Going after the ins - campaigns of politicians Barbara Boxer and Al D'Amato

How two beatable Senate incumbents met challenger threats - with different outcomes

Both vulnerable at the start, Senate incumbent Barbara Boxer eventually cruised to victory while New York's Al D'Amato lost re-election decisively. Clearly, national factors played a role in their divergent fates. But the strategic choices their campaigns made about spotlighting messages and running ads may have made the difference for both of them.

People do not often mistake Barbara Boxer for Al D'Amato. One is a feisty feminist from the West; the other a combative conservative from the East. However, politically at least, they faced similar challenges in 1998.

Both were incumbents with reputations as outspoken partisans. Both had high negatives, especially among moderates. Both were running in states known for big, expensive and acrimonious Senate races. And both faced strong challenges from experienced opposition.

Despite these similarities, their fates were different. First-termer Boxer won while third-termer D'Amato lost. Clearly, national factors played a role in their divergent fates. However, they - and their opponents - made many strategic choices that had a major influence on election day. Understanding these choices shed light on how modern campaigns are run.

Trading Accusations

Brash and controversial, Boxer and D'Amato had many admirers, but also had many detractors. Boxer's favorables were running just ahead of unfavorables in the late summer and dipped below unfavorables at the end of September. D'Amato's favorables were hardly better, languishing in the 30s in the summer before the campaign.

On one point, their 1998 reelection strategies were similar: Raise a lot of money. Boxer used, among other things, a list of over 100,000 contributors to tap individuals for roughly $12 million. Perhaps her single biggest asset, though, was one that many thought would bring her down: the First Family. The president and First Lady's fundraising efforts on her behalf brought in almost $5 million.

D'Amato was no less assiduous. He used his chairmanship of the Senate Banking Committee to stay in close contact with finance and insurance interests - interests that contributed almost $5 million to his campaign. In all, he raised more than $27 million between 1993 and 1998.

The two senators differed, however, not only on substance, but also on strategy. Boxer concentrated on popular liberal issues such as gun control, health care, education and abortion while covering her back on conservative issues such as crime and support for business. On crime, Boxer supported expanding the use of the death penalty for federal crimes, eliminating early parole for violent offenders and increasing penalties for most offenses. On business, Boxer favored targeted tax cuts and exportation of encryption technology, important issues for many Silicon Valley companies.

D'Amato opted for a riskier approach. He not only conceded personality; but he also went against popular opinion on high-profile issues such as abortion and gun control, opposing both.

D'Amato forged a two-part strategy: build non-ideological support based on his unrelenting pursuit of New York's interests and appeal to swing groups with targeted issues. For the first goal, he continued his famous "Senator Pothole" routine, tirelessly serving constituents and seeking out money for New York. To solidify this reputation, he aired a series of "case work" ads on the radio in which people described help they had received from D'Amato.

For the second part of the strategy, D'Amato forayed into traditionally Democratic territory. Most visibly, he sought out support from Jewish voters. In his previous two victories, he had won about 40 percent of the Jewish vote, and he hoped to replicate those totals in 1998. He emphasized his strong pro-Israel record and efforts on behalf of Holocaust survivors seeking restitution from Swiss banks.

D'Amato also appealed to women by fighting for more funds for breast cancer research and pushing legislation requiring insurance companies to pay for breast reconstruction surgery for cancer victims. He was particularly interested in cultivating women voters after his Whitewater hearings came off to many women as a personal attack on Hillary Clinton.

The Candidates: Handlers, Wagers, Payoffs

                  Charles Schumer (D)     Al D'Amato (R)

Manager           Josh Isay               John Lerner
Media             Morris & Carrick        Jamestown Associates,
                                          Arthur Finklestein

Pollster          Garin Hart Yang         Jamestown Associates
Expenditures      $16,825,671             $27,422,342
Vote Percentage   49% (2,450,065 votes)   41% (2,058,988 votes)

                  Barbara Boxer (D)       Matt Fong (R)

Manager           Rose Kapolczynski       Ron Rogers
Media             Greer, Margolis,        Russo Marsh & Assoc.
                  Mitchell, Burns

Pollster          The Mellman Group       Moore Information
Expenditures      $15,613,865             $10,818,417
Vote Percentage   53% (4,410,056 votes)   43% (3,575,078 votes)

He also sought to appeal to moderates by cultivating leaders of traditionally Democratic communities. He actively sought and received the endorsements of ex-U.S. Rep. Floyd Flake, a prominent African-American minister from Queens, and the Human Rights Campaign, a gay and lesbian organization. There was little expectation that these endorsements would move many black or gay votes, but the hope was that they would communicate an image of moderation and tolerance.

