Harsh arson prevention lesson

The fire that occurred at Lower Hayes, Black Lane in Macclesfield on June 6, 2004 was clearly preventable. A range of partner organisations identified that a serious incident was imminent. Even though this was the case and numerous interventions were taken to prevent the fire, it still occurred. This incident highlights how far we have come but more importantly, the potential for the future

The cost of the fire in Macclesfield for those agencies involved will run into millions of pounds at this time they stand at 1.3 million [pounds sterling], which does not include policing costs, nor does it take into account the consequential loss or environmental impact). Whilst all the agencies involved took the threat Seriously, it is not until we take a collective responsibility to tackle the problem of arson and its cost, will we be able to prevent such fires occurring.

In certain areas almost 70 per cent of Cheshire Fire Service's activity is due to deliberate fires. These can only be tackled and prevented by working in partnership. We need to develop more robust working policies, procedures and relationships to tackle arson. This incident highlights how far we have come but more importantly, the potential for the future.

Background

Lower Hayes, Black Lane in Macclesfield was built in the mid-1920s. The whole building comprises two floors measuring approximately 200 x 60m. It is built of brick under a slate roof with cast iron columns with Northern Lights.

Being an old mill there was little or no fire separation. Like other similar premises it has recently been in multiple occupancy. The current partial occupiers prior to this fire were a carpet wholesalers that was to re-locate to Bollington within the next month. Directly adjacent to the building, some six metres away another company occupied an outbuilding of similar construction which was used for large scale flammable liquid storage.

PREVIOUS INCIDENTS

In the last 12 months Cheshire Fire Service had attended six incidents on this site of varying levels of seriousness. The first fire in May 2003 involved the first floor above the carpet wholesalers. This area was used as a go-kart track for remote control cars Regionally, this track was highly regarded as a premier facility and offered pleasure and recreation to hundreds of people.

Twelve months ago the building had become an area where young people would meet in the ground and first floor and it was evident that alcohol consumption and drug abuse had been taking place. The general surrounding area has a high degree of social problems. The fire, which occurred in May, was started on the first floor.

Access for the youths was easy due to the total lack of security or boarding up. The race track area was separated from the derelict part of the mill by plywood sheeting across the original openings. Holes had been punched in the sheets and a flammable liquid poured through which then ran under the timber grandstand area adjacent to the track. It is believed that burning paper was pushed through the hole to ignite the liquid.

This fire developed rapidly due to the timber partitions spreading to the roof--which caused approximately 50 per cent of the roof area to collapse. The fire was attended by seven fire engines and one hydraulic platform. The fire took a total of five hours to bring trader control and extinguish. Whilst it was clearly recordable as arson, no one was charged or prosecuted.

Between January 2004 and the large blaze in June 2004, the service attended four small fires, three of these occurred over the weekend of Sunday and Monday May 30-31, 2004, which was a bank holiday.

On May 31, youths in the area verbally abused service personnel and damaged vehicles by kicking them. It is thought that several of the youths involved were known to be in breach of Anti-Social Behaviour Actions (ASBOs). At this point the local Station Commander, Ian Swan, who was aware of this escalating problem, implemented the Arson Intervention Plan. This entailed organising a joint site meeting, which occurred on June 1, involving the local borough council, the companies occupying the site, and the local police. Local youth offending teams were alerted to take action by a Cheshire Fire Service youth support officer.

At this meeting it was established that one of the companies had unsecured, hazardous storage of substances outside the building and close to the River Bollin. Also on site were large numbers of pallets and considerable amounts of refuse. Additionally, several broken windows at ground floor level offered easy access.

All parties who attended the meeting were given literature, detailing actions to be undertaken to prevent arson. A joint inspection was undertaken which highlighted concerns of building safety based on the derelict nature of the building. The borough council technical services representative agreed to contact the building owner to discuss site security. The borough council and the Fire Service felt the preferred option was to demolish. If this could not be achieved then immediate steps needed to be taken to ensure site security.

