Terrorism: Central threat or diversion?

On the anniversary of the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, President George W. Bush said, "We will not allow any terrorist or tyrant to threaten civilization with weapons of mass murder." He thus restated the same duality of aims that he touched on in his address to a joint session of Congress right after the attacks. There was the recognition from the start that the real threat to America came not just from small gangs of freelance criminals, but from foreign regimes that might employ a variety of strategies-from supporting terrorists to developing weapons of mass destruction, against U.S. security interests.

The American people have, quite naturally, been most sensitive to terrorist threats at home. The most important thing to remember about terrorism, however, is that it is the weapon of the weak. Though the casualty count from September 11 is often compared to that of the Pearl Harbor attack, there was no surge of enemy conquests across vast areas of the world like those the Japanese launched on December 7. Al Qaeda was not a major power with the resources needed to upset the balance of power in the world.

However, Osama bin Laden did have a long-term plan to gain additional resources. He would drive a decadent, casualty-averse United States out of the Middle East. Then he could overthrow those Muslim states which had cooperated with Washington. His focus was on the seizure of territory and the establishment of regimes that could mobilize the much greater resources available to nation-states for the conduct of war. His objective was not to conquer New York, but his native Saudi Arabia from which he hoped to rule the Arab world.

This kind of strategic thinking should also be the primary concern of American policy. The United States must make sure its resources do not fall short of its needs when confronting menaces that do threaten the balance of power or the security of entire regions.

The war on terrorism when seen from a broader perspective is not a new mission requiring a fundamental shift of units, weapons and deployments from what the Army was doing before September 11. Indeed, if in response to domestic terror attacks the Army (and other services) were to withdraw from their overseas orientation to become entangled in homeland security, or give up its high-end capabilities in armor and artillery to become merely light global SWAT teams, it would further the strategic aims of the terrorists. American forces must not be diverted from their primary mission of waging decisive warfare against other nation-states.

Military units, with the exception of air defense and border/Coast Guard duties, are ill-suited for the homeland security mission, which depends on intelligence and police work, not combat. If there is a need to expand domestic security personnel to conduct wider investigations or protect possible targets, then the appropriate federal, state and local agencies should recruit and train people for these duties. They should not look to the reassignment of military personnel away from the combat missions for which they are prepared, and for which they are needed.

Terrorism has its origins in unstable conditions overseas and in the ambitions of those who want to exploit that instability for their own ends. U.S. strategy has sought to remain militarily engaged overseas in order to shape world events in ways that minimize threats to American interests. When President Bush first came into office, there was a desire to cut back on this kind of engagement because of its cost and the strain it was putting on a military force structure which had been cut by over a third since the 1991 Gulf War. The September 11 terror attacks brought home to the Bush administration the need to stay engaged on a global basis.

Engagement is political in nature; that is, it is meant to persuade and deter. Forces on the ground, interacting with local governments, conducting joint training, executing humanitarian or other small-scale operations and being visible as a sign of commitment are the most effective military supports for this kind of diplomacy. That is why prior to September 11, the Army had 150,000 forward-deployed soldiers, providing over 60 percent of America's forces assigned to the theater combatant commanders.

The United States also needs to expand its overseas basing of troops to speed their deployment, facilitate coalition building and strengthen deterrence. The prepositioning of heavy equipment needs to be increased so that American troops can react more quickly to crises without sacrificing their combat power. Forward deployment gives the United States more leverage to influence regional governments and assure local allies.

The principal role of the U.S. military is to maintain a favorable balance of power in key regions of the world and to be prepared to fight major wars to prevent those balances from being shifted against American interests and allies. Foreign policy depends on the credibility of the United States to fight and win wars at the highest level of threat.

According to the legendary Confederate raider Col. John Mosby, "The military value of a partisan's work is not measured by the amount of property destroyed or the number of men killed or captured, but by the number he keeps watching." Partisan warfare is an order of magnitude above terrorism, which is at the lowest rung of the conflict ladder. Terrorism is an asymmetrical tactic born of frustration with America's overall superiority in the military balance of power, but it cannot change that balance. Only the United States can change the balance by overreacting to the threat of terrorism and shifting so many forces to "watching" that it loses the ability to act decisively against larger dangers.