Lucky Breaks

As the incumbents sought to strengthen their positions from one coast to the other, challengers began to eye their seats. The good news for potential challengers was that there was a real opportunity to defeat the incumbents. The bad news was that this prospect attracted others, setting up potentially bruising primary fights.

In California, Republican State Treasurer Matt Fong faced a tough primary against car alarm magnate Darrell Issa. Issa had two things going for him. One was money. Lots of it. Worth $250 million, he made it clear he was willing "to spend what it takes" to win. (In the end, he spent $12 million.) Second, he had a base among conservatives energized by his positions on abortion, taxes and the environment.

Although Issa led for most of the campaign, he lost largely because of three late developments. First, voters turned against free-spending political novices, reacting especially negatively to Al Checchi's efforts to overcome a lack of governmental experience with a massive $40 million war chest in the Democratic gubernatorial primary.

Second, a spate of bad stories caught up with Issa. Former business associates accused Issa of arson and theft, while it also came to light that Issa had been indicted for car theft as a young man. These were especially harmful for an archconservative car alarm salesman.

Third, Issa let up at the end. Instead of turning up his already high volume of paid media, he kept it flat, allowing Fong to match him ad for ad in the final days.

Though Fong squeaked to a thin 2-point victory in the June primary, his campaign was broke. On June 30, he reported $215,000 on hand and more than $700,000 in debt. Boxer, meanwhile, reported almost $4 million in the bank with no debts.

In New York, U.S. Rep. Charles Schumer (D) was also a come-from-behind Senate primary winner. He faced former vice presidential candidate Geraldine Ferraro and New York City Public Advocate Mark Green. Early on, Ferraro ran well ahead in the polls. To overcome her lead, Schumer's strategy was threefold. First, raise lots of money. Second, use it to pound home a record of achievement on gun control, education, HMO reform and social security. Third, stay positive.

Not everyone agreed with this last point. Many thought that Schumer would have to attack Ferraro to peel voters away from her. The Schumer campaign, however, was horrified by the possibility of a repeat of the divisive, bloody '92 Democratic primary that saved D'Amato.

Ferraro's inability to get her own campaign off the ground made it unnecessary for Schumer to attack her. She sat on her lead in the polls, letting her fundraising lag while doing little to counter the perception that she had accomplished little.

Schumer's media consultant Hank Morris became convinced they were on the right track one day in early August when he toured pool clubs in the Bronx with Schumer. "When people heard his record, they came around," said Morris.

By the September 15 primary, Schumer rolled to a surprisingly easy 51-26-19 victory over his two rivals.

Having won their primaries, both challengers were well-positioned for strong campaigns. Both played to their parties' strengths, while moderating on other issues.

In California, Fong portrayed himself as a moderate alternative to Boxer. He combined traditionally conservative - and generally popular - stances on taxes, crime and national security with moderate positions on social issues.

Fong's middle-of-the-road platform on social issues was supposed to be an asset, but it seemed long on caution and short on appeal. On abortion, he refused to call himself either pro-choice or pro-life. His position was that he respected the right of a woman to get an abortion in the first trimester, but not beyond. On guns, he said the government should maintain existing restrictions on handguns, but should go no further. On gay issues, Fong said he is not a supporter of homosexual behavior, but was against discrimination.

Fong also hoped to use his Chinese ancestry to cut into Democratic strength among minority voters. Most promising was the possibility of attracting strong support from Asian-Americans.

In New York, Schumer also played to the strengths of his party while trying to blur its weak points. He had gained prominence for his work on gun control and had also been active on behalf of abortion rights, social security and education. But Schumer was also careful to protect himself against charges of being too liberal. In the early '90s, he moved away from opposition to the death penalty, and he talked openly about limiting government's role in curing social ills. He also stayed close enough to Wall Street interests to ensure not only a healthy donor base, but to preempt any "anti-business" labeling.

Quiet Approach

Boxer's camp decided to stay off the air during the primary. Dan Lungren, who was running essentially uncontested for the Republican nomination for governor, chose to go on the air during this period. Many thought Boxer should do the same to take the initiative and forestall an embarrassing low vote share in the "blanket" primary. However, Boxer's advisers thought that their ads would get lost in the primary shuffle. They held firm and stayed off the air.

