Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to U.S. Military Power - Book Review

by Roger W. Barnett, Brassey's, Inc., Washington, D.C., 2003, 176 pp., notes, bibliography, index, $39.95 (cloth), $24.95 (paperback).

The author, a professor emeritus at the U.S. Naval War College, presents an illuminating argument that in light of the terrorist attacks against the United States, it needs to create a system of purging the constraints that dictate traditional military responses. The challenge, the author maintains, is that United States policymakers and the military take the initiative and prevent or defend against an enemy's ability to engage in asymmetrical warfare. He defines this nature of warfare as "taking the calculated risk to exploit an adversary's inability or unwillingness to prevent, or defend against certain actions." Conversely, a military situation where the weak using unconventional warfare is capable of defeating the strong.

The author analyzes a number of current asymmetrical scenarios, such as an adversary's use of weapons of mass destruction. The argument presented is that the United States is deterred in dealing with asymmetrical warfare by a number of traditional constraints, such as operational, meaning reservations regarding the effect on the use of force and the relationship between ways, means, and risks. On organizational constraints, the problems a democracy has and its ideological relationship with international organizations are discussed. Regarding legal constraints, the book deals with the complexity of arms control, balance of power, and international law.

Finally contested is the moral aspect, such as the traditional American way against the use of force to resolve disagreements. These constraints, he maintains, need to be selectively disposed. The problem today, Barnett argues, is that U.S. national policymakers are in a dilemma because they struggle between conventional power projection that relies on massive firepower and maneuver warfare--an operational principle of the U.S. military during the 20th century--and at the same time, the military is tasked to act as peacekeepers, operating under the constraint of pacifism. He predicts that without changes in the rules of 20th-century symmetrical warfare and adjustments to the challenges of the 21st century, the country may face what he calls a "paralysis" that would increase risks and lead to the application of additional military power.

The author chastises U.S. policymakers for deliberate actions that allowed constraints to handicap the terms of military engagement, concluding by suggesting, "Constraints on the use of force should be reviewed in a holistic way." Barnett advocates the military be given an opportunity to determine unnecessary constraints and be provided with the opportunity to deal with asymmetrical initiatives.

The concept of asymmetric warfare is not new. Consider the military philosophy of the ancient Chinese, Sun Tzu and his "art of war," and Sir B.H. Liddell Hart's "indirect approach" of the 20th century. Though much has been written on the subject, the most interesting portion of the book is how the author emphasizes the constraints that affect the necessary responses to deal effectively with asymmetrical vulnerability. At times the book lacks clarity, however, it is worth considering, especially for advanced military studies.

GEORGE F. HOFMANN, PHD.

Department of History

University of Cincinnati

COPYRIGHT 2003 U.S. Army Armor Center
COPYRIGHT 2003 Gale Group