one can argue that Cohen is only partly right in his assessment that since wars are rare, military officers do not know much more of value than civilians. Still, this is nitpicking in a generally masterful presentation of civil-military relations.

James Burk's chapter on the history of civil-military relations from 1950 to 2000 provides a generally excellent account of the topic except that he misses the famous "revolt of the admirals." The revolt arose from conflict about the role and mission of naval aviation in future wars at the beginning of the second Truman administration. Although the revolt occurred in 1949, a year before the beginning of his time frame, it is so instructive as a major example of civilianmilitary leadership friction that it is a pity he ignored it.

Although one could go on criticizing or praising various elements of the study, the foregoing is sufficient to give the substantial flavor of the book. Because of the limitations cited, it is this reviewer's opinion that the subject should be revisited in the not-distant future. Still, the conclusion that a gap, at least a minor one, exists seems to be correct. Those elements of our society that object to the gap may have to accept it as the price of an effective national defense.

Reviewed by Robert C. Whitten

Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)

Immediate past book review editor of JPMS

Copyright Dr. George Kourvetaris Summer 2003
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