California's primary is almost four months before the general election, and for the first three months after it, both candidates were unusually quiet. For Fong, especially, this was mostly a financial decision, as he had little money. Despite the quiet, however, he ran strong in the polls.

When Fong went up with TV ads, they were cautious and positive. He and his family spoke of tougher crime laws, lower taxes and school vouchers. They did not explicitly attack Boxer.

Many were surprised by his decision not to attack early. Fong's main advantage was Boxer's negatives. Fong's ads did little to push them along.

Boxer also started positive. Her early spots in mid-September touted her record. They were designed to build on media consultant Jim Margolis' three R's: reassurance, roots and record. By showing old home movies of Boxer as a young mother and current shots of her as a concerned grandmother, they sought to reassure Californians that Boxer shares their values.

But shortly thereafter, Boxer's campaign started to define the choice voters faced; that is, they turned the campaign's focus from a referendum on Boxer to a comparison of the two candidates. Margolis' firm did this by focusing on what he calls "voting decision issues" at the intersection of what swing voters care about and where Boxer had an advantage.

Three issues were crucial to Boxer's aggressive attack strategy: guns, abortion and the environment. On each, Boxer portrayed Fong as an extremist and Boxer as sensible. To ensure that the message would sink in, each spot was backed with at least 800 gross rating points of air time.

Fong's response to Boxer's attack blitz lacked resolve. He repeatedly asserted that the ads distorted his record, but never got much traction. For example, in response to Boxer's gun ad, Fong told the San Francisco Chronicle that he thought low-income people should be able to buy cheap handguns, making it unclear how Boxer's claims that Fong opposed banning Saturday Night Specials were distorting his record.

Fong's presence on TV was limited, as well, by a shortage of money. This shortage was in part due to decisions made outside of his campaign. For example, the National Republican Senatorial Committee decided that Republicans could get a better return on money spent in less expensive states such as Nevada, Kentucky and South Carolina.

The huge overhead of the Fong campaign also reduced its ability to finance a media effort. It spent only 35 percent of its $10 million on ads, far less than the 60 percent of the $15 million spent by Boxer.

When Fong finally went negative the Friday before the election, it was too little, too late. He ran ads featuring his popular mother, a former Secretary of State - and a Democrat - March Fong Eu calling Boxer "too liberal" and attacking Boxer for distorting Fong's record. "She should be ashamed," said Eu.

Fong went on the defensive again when the story broke a week before the election that he had given $50,000 in left over campaign money from a past race for state treasurer to the Traditional Values Coalition, a conservative organization working to ban same-sex marriages. Boxer seized on this as validation of her portrayal of Fong as being "out of the mainstream."

Fong's response was to sign a pledge to support more money for AIDS research and protection for gay workers. This action was unlikely to swing gay voters to his camp, while it only further demoralized conservatives wounded by Fong's "pro-nothing" position on abortion. Moderate voters, to whom the pledge was almost certainly pitched, were probably most impressed by an image of vacillation.

Meanwhile, Boxer was bringing together her messages in a final ad. It used credible third parties to argue "Fong is wrong" on a variety of issues, referring to statements by police on guns, nurses on HMOs and the Sierra Club on the environment. Boxer's campaign had planned two tracks of ads, one with its own messages and another responding to Fong's attacks. Without strong attacks from Fong, however, Boxer's camp stuck to its own ads for the duration.

Final Slugfest

There was nothing California casual about New York's race. Instead, it was a slugfest from the opening bell.

Twelve hours after Schumer won the Democratic nomination, rival D'Amato was on the air attacking him. The GOP ads were straight out of the D'Amato play-book: turn the focus on the challenger.

This was no surprise to the Schumer people. They had already prepared responses to go on the air immediately.

Their early goal was simple: "We knew we would be outspent early, so we just wanted to make sure we would stay alive," said Schumer media adviser Hank Morris.

Because D'Amato had a financial advantage, a key element of Schumer's early response was to use 10-second ads to maintain a TV presence. These ads were condensed from 30-second spots. The ads parried D'Amato's attacks, arguing, for example, that although D'Amato was attacking Schumer on crime, it was D'Amato who had voted against the crime bill that put 100,000 police on the streets.

The tag line on the ads was their most controversial element. It was "D'Amato: Too many lies for too long." Some thought it was too provocative and risked a backlash, but the campaign had found that part of D'Amato's appeal was his bulldog style. By acting tough early, Schumer made it clear he would not be bulldogged.

