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  • 标题:Fighting the Stryker rifle company
  • 作者:Robert Thornton
  • 期刊名称:Armor
  • 印刷版ISSN:0004-2420
  • 出版年度:2004
  • 卷号:March-April 2004
  • 出版社:Armor Magazine

Fighting the Stryker rifle company

Robert Thornton

This article discusses tactical operations in the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) rifle company and provides a Stryker company commander's review of recent operations in an effort to generate discussion about capabilities and employment. This article is based on company-level training executed prior to the Stryker initial operation test and evaluation (IOT&E). During the IOT&E, the MGS platoon consisted of three, four-man Stryker antitank guided missile (ATGM) vehicles. Stryker ATGMs will continue to be used as in lieu of vehicles (ILOVs) until developmental and qualification testing of the MGS is completed and fielding begins in FY05.

A Company, Task Force 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, SBCT, was deployed from Fort Lewis, Washington, to Fort Knox, Kentucky, to begin instrumentation in preparation for the IOT&E, which is structured to validate the SBCT concept by comparing and contrasting companies from 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, 1st Brigade (SBCT), 25th Infantry Division (Light), and companies from a 10th Mountain Division battalion. Both battalions will execute similar tasks, in similar conditions, and against a similar opposing force (OPFOR).

The preparation for IOT&E focuses on four tasks: conducting a raid; conducting a perimeter defense; conducting security operations in a stabilized environment; and conducting resupply operations.

Company-level training began in March 2003 and continued through May 2003. It consisted of three separate field-training exercises (FTXs) that varied all the conditions of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilians (METT-TC). All three were well resourced and challenging. Throughout the entire exercise, the battalion sent out a tactical operations center (TOC), and a combat trains command post (CTCP) to provide command and control (C2) and logistics support. The first covered two back-to-back, 5-day iterations, where all four tasks were trained in each 5-day period. The second exercise in April began with a 180-mile road march (complete with the Stryker's add-on armor) and went into a 3-day FTX where we conducted a raid and security operations in a stabilized environment (SOSE).

The final FTX in May was the most challenging--a continuous 7-day exercise that closely resembled the 9-day iterations of the IOT&E. The OPFOR was ramped up from one rifle company, augmented with a platoon of light armored vehicle (LAV) IIIs and high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) gun trucks, to two rifle companies with a full complement of LAV IIIs, organic mortars, and a U.S. Army National Guard M1A1 tank platoon.

At times, my task organization included the battalion's engineer platoon (with its engineer squad vehicles) from the 73d Engineer Company, and the antitank platoon, with the Stryker ATGM variant, from 1st Platoon, D 52d Antitank Company. The battalion's reconnaissance platoon, mortar platoon, and sniper section supported the company operations. Company battle-space varied--at times it was 25 to 30 kilometers.

Key Differences

Understanding the SBCT structure is critical to understanding how it is employed. By leveraging technology, SBCT leaders can do more with less. At first glance, a robust 170-man company with all the elements of combined arms by modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE) standards would appear to be the answer to every tactical problem faced by a company commander. Because an SBCT unit can do more, it is tasked to do more. In fact, between the digital technologies in the form of the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), the mobility provided by the Strykers, and the numbers and types of soldiers, an SBCT unit probably covers three to four times the battlespace of any other type of company. Battalion and brigade commanders have remarked that an SBCT company commander's job duties are more similar to those of a battalion commander than those of a company commander in our current force units.

This creates a "one-floor-up" profile for leaders in the SBCT. Platoon leaders now make many decisions and have access to assets that before were only available to the company commander. This carries over to every level, right down to the new soldier who is now both a rifleman and squad designated marksman (SDM) on alpha team, or a rifleman and Javelin gunner on bravo team. The agile and adaptive leader who leverages the available technology makes the SBCT work. For example, the population of the FBCB2 of confirmed enemy allows the company commander to focus combat power at the decisive point within a large battlespace. The commander does not have to own every inch of the 25 kilometers he is assigned by the battalion commander; he just has to influence the bulk of it while he dominates the key terrain as determined by METT-TC.

