Thoughts on the Future Force: A Review

Thoughts on the Future Force: A Review

For the last several years the U.S. Army has attempted to transform itself into the force best suited for the 21st century while at the same time taking an active role in the global war on terrorism. In 1999 Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric K. Shinseki opined that our Cold War-vintage heavy divisions were too heavy to get anywhere fast enough and our light divisions too light to handle a lethal, capable adversary. Since then Army transformation efforts have pursued a strategically mobile, tactically agile, and incredibly lethal joint force, with the newly deployed Stryker brigades offering a glimpse of what is now possible. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and the intense media coverage they generated have understandably diverted attention from other topics, but useful discussion of defense transformation has continued nevertheless.

In 2003 at least five writers brought out books on the subject: Col. Douglas A. Macgregor with Transformation under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights (Praeger Publishers, $34.95); Maj. Gen. (retired) Robert H. Scales Jr. with Yellow Smoke: The Future of Land Warfare for America's Military (Rowman and Littlefield, $34.95); Bruce Berkowitz with The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century (Free Press, $26); Norman Friedman with Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War (Naval Institute Press, $33.95); and Gen. (retired) Wesley K. Clark with Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire (Public Affairs, $25). Let us briefly examine what each of these authors has said and how well, the extent to which a valid use of history reinforced their arguments, and the degree to which the Army seems mindful of their views in its pursuit of transformation.

Building upon his widely read Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century (Westport, Conn., 1997), Macgregor's Transformation under Fire makes a readable and understandable case for specific reforms. Macgregor articulates his chosen six early on: reorganize the Army from its divisional structure into combat groups; adopt a rotational readiness posture; streamline Army command and control; make U.S. Joint Forces Command the executive agent for all matters pertaining to interoperability; create a new personnel system to support a reorganized, information-age Army; and focus on sustained joint experimentation. In subsequent chapters he makes the case for and explains each of these, arguing that the time for change is now. Although mindful of the promise of further technological advance, Macgregor sees the Army's ills as essentially organizational and argues that the technology necessary for a nimbler, more capable Army is already available. He does not believe that the battlefield picture will ever be perfect, that the fog of war will be banished, or that the precision strike will obviate maneuver. He does believe that specialized, brigade-size combat groups organized either to maneuver, strike, conduct C^sup 4^ISR or sustain, serving in standing joint task forces with which they would train extensively, would radically improve efficiency and effectiveness beyond the level that the divisions of today can achieve. Emphasis should be upon effects, and resources to achieve them should be tailored accordingly, with habitual organizational relationships taking a back seat to desired results. Macgregor's text is a classic example of telling us what he is going to say, saying it, and telling us what he has said. It is well documented and supported by charts, diagrams, and a glossary.

Robert Scales's Yellow Smoke concurs with much of Macgregor's argument. Indeed, Scales wrote the foreword to Transformation under Fire. Yellow Smoke builds its case differently, however, and reaches some distinct conclusions. Scales draws widely on historical episodes from Korea, Vietnam, Kosovo, and Afghanistan to argue that over time, Americans have evolved a firepower-centered style of war predicated on the notion that limited wars should be won at a limited cost in American lives. As head of the Army's Desert Storm assessment team, leader of its Army After Next project, and commandant of the Army War College, Scales certainly has been in a position to observe the discussion, debate, simulations, and exercises that have shaped that evolution recently. In his text he takes us inside some of the analyses and war games in which he participated. After a broad discussion featuring historical assessment, operational analysis, and personal memoir, Scales pulls together a strong final chapter that posits and persuasively explains 10 goals for the future: increase the speed of operational forces; project and maneuver land forces by brigades; maneuver by air at the operational and tactical levels; establish an "unblinking" eye over the battlefield; proliferate precision weaponry and distribute it downward; adopt an operational maneuver doctrine based on firepower dominance and area control; supplement manned with unmanned reconnaissance; maneuver with all arms at the lowest practical level; establish a "band of brothers" approach to selection, training, and readiness; and move beyond jointness to true interdependence of forces. A short book intended as an easy and interesting read, Yellow Smoke is thinly footnoted and lacks charts, diagrams, and maps.

Bruce Berkowitz's The New Face of War takes a decidedly different tack. While Macgregor and Scales acknowledge the information revolution as one of several developments affecting the future of our Army, Berkowitz states unequivocally that the information revolution has fundamentally changed the nature of combat. To win wars today, he asserts, one must win the information war first. Despite his title, Berkowitz focuses on this imperative to the exclusion of all others. In a series of brief chapters heavily laced with engaging anecdotes he traces the evolution of information warfare through time. A persistent theme is the paradigm "deny, deceive, destroy, or exploit." When you have access to an adversary's communications traffic, do you drown it out with signals of your own, send false signals on it, incinerate the source, or monitor it and act on this intelligence without his knowing that you are doing so? Berkowitz makes the case that information dominance has come to be decisive in everything from dogfights between fighter jets to the success or failure of terrorist attacks. Al Qaeda uses computers and the Internet with a facility that would do credit to sophisticated armed forces. In the course of his discussion Berkowitz introduces and explains such contemporary terms as "zapping" (precision strike), "swarming" (nonhierarchical attack-like bees do), "network centric," "platform centric," and "just-in-time." One of his most thoughtful and useful discussions concerns the prospect for an electronic Pearl Harbor. Far from painting a generalized doomsday scenario, he concludes that such an attack would have to be tightly focused and synchronized with larger efforts to succeed. One could not destroy the United States over the Internet, but one might deceive American intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets long enough to make a devastating strike on Taiwan a fait accompli. The New Face of War is adequately footnoted but does not contain charts, graphs, or maps.

