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  • 标题:Full-spectrum indirect fire support
  • 作者:Keith J. Bucklew
  • 期刊名称:Infantry Magazine
  • 印刷版ISSN:0019-9532
  • 出版年度:2004
  • 卷号:July-August 2004
  • 出版社:U.S. Army Infantry School

Full-spectrum indirect fire support

Keith J. Bucklew

An indirect fire support system by my other name is still an indirect fire support system. Those of us who profess to be professional fire supporters and/or artillerymen (or artillerists) ought to look where we can further employ our expertise for the betterment of our Army and our fighting forces. One such area, which many within our circles often dismiss, is the employment of mortars. Mortars come in all shapes and sizes, but the Army currently fields 60mm, 81mm, and 120mm mortars.

For obvious reasons mortar systems have been inherent to infantry MTOEs (modified tables of organization and equipment) for many years. Despite the evolutional shift to precision fires, there remains a viable need for responsive area fires. If you doubt this, ask ally infantryman who has been in combat.

Infantrymen tend to focus on the employment of their direct fire systems, regardless of their worth. Consequently, while infantrymen will never surrender their mortars, they do not prioritize them as highly as their primary direct fire weapon systems.

A solution to this ageless issue may seem revolutionary. But in this era of transformation, we are being challenged to "think out of the box." I submit we need to "get out of the box." Put another way, we need to "expand the fire support box." Undoubtedly, file Army's modularity study will address this issue. So, help may be on the way.

Infantry MTOEs should be modified to fill mortar sections and platoons with 13-series MOS Soldiers. Fire support Soldiers would fill the positions as mortarmen, similar to 13B cannoneers, and mortar fire direction centers' (FDCs) Soldiers would be staffed similar to the 13E MOS. Similarly, officers in roles as mortar platoon leaders would be 13-series. Other specialties (intelligence, medical, and signal) have embedded their branch specific Soldiers in infantry, armor, and field artillery units for many years. Why should we be any different? The crux of the issue is putting those who are best qualified in the job. First, let me say there are many high quality Soldiers who are mortarmen. My point is that those who specialize in indirect fire support should be charged with managing, training, equipping, and resourcing all fire support, not just a portion of it. For years the infantry has relied upon the direct support (DS) artillery battalion to help train their mortar crews and mortar fire direction centers. Let's just take it a step further and incorporate fire support personnel into the mortar crews. Just as the 13F MOS was created almost 25 years ago to include artillery and mortar forward observers, so too should the remainder of the mortar equation be transformed. The time for this change is now. Accurate and timely indirect fire support is the service we provide. We should be the full-spectrum provider of indirect (and/or non-line-of-sight) fire support, not just the keeper of cannons and rockets.

For several years the artillery community has been accused of walking away from the close fight. This change would serve greatly to dispel this notion. Fire supporters are committed to support the close fight, I would presume our infantry brethren would greatly welcome our desire to provide our indirect fire expertise and manning to make the task force a more ready and capable fighting force. Clearly this change would take some responsibility away from the infantry, but the maneuver commander should still retain ownership, as the mortars should remain on the infantry MTOE. Another positive aspect of this change is that closer integration of mortar fires in the overall fire support plan could and should be greatly enhanced.

A major portion of Army Transformation involves the expansion of the quantity of maneuver brigades. As this develops, cannon battalions will be either assigned or organic to the maneuver brigades. As these "Units of Action" are designed, so too will the weapon systems be addressed.

The advent of the 120mm mortar prompts some questions. At the risk of stirring the pot and provoking a different viewpoint I ask, "Is the 105mm howitzer needed?" The combined attributes of the 120mm mortar (range, lethality, mobility, flexibility, and rate of fire) surpass the capabilities of the 105mm howitzer. A variant of this whole issue could be to field the 120mm mortar as the primary weapon system tot light field artillery battalions in direct support of light infantry. The DS battalion would include three batteries of 120mm mortars and one battery of towed 155mm howitzers. Yet another option would be two eight-howitzer batteries of either 105mm or 155mm and one battery of 120mm mortars.

By now, traditional artillerymen may be experiencing dizziness and queasy stomachs. Breaking out of our comfort zones and traditional ways and means will do that. It involves change and risk-taking. But it's time for fire supporters to expand and transition. We are the Army's all-weather, fully capable providers of fire support. Our mission does not change: we must provide accurate and timely fires to support the maneuver commander. What must change is HOW we do it. We need to step forward and ask for this opportunity to enhance fires in the close fight. Then, we need to give this initiative the horsepower to do it right.

COLONEL KEITH J. BUCKLEW

Commander,

138th Regiment (Combat Arms),

Indiana Army National Guard

COPYRIGHT 2004 U.S. Army Infantry School
COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group

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