The ability to task organize at lower levels to accomplish specific tasks is another SBCT distinction. Because the SBCT rifle companies are organically a combined-arms unit and most SBCT vehicles have a common command and control platform in the FBCB2, habitual relationships come easier and work better. An example would be task organizing the mobile gun system (MGS) platoon to accomplish route clearance. The current interim MGS platoon consists of three ATGM ILOVs and 12 19Ks. A typical task organization for route clearance would be two ATGMs with a section of infantry, including the rifle platoon sergeant and forward observer, and a sapper squad in the engineer squad vehicle under the MGS platoon leader. The remaining ATGMs, with the platoon sergeant, are attached to the rifle platoon under the rifle platoon leader. The company now has four maneuver elements with the required combat power to accomplish their tasks.

Another example would be the quick reaction force (QRF). During security operations, three platoons are typically given tasks, which develop the area for decisive operations. One platoon is held back as the QRF to be the decisive effort. The other platoons may be escorting logistics, manning traffic controls points, or executing an ambush or hasty attack, but the QRF platoon is positioned centrally and kept on a short string to be decisive. The mobility of the Stryker and the situational awareness (SA) provided by the FBCB2 allow it to move quickly to a dominating position and be decisive. Understanding how SBCT leaders leverage digital C2 and Stryker mobility are key to understanding how the SBCT units conduct full-spectrum operations across a large battlespace.

Raids and Attacks

The flexibility of the Stryker rifle company in the offense is built into its organization. The Stryker rifle company's offensive mission capabilities are extremely diverse and lethal and include 20 various types of Strykers, organic combat multipliers, such as an MTOE sniper team, a fire support team (FIST), company mortars that have both the 120mm and 60mm systems, the MGS (we have the ATGM ILOV), a C2 architecture that includes FBCB2, amplified vehicle radio communications, all-source imagery processors, multiband integrated tactical radio systems, and the ability to field full platoons, complete with full weapons squads (1 Javelin and 1 SDM per rifle squad), to conduct dismounted operations.

Using the Stryker rifle company's flexibility, we conducted seven successful variations of raids and attacks. Below are three of the seven operations that highlight the organization's flexibility and its use of the Stryker to complete the mission.

Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) Raid

The first operation was against the town of Regenberg, one of the MOUT sites at Fort Lewis. The enemy situation revealed OPFOR leaders meeting to discuss future operations. They had about a platoon-sized OPFOR local security with a mounted reinforcement (2 to 3 tech vehicles) 15 minutes away. Variables included civilians on the battlefield (COB) and a booby-trapped arms cache that had to be located. The town sat down in a bowl, which made using vehicles difficult, as surprise was critical to keep the OPFOR leaders from fleeing. Rules of engagement prevented the use mortars larger than 81mm, as well as crater-producing or incendiary munitions. To limit collateral damage from over penetration, a direction of attack was chosen that kept fires oriented south and away from the majority of the COBs.

The company scheme of maneuver relied on a dismounted infiltration to achieve surprise and fix the enemy on the objective (OBJ), then bring up the vehicles to set up blocking positions, assist in clearing the OBJ, augment security, and escort casualty evacuation (CASEVAC). The concept called for the sniper team to conduct a route recon from the planned dismount point, about 700 meters away from the OBJ, then maintain eyes on the support by fire (SBF) and assault positions with a two-man element, while the third man would linkup with the main body to act as a guide. The MGS platoon leader was in charge of the vehicles once we dismounted, and the engineer platoon would clear the route into the OBJ after we initiated contact at the assault position.

