Clinton sounds good: but now a word from Scrooge - problems with communitarianism - Editorial

There are various ways, in addition to tranquilizers, of coping with the fissiparous and contingent nature of modern life. Philosophically many of those on the liberal end of the spectrum, including Commonweal, look to communitarianism as a way of ameliorating the distortions of liberal individualism. Communitarianism emphasizes the reciprocal nature of rights and responsibilities, and embraces traditional mediating institutions such as the family, churches, and neighborhoods in an effort to forge a sense of moral cohesion and political momentum. It's modern liberalism's somewhat dowdy and sensible cousin.

In the Chronicle of Higher Education (December 2, 1992) the political philosopher William A. Galston wrote enthusiastically of President-elect Bill Clinton's use of communitarian ideas and rhetoric ("New Covenant," etc.). Galston thinks the communitarian critique of Reaganism and of rights-based, interest-group liberalism offers a "|third' way of conceiving government and policy."

This is a complex argument and it can be too easily over-simplified. I have strong sympathy for the communitarian agenda, and some version of it is doubtless the best hope for the Democratic party. Yet I suspect that communitarianism's hope of marrying a liberal sense of self-determination with some compelling idea of the common good is finally sentimental - more a symptom of what we have undoubtedly lost than a realistic appraisal of the fractious conditions we face.

If we are serious about pluralism, we may have to live with a public language that has few words for solidarity and perhaps even fewer about the common good. That's a recipe for political frustration, but ironically we probably have little choice in the matter. Where choice is the first principle of social and political organization, moral inconclusiveness is the admission price.

Communitarianism's hope for mediating institutions seems forlorn as well. Families and churches, not to mention neighborhoods, are hardly the crucibles of identity they were even forty years ago. We are all liberals now, and that means we see ourselves as free to choose even our most basic associations. The idea that a church or any other organization might exert some self-evident moral claim on anyone is hard to square with increasingly absolutist notions of the autonomous self. As David Carlin writes in this issue, an "institutional identity" is archaic in a mobile and achieving society such as ours. Where the rub comes is in the ineffectuality of liberal institutions such as public schools or welfare agencies. The social and moral strength of traditional institutions - their ability to sustain relationships, solve problems, and care for their own - is understandably envied in a society where too many people experience "mobility" as the fall beyond institutional protections of any kind. That envy accounts for much of communitarianism's appeal.

Communitarians argue that we can achieve a common good without sacrificing essential liberal prerogatives. Galston, for example, claims that such alchemy is evident in the civil rights and environmental movements. He hopes more dramatic political progress based "on widely shared moral sentiments" lies ahead in the areas of the family, work, and citizen responsibility. I hope he's right, but I wonder. The civil rights and environmental agendas are problematic, to say the least. And exactly what are our "shared moral sentiments" about the family?

Aside from Clinton's skillful use of rhetoric, I see little evidence that the Democratic party is interested in moral consensus on issues such as abortion, crime, welfare, feminism, homosexual rights, or race. If abortion is any indication, compromise is viewed as tantamount to betrayal. On the most neuralgic cultural issues, the pursuit of group self-interest remains the paradigm. If Clinton's cabinet appointment process is any indication of how Democrats will govern, dividing up the pie remains a much greater passion than either sharing or expanding it. No less than classic market capitalism, interest-group politics holds that the whole is best served by the minimally restrained ambitions of its competing parts.

Clinton has been something of a genius in bringing together his party, but it remains to be seen whether a "third way" exists. I fear that the logic of liberalism as popularly understood will only continue to erode the idea of moral consensus. And ultimately, I don't see how communitarianism can overcome the problem of voluntary association inherent in the broader liberal vision it embraces. Our liberal faith and sense of self demand that all social relations, from marriage to religion, be freely chosen and freely terminated if so desired. This has proved a great liberation, at least for those who can take advantage of such freedoms. But politically and socially it means that sustaining any community of obligation or any organizational effort over time is very difficult, for that requires making choices, not just praising choice. Our political energies go into attracting and securing an always precarious loyalty - as Clinton's representational cabinet suggests - not solving problems. Solving problems requires a more explicit and binding moral commitment - a firmer institutional identity if you will-than liberalism seems capable of tolerating.

I hope Clinton proves me wrong and that Galston is right on these questions. But at the moment I just don't see many "shared moral sentiments" on the horizon. In the end, I suspect that we come to share moral sentiments when we share institutional commitments, and not the other way round.

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