When it was clear Schumer was not going to wither under D'Amato's Tasmanian devil style of campaigning, the incumbent's campaign did not quite know how to respond. "He was trying to run a formulaic campaign when the formula no longer applied," said political analyst Jennifer Duffy. Beating up Schumer for being a liberal was not moving voters. Many observers questioned whether the patented liberal-bashing tactic of D'Amato's longtime general consultant, Arthur Finkelstein, was right for this race.

D'Amato's main issue turned out to be legislative votes Schumer missed in the House while he was campaigning in the Senate primary. D'Amato linked missed votes to specific issues, especially on votes of interest to Jewish voters.

However, the effectiveness of D'Amato's insistent focus on the missed votes was at best mixed. It may have raised doubts about Schumer among some swing voters, but it also alienated others, underscoring D'Amato's reputation as a cagey operator and nasty combatant. Many thought that focusing on Schumer's missed votes was a red herring inconsistent with the widespread belief that Schumer was one of the hardest workers in Congress.

A week before the election, D'Amato released an ad blasting Schumer for missing more House votes in the last 12 months than D'Amato missed in the last 12 years in the Senate. But the next day, it came out that D'Amato had, himself, missed almost 1,000 roll call votes when he first ran for Senate in 1980 as a member of the Nassau County Board of Supervisors.

Had Schumer's team known about D'Amato's missed votes earlier, they might have nipped the issue in the bud. Instead, D'Amato pounded away on it and then, when his earlier record was revealed, he looked like the hypocrite Schumer's folks had been portraying him as all along.

A big break for the Democrats was the so-called "putzhead" controversy. In a private meeting with Jewish leaders two weeks before the election, D'Amato referred to Schumer as a "putzhead." (and referred to rotund Democratic U.S. Rep. Jerry Nadler as "Waddler"). When challenged about the putzhead comment, D'Amato at first denied it: "I just have no knowledge of ever doing it. I just don't. All right? I think it's ridiculous."

Schumer siezed the opportunity to go on the offensive. He called the comment a "cheap slur." Nadler said it "shows a pattern of contempt for people generally, or, perhaps, for Jews in particular."

The incident resonated because it reinforced D'Amato's image as being mean-spirited and untrustworthy. It fit the "Too many lies for too long" theme.

Another bad break for D'Amato was the late October murder of an abortion doctor in Buffalo. This drew attention to the abortion issue and made it easier for the pro-choice side to demonize pro-lifers. The National Abortion Rights and Reproduction Action League released a commercial late in the campaign that capitalized on these concerns, linking anti-abortion violence to D'Amato's opposition to laws designed to protect clinics.

As the campaign closed, D'Amato went after Schumer's ethics based on a 1980 investigation of whether Schumer illegally used state workers in his congressional campaign. It gained little traction from the media; D'Amato had been linked to ethical probes himself.

Schumer, meanwhile, went after D'Amato on all fronts in an ad called "Decades." Newspaper clippings rolled by, documenting D'Amato controversies: his votes for property tax increases; a kickback scandal; speaking fees from special interests; a rebuke by the Senate ethics committee; the investigation of Hillary Clinton on Whitewater; votes to cut Medicare, Headstart and student loans; and opposition to campaign finance reform. It was an exhaustive list condensed into 30 seconds.

Finklestein Formula

On election night, incumbent Boxer and challenger Schumer swept to victory, the former winning by 10 percentage points, the latter by 8 points.

So what happened? First, it was clearly a good night for the Democrats across the country. Voters cared more about Democratic issues, polls showed, and were turned off by Republican efforts to impeach and remove the president.

Early in the campaign, the conventional wisdom had been that the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal would keep demoralized Democrats at home. This was thought to be an especially large problem for Boxer whose daughter is married to Hillary Clinton's brother and who faced criticism for her restraint in criticizing the president's behavior. Many thought that someone who had made her name attacking Clarence Thomas and Bob Packwood should not pull her punches for partisan, or even family, reasons.

However, while turnout was down in both states relative to the last midterm election, it fell slightly more in traditionally Republican areas. For example, turnout in New York City fell 10 percent, while it fell as much as 18 percent in firmly Republican areas such as Oneida County. D'Amato's campaign did little to push Republican turnout, relying instead on consultant Finkelstein's formula of allocating almost all money to TV over GOTV efforts.

In California, the pattern was similar. Overall turnout was down 3 percent, but dropped more in conservative bastions such as Orange County (down 5.5 percent), Kern County (down 6 percent) and Madera County (down 7 percent).