One rifle platoon was the SBF and they provided the company with freedom of maneuver. An additional weapons squad augmented the SBF, which was the mortar section using hand-held 60mm tubes with 10 rounds of ammunition each. The SBF was also tasked to dismount two M2s and bring in 2,000 rounds. Once the SBF initiated fires, the sniper team would set in on the open flank of the SBF to provide precision fires and isolate the OBJ. The other two rifle platoons would clear the OBJ (a series of six target buildings), then clear according to enemy situation. Building numbers and streets provided control measures and platoons cleared building by building, which is how most units clear the objective.

During the attack, the javelin gunner used the command launch unit to provide reconnaissance and surveillance; an SDM equipped with an M4, who was trained at the brigade SDM course, acted as a counter-sniper; once the route had been cleared, we linked up with and used infantry combat vehicles (with their remote weapons system M2s and MK-19s) to destroy fortified positions; and we used MGS platoon sergeants to employ the modified improved TOW acquisition system (MITAS) thermals of the ATGM to look deeper into the OBJ and provide information on OPFOR and COB activities once the route had been opened. These are just a few of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used during the operation.

Consolidation and Reorganization

Once the OBJ was secured, we were given a fragmentary order (FRAGO) to continue our consolidation and reorganization, but not to pull off the OBJ as planned until nongovernment organizations (NGOs) could be brought in. The first sergeant switched from providing reports from the SBF to managing CASEVAC. A medical platoon medical evacuation vehicle (MEV) and a family of medium tactical vehicles (FMTV) were used to evacuate 22 casualties and a section of infantry combat vehicles (ICVs) provided the escort.

The CASEVAC used the breach made by the sappers to get the vehicles on the OBJ. The XO, who had been talking with battalion and updating the common operational picture (COP) on his FBCB2, immediately began working logistics resupply and maintenance evacuation. A senior platoon sergeant was tasked to take charge of the company's perimeter security until the first sergeant completed CASEVAC operations. A platoon leader worked the COBs and enemy prisoners of war.

Hasty Attack Against Tanks

Another attack allowed for much greater integration of the vehicles. After a 24-hour defense, the company received a FRAGO to conduct a hasty attack against a combat security observation point consisting of a tank platoon and two squads of infantry that were holding a bridge 5 kilometers (km) away. The OBJ included a rectangular drop zone (DZ) bordered by a lake on the left flank (east), a bridge and a stream on the south side, a railroad track on the west (also the right boundary), and a hardball road served as the battalion's line of departure and as our unit's probable line of deployment (PLD). The DZ was about 2.5km in length by 1.5km in width. There was a centerline road in the DZ, which served as a platoon boundary. The OPFOR was using its rifle squads on its flanks as observation and listening posts to control the two tank sections' fires and as local security. One tank attacked my infantry with coax and M2 fires while the other used main guns against Strykers.

Company scheme of maneuver called for two platoons attacking abreast, augmented by the MGS (ATGM ILOV) to clear the OBJ. One platoon would receive two ATGMs; the other would receive the sniper team and a dismounted 60mm. The third rifle platoon was the finishing force (follow and support) and would move to a flank of either platoon as needed. We had battalion mortar priority of fire (POF) with 120mm and 81mms.

TTP Against Armor

A TTP we used at the platoon level was dismounted infantry clearing forward while overwatched by their ICVs and the ATGMs. When the dismounted element reached a prominent IV fine, they would establish an overwatch with their javelins then bring the vehicles forward. This worked well, in that the javelins and the ATGMs provided redundant antitank coverage and freed up the ICVs to provide heavy weapons fire for squads and platoons when they made contact with the OPFOR infantry. When this TTP was used, the OPFOR infantry was quickly killed. The mobility and firepower of the ICV with its remote weapons station controlled by the squad leader on the ground fixed and finished the enemy before he could reposition.

In retrospect, the MGS platoon should not have been tasked down to the platoons in this instance. The platoon leaders' span of control, with squads dismounted from their vehicles and controlling the javelins, was about as much as they could handle. The company would have been better served if the MGS had been tasked to provide overwatch to prevent the enemy from employing its tanks. That would have given the MGS platoon leader room to exercise initiative, reduced the C2 burden on the rifle platoon leaders, and allowed greater survivability and effectiveness on the part of the MGS.

