Telecommunications, Mass Media and Democracy: The Battle for the Control of U.S. Broadcasting. - book reviews

Robert McChesney's book is an extensive history of the struggle over broadcasting policy and control of the airwaves in the formative years of the radio industry and the subsequent consolidation of commercial broadcasting control, with some final reflections on the implications of this history for today. The book is rich in details on the Radio Act of 1927 and the workings of the Federal Radio Commission (FRC), which implemented its vague mandate, the interest groups struggling for a place in the broadcasting scene, and the lobbying efforts of the industry and defensive struggles of the oppositional non-commercial broadcasters and their supporters.

This is a saga of struggle. One of McChesney's main themes is that it is a fallacy to think that commercial broadcasting was established and consolidated in the early and mid-1920s, or even at the time of the passage of the Radio Act of 1927. McChesney points out that in 1929, NBC still "presented itself as a public service corporation that would only sell the amount of advertising necessary to subsidize first-rate noncommercial programming." The battle for control of broadcasting was won by the commercial broadcasters in a secret, unlegislated, virtual coup d'etat by the supremely friendly regulators of the FRC working in cahoots with the commercial interests and their affiliated "experts," and with the help of key legislators. A "revolving door" between regulators, industry, and experts was quickly put in place. The FRC, using its huge discretionary power, by fiat, and without public knowledge, debate, or legislative authorization or oversight, gradually reallocated spectrum rights from non-profits to commercial broadcasters.

McChesney notes the hypocritical shift in the industry position on the virtues of regulation between the years before and after the passage of the Communication Act of 1934. In the earlier years they had no complaints about the detailed and intrusive regulation by the FRC, which wa actively serving them. But from 1935, when their power was assured, they began to speak out against regulation as un-American and a menace to "free speech."

This historical analysis is the basis for a second McChesney theme, namely, the fraudulence of the claim that commerical broadcasting was freely chosen by the populace and is in that sense "natural." The public not only never participated in this choice, they weren't even informed that it was being made and that non-commercial broadcasters were being eliminated or marginalized. The debate surrounding the 1934 act was superficial, unpublicized, and both the debate and the act essentially ratified the coup d'etat. Many individuals who were aware of what was going on protested vigorously, but had a hard time getting their message heard.

During the years of the coup, the FRC had squeezed out non-commercial broadcasters on the grounds that they represented "propaganda," in contrast to the commercial broadcasters, who strove for large audiences by offering whatever fare would please them, in "democratic" fashion. The FRC designated the latter "general public service" stations. As McChesney points out, the implication was that advertising was "the only legitimate form of financial support for the broadcaster, as by definition any other form of support had propaganda strings attached." That advertisers had to be satisfied and were "special interests" never struck the FRC, nor did the fact that station owners and managers constituted a special interest group with an axe to grind that was likely to affect station offerings. As McChesney stresses, the FRC's extraordinarily biased perspective coincided with that of the commercial broadcasters and was important in providing an intellectual rationale for the commercial broadcasters' seizure of control.

Another major McChesney theme is that the triumph of commercial broadcasting did not happen without a major struggle, and much of the book is devoted to describing the contending forces and their successes and failures. Educational, religious, and other non-profit stations had occupied an important part of the broadcasting spectrum through 1926, and as they were rapidly being expelled and forced into expensive hearings and litigation to protect their rights by the FRC, many of them fought back. The Payne Fund bankrolled an important oppositional effort, and a loose coalition of educators, intellectuals, civic groups, and church and union representatives fought strenuously to preserve a place for non-profits in the allocation of air channels. They coalesced into a loose reform movement that did battle with the industry and the FRC.

The heroes of the battle included Edward Nockels, a Chicago trade unionist who organized and ran a labor affiliated station, Father John B. Harney, a Catholic priest in New York City who led the missionary Paulist Fathers, and organized a Catholic radio station in 1924, and Gross W. Alexander, head of the Pacific-Western Broadcasting Federation, a university-based group organized in 1928 to provide "disinterested cultural programming" and a "genuine university radio." Nockels was unique among the oppositional leaders in recognizing that the non-commercial stations had to include entertainment and other light fare as well as intellectual material; the others adhered to a more narrowly elitist and less politically astute perspective, which weakened their appeal. He was also a powerful critic of the ongoing coup, regularly calling congressional attention to the fact that "Never in our history has there been such a bold and brazen attempt to seize control of the means of communication and to dominate public opinion as is now going on in the field of radio broadcasting." The FRC's mistreatment of Father Harney's station in favor of commercial rivals drove him to the reform movement in self protection, but he also sought a better system of broadcasting. Gross Alexander's plan came to grief, not from FRC discrimination, but rather because he was unable to get funding for his proposed 50,000-watt station, which was opposed by the commercial broadcasters and their business (and foundation) allies.

