Open Skies Treaty will enhance international security - U.S. Representative to the Open Skies Conference John H. Hawes speech - includes statement by Secretary of State Warren Christopher on El Salvador Truth Commission report - Transcript

John H. Hawes, US Representative To the Open Skies Conference

Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, March 11, 1993

Mr. Chairman, I am honored to testify before this committee in support of the Open Skies Treaty. As Secretary Christopher indicated in his letter of March 4 [to Chairman Pell], the treaty ... will contribute to mutual understanding and confidence-building by giving all States Parties, regardless of size, a direct role in gathering information about military forces and activities of interest to them.

This treaty has been made possible by the dramatic political changes of the last several years. When former President Eisenhower first proposed cooperative aerial observation in 1955, the idea was summarily rejected by the Soviet Union. Indeed, it was only after the abortive coup in Moscow in August 1991 that an agreement could be negotiated embodying the values of openness and cooperative international observation.

In my remarks I will briefly describe the content and operation of the treaty. Before doing so, let me put that in context by noting the four essential ways in which the Treaty on Open Skies will contribute to international security in the post-Cold War world.

First, the treaty empowers all signatory states--regardless of size, wealth, or level of technology--to acquire meaningful security information on neighboring countries. This will enhance the confidence of all participants and enable them to play more responsible roles in maintaining regional and international security. In this regard, moreover, by generating information which can be easily shared and discussed among participants, the Open Skies Treaty will avoid the difficulties often encountered in working with restricted information.

Second, the treaty nails down the key principle of full territorial openness. All the territory of all the participants will be open to observation, including specifically all the territory of states which formerly restricted large portions of their territory on grounds of national security. The United States insisted on full openness during the negotiations as a sine qua non for an effective confidence-building regime. The United States determined at the outset, moreover, that such an unprecedented degree of openness would not pose an unmanageable security risk within the United States itself.

Third, the treaty dramatically advances the tools available for confidence building. Over the past 2 decades, the array of confidencebuilding measures has expanded steadily. Now the Open Skies Treaty adds to this tool kit detailed procedures for aerial observation, with agreed sensors, predetermined quotas, and no right of refusal. It also establishes a new framework for contacts, cooperation, and consultation among participating states.

Fourth, the treaty establishes a major precedent--which may prove particularly useful in other parts of the world beyond the original signatories-- in reducing tensions, contributing to greater mutual understanding, and reinforcing regional peace and security. Other nations outside the EuroAtlantic area, where the treaty was negotiated, have already expressed interest in the treaty.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to describe the principal provisions of the Open Skies Treaty relating to participation, coverage, sensors, quotas, aircraft, data, and costs.

Participation

The Open Skies Treaty was negotiated between the members of NATO and members of the former Warsaw Pact. The latter organization dissolved during the course of the talks. Original signatories include all 16 NATO states, the East European members of the former Warsaw Pact, and 5 of the successor states of the former Soviet Union: Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Ukraine. Since signature of the treaty on March 24, 1992, the former Czech and Slovak Republic has divided into two separate states; both are in the process of reaffirming their participation in the treaty.

The treaty is now open to signature by all seven other successor states of the former Soviet Union. Following entry into force, the treaty will be open to requests for accession by all states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The treaty and the Open Skies concept are not, however, confined to Europe. Beginning 6 months after entry into force, any state, without regard to geographic limitations, can accede to the Open Skies Treaty provided that it will contribute to the objectives of the treaty and has the consensus approval of the Open Skies Consultative Commission.

Coverage

The Open Skies Treaty provides that all of the territory of participating states must be open to observation. No exceptions are permitted for "national security" purposes. Observation flights will follow routes set by the observing party; only modifications for legitimate reasons of flight safety may be proposed.

The question of full territorial access was debated within the US Government when the initial Open Skies proposal was developed. At that time, a decision was made that full access was essential to the political and confidence-building objectives of the proposal and that such access could be provided in the United States consistent with national security. Given the previous restrictions in force in the former Soviet Union, this requirement for full territorial access was perhaps the subject most intensely debated in the negotiation. Agreement was only reached in the fall of 1991, following the abortive Moscow coup of August 1991.

The treaty text not only affirms the principle of full territorial access but also spells out how this is to be implemented effectively in actual aerial operations. The treaty does this with detailed provisions on the formulation of the flight plan to ensure that the observation objectives of the observing party will be achieved.

Sensors

Once the question of access was determined, the second factor shaping the quality and quantity of information which the participants could gather in Open Skies was the package of sensors to be employed.

For the United States, the sensors which have been agreed [to] for use in Open Skies will not provide a significant new source of information. For most other participants, however, the ability to utilize the Open Skies sensor suite to observe the full territory of the other participating countries will represent a new and very significant enhancement in their ability to gather security-related information. The United States will, however, be a major, indirect beneficiary of this increase in knowledge, confidence, and security of the other participants. This, in fact, was one of the primary considerations behind the US initiative in presenting the Open Skies idea and bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

All parties in Open Skies will have access to sensors of equal capabilities. In the spring of 1990, the East European states obtained agreement from the United States and its NATO allies that all participants would have access to sensor capabilities equal to those employed by any other participant. The East European governments no longer could, or wished to, depend on the Soviet Union for sensor support.