Raid Against Brownsville

During the final FTX, the battalion used an 11-building live fire MOUT site as part of its area of operations for force on force. Brownsville (Range 31 at Fort Lewis) is a plywood-constructed town built in a reasonably open area, similar to a bowling alley. Its buildings vary, some have two stories with stairs or ladders, and others are one-story modulars with walls separating spaces similar to a strip mall. The rear of the town abuts the small-arms impact area. There is a centerline road that runs the long axis of the town that we used as a platoon boundary, and two roads that cross the short axis were used as phase lines. The centerline road had a point obstacle consisting of wire and mines.

During this raid, the speed of the vehicles was used to take advantage of the terrain. The antitank threat was negligible given the vehicles' add-on armor (a kit of reactive armor that gives the Stryker protection up to rocket-propelled-grenade level), the situation template, and the scheme of maneuver. Initially the MGS established an SBF at about 600 meters outside the OBJ, with a squad of infantry providing its local security. The fire support officer (FSO) and XO located with the MGS. Two rifle platoons nearly simultaneously attacked the two nearest buildings on either side of the centerline road. The road served as the direct fire control measure. As the platoons passed the MGS SBE the MGS went into an observation mode. The engineer platoon (-) then went to work on the point obstacle that had to be breached to bring in logistics. The obstacle was about 300 meters from the OBJ, but the enemy's focus was no longer on the breach. The third rifle platoon was committed to reinforce success on the right flank. Snipers were attached to that platoon to act as counter-snipers.

The OPFOR was quickly overwhelmed by the two-directional attack. Many were shot from behind as they concentrated on the threat across the street. Using remote weapons system (RWS) thermals and weapons systems to provide accurate M2 fires and intelligence to the platoon leader worked great. Casualties were quickly pulled back to the platoon casualty collection point (CCP) in the rear of vehicles and treated until the company CCP was established. A platoon-sized OPFOR, with one M2 mounted on a visual modification (VISMOD), two medium machine guns, and three rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) were destroyed and the OBJ cleared in 20 minutes. The Stryker's speed, mobility, protection, and firepower were put to good use based on METT-TC.

Perimeter Defense

The perimeter defense task really applies itself to the noncontiguous battlespace in which the SBCT operates. The lines of communication are often long and must be cleared or maintained. Restrictive terrain may further affect lines of communications. Adjacent unit relationships are more digital than physical. The mobility and firepower of the SBCT company allow it to take on a larger area of operation (AO).

Out of the five defenses we executed, the major condition differences were time, enemy, and terrain. During one defense, we had about 3 hours to conduct a hasty defense following an attack against two motorized infantry companies that had LAV IIIs and HMMWV VISMODS. While we were preparing the defense, we were also conducting CASEVAC, rearming, and refueling operations. Another defense had platoons operating out of contact with one another in restrictive terrain. This was more of a nodal defense of key intersections where traffic control points were further developed as the priority intelligence requirements were answered by the S2. Another had the company defending a 9-kilometer sector, with an engineer platoon and an antitank platoon attached. The enemy included a platoon of T-80s (replicated by M1A1s), eight BTRs (LAV IIIs), and two 150-man companies with organic mortars and artillery fire support.

Hasty Defense of a Flight Landing Strip

The hasty defense mission (3 hours preparation) of a flight landing strip (FLS) required simplicity to allow maximum planning and rehearsal at the platoon level. A rifle platoon was tasked to delay on either flank. The MGS platoon was tasked to destroy in the center, and the third rifle platoon was tasked to counterattack into a flank once the enemy main effort was determined. The engineer platoon would become the company reserve on completion of the obstacles. They were eventually used to reinforce a rifle platoon. Limited success here--the enemy bypass was contained, but most of the sappers were lost. After this lesson-learned experience, during the defense in sector that followed a few days later, we set a battle position overwatching a ford site in the rear of our sector, which worked great.

