Engineer Success on the JRTC Battlefield: An OPFOR Engineer Perspective - Joint Readiness Training Center - Opposing Force

Serving as the Opposing Force (OPFOR) task-force engineer for 18 rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, provided key insight on how successful engineer operations allow a brigade-plus organization to accomplish a wartime mission. Each year, 10 light infantry brigades came to JRTC to participate in one of the most realistic combat-training exercises in the U.S. military. Brigade commanders are expected to accomplish the given mission while leading 6,000 soldiers, dealing with the challenge of a role-playing civilian populace and news media and, of course, conducting combat operations against the insurgent and invading forces of Cortina, a fictitious country developed by the staff at JRTC. An important lesson learned by each brigade is the importance of mobility, countermobilty, and survivability operations to mission accomplishment.

Engineers preparing to enter Cortina need to understand a few important concepts to enjoy success on this light battlefield. First, they must understand the strengths and weaknesses of the OPFOR. Second, a Blue Force (BLUFOR) unit must secure and guard an OPFOR obstacle once it is encountered. Third, and most important, securing the breach site is the key to a successful breach on the JRTC battlefield.

Understand OPFOR Strengths and Weaknesses

The OPFOR at JRTC has many strengths and weaknesses that differ from U.S. units. The forces of Cortina do not have the resources on which U.S. soldiers rely. The enemy soldiers are forced to substitute ingenuity and tenacity to compensate for this lack of resources. Success can be gained by understanding the strengths and weaknesses of this enemy.

OPFOR Class IV and V supplies are very limited for countermobility operations. An S2 can analyze the known enemy obstacle on the ground against the templated Class IV and V resources to determine future countermobility capability. The typical complex obstacle found in Cortina during a People's Democratic Republic of Atlantica (PDRA) defense contains 40 rolls of wire and 15 mines (see figure on page 37).

The TM-62 is used in probable breach points due to the effectiveness allowed by its fuse. Although there are many variants, the version of the TM-62 portrayed at JRTC has a seismic, magnetic, and pressure fuse. It is the antitank (AT) mine preferred by OPFOR soldiers on the ground. The box mines (YAM-5 and TMB-D) are not as effective, and they are difficult to bury properly because of their large size and rectangular shape. The AT mines will be reinforced and protected by antipersonnel (AP) mines, typically OZM-3s, either placed on the flanks or tied in to the wire obstacle (very effective method). Air-delivered scatterable mines can be used by the PDRA. The system requires multiple passes from the MI-17 HIP (helicopter) for emplacement. This platform is extremely vulnerable to U.S. Army air-defense-artillery assets and is not as capable as an air Volcano for seeding a large area (only 200 by 100 meters).

The OPFOR in Cortina has a very limited amount of combat power to maneuver against the enemy. The Cortina Liberation Front typically fields about 150 soldiers during the low-intensity conflict. The PDRA will have less than 250 soldiers and a small mechanized counterattack force during defensive operations. The importance of these numbers to the task-force engineer is the limited number of troops providing security at the obstacles. A platoon or less will provide cover and observation for a major tactical obstacle. The OPFOR infantry has very few transportation assets and therefore a limited ability to move forces quickly in the area of operations. The tanks and Soviet mechanized infantry vehicles (BMPs) can move quickly to provide supporting fires, 'but once they have started their engines, it is only a matter of time before OH-58 helicopters or AC-130 aircraft will find them by their thermal image. Therefore, the OPFOR commander will only bring mechanized forces out of hide sites when he sees that the situa tion is urgent and is willing to risk those assets. One important method the OPFOR uses to make up for a lack of troops is employing the Leesville Urban Group (LUG). These terrorists in civilian clothes and long hair blend with the population to provide intelligence on BLUFOR activities. They routinely infiltrate a U.S. perimeter under some false pretense of making site sketches to post in the Cortina Liberation Front's tactical-operations center. They will also be called on to execute offensive terrorist operations such as nick bombs, truck bombs, sniper attacks, and ambushes.

OPFOR indirect-fire assets used against breaching forces are also at risk. Mortar teams have to displace quickly to avoid counterfire (typically 4 minutes or less). Artillery acquired by the AN/TPQ-36 Fire-Finder Radar System will usually receive counterfire before it can displace. The OPFOR will have soldiers or terrorists from the LUGs that report the direction of the AN/TPQ-36. The task-force engineer should ensure that his soldiers are receiving radar coverage during breaching operations. When covered by the AN/TPQ-36, the OPFOR's willingness to fire on a breach point will be affected. The obstacle will be tied in to the terrain (usually water or a swamp) and covered by 82-millimeter mortar, if not by artillery or rocket fire.

BLUFOR engineers preparing for the defense need to understand the mobility of the OPFOR while fighting as the PDRA. The day before the attack, division recon units travel the planned mechanized attack routes to report obstacle construction and disposition of BLUFOR troops. They are followed by the brigade recon to give an updated status. Both recon forces avoid contact unless a high-payoff target presents itself (parked Volcanoes are a favorite). Light forces begin marching the night before the attack, clearing the route with attached sappers and killing the BLUFOR securing the route.

Important targets for the dismounted forces are Volcanoes, Modular Pack Mine Systems (MOPMS), and Hornets that have yet to be employed. The BLUFOR typically do not employ these systems more than 4 hours before the attack due to the short-duration destruction times. Dismounted forces that find and destroy these assets before they are activated avoid a tactical breach, which makes it difficult for the BLUFOR to fill the gap before the main effort arrives. OPFOR companies on the dismounted routes leave a soldier at each point of breach to ensure that the mechanized attack finds the lane and passes through the obstacle. The mechanized attack launches at first light on the morning of the attack. The OPEOR is prepared to shift its main effort minutes before rollout.