Norman Friedman is a widely published strategist and naval historian who spent more than a decade as consultant to the secretary of the Navy. In Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War he studies the September 11 attacks, the evolution and ideology of the al Qaeda terrorist organization that perpetrated them, the regime that provided al Qaeda a base in Afghanistan, the efforts of the United States to coalesce and support the forces that removed that regime, and the dramatic course of the Afghan campaign itself. Friedman then goes on to assess the implications of that campaign on the course of the global war on terrorism and on the nature of future warfare. In his view we are witness to an evolving tactical style that is well on the way to integrating information technology and precision-guided munitions into a network-centric system that will revolutionize the art of war. He does not particularly prescribe further developments along these lines but rather describes changes that in his view are already occurring. As a naval historian he is also able to make significant points about the role naval aviation played in so remote a country and the value added when Marines put their boots on the ground. Friedman acknowledges Operation Iraqi Freedom but does not devote much attention to it. When, in his final chapter, he recenters his discussion on terrorism and the means to combat it, he suggests that Operation Iraqi Freedom may have been more useful as a demonstration of American capability and will power than for any particular effects on al Qaeda per se. In the end Friedman concludes that we can reduce terrorism beneath unacceptable levels of incidence and damage but never eliminate it entirely. Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War is robustly documented with 56 pages of notes and a bibliography and is amply supported by maps and photographs.

Wesley Clark's Winning Modern Wars provides a brief account of the origins and course of Operation Iraqi Freedom and then builds upon that base to propose a way ahead in the global war on terrorism and to comment upon the future of war in general. Written shortly before he decided to run for president, much in the book could be seen as politically motivated. One can also take the book at face value as an effort by a man with an impressive knowledge of the subject to share his wisdom on adapting the American military to the evolving challenges of the new century. Clark addresses the Army's tactical and operational levels but does not have much new to say about transforming them. He seems to believe that transformation at those levels is on track and should be carried forward, especially with respect to the incorporation of information technologies, precision-guided munitions, and other technological advances. Unlike Macgregor and Scales, he is dismissive of the notion of flattening command hierarchies, believing that each echelon demonstrated its unique and valuable contribution during the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom, in which American soldiers and units so overmatched their adversaries. Clark does argue that the campaign's operational plans were flawed, criticizing especially what he sees as the paucity of forces initially committed, insufficient attention paid to lines of communication, and unpreparedness for making a smooth transition to occupation. Clark's strongest criticisms, however, are at the strategic level. He believes the United States should revert to a strategy that prioritizes inclusiveness with respect to allies and friends, uses and strengthens international institutions, and diminishes the role of the armed forces in nonmilitary functions. The things that must be done to transform America's military are already under way, Clark believes, but even a transformed military cannot ultimately succeed in the absence of a viable strategy. Winning Modern Wars is brief, readable, and thinly documented. It has one map but no charts, tables, or photographs.

As historians, the readers of Army History have a more than casual interest in the extent to which these authors use history to reinforce their arguments. Both Friedman and Clark construct credible accounts of their chosen campaigns-Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively-before mining them for insights concerning the way ahead. The recency of the campaigns creates major challenges for them, of course, but both historical accounts are written as sensibly as time and space would allow. Scales and Macgregor range more widely through history in constructing their arguments but adopt a different methodology. Scales comments that he uses history for metaphor rather than analogy, and Macgregor employs much the same approach. Scales maintains a reasonable attention to chronology, but Macgregor jumps around through time to cherry-pick historical episodes that fit his lines of argument. This is an approach prone to drive historians crazy, leading as it can to incompatible comparisons, incomplete accounts, and curious interpretations. Berkowitz does not use history as we would recognize it, but he does sustain the liveliness of his narrative with one anecdote after another. Many of these are documented, all of them, are entertaining, but some seem improbable.

Given two books focused on events too recent to fully absorb, two books exploiting history for metaphor rather than analytic framework, and a book not really relying on history at all, have we lost anything because of the thinness of their historical grounding? I say yes, and cite as examples insufficient attention paid to logistics, span of control, casualty replacement, and interoperability with allies.

