The FA and the Objective Force��an uncertain but critical future

We are an Army at war. We are also an Army postured for significant change. Both of these conditions inevitably bring uncertainty to our view of the future.

In my last article, I stated the Field Artillery is absolutely essential today to the success of our joint forces and the Army's combined arms team and that the Field Artillery, fully integrated with joint fires and all other effects-producing systems, will be even more critical in the future. I want to reinforce that message.

As we consider the directions our nation may take in the near term to achieve our objectives in the Global War on Terrorism, we can anticipate the vital role the fires of the Field Artillery may play. The potential for employing ground forces in the war combined with the recent completion of two Congressionally mandated indirect fires studies and the Maneuver Unit of Action (UA) Operational and Organizational Concept (O&O) only reinforce that current and future forces will remain dependent on indirect fires and that the Field Artillery has a critical role to play in both.

The Need for Maneuver and Fire Synergy. In today's rapidly changing contemporary operating environment (COE), there is an unprecedented need to achieve true synergy between fires and maneuver. Fires and maneuver have an empowering relationship on the battlefield, each complementing the other in contributing to the achievement of decisive outcomes. A commander may employ his maneuver force to attain positions of tactical advantage in order to most effectively employ his fires. In other circumstances, it may be the effects of fires that will permit the effective maneuver of forces. From positions of tactical advantage, a commander can employ accurate, destructive fires against high-value targets to eliminate enemy combat capabilities.

The effectiveness of our fires will present a dilemma to our adversary. He either will have to remain in position and continue to suffer the effects or move in an attempt to reduce the vulnerability of his position. By moving, the enemy risks exposing his force to exploitation by ground maneuver and the effects of joint and land-based fires. In either event, the position of advantage gained by maneuver enables fires to be employed to achieve the destructive effects that lead to tactical decision.

Expectations of Fires. The Army requires fires that are immediately responsive and continuously available in all types of terrain and weather. While we expect to derive full effects from the fires of joint and coalition capabilities as well as the tremendous firepower afforded by Army aviation, these capabilities cannot ensure the fulltime, full-spectrum requirements of maneuver forces are met.

The Army must have an organic ability to deliver fires in a fully networked architecture: destructive fires, both point and area; protective and suppressive fires in the required quantity and duration; and special munitions, such as obscurants, illumination, and obstacles.

Before forces are joined, the increased long-range killing capability of fires will fix and destroy the enemy. By achieving greater destruction at standoff, we can ensure freedom of action and reduce the need to rely on tactical assault to achieve decisive outcomes. Long-range fires will dislocate, disintegrate or destroy the enemy, creating the opportunity for maneuver to transition to exploitation or move to other positions of advantage.

Once contact occurs, fires must be fully integrated in support of maneuver. Fires must be continuously available on demand, tailorable to mission requirements and scaleable to achieve the effects desired. Fires will continue to be employed against planned targets; however, we must significantly improve our ability to attack targets of opportunity to respond to the needs of forces at the lowest tactical level.

Fires generally will be categorized into three primary purposes: destructive, protective and suppressive, and special purpose fires. See Figure 1 for the definitions of those purposes.

Mix of Capabilities. Our future fire support system will require a mix of capabilities, including the full range of joint fires and indirect fire systems. Missiles, rockets, cannons and mortars as well as fixed-wing aircraft and attack helicopters all offer unique capabilities and, likewise, have system-specific limitations that must be understood and considered.

For ground forces, a mix of mortar, cannon, rocket and missile systems clearly provides the greatest flexibility and mitigates the individual shortcomings of each delivery means. The strength of our future fire support system will be the ability to employ this mix of capabilities, enabled by networked command, control communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance ([C.sup.4]ISR).

A Continuing Need for Cannon Artillery. The Army clearly has articulated the need for a cannon as an integral component of this fires system to provide immediately responsive, continuously available fires to our maneuver units for the foreseeable future.

Cannons will continue to be required in the Objective Force to deliver both precision and non-precision fires and as the primary delivery system of a wide variety of special purpose munitions. Cannons give us the ability to deliver close supporting fires, often in close proximity to friendly forces, 24 hours a day in all terrain and under all weather conditions.

Precision cannon fires will achieve increased lethality in those instances where intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets provide precise target locations and the target type warrants engagement by a precision munition. Cannons also will enable us to deliver non-precision fires in those circumstances when target locations are imprecise or where area effects are required.

Cannon artillery is responsive, flexible and agile and enables high-volume fires, both in quantity and duration. Cannons offer us a wide range of trajectory options to support the diversity of battlefield and terrain requirements--from direct fire to high-angle fire.

The responsiveness and effectiveness of cannon artillery will be greatly enhanced when integrated with all other forms of fires into a system of networked fires.

