Fiasco Offers Valuable Lessons For Leaders Facing Adversity

Norway 1940: The Forgotten Fiasco.

Joseph Kynoch. Airlife Publishing Ltd., England. Order through Stackpole Books, (800) 732-3669. 174 pages-photographs; maps; index; $26.95.

By Lt. Gen. Richard G. Trefry

U.S. Army retired

Too few people are still around who would recall the month of April 1940. On April 9, 1940, the Germans invaded Denmark and Norway. The Allies, principally Great Britain, responded by dispatching a force to Norway that was purported to be capable of thwarting this German aggression. Historians will remember that Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, in the well of the House of Commons, made the infamous statement to an assembled House that by taking this action, "Hitler had missed the bus." The fact remains that the Allied response was a fiasco, and by the end of June the Germans were in control of Norway from the North Cape to the North Sea.

This small book describes the adventures of a private in the 1st of the 5th Battalion of the Leicestershire Regiment from the time of his call-up to the end of the Norwegian campaign.

The 148th Brigade went through several fits and starts of loading in Scotland to deploy to Norway. Reading of this period of adventure, one cannot help but be amazed at the lack of professional competence and discipline by higher staffs in subjecting soldiers to such routines. There are some lessons here which it would be well for all of those involved in activating reserve units for deployment today to learn.

After the troops finally sailed, they were separated from their equipment, which went by another ship that was torpedoed off the coast of Norway. As a result, the force landed with no motor transport and very little of their other ancillary equipment.

This book covers the period from approximately April 22 through May 6. It graphically portrays what happens when an ill-equipped, ill-trained force with the best of intentions confronts a well-armed, superbly trained force that was aided and abetted by a native population that was surprisingly hostile to the Allies despite the fact that the Norwegian forces, which were primarily militia, were pro British. Unfortunately they had neither the equipment nor the numbers to withstand the German onslaught.

The fighting in this book generally took place between April 20 and May 3, and it portrays what an ill-equipped, underrated force can do against terrible odds with professional leadership at the NCO and company levels. The experiences of the British army under air attack are particularly instructive when one considers that it is doubtful that a single soldier in the U.S. Army today has experienced a hostile air attack during his/her lifetime. We have been truly lucky to have missed such an onslaught. Yet it is surprising that the British army, basically at the squad and platoon level, considering their lack of equipment and adequate intelligence of the hostile forces, was able to delay this vastly superior force for 10 days. There are many lessons that could be applied in our school system, from battalion on down, concerning a delaying action in the face of a vastly superior enemy. The U.S. Army should never be put in such a position, but if it is, we could do worse than emulate the discipline and the competence of these poor British infantrymen who did so much with so little.

At the completion of this debacle, some of the force escaped by ship and returned to Scotland in early May, but the book also points out that more than 100 British soldiers traversed the mountains of Norway to reach the Swedish border successfully. Upon their arrival in Sweden, they were interred, but within a relatively short time, they were returned to England. One of the tantalizing questions that is never answered is how these British soldiers executed this escape. It is all the more noteworthy when you read that few of the soldiers had ever been on skis and were confronted by German Alpine troops. Perhaps it proves the adage that one learns fast in the face of adversity. It would be interesting to read how this evacuation was conducted.

In an age where we have been brought up to believe that the good guys always win and the hostiles are easily defeated, this book provides fresh food for thought when the tables are turned. From an individual standpoint, the book also demonstrates how small unit leadership with an implacable will that will not tolerate defeat is able to make such a heroic effort in the face of such awesome adversity. The subtitle for the book, "The Forgotten Fiasco," cannot be topped.

LT. GEN. RICHARD G. TREFRY, USA Ret., served as Army Inspector General from 1978 to 1983. He is a senior fellow of AUSA's Institute of Land Warfare.

Copyright Association of the United States Army Jun 2003
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