Battalion MDMP in a time-constrained environment - Training Notes
Jeffrey S. Buchanan"You can ask me for anything you like, except time."--Napoleon Bonaparte
It is 2100 on the second day of a rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). The commander of Company A receives a radio message from the battalion tactical operations center (TOC) that says, "The scouts have located a suspected Cortinian Liberation Front (CLF) cache point in the vicinity of LZ FALCON. Your mission is to destroy CLF and the cache no later than 2330 tonight to prevent the enemy from resupplying its forces in AO Rakkasan. You will get three UH-60s for three lifts and the takeoff time for the first lift is 2300. What are your questions?" The company commander quickly plots the grids and realizes that the pickup zone (PZ) is over two kilometers away, and that the only way to make it to the PZ is to move now. As the company moves to the PZ, the commander quickly formulates his ground tactical plan, landing plan, loading plan, and staging plan. At 2240 hours, Company A arrives at the PZ, the commander finishes disseminating the order as the aircraft approach, and most platoons get on the aircraft without a clear understanding of the mission or of what is expected.
This scenario is played out time after time during most unit rotations to the JRTC. But why? Is our time management that poor? Does our doctrine fail to support quick mission planning? The answer to both questions is yes. As an Army, we are poor time managers during planning, and the current military decision-making process (MDMP) at the battalion level is inefficient. The solution we have developed addresses more efficient time management by modifying the process. This article will address various tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for overcoming time management and mission planning.
The MDMP as described in Field Manual (FM) 101-5, Staff Organizations and Operations, may work well for corps and division-level operations. The complexity of operations at those levels dictates that multiple courses of action (COAs) be developed, analyzed, and compared in exacting detail to attain the best possible solution to each problem. Division and corps headquarters are generously staffed with real experts in their respective fields. Moreover, those who receive the orders generated by division and corps MDMP (brigades and divisions) are staffed with their own experts, capable of dissecting each order and initiating their own MDMPs.
Such is not the case for a typical infantry battalion. At the battalion level, operations are not (or should not be) very complex, and as a whole, the staff lacks experience and the company commanders and specialty platoon leaders have no staffs.
This ponderous process has taken on a life of its own. Many practitioners forget that the MDMP is a means, not an end. Instructors, evaluators, and observer controllers delight in critiquing a unit's MDMP. "After all," many seem to think, "the MDMP is a recipe book ... if I add all the ingredients in the right sequence and cook to order, I'll create a masterpiece." The problem is that the best process in the world can still generate a poor plan. What is important is getting a workable plan to the consumers early enough that they can accomplish the mission.
The TTPs we use are a combination of techniques currently in vogue at the combat training centers and many of our branch schools. There is nothing new or revolutionary in our system, but it works for us. This system is not the answer to all of our decision-making problems. In fact, the intent of this article is not to provide "the answer," but rather to offer some TTPs and, more important, to stimulate thought about how a battalion can get a workable plan to the companies early enough to have a positive, instead of negative, effect on the probable outcome.
Time Management
General George S. Patton, Jr., once said that execution, rather than planning, amounts to 95 percent of mission accomplishment. He also directed that army-level orders "should not exceed a page and a half of type-written text with the back of the page reserved for a sketch map." As a result, commanders were able to conduct their own planning, preparations, and rehearsals instead of having to wait for a higher headquarters to crank out an exhaustive operations order (OPORD). A side benefit is that when the consumers do not have to sift through a half-inch thick document to find the few pieces of valuable information. They can be more efficient in their planning, and once again, devote more time to rehearsals.
Rehearsals are critical in achieving two results: First, everyone understands each part of the plan, and second, everyone is fully prepared to act when the plan does not go exactly according to the script. The perfect plan (if one has ever existed) never won a battle, but Soldiers who understood the plan and then executed it won the fight.
At the battalion level, those rehearsals consist of at least a maneuver or combined arms rehearsal, a fire support rehearsal, a reconnaissance rehearsal, and a combat service support (CSS)/CHS rehearsal. At the squad and platoon levels, the rehearsals are both mission-specific and general--namely the critical battle drills for a given operation. Without the sound management of available time, rehearsals are often the first items to be cut.
