War with Iraq: Critical Lessons

by Buster Glosson, Glosson Family Foundation, Charlotte, NC, 2003, 320 pp., $28.95 (hardcover).

Retired Air Force Lieutenant General Buster Glosson has written an autobiography based on his wartime daily diary during the first Gulf War. Like Richard P. Hallion's Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War, it is another argument over the dominant impact of air power. Glosson, however, tells his story, from a perspective of a major player who planned and executed the air campaign against the fourth largest field army in the world.

The book's thesis emphasizes the supremacy of air power in shaping the battlefield. He believes the use of brute ground forces is a thing of the past, criticizing General Colin Powell in reference to what he calls the "old school thinking" in Washington that modern wars are won with massive ground troops. He maintains war has an enduring nature; however, the conduct of war changes with technology. Thus, his focus is on precision air power as the deciding factor in the conduct of warfighting, especially with his favored weapons system, the F-117 Stealth Fighter. Glosson credits himself for developing a new strategy with the F-117s, the backbone of the air war in Iraq, because they provided surprise and delivered precision bombs.

Quite evident, the author is a strong proponent of strategic air power as a deciding doctrine in winning modern war as indicated by his admiration for the controversial BG Billy Mitchell, who after World War I, became a strong proponent for strategic air power that impeded the development of an air-ground tactical doctrine during the interwar period. In addition, President Bush comes under criticism for abruptly ending the war before Saddam Hussein and his regime was eliminated by air power. The author notes in his diary, "history will judge."

In conclusion, Glosson list numerous critical lessons as a baseline for future wars that can be summarized, as there is no substitute for winning with an emphasis on a minimum loss of lives. His solution is that precision air power combined with Special Forces is more decisive than an overwhelming force.

Generally, as with all autobiographies, War With Iraq explains history from a personal, one-sided point of view. Army readers may have trouble with the author's assertion that air power is the decisive arm capable of destroying the battlefield. This attitude brings forth the conflict between service cultures regarding the nature of modern warfighting. Air Force planners, like Glosson, viewed the application of air power as a separate campaign and as the deciding factor. Army leaders--like Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf--historically recognized the reality of wrestling terrain from an enemy, not only at the operational level, but the importance of ground tactics.

For years, Army leaders viewed air power as a means to degrade the enemy and shape the battlefield for ground operations, which was recently demonstrated during the Iraqi campaign. One serious omission is evident. Glosson does not integrate his strategic thoughts with the doctrine that won the war in 1991, AirLand Battle Doctrine that emphasized the importance of joint and combined operations.

GEORGE F. HOFMANN, PH.D.

Department of History

University of Cincinnati

COPYRIGHT 2003 U.S. Army Armor Center
COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group