Every terrorist group, rogue state and would-be peer rival understands this, and thus hopes that Washington will become so consumed with force protection and antiterrorist measures at the low end of the conflict spectrum that it will neglect to maintain its strength where the stakes are higher. If Americans can understand the weakness of terrorism, then they can weather its psychological impact and thus deny any gain to those who launch such attacks.

Unfortunately, there continue to be reports and rumors that in order to pay for the war on terror and continue transformation at the same time, more cuts in Army force levels are being planned. A pattern is emerging that downgrades ground forces just when the world-wide geopolitical situation indicates an increasing need for more boots on the ground to control events.

To meet expanding mission requirements in the post-September 11 world, the Army needs to increase its active force structure and probably its total force structure, not reduce it. The Army was already stretched by its operational tempo before September 11. For example, when the terrorists attacked, the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) was already planning for deployments to Kosovo and Egypt. Soon it had elements in five additional nations, including Afghanistan. While the United States was slow to commit regular troops to Afghanistan, a brigade from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) was also finally deployed.

The war on terrorism has also put a strain on special operations units and combat support units (transportation, public affairs, military police, quartermaster and engineers) even though the demands from these operations are well below what would be required to wage decisive warfare against a regional power like Iraq.

The real danger is not ad hoc "private" groups, but state-sponsored terrorism, which can be directed to advance the ambitions of regional powers. If these regional powers also develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD), then the geopolitical landscape changes dramatically for the worse. The threat posed by Iraq is more typical of the kind of challenge the United States will face in the future than is terrorism.

When President Bush articulated a policy of preemptive action in his address to the 2002 graduates of West Point, he was moving beyond the nonproliferation of WMD to counterproliferation, and putting this priority at the top of his list. He declared, "The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology ... the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology." The President told the newly minted ground force officers, "We will send you, our soldiers, where you're needed. All nations that decide for aggression and terror will pay a price."

Counterproliferation includes a spectrum of military capabilities, from missile defense to disarming attacks. The most effective method, however, is regime change, which the Bush Administration has said is the objective in Iraq. As former Secretary of State James K. Baker argued in a Washington Post column August 25, "The only realistic way to effect regime change in Iraq is through the application of military force, including sufficient ground troops to occupy the country (including Baghdad), depose the current leadership and install a successor government." The postwar operations will also require heavy engagement of Army forces for an unknown period of time.

Meanwhile, the Army will have to maintain enough strength to carry out its other duties around the world as it musters the forces needed for a possible campaign in Iraq. Current budget plans do not seem to make such a robust force structure possible. Defense budgets running between 3.0 and 3.5 percent of gross domestic product represent the lowest commitment of the country's resources to national security since 1940. In such a constrained fiscal setting, the Army risks being pulled in too many directions, with a diminished capacity to operate in a decisive manner on any front.

With the exception of President Ronald Reagan, who managed to simultaneously expand and modernize the Army, there has been a disturbing trend among Republican administrations to downsize ground forces in favor of airpower and various hightech silver bullets ever since the Korean War. Yet, as Lt. Gen. John M. Riggs, Director of the Objective Force Task Force, told the House Armed Services Committee last April, "If our purpose as a nation is merely to punish our adversary, we can do that with munitions. But, if our purposes are to avoid war and to fight and win wars when necessary, it will take soldiers on the ground to provide the human dimension necessary for final resolution."

When the United States sent troops into Afghanistan, President Bush said that more than just pounding sand was needed to get at the roots of terrorism. He has taken the same stand with his calls for a regime change in Iraq. It would be a great misfortune if the President's forward looking strategy failed because his administration could not shake old force planning prejudices. 0

WILLIAM R. HAWKINS is the senior fellow for National Security Studies at the U.S. Business and Industry Council in Washington, D.C.

Copyright Association of the United States Army Dec 2002
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