When a one-third/two-thirds time management tool is used, most units are greatly stressed. A probable scenario follows: The brigade staff gets the order from the division on Day 1, with an execution time of Day 3. The brigade issues its order on Day 2, and the battalion issues its order on Day 2 1/2. This leaves the company commander less than one day to plan and rehearse. By the time the squad leader receives his order, his squad is moving to the objective.
We have been effective in using a one-fifth/four fifths rule. It is generally applied the same way as the one-third/two-thirds rule, but with a few exceptions. The first exception is to develop a detailed time line that supports the rule and a staff well trained and disciplined to follow that time standard. The second is that the battalion executive officer (XO) dedicates a block of time for company commanders. This amounts to two-fifths of the total time available--"blocked" to the companies in which the battalion staff will not plan any rehearsals, back briefs, or meetings--thus allowing companies time to focus on the mission without interruption. It is our experience that any one event can expand to fill the available time. When the time available to the battalion is cut from one-third to one-fifth of the total time, there is not much time to waste. The result is often an order that is less than perfect, but we make up for the imperfection with a generous helping of rehearsals at all levels.
Commander Involvement
Probably the most important aspect of our battalion's planning process is the involvement of the commander. We don't waste the time or energy having the staff develop, war game, and then compare various courses of action. We use the directed or "focused" course-of-action technique. The commander, S-2, S-3, and fire support officer (FSO) attend the brigade OPORD. Immediately after this order, the commander sketches out a course of action and then modifies it on the basis of S-2, S3, and FSO input. Upon return to the TOC, the staff gives a quick mission analysis brief, and then the commander solicits input on the course of action from the XO and the command sergeant major (CSM). Given those modifications, the commander develops his commander's guidance.
Below is an outline of the Commander's Guidance Checklist we use at the completion of mission analysis. Although it may seem a bit too detailed, it focuses the staff; essentially it is "how I see the terrain; how I see the enemy; how I see us; and here's what I want you to do":
As you can see by our format, the commander's guidance is a fairly detailed description of the way the commander sees the enemy, the terrain, and our unit. He personally drafts the course of action and determines what critical decisions he or the enemy commander must make--along with corresponding draft commander's critical intelligence requirements (CCIRs). Finally he directs the course of action and provides planning guidance for each BOS. We have the format for the commander's guidance printed on carbon paper so that copies are readily available for the staff to use in building the order, without having to depend on a copy machine. That planning guidance is also attached to Warning Order 2 to the companies, so that the company commanders can get on board early in the process.
Battalion MDMP Sequence
A condensed description of our battalion's MDMP is shown in Figure 2. Following the commander's guidance, the staff does a quick suitability, feasibility, and acceptability check of the COA, and the S-3 refines it. He then briefs the staff on the refined COA to set the stage for the war game. The purpose of our war game is not to analyze and compare courses of action, but to synchronize the one we have selected and identify or refine the decision points and CCIRs. Immediately after the war game, the staff finalizes the OPORD for publication.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
The Matrix Order
Another way to improve time management and facilitate the orders process is to use a quick and easily transferable OPORD format (see Figure 3). This format also doubles as the warning order (WARNORD)/fragmentary order (FRAGO) format. The order itself is a pre-printed form that is made of transferable carbon paper. This allows us to write WARNOs, FRAGOs, and OPORDS without being wedded to a computer or a copy machine. The format is a blocked matrix order, with all the parts of the five-paragraph OPORD.
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
There is not a lot of room for unnecessary verbiage in a two-page matrix order, so the staff has to distill the various tasks, purposes, and coordinating instructions into what is truly important for the company commanders. The company commanders don't have to search for those important details, and the result is a better common understanding of the plan. Note that each staff officer is restricted to a one-page annex only. Below is the base order found in our TACSOP.