Small engagement areas, ambushes, and local counterattacks marked the FLS defense. Here the mobility of the Stryker to move soldiers and equipment kept the enemy from taking advantage of any potential successes. The FBCB2 allowed me to gain and maintain SA, then develop situational understanding and move the appropriate element to where it was needed. An example of the usefulness of FBCB2 is the linkup with the battalion reserve. About midway through the fight, the battalion reserve antitank platoon linked up with me via FBCB2, which allowed me to send graphics over 20kms of terrain hours earlier. With the battalion reserve, we killed the remaining vehicles and the enemy withdrew.

Defense TTP

Throughout all of the defenses, the vehicles' capability to pick up and move forces to the decisive point at every level, our heavy weapons' lethality, antitank systems, and mortars, along with the C2 provided by the FBCB2, allowed decisions to be made that enabled us to operate in large battlespaces and retain the initiative. The enemy's situation was transparent, as long as we retained the flexibility to move within the depth of the battlespace.

Security Operations

In an AO, it is the company commander's responsibility to secure the area. It may also include securing a higher headquarters' key assets, such as a retrans site or escorting nongovernment officials, or managing a string of traffic control points that support a larger battalion or brigade collection plan. The company commander is tasked with grasping and retaining the initiative within an AO that may be up to 12 or more square kilometers and include urban areas. He is required to do some staff work, put on his red hat, make decisions, and start figuring out what the enemy wants to do in his AO then get out in front of him.

The sequence of events starts with a recon of the AO, then movement into the AO, then finding, fixing, and finishing the enemy while sustaining operations and facilitating higher headquarters' objectives. The company commander is allowed to execute great initiative within the higher commander's intent, as opportunities are often time sensitive. Operations take on the tune of distributed platoon operations, with one platoon being the decisive effort at the time, but based on events quickly shifting to a supporting role, or vice-versa.

An example would be a platoon conducting a presence patrol with a brigade human intelligence (HUMINT) asset. They receive information that an OPFOR resupply will come into the AO from the east between 2400 hours and 0200 hours. The commander calls the battalion commander and informs him of his intent to establish an area ambush to destroy the resupply. The battalion commander calls brigade and requests ground surveillance radar and I-REMBAS (a device capable of picking up acoustical signatures) support. Another platoon conducts its troop leading procedures (TLPs) for the ambush while the platoon that conducted the patrol finishes its route (turns over responsibility for the town to the sniper team) and links up with the logistics package (LOGPAC) at the combat trains command post (CTCP). Another platoon conducts the ambush and destroys it, but turns up the grid location and linkup time for the enemy resupply site. It is now 0130 hours and undoubtedly the enemy logistics site will fold and withdraw, an opportunity exists. The QRF platoon is now tasked to conduct a hasty attack. The MGS platoon, task organized with an infantry squad, a sapper squad, and an MEV, are tasked to standby with the first sergeant for CASEVAC. Mortar POFs shifted all day. This cycle continues throughout the security operation as events dictate.

In some ways security operations resemble a search and attack; however, it is a full-spectrum task. It requires agile and adaptive leaders executing their current task and purpose, but who understand the commander's intent and recognize opportunities that appear, then self retask to meet the intent.

Continuous Operations

Throughout the FTX, the pressure of continuous operations was felt. The battalion commander made a conscious decision to operate in contemporary operating environment conditions. Attacks and defenses were executed hot on the heels of one another among the consolidation and reorganization. Almost every attack and defense we prepared for was done in the midst of a security mission. As the battalion commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) were answered, the battalion shifted its decisive effort based on the current situation and conditions. As we grew accustomed to this sustained operating tempo (OP-TEMPO) and fell into a battle rhythm, our operations fell into step with the battalion's. Standard operating procedures were developed at the lowest levels to compensate for the condensed planning time.