As an interim measure, the police community support officers and wardens agreed to patrol the area on a regular basis. On completion of the site inspection the number and locations of pallet and refuse storage was highlighted, as well as potential accessibility to stored stock.

This overall approach to arson prevention is based on three stages:

Stage 1--Will be at station level. Station personnel would incorporate local actions using the Community Fire Safety (CFS) Firefighter Tool Kit.

Stage 2--Where the arson problem is more complex to deal with than at Stage 1, joint action between the stations and the local Action Task Force (ATF) is required.

Stage 3--Will be at corporate level The local elected member who is also a member of the fire authority was given a written briefing.

INVOLVING THE LOCAL MEDIA

At a local level a press release was produced in order to focus the problem of anti-social behaviour and targeting of parents asking them to be aware of what their young people were involved in and the potential dangers. Additionally, the local community safety officer made arrangements to appear on the local radio station to highlight these issues. The officer regularly has input to the radio station to promote community safety.

Common Acknowledgement

By this stage a range of partners recognised there was a very serious potential for an incident of arson and subsequent large fires. On June 2 a re-inspection took place. The company storing flammable chemicals had secured their premises. However, no actions had been taken by the site owners or carpet wholesalers.

The Fire

On June 6 at 1733 two fire engines were mobilised following a 999 call. The caller stated smoke was coming from a mill in Black Lane. Firefighters were on the scene within five minutes. On arrival crews were met with a serious fire which had started on the ground floor.

The fire, which involved hundreds of tons of palletised carpet tiles, was developing rapidly and smoke logging the entire building. Initially, firefighters wearing breathing apparatus tried to extinguish the blaze. The fire would appear to have started in an external covered area which offered easy access as highlighted in the site meeting on the preceding week.

The fire spread rapidly to the inside of the building. Due to the highly dangerous nature of the building, all firefighting operations were carried out externally. At the height of the blaze it was estimated that one million carpet tiles were burning. This equates to an area carpeted equivalent to the size of 120 football pitches.

As part of the service's incident command procedures, strict sections with individual commanders were established. This included a process of constant and ongoing dynamic operational risk assessment Firefighting crews were aware that there was a quantity of cylinders stored on the ground floor. It is believed these were LPG to power fork lift trucks. At the height of the blaze two of these caused major explosions.

Due to the dangerous nature of the building and the very large quantity of carpet tiles, extinguishing the fire proved difficult. Over a period of three days a large volume of black smoke and toxic gases were released into the atmosphere. Close working with the Environment Agency was essential to minimise the contamination of the River Bollin. Water run off from the fire allowed toxic products to enter the water course. Their effects were reduced by placing several large bales of straw in the river to absorb the contaminants.

During the incident, local residents were asked to keep doors and windows closed and to go indoors in the affected areas.

LOGISTICS

At the height of the blaze ten pumps attended with one hydraulic platform. This was reduced to six pumps at 1800 on June 7, then down to three on Tuesday morning. This involved over 350 firefighters over the three-day period.

Representatives of the following organisations were also involved: Ambulance Service, local authority, Cheshire Police, Environment Agency, Environmental Health, Building Control, demolition experts and loss adjusters Due to the duration and location of the incident, banks of mobile toilets had to be ordered. Temperatures due to the hot weather exceeded 80[degrees]F and made firefighting operation arduous.

The Service's Incident Command Unit catered for all those attending. The local Tesco's store is to be highly commended for their support in feeding and supplying bottled water to workers at the scene.

The incident was handed over on June 9 when it was brought to a close. Due to the nature of the subsequent demolition operation and digging out, smoke was still being emitted from the site over a week after the original fire. Health protection officials received complaints from local residents with sole throats. Further fire appliances had to attend to damp down and try to reduce smoke and emissions.

At the time of writing, whilst there has been a considerable amount of liaison and planning between a range of agencies, the building remains standing and represents a severe fire hazard and danger to local young people.

The total sum of the incident and the time and costs from other agencies is in the region of 1,294,972 [pounds sterling].