Warning orders are written on this format, with whatever information is available, to put out to subordinate units. As the staff continues with planning, a new warning order is written that incorporates new information and information already published. This allows the subordinate units to begin parallel planning. Most of the operations order is written after the COA and before the war game. At the conclusion of the war game, we publish the final operations order.
Units will continue to conduct operations in time-constrained environments--and many with unclear guidance and plans--unless commanders take control of time management and adjust the MDMP process.
Although we never seem to have enough time or information to execute a mission, the key to success is to issue quick and clear orders, parallel plan with higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters, and rehearse the plan thoroughly. If they get a perfect plan too late, we will all fail. Our squads and platoon win the fight. If they get a workable plan early enough to aid in mission preparation, we will all succeed.
EVENT ATTENDEES ACTION
Receive BN CDR - Send copy to BN XO
mission room S-2 - Staff examines
BDE FSO, LNO - Determine TF's
purpose
BN staff XO, S-1, AS-2 STAFF HUDDLE #1
conducts AS-3, S-3 AIR, S-4 - CDRs' intent
mission ALL SLICE - Higher mission
analysis - Nestling diagram
- Critical times
- Essential tasks
- CSS considerations
- XO guidance
BN CDR ALL Staff STAFF HUDDLE #2
returns - Rec CDR guidance
Mission ALL Staff Mission Analysis Brief
Analysis Brief
to BN CDR
COA CDR and Staff - Receive CDR Guidance
Development/H on COA
asty Wargame - Hasty Wargame of COA
Initial Targeting CDR, XO, S-3, S-2 Initial TGTS, Priority
Meeting FSO
COA Brief to CDR and Staff Deliberate wargame
Meeting
R&S Meeting CDR, XO, S-3, S-3, Collection Planning
FSO
Detailed CDR and Staff Deliberate war game
Wargame
BN CDR CDR RECON
RECON
OPORD Prep Planning group - Staff pargraphs
- Annexee submitted
OPORD Brief CDRs and Staff Brief to Task Force
Confirmation BN, CDR, CO Brief Task and Purpose
Briefs CDRS,
Special PLs
Execute R&S S-2, S-3, FSO, R&S Early insertion of R&S
Plan
Company Time Companies Develop co orders
Final CO CDRs to BN Backbrief format
Backbriefs CDR
Air Mission S-3s, S-3 Airs, Complete AMB
Coordination BAE, LNOs checklists
Meeting
Air Mission Orders Group, Brief to Task Force
Brief CDRs, AVN LNO
Flight Leader
TF Rehearsals BDE TF Leaders COMMEX
R&S, FS, Man, CSS/
CHS, PZ rehearsals,
FS Rehearsal
EVENT PRODUCT/OUTCOME
Receive
mission room
BDE
BN staff - WARNO 31
conducts - Reverse BOS
mission worksheets
analysis - Mission analysis
worksheets
- Staff estimates
BN CDR - RFIs to BDE
returns - Finish MA Brief
Mission - Staff requests CDR's
Analysis Brief guidance
to BN CDR - Approved planning
timeline
WARNO #2
COA - COA sketches
Development/H - COA
asty Wargame
Initial Targeting HPTL
Meeting
COA Brief to - Final task organization
Meeting - Operational graphics
- Synchronization matrix
- Decision support
template
- BN R&S
R&S Meeting Collection Matrix and
Plan
Detailed - Final Task
Wargame Organization
- Operational graphics
- Synchronization matrix
- Decision support
template
- BN R&S Plan
BN CDR Confirm plan
RECON
OPORD Prep OPORD
OPORD Brief OPORD disseminated
Confirmation
Briefs
Execute R&S
Plan
Company Time
Final Map board and graphics
Backbriefs
Air Mission AMB products
Coordination
Meeting
Air Mission AMB package
Brief
TF Rehearsals Mutual understanding of
Operation
When this article was written, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey S. Buchanan, Major Todd Wood, and Major Jim Larsen were assigned to the 187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division.
COPYRIGHT 2003 U.S. Army Infantry School
COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group