Company TLPs were refined. I pushed out the battalion FRAGOs via FBCB2 with a free-text warning order with company-specific information. I contacted the battalion commander to receive his guidance, issued the next FRAGO within the hour, accompanied by a company set of digital graphics that I could push to everyone in the battalion. I had a conference call with my leaders, sent out my reconnaissance, arranged for company leaders to assemble for a face-to-face and rehearsals then began movement. The eight TLPs did not change, but the methods and speed in which they were executed did to keep pace with constraints. Throughout our mission, the digitally enhanced field manual and the mobility of the Strykers allowed us to meet imposed constraints.

TTPs for Employing Company Assets

Using the fire support platoon:

* MTOE FSO and FIST. Works great as your S2 during rehearsals--can move red icons on FBCB2; is the fire support platoon leader and targeting officer; and can be tasked as your nonlethal guy, if you receive brigade assets, such as HUMINT, psychological operations, and civil affairs. The FSV is probably your company's best C2 platform; it has a ground-lasing device (GLLVD), but currently the 120mm has no precision-guided munitions (PGM) round; however, it does provide a control for 155 copperheads and close air support (CAS) laser-guided munitions, and aids in target registration. You will need a company fires net--organic forward observers (FOs), better C2 platforms, ATGM laser ranger finders, and 120mms at the company level mean a lot more fire missions.

* Mortars. The arms room concept for mortars provides a huge plus in flexibility, such as ROE, effects, better white phosphorous, and increased range to cover Stryker battlespace. During one defense, we set up 60mms for a platoon in restricted terrain with danger close obstacles, and set up the 120mms to cover our tactical obstacles in the more open areas. The 10-man mortar section can provide more of their own security as the mortar combat vehicle (MCV) has an RWS with an M2.

* Sniper team. The sniper team can be used as part of your leader's recon, and as the security element to keep eyes on the OBJ. They can be used as an economy of force on a flank, key node or rear area that you do not want to use a platoon in yet; used as an overwatch or countersniper role; used to augment the SBF; attached to a platoon for platoon missions; used as FOs or to infiltrate a COLT team made up of organic platoon FOs with the GLLVD. Our sniper team used a HMMWV from headquarters for better commo and mobility. They can also be inserted with battalion recon platoons to facilitate adjacent unit coordination. Insert early to provide reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) over company FM net in terms of last minute target refinement and/or security information during infiltration of other company elements; and they can eliminate key enemy weapons or personnel immediately prior to the assault and force the enemy to consider another direction.

Using the MGS (ATGM ILOV):

When using the MGS (ATGM ILOV) be conscious of the local security requirements. The ATGM ILOV is another C2 element you can use--task organize with sappers or infantry to do route clearance. The vehicle has great thermals for reconnaissance and surveillance and battle damage assessment. The laser range finder generates quick calls for fire. Tube-launched, optically tracked, wire guided (TOW) II A&B, TOW BB (bunker buster) missiles and MITAS provide excellent long-range precision fires against a wide variety of targets, including bunkers, armor, and snipers. The ATGM ILOV is not the MGS; survivability in restricted terrain is an issue--no fire and forget with a wire guided missile, no coaxial machine gun. The ATGM has some pluses and negatives when compared to MGS requirements. It can be used at blocking positions to isolate from outer or inner tings during raids; it can be paired with snipers or javelins for AT ambushes, forward security/ counterrecon fights; or paired with a rifle platoon as a hunter-killer combination.

Using engineers:

Sappers have a javelin per platoon; the engineer squad vehicle (ESV) has RWS with an M2; sappers have M240s; ESV has plow or roller and a pneumatic dart-style marking system that works great day or night; ESV plow and roller greatly impact ESV mobility; when we set conditions for breaching out of contact, the sappers lived and our CASEVAC got through; and sappers can easily set a blocking position and set up a hasty defense--this prevented a penetration in one of the defenses.