Costs

Environment Agency Staff time 5,000 [pounds sterling] Equipment costs Estimated at 4,000 [pounds sterling] (ongoing)

Macclesfield County Council 3,000 [pounds sterling] Staff time of two officers employed over incident duration and sanbags also needed

Adlington Carpets: Stock 100,000 [pounds sterling] Stall 36,720 [pounds sterling] annually Possible loss of business 100-150,000 [pounds sterling] annually

Incident on May 11, 2003 Macclesfield Model Car Club Racing track destroyed on first floor, of 120 members, 90 per cent were lost. Unable to hold competitions as new venue too small Weekly meetings 300 [pounds sterling] Membership loss 2,400 [pounds sterling] Inconvenience to club 6,000 [pounds sterling]

Incident on May 30, 2004 Pump 1 x 5 crew x 40 hours 1,569 [pounds sterling] Pump 2 x 5 crew x 2.1 hours 821 [pounds sterling] Pump 3 x 4 crew x 1.6 hours 430 [pounds sterling] Pump 4 x 4 crew x 4.0 hours 631 [pounds sterling] HP x 4 crew x 2.2 hours 430 [pounds sterling] Sub Officer 2.5 hours 30.00 [pounds sterling] Total 3,911 [pounds sterling]

Incident on May 31, 2004 13:25-14:49 Pump 1x5 crew + SubOx1.28 hours 521 [pounds sterling] Pump 2x5 crewx1.35 hours 528 [pounds sterling] 18.50-19:21 Pump 1 x 5 crew x 0.43 hours 169 [pounds sterling] Pump 2 x 5 Crew x 0.50 hours 201 [pounds sterling] TOTAL 1,419 [pounds sterling]

Incident on June 6, 2004 Pump 1 x 5 crew x 5.67 hours 2,214 [pounds sterling] Pump 2 x 5 crew x 4.67 hours 1,824 [pounds sterling] Pump 3 x 5 crew x 4.98 hours 1,947 [pounds sterling] Pump 4 x 5 crew x 3.47 hours 1,355 [pounds sterling] Pump 5 x 5 x 3.08 hours 1,205 [pounds sterling] Pump 6 x 5 crew + SubO x 4.78 hours 1,878 [pounds sterling] Pump 7 x 5 crew + Sub O x 4.82 hours 1,893 [pounds sterling] Pump 8 x 5 crew + Sub O x 4.78 hours 1,878 [pounds sterling] Pump 9 x 5 crew x 4.82 hours 1,883 [pounds sterling] Pump 10 x 5 crew + SubO x 15.93 hours 6,258 [pounds sterling] Pump 11 x 5 crew x 4.92 hours 1,921 [pounds sterling] Pump 12 x 5 crew x 9.78 hours 3,823 [pounds sterling] Pump 13 x 5 crew + SubO x 3.42 hours 1,342 [pounds sterling] Pump 14 x 5 crew + SubO x 3.37 hours 1,322 [pounds sterling] Pump 15 x 5 crew + SubO x 4.37 hours l,715 [pounds sterling] Pump 16 x 5 crew X 4.10 hours 1,602 [pounds sterling] Pump 17 x 5 crew + SubO x 5.28 hours 2,074 [pounds sterling] Pump 18 x 5 crew x 4.88 hours 1,908 [pounds sterling] Pump 19 x 5 crew x 4.10 hours 1,602 [pounds sterling] Pump 20 x 5 crew x 4.97 hours 1,941 [pounds sterling] Pump 21 x 5 crew + SubO x 4.75 hours 1,865 [pounds sterling] Pump 22 x 5 crew x 450 hours 1,758 [pounds sterling] Pump 23 x 5 crew X 6.55 hours 2,559 [pounds sterling] HP x 5 crew x 18.92 hours 7,392 [pounds sterling] 16 x BA 482 [pounds sterling] Total 79,897 [pounds sterling]

Survey of Building completed by Steve Randell 3,000 [pounds sterling]

Operation                                      Cost

Re-building of property                850,000 [pounds sterling]
Stock moving                           100,000 [pounds sterling]
Environmental contamination costs      Unqualified to the date

COPYRIGHT 2004 DMG World Media Ltd.
COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group