Another factor was that the Democrats kept their base. In California, Boxer conceded nothing on Asian or minority voters. She touted endorsements from prominent Asian-American politicians such as Gov. Gary Locke (D-WA) and Sen. Inouye (DHI) and linked Fong to the anti-immigrant policies of sitting GOP Gov. Pete Wilson as much as possible.

Among Asian voters, Fong was able to run 15 points ahead of Republican gubernatorial candidate Lungren, but still only received 44 percent, not much of a boost considering Asians comprised less than 5 percent of the California electorate. Among other minority groups, Fong made no headway, running the same as Lungren and garnering only 13 percent of African Americans and 23 percent of Hispanics. The only clear success among minorities for Fong was in fundraising, as Asian-Americans contributed over $1 million to his campaign.

D'Amato, too, had little success penetrating the Democratic base. Despite his tenacious efforts on behalf of the Jewish community, it was difficult for him to differentiate himself from Schumer on the group's issues. Schumer himself is Jewish and has a solid record on Jewish issues and is closer to the generally liberal views of many Jewish voters. On election day, D'Amato ran well behind Schumer among Jewish voters, with only 23 percent. D'Amato also made no inroads among minority or union voters.

What really drove the campaign, however, was the ability of the Democrats to drive up their opponent's negatives while presenting policies that appealed to swing voters. Driving up D'Amato's negatives was easier because he gave his opponent so much help, although it required aggressive ads and a mistake-free campaign.

Driving up Fong's negatives was tougher, as his caution seldom presented obvious targets. But Boxer's ads found issues people cared about and presented them in stark, easy to understand terms. And they worked. Before them, Fong's favorable to unfavorable ratings were 55-17. By mid-October they had fallen to 4.7 to 36. Even more remarkable, the ratings among independents went from 55-8 to 28-43.

Finding a Hook

So what can we take away from these two elections?

First, for unpopular incumbents, personality is not destiny. Being unpopular does not mean certain defeat. The key for an incumbent is to keep the campaign from becoming a referendum on him or her, but to make it a choice between two rivals.

Boxer found big shiny hooks in Fong's record on abortion, guns and the environment. D'Amato, on the other hand, could not penetrate Schumer's record. When he tried, on missed votes and ethics, his attacks either had little effect or backfired. Meanwhile, D'Amato - and fate - conspired to give Schumer a few decisive lucky breaks that put the incumbent on the defensive.

Second, overly cautious and complacent challengers lose. By assuming that Boxer's negatives would bring her down without any help from him, Fong let Boxer redefine the race. Exit polls showed that 43 percent of Fong's supporters were voting against Boxer. That was probably his best issue, and he did not push it as hard as he could have. Schumer, on the other hand, was anything but complacent, working hard to remind New Yorkers why it was time for D'Amato to go.

Third, issues matter. Boxer and Schumer presented voters with issue alternatives, especially on guns, abortion and education. The losing campaigns had few issue-based connections with swing voters.

These two races show that even a vulnerable incumbent is tough to beat; it takes an aggressive challenger campaign that can make the case that it's worth the voters' while to bring in someone new.

30-SECOND TV SPOT

"Decades" Schumer for Senate Producer/Consultant: Morris, Carrick & Guma

ANNOUNCER: D'Amato raises property taxes six times. D'Amato requires government workers to kick back salaries. D'Amato takes hundreds of thousands in speaking fees from special interests. D'Amato rebuked by Senate Ethics Committee. D'Amato conducts partisan hearings on Hillary Clinton. D'Amato votes with Gingrich to cut Medicare. D'Amato votes to cut Head Start, student loans and against school standards. D'Amato opposes campaign finance reform. D'Amato: Too wrong for too long.

"Favorite- Right" Boxer for Senate Producer/Consultant: Greer, Margolis, Mitchell, Burns & Associates

ANNOUNCER: This is a Saturday Night Special. It's the favorite gun of street criminals. This is an assault weapon. It's the favorite gun of drug dealers. This is Matt Fong. He's the gun lobby's favorite candidate for the Senate because he's against new bans on Saturday Night Specials and assault weapons. And this is Sen. Barbara Boxer. She's pushing for tough bans on Saturday Night Specials and assault weapons. That's why she's the favorite Senate candidate of California's police. Barbara Boxer. The right direction for California.

Michael Bailey is an assistant professor of government at Georgetown University.

COPYRIGHT 1999 Campaigns & Elections, Inc.
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