Using FBCB2:

FBCB2 can be used to push out short FRAGOs and graphics; FBCB2 should augment a map with graphics, not replace it; and FBCB2 reporting for logistics and sensitive items frees up the FM nets and should be SOP--set free text messages at given times in accordance with battalion SOP. The company XO is responsible for updating the COP via FBCB2. He inputs FM reports into FBCB2, which keeps the FBCB2 from being overpopulated with redundant reports. FBCB2 allows for distributed operations over the SBCT battlespace.

Using other brigade assets:

During train up, the brigade was still fielding much of its equipment, conducting training, or supporting the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, at the combat training centers. Even with all of the enhanced capabilities of the SBCT infantry company and battalion, the brigade assets, such as RSTA troops with unmanned aerial vehicle platoons, will double their effectiveness by achieving the fundamentals of full-spectrum operations.

Logistics and resupply:

* Escorts. All logistics operations need to be escorted by at least an infantry section. LOGPAC should be organized so that classes of supply are lined up in the order that supplies are to be drawn; for example, III, I, V, VII, and IX. The XO or first sergeant should escort LOGPAC and control FM flow. FBCB2 personnel and logistics statistic SOPS are critical to avoid tying up FM nets. The longer the lines of communications through bad-guy country, the more combat power is necessary for escort.

* Refueling operations. Refueling operations are generally executed service-station style, one section at a time, either in the center of the company's tactical assembly area (TAA) or on a side road with cover and concealment and a two-way exit during tactical operations where the company is spread out. The lead platoon secures the site until the last platoon can relieve in place, bottom line is security is paramount. This procedure takes about 2 hours from time of receipt of fueler.

* Treat all logistics missions like combat missions. Have a fire support plan, conduct an intel brief, and rehearse actions on contact. Ground lines of communications to the infantry companies are the primary mode.

TAA procedures/TTP:

* TAA Procedures. Quartering party--first sergeant or XO leads with nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) NCO, a rifle platoon, one ATGM ILOV, and the weapons squad leaders. Company-sized TAA is 400 meters (or more depending on attachments) in diameter; restrictive terrain may call for platoon-sized TAAs in a star pattern.

* Security. Fifty-percent security per platoon is adequate as a general rule; rifle platoons use two fire team-sized observation and listening posts 100 meters out and two fire teams as a QRF inside the perimeter--either the driver or vehicle commander as up in the ICVs, ATGM crews keep 2 men up, and mortars keep one tube up. When bringing leaders to one location, increase security to 100 percent.

* MGS or ATGM variant placement. Placement varies, concentrating them in one spot makes logistics operations easier and faster, but interspacing them between rifle platoons provides good thermal coverage and better security for those variants from dismounted infantry. Company headquarters and fire support platoons are usually placed in center, although mortars may have to relocate to meet mask and overhead clearance needs.

The SBCT rifle company performs as advertised. It achieves decisive operations in the offense, defense, stability, and support, and is capable of full-spectrum operations. It dominates its battlespace through use of combat power elements--maneuver, firepower, information, protection, and leadership as applied to current conditions. The MTOE sets the framework for combined arms at the company level. The SBCT company achieves the Tenets of Army operations--initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility through mission-type orders, junior-leader initiative, and situational awareness and understanding. As Transformation continues toward equipping and training the remaining SBCTs and building the Objective Force, TTP and doctrine will continue to evolve. The fundamentals that prepare leaders to fight the conditions as defined by METT-TC will not.

CPT Robert Thornton is currently serving as commander, A Company, 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, Fort Lewis, WA. He is a graduate of Austin Peay State University His military education includes Infantry Officers Basic Course and Armor Captains Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, including assistant S3, 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, Fort Lewis, WA; XO, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment (1-187), 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, KY; platoon leader, Antitank Platoon, D Company, 1-187 Infantry, Fort Campbell; and rifle platoon leader, C Company, 1-187th Infantry, Fort Campbell.

COPYRIGHT 2004 U.S. Army Armor Center
COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group

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