Networked Fires. Networked Fires will be an application within the Objective Force battle command system. As a fires system-of-systems, it will give commanders the ability to apply full-dimension effects solutions in near real-time throughout their battlespace.

* Networked Fires will link all relevant Army, joint, national and multinational sensors, Army and joint fires and effects delivery means, and the information technology systems of battle command to develop integrated strike solutions.

* Networked Fires will apply effects-based solutions to achieve the commander's objectives through the integrated application of lethal and nonlethal munitions and other effects.

* Networked Fires will change our focus from attacking specific weapon systems to a more precise application of effects against decisive points, centers of gravity and key nodes of the enemy's systems.

* By employing effects-based fires, we will be less concerned about command and support relationships and more focused on achieving desired outcomes by employing the delivery system that can most effectively deliver the desired effects.

* Networked fires will enable all echelons to have access to Army and joint effects.

This Networked Fires capability will be particularly relevant to the synchronization of fires that must be achieved in the Objective Force between the Unit of Employment (UE) and UA.

Fires and Effects for the UE. UEs in the Objective Force are division- and corps-like elements that will employ and support multiple UAs. Among the core missions evolving for the UE are shaping and isolating the battlespace and shielding the force.

While integrating and synchronizing Army forces conducting full-spectrum operations at the higher tactical and operational levels of conflict, UEs will orchestrate continuous shaping operations with extended-range precision fires, selected air-ground maneuver operations and the full range of Army and joint effects-producing capabilities. The process of shaping will set conditions for follow-on tactical engagements or battles in support of multiple subordinate UAs. One of the most critical shaping tasks will be to achieve favorable force ratios to enable tactical maneuver. The UE will isolate the battlefield by eliminating an enemy's ability to synchronize action, attacking mobile reserves or blinding the enemy by disabling his command and control capabilities.

Shielding the force includes eliminating the enemy's long-range precision fires, thus shielding the force from his effects.

To accomplish these missions, it is clear the UE will require robust long-range fires linked to precise targeting systems. This force certainly will require precision missiles and rockets carrying discriminating munitions. While the detailed design work for the UE is still in progress, access to joint and precision fires is an acknowledged requirement.

Division Artillery. Current concepts envision a division artillery structure in the division-level UE with organic target acquisition and long-range precision fires capabilities. The division artillery will employ the fires of reinforcing fires units allocated from force pools and tailor fires packages to meet the specific needs of UAs. Through Networked Fires, the division artillery will have access to available fires of the UA non-line-of-sight (NLOS) battalions.

Fires and Effects Cell (FEC). The plan for the Objective Force staff structure includes a FEC as one of five staff components that assist the UE commander in battlefield visualization and communication. The FEC will plan and coordinate the production of effects resulting from the application of both lethal and nonlethal capabilities.

Fires and Effects for the UA. In support of the tactical fight, the UA brigade will coordinate and integrate organic UA, UE and other Army, joint and multinational NLOS fires assets.

Fires and Effects Cell. The UA brigade also will have a FEC. It will (1.) Advise the commander on the capabilities of friendly and enemy fires and effects assets; (2.) Develop targeting priorities and attack criteria to meet the commander's guidance and intent; and (3.) Develop the brigade scheme of supporting NLOS fires to support the maneuver plan, meet the commander's s intent and accomplish the mission.

The FEC will exploit networked sensors, delivery systems and effects to provide the commander the broadest possible range of options and capabilities. It will accomplish this by applying the commander's objectives for NLOS fires as parameters in a networked system-of-systems and by dynamically establishing sensor-to-shooter linkages based on changing conditions of the battle.

The FEC rapidly will plan, coordinate, synchronize and manage the delivery of organic and supporting NLOS fires and nonlethal effects throughout the UA battlespace.

The NLOS Battalion. Within the UA will be an NLOS battalion equipped with organic acquisition means, future combat system (FCS) NLOS cannons and attack missile capabilities. The NLOS battalion will coordinate and provide full-spectrum Army and joint fires and effects to enable the UA to conduct decisive operations. The primary tasks the NLOS battalion must accomplish include those outlined in Figure 2.

We are in the process of experimentation, analysis and design to further develop UA fires and effects capabilities and the detailed organization of the NLOS battalion. Figure 3 lists several characteristics we expect to include in the UA fires and effects design.

In conjunction with the Armor Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Georgia, we are working to further develop the doctrine and tactics the UA will employ. We are engaged with the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as well to contribute to the evolving conceptual work on the UE.

At each echelon of command, the Army clearly has established a solid foundation that recognizes the importance of fires. Our task now is to ensure ongoing developmental work accounts for the full range of fire support tasks at every level.