The villains in the piece, exclusive of the industry spokespersons, legislators, and members of the FRC, included, importantly, William Green and the other top leaders of the AFL, who gave Nockels no support and, with remarkable political naivete, felt no need to assure a labor voice in broadcasting. In 1928, the AFL expressed a touching faith in the FRC's efforts (which were systematically undermining non-profit radio), and in 1933 they gave a ringing endorsement to advertising and to the "American system of broadcasting." The Communist Party failed to see the struggle over control of broadcasting as important, and Norman Thomas and the socialists did not battle hard on this issue. In the years before the passage of the 1934 act, some leaders of the ACLU argued for the preservation of spectrum space for non-commercial interests, but the organization appointed a Radio Committee that included outsiders who brought "expertise" plus support for the commercially dominated status quo, and succeeded in effectively removing the ACLU from the reform movement. After the battle was lost, the ACLU increasingly sided with the commercial broadcasters against further regulation on grounds of encroachment on broadcasters' free speech. The broadcaster/advertiser constraints on free speech did not strike the ACLU as comparably worrisome. This form of liberal bias and naivete was important in weakening the forces supporting non-commercial broadcasting both before and after the Act of 1934.

The struggle was lost, McChesney contends, partly because the commercial broadcasters had achieved considerable economic and political power by 1934. The forces in opposition were, weakened by the depression and the struggle with the FRC, divided, politically inept, and some of them co-opted by gifts and promises from the commercial interests. The newspapers mainly lined up with the commercial broadcasters and kept a tight lid on debate, either because of economic links or persuasion that any government regulation of broadcasters would threaten the newspapers as well. McChesney stresses the important fact that the opposition lacked an alternative model and vision to counter the commercial broadcasters' claim (accepted by the FRC) that they alone were financially independent and self-supporting and "democratically" responded solely to the demands of listener audiences. The opposition gave strong arguments that commercial interests dominating radio would have damaging effects, but their arguments were complex and their policy recommendations were weak and vulnerable. They would leave the commercial interests dominant but reserve some broadcast space for non-profits. This meant reliance on government intervention that might possibly require subsidies for non-commercial broadcasters. In a business culture their case was not convincing and was never given a fair hearing. The reform movement put its best effort behind a proposed Wagner-Hatfield amendment to reserve 25 percent of air space for non-commercial interests. The defeat of this amendment marked the final triumph of commercial broadcasting interests and the last time they would be subject to a serious structural challenge. A rapid ideological and institutional consolidation of commercial broadcaster power followed, and the opposition movement rapidly passed into oblivion.

Following the coup and passage of the 1934 act, the commercial broadcasters sought to eliminate any regulatory control over their programming. They were not entirely successful in this, but nearly so. The Fairness Doctrine and general regulatory system were put in place, but did little to interfere with broadcaster rights, while preserving the image of genuine public control. The growth of advertising as the underpinning of broadcasting was rapid. Both the industry and the FRC had acknowledged from the earliest years that there was a conflict between advertising and non-entertainment programming, and the industry promised faithfully in 1934 that it would provide for all the necessary public service programming--educational, children's, religious, public affairs--out of its own pocket. This promise and the importance of "public service" programming were reiterated by the FRC in its 1946 document "The Public Service Responsibilities of Broadcast Licensees." But as the industry matured and advertising increased to the point where all hours could be funded by this means, "public service" programming shriveled, without debate or opposition from the FRC. The new industry rationale was that "public service" meant giving the public what it wanted, which coincided both with what they got and what the advertisers and bottom line pressures demanded.

McChesney argues that it is a mistake to claim that the triumph of commercial broadcasting was "inevitable." This is debatable and ultimately a matter of judgment and semantics. It is true that there was an opposition to the commercial broadcasting takeover that has possibly been underrated, and which McChesney has clearly brought to light. But the opposition was defeated quite decisively by commercial forces that gathered strength with remarkable speed from 1927 to 1934. This, combined with the lack of support from organized labor and the left, the lack of oppositional unity, and the ease with which elements were bought off, and the absence of any philosophic underpinning, all of which McChesney records in detail, make it clear that what happened was not a matter of chance and that the forces involved were virtually unstoppable in the economic and political environment of the time. The lesson McChesney intends may be that fighting the good battle is worth the effort, but the history he records and the ignominious end depress as well as exhilarate. Furthermore, as McChesney recounts, the consolidation of power that followed has taken the question of changing the structure of broadcasting out of the realm of practical politics altogether. Structural change is taking place right now, but it is further strengthening commercial broadcasting on a global basis, as public ownership and regulation of broadcasting erode in the surge of neo-liberal rule.

McChesney's further lessons are unassailable. One is that scholars committed to democracy "must relentlessly debunk the myths that provide a buttress for the existing media and social structure." This book is a valuable contribution to that end. At a broader level, he argues that real change must come from below, not from top-down struggles, no matter how valiant and well-intentioned.

If no other lesson emerges from the early 1930s, then let it be that any viable campaign to reconstruct the media system must be part of a broad-based mass movement that is attempting to reform the basic institutions of American society. Left as the province of elites, any effort at media reform will quickly be washed up on the same shores that received the broadcast reformers of the early 1930s.... When U.S. political culture begins to address fundamental issues of power, much as politics should do by definition, questions regarding the media will and must be where they belong: on the agenda.

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