The mobility of the T-62s is an important factor to consider when preparing an obstacle plan. The OPFOR mechanized troop is accustomed to travelling through the swamps. Do not expect them to follow the road or well-established trails. They regularly surprise U.S. forces by emerging from the wood line at a high rate of speed, at times within the arming range of a tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile. They also are not afraid of the poor traction in the lowlands. During some rotations, the OPFOR loses more tracks by getting stuck in the mud than from enemy fire. By moving through these unexpected avenues of approach, they are able to appear at the brigade support area or tactical-operations center with few casualties. Some T-62s are equipped with a mine-clearing plow. This is an important fact to remember when templating a scatterable minefield. The low density of AT mines in scatterable minefields makes them an easy breach for mechanized forces trained in proper plow techniques. The mec hanized attack has several plow tanks that are proficient in the breaching drill.

Secure OPFOR Obstacles

The BLUFOR must secure the area around an OPEOR obstacle once it is encountered on the JRTC battlefield. The OPFOR uses an obstacle as a choke point to commit its limited forces. The PDRA commander often launches his limited mechanized assets or even moves infantry to capitalize on BLUFOR preoccupied with beaching operations. Many times BLUFOR troops encounter an obstacle and either fail to report its location or their report is ignored. These mistakes cause other BLUFOR vehicles to be involved in mine strikes or an ambush.

The engineer company needs to identify, mark, and breach each obstacle. In addition, the obstacle needs continued observation and clearing to protect against reseeding of the minefield. OPFOR soldiers will place an additional mine at the end of a breach lane to produce casualties and weaken the BLUFOR's confidence in the routes. Any minefield that is cleared and then left unsecure will have the same wire strung back across the road. Mines taken from a local cache are also emplaced. If a minefield is not to be completely cleared, the cleared lane needs to be marked with a system that will withstand heavy military traffic and forces civilian traffic to drive only through the cleared lane.

Concertina wire that funnels the traffic is a proven technique. Any marking system that allows a driver to stray from the lane, go around the marking system, or knock down the markers will lead to BLUFOR casualties. In addition, Cortinian natives who were not briefed on a lane-marking system will also use the breach lane during their daily travels. A destroyed civilian vehicle in a BLUFOR-controlled obstacle does not look good on the national newscast.

Secure the Breach Site

Securing the operation site is the key to a successful breach on the JRTC battlefield. The other breaching fundamentals--suppress, obscure, reduce and secure--must also be completed to standard, but the enemy's eyes on the obstacle are his strength. Properly securing the obstacle will prevent the OPFOR from observing the attacking BLUFOR and calling observed indirect fire.

Suppress. Suppression of the target is most effectively executed by using indirect fire. The OPFOR providing security of the obstacle will not show itself when presented with an organized breach force. This makes direct-fire suppression very difficult. The OPFOR remains in the vegetation and interdicts the enemy using its own indirect assets (primarily 82-millimeter mortars). In addition, small-arms direct-fire engagements typically come out in the OPFOR's favor.

Obscure. Obscuration of the obstacle reduces the number of direct-fire casualties but will not eliminate casualties due to indirect fire. Keeping in mind the small size of the typical obstacle emplaced by Cortinian forces, obscuring the exact location of soldiers is not sufficient to save them from mortar rounds. The OPFOR commander will direct his troops to have a 10-digit grid coordinate for the obstacle and probable breach points. The blast radius of an 82-millimetermortarora 152-millimeter artillery round will affect the engineers in and around the wire. Coordinate with the chemical units or fire-support officer to assure that the smoke will arrive on time and on target.

Reduce. Reduction of the obstacle needs to be executed quickly. All mines are subsurface unless placed on a hardball road. Do not attempt to remove the mines from the route. The seismic fuse on the TM-62 will kill anyone who attempts to remove it. Be aware of OZM-3 trip wires while approaching and cutting the concertina. The OPFOR in the defense shifts forces to affect BLUFOR troops during a breach. The force augmentation could range from a few scouts to a tank-BMP team. Moving BLUFOR forces through the breach allows them to fight in an open area past the obstacle and out of the planned engagement area.

Secure. Securing the operation site is the key to a successful breach on the JRTC battlefield. The small number of OPFOR soldiers providing observation on the obstacle demonstrates that indirect fire is the key to obstacles in Cortina. The first rounds cause casualties and begin the casualty-evacuation process. Each successive wave of BLUFOR trying to breach and rescue fallen comrades only adds to the pain of the process. Infantry forces must secure the point of breach and clear the surrounding area through occupation before the obstacle can be reduced. Searching the immediate area flushes out OPFOR and identifies hide sites. Once the immediate area is secured, the surrounding terrain needs to be swept to ensure that OPEOR scouts are not waiting to call a fire mission. Removing OPFOR eyes from the obstacle makes the reduction an easy battle drill.

Conclusion

Engineers who heed these suggestions will be more successful both on the JRTC battlefield and in light conflicts. Remember to know and understand the OPFOR. Locate the obstacle, secure the site, and remain in control of the area after the breach. This knowledge will allow the most intelligent use of engineer forces in the breach and the defense, greatly improve the BLUFOR's performance, and produce a better-trained and -prepared force.

Captain Matthews is the S4 of the 27th Engineer Battalion (ABN), Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He was previously the OPEOR task-force engineer, 1/509 Infantry (ABN), at the JRTC; assistant operations officer, HHC/20th Engineer Brigade (ABN), Fort Bragg; and vertical platoon leader, Fort Polk. CPT Matthews holds a bachelor of science degree in civil engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology and is a graduate of the Airborne, Jumpmaster, and Ranger Schools. He is a professional engineer in Missouri.

COPYRIGHT 2001 U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center
COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group