All of these books are indexed, yet in none of the indexes do such terms as logistics, lines of communications, maintenance, supply, or combat service support appear. In fairness, most of the authors comment somewhere about logistical issues and Macgregor devotes several pages to an organization he labels the "early deploying support group," but none of the authors persuade us they have thought through the sustainment of the ambitious operations they describe. Historically, logistics have dominated both operations and revolutions in military affairs, as the essays in The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050 (New York, 2001), edited by MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, demonstrate. Gen. Shinseki liked to point out that there will be no revolution in military affairs without a revolution in military logistics.

Some of our authors advocate eliminating an echelon or two in the command hierarchy, and all describe the huge supervisory and management responsibilities of each echelon that does exist. This surfaces a timeless topic, span of control. Macgregor goes to particular lengths to make the case that the current hierarchy is antiquated and argues that the Army's resistance to change originates in the fact that only bureaucratic sycophants conditioned to defend the status quo become general officers within our system. Perhaps a careful reading of retired Col. Gregory Fontenot's forthcoming book, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi freedom, which the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth will soon publish, may incline him to a more charitable view both of our generals and our hierarchy. It is hard to imagine how the capture of Baghdad and its environs on 4-9 April 2003 could have been achieved as successfully as it was had it not been for the unique yet complementary contributions of the headquarters commanded by Lt. Gens. David McKiernan (CFLCC) and William S. Wallace (V Corps), Maj. Gen. Buford Blount (3rd Infantry Division), and Col. David G. Perkins (2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division). It is even more difficult to visualize the conduct of current operations in Iraq without brigades, divisions, or the corps, the last acting as a joint task force, with each fulfilling its separate and formidable role. Historical discussions such as John B. Wilson's Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades (CMH, 1997) provide valuable insight into why the U.S. Army has been organized as it has and how much that organization has been adapted over time. Information technology alone does not much ameliorate the human limitations that constrict effective spans of control. We should fully understand the purposes that have been served by each level of the hierarchy before we attempt to transform or abolish any of them.

In his 1970 doctoral dissertation "Towards a Science of War through Some Mathematical Concepts of Macrocombat," Col. Robert W. Samz made the point that attrition tends to dissipate qualitative differences between determined adversaries during prolonged hostilities. Our authors write in a manner that seems unmindful of casualties, as if our good fortune with respect to combat losses during our recent offensives will continue indefinitely. Macgregor and Scales advocate rotational systems that historically have proven themselves far more successful when casualties are few and combat episodic than when losses are heavy and combat is sustained. Retired CSM and now Dr. Robert S. Rush has done a persuasive job of illustrating the relative advantages of different replacement systems in Hell in Hürtgen Forest: Ordeal and Triumph of an American Infantry Regiment (Lawrence, Kan., 2001) and subsequent studies for the Center of Military History. Casualties and the replacement of casualties have long been one of warfare's most central features. We would be wise to anticipate both when imagining future wars.

Clark makes participation within a coalition a central theme of his work and Friedman gives the role of allies due attention, but allies are largely invisible in the texts of Macgregor, Scales, and Berkowitz. Our nation has a long history of fighting within coalitions, and for three generations we have struggled for interoperability with our allies despite widely divergent technological capabilities. Within NATO interoperability in the face of American technological advance has become such an imperative that for the alliance's force planners it is almost a fetish. None of our authors comes to grips with the working mechanics of such issues at the tactical level, although Friedman and Clark at least acknowledge them. Recent historical experience, with the exception of Operation Iraqi Freedom as it has thus far transpired, suggests that half or more of the troops tackling the typical future adversary will belong to allies. We would be wise to factor those allies into our thinking on the future force.

Whatever their limitations, the recent books by Macgregor, Scales, Berkowitz, Friedman, and Clark each provide a thoughtful analysis that greatly enriches the discussion of future warfare. Is the Army listening? In its internal discussions relating to defense transformation, in the chief of staff's selected focus areas, and in such documents as the 2003 U.S. Army Transformation Roadmap, the 2004 Army Posture Statement and The Army Plan, 2006-2023, it seems to be. Our authors' major recommendations have by and large been taken into account somewhere during the course of the deliberative give and take. The Army's most senior leaders may or may not have read each book, but intermediate-level players on their staffs clearly have. This is not to say that every recommendation will be honored-and given the conflicts among them they could not all be accepted-but it does seem that every recommendation will be heard. These are important books, and I strongly recommend them to all libraries serving soldiers and to anyone attempting to fathom the way ahead for our Army. I also encourage readers to reflect on the history of our nation's employment of military force as they consider the proposals these books make for the Army's future.

By Brig. Gen. John S. Brown

U.S. Army retired

BRIG. GEN. JOHN S. BROWN, USA Ret., has been chief of military history at the U.S. Army Center of Military History since December 1998. He commanded the 2nd Battalion, 66th Armor, in Iraq and Kuwait during the Gulf War and returned to Kuwait as commander of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, in 1995. He holds a doctorate in history from Indiana University and is the author of Draftee Division: The 88th Infantry Division in World War II (Lexington, Ky., 1986). This article originally appeared in the Winter-Spring 2004 issue of Army History and is reprinted by permission.

Copyright Association of the United States Army Aug 2005
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