Today and Tomorrow. We are an Army at war today, and in that war, our nation may require the fires of her Field Artillery to help accomplish national objectives. Should the Field Artillery formations of our operating forces be called upon to deliver fires in support of the Global War on Terrorism, the readiness needs of our Field Artillery commanders will have "Priority of Fires" from the Field Artillery Center and School here at Fort Sill.

The Field Artillery School has placed great emphasis on identifying and resolving those issues most critical to the commanders and command sergeants major of our Field Artillery formations. The FA School has been working on the input receive d from them at the Senior Field Artillery Leader's Conference last April with a clear priority to solve those issues that may have an operational impact in the near term. We are aggressively attempting to resolve the issues we face in manning, training and equipping the force and will continue to do so.

We are also an Army engaged in transforming for tomorrow. I am confident the developmental work for the Objective Force lays a solid foundation that underscores the critical importance of fires and effects. Enabled by the tremendous advances that we expect to achieve in [C.sup.4]ISR, the success of the future force depends on our ability to achieve a true synergy between maneuver and fires. The Field Artillery is a full partner in achieving that success.

Figure 1: Fires for the Objective Force. Fires are categorized as Destructive, Protective/Suppressive or Special Purpose.

* Destructive Fires include precise or area fires to shape engagements by striking the enemy before forces are joined. Destructive fires also are employed in conjunction with direct fires after forces are joined to present the enemy with multiple lethal challenges.

* Protective/Suppressive Fires. Protective Fires may be lethal or nonlethal and are oriented on the friendly force to facilitate our ability to maneuver. Ultimately, protective fires for maneuver formations may include danger-close missions and final protective fires (FPFs). Suppressive Fires also protect friendly forces but are oriented on proactively attacking targets, such as enemy indirect fires or air defenses. Suppressive fires may be employed to facilitate ground maneuver and the employment of Army or joint aviation assets. Inaccurate or unconfirmed target locations may dictate the employment of suppressive fires.

* Special Purpose Fires add to the full-spectrum relevance of the Field Artillery. These fires may include munitions that have obscurants, multiple means of illumination, countermobility capabilities, thermobaric effects, incapacitants and munitions that will blind or disable enemy acquisition and observation systems.

Figure 2: NLOS Battalion Tasks

* Provide precise or area long-range destructive fires.

* Provide close support tactical fires fully integrated with maneuver to isolate or fix enemy forces, protect friendly forces with suppression or obscuration, deny mobility, counter indirect fires and protect maneuver formations.

* Conduct artillery raids.

* Employ Networked Fires to access external capabilities, including direct access to joint fires, and "missiles-in-a-box."

* Perform target acquisition with an organic radar and small-unit unmanned aerial vehicle (SUAV).

* Provide special purpose fires to include obscurants, illumination, counter mobility and a range of nonlethal effects.

Figure 3: Some Characteristics of the Developing NLOS Battalion

* Provide reliable, timely, accurate and effective fires and effects that are continuously available with high sustained rates-of-fire and rates-of-kill in all weather and terrain conditions.

* Support sensor-to-shooter teaming relationships with strike aviation platforms, unmanned sensors and the reconnaissance troops and maneuver companies of combined arms battalions.

* Be capable of rapid teaming, expeditious task reorganization and mission tailoring.

* Be capable of maneuver by platoons or in teams in all terrain or weather.

* Be able to mass fires without having to collocate weapons systems, providing mutual support and massed effects from dispersed locations.

* Provide increased overmatching lethality with quicker response times, increased accuracies of target location and weapon delivery systems, higher sustained rates-of-fire, the ability to rapidly deliver discrete or volume fires and superior munitions effects.

* Be able to rapidly integrate joint, multinational and other Army reinforcing fires means and effects.

Major General Michael D. Maples became the Chief of Field Artillery and Commanding General of FortSill, Oklahoma, in August 2001. In his previous assignment, he was the Director of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (G3) at the Pentagon. In Germany, he was the Assistant Division Commander (Support) in the 1st Armored Division and Senior Tactical Commander of the Baumholder Military Community. He also served in Germany as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps and for the Kosovo Force (KFOR), planning and executing the entry of NATO forces into Kosovo; G3 of V Corps; and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in US Army Europe (Forward) in Taszar, Hungary, sup porting US forces in the Balkans during Operation Joint Endeavor. He commanded the 41st Field Artillery Brigade, V Corps, Germany, and the 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery, 75th Field Artillery Brigade, Ill Corps at Fort Sill, Okla homa, and in the Persian Gulf during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. He also commanded B Battery, 6th Battalion, 37th Field Artillery in the 2d Infantry Division in Korea. He holds an MA in Organizational Behavior from Pacific Lutheran University, Tacoma, Washington.

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