Misguided Weapons��Technological Failure and Surprise on the Battlefield

by Azriel Lorber, Brassey's Inc., Dulles, VA, 2002, 293 pp., $26.95 (hardback).

"The instruments of battle are valuable only if one knows how to use them."--Charles Ardant du Picq (1870). Many books encourage the reader to question the writer's thought process. It is the rare book that inspires the reader to question his own. Dr. Azriel Lorder's Misguided Weapons is this kind of book. Recent ARMOR magazine discussions have been centered on different approaches to warfare--attrition, maneuver, or something else. Often overlooked in these debates are the technological changes in weaponry and equipment used by these differing approaches. Lorber argues that the proper understanding of technology may, in fact, be more critical than the tactics used.

Lorber is a retired Israeli officer and aerospace engineer. He has explored the impact of technological changes on warfare from the Middle Ages through the Persian Gulf War. More importantly, he investigates how the failure to comprehend technological change has led to either defeat or a higher cost of victory. Additionally, he analyzes why these changes were missed despite readily known evidence of their existence.

The author sites the Battle of Crecy as an early example of failing to understand technological change. Despite having knowledge of and suffering defeat at the hands of the English soldier's longbow, the French knights charged headlong into the volley firing the longbow and were massacred. In fact, this lesson was ignored repeatedly and the French lost again at Poitiers and at Agincourt.

Other historical examples include the refusal to adopt the Gatling gun during the Civil War, the German's radar detection shortcomings during World War II, the American's failure to adopt the 17-pound British gun for the Sherman tank, and the Israeli's ignorance of the effectiveness of antitank guided missiles during the 1973 October War. The examples sited are not limited to those of past history; the book also discusses more recent deficiencies such as those of the Patriot missile against Iraqi modified scuds.

More than just listing these historical failures, Lorber probes into the psychological reasons why individuals are unable or unwilling to adapt to changing technology. Some of these reasons include preconceived ideas, overconfidence, political meddling, and the not-invented-here attitude. When looking at the psychological failures of others, a reader is forced to look within and wonder what changes he is missing today due to similar preconceptions.

I highly recommend this book to all military personnel and the politicians who have influence over military development. By the end of the book, the reader's well-thought-out positions may be subject to question. This tome is not only thought provoking and interesting, but it is well written. It is a welcome addition to any military professional's library.

MAJ DEREK C. SCHNEIDER

Owensboro, KY

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