At the same time, they recognized that most Western sensors were still subject to technology transfer controls. This right of equal access is specified in the treaty and was one of the first points of agreement in the negotiations. One result of this agreement was that the United States and its NATO allies had to ensure that any sensor capability which we wished to use in Open Skies could be made available to all other participants. In practice, that imposed a ceiling on the sensors, which we and our NATO allies were prepared to employ under the treaty.

In the spring of 1991, the United States and its NATO allies proposed that Open Skies sensors include optical and electro-optical cameras, synthetic aperture radar [SAR], infrared line scanning systems, air sampling systems, and multispectral systems-- although NATO agreed that the last two systems would have a lower priority. Agreement was reached in the treaty on the inclusion of panoramic and framing optical cameras, video cameras, synthetic aperture radar, and infrared line scanning systems. Air sampling systems and multispectral systems were not accepted. Additional sensor systems can be agreed [on] by consensus of the Open Skies Consultative Commission.

In determining sensor specifications, the United States and its allies worked from the postulate that Open Skies optical imagery should permit analysts to recognize armored vehicles--i.e., to distinguish a tank from a truck-in objective which was eventually accepted by all participants. This recognition could be achieved with a ground resolution of 30 centimeters [the ability to distinguish between two bars-of a standardized array and size--which are 30 cm apart; also known in US usage as] 60-cm Ground Resolved Distance. This standard would enable Open Skies to contribute meaningfully to confidence building as well as supplement arms control verification regimes. Many of the European states, for example, believed that the ability to observe armored vehicles would be a useful supplement to the verification provisions of the CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty, inter alia, because Open Skies flights could reach the former Soviet Union east of the Urals, outside the CFE zone of application.

At the same time, this imagery standard would not permit the collection of technical intelligence e.g., on models of tanks and their equipment-- and thus would not trigger security concerns in participating countries. This limitation was important to the military representatives of the former Soviet Union. This may have reflected not only tactical military concerns but also essentially political concerns about the implications of greater openness. The tank-recognition standard also served to minimize certain counterintelligence and anti-terrorist concerns in the West.

The standard for video cameras is the same as that for optical cameras-- i.e., 30 centimeters ground resolution. In practice, it is believed that the most potential value will come from optical imagery and that the altitude from which the optical cameras will operate may preclude the collection of quality imagery by video cameras most of the time.

The standard for synthetic aperture radar was set at 3 meters ground resolution, which allows recognition of the presence of very large equipment or buildings but is not sufficient for recognition of individual pieces of equipment. This level was primarily determined by US concerns that systems with a better resolution would pose unacceptable technology transfer problems. The Soviet Union had initially not wanted any synthetic aperture radar. In April 1990, it moved to accept SAR in principle but at a ground resolution capacity of 10 meters. In the fall of 1991, it accepted inclusion of SAR at 3 meters ground resolution.

The standard for infrared line scanning devices was set at 50 centimeters ground resolution. The United States and its NATO allies would have preferred to use the same standard for infrared as for optical imagery. The Soviet Union resisted this, arguing that infrared imagery of that quality would provide an observer with tactical information which could be useful in attack planning, thereby going beyond the confidence-building purposes of the regime. For this reason, the Soviet Union had initially objected to the inclusion of any infrared systems. Even when it ultimately agreed to the inclusion of an infrared system with a 50-centimeter ground resolution, it insisted that it only be used after the initial 3 years of implementation of the treaty.

Quotas

Observation under Open Skies will not be subject to refusal. All parties to the treaty are assigned "passive quotas," specifying the number of flights they must accept from other participants in a year. Further, parties are assigned "active quotas," specifying how many observation flights they may undertake and which countries they may observe. The determination of the passive and active quotas of the participants was a sensitive subject in the negotiations.

Under the Open Skies Treaty, the United States will have a passive quota of 42 flights annually--i.e. it will be obligated to accept up to 42 flights from other participating states if requested. The United States originally said it could accept 52 flights annually, or one flight per week. That number was lowered in the course of the negotiations so that the US number would not exceed the number for Belarus-Russia, also 42.

For the first 3 years after entry into force, countries will only have to accept up to 75% of their passive quotas, meaning that the initial US passive obligation is 31. For the first year of the treaty's operation, only 4 of these 31 potential flights over the United States were requested, all by Belarus-Russia, which are operating as a "group of states parties" under the provisions of the treaty. As a group, Belarus-Russia will have a joint quota and will conduct observation flights jointly and receive flights jointly, which may go to any portion of their combined territory. No other participating state expressed interest in observing the United States.

The treaty provides that a country's active quota i.e., the number of observation flights it may conduct--may equal but not exceed its passive quota. Thus, the ceiling for the US active quota in the initial period would be 31. The initial negotiated distribution 'of the active quota of the United States provides for 9 flights: 8 flights over the Belarus-Russia group of parties and one flight over Ukraine, the latter to be shared with Canada. The United States would have preferred to utilize more of its potential allocation of active quotas, particularly in Eastern Europe and the nations of the former Soviet Union. But the passive quotas of Russia and all the countries in the former Warsaw Pact were oversubscribed.

Belarus-Russia provides a good example. The passive quota for Belarus-Russia--as a group--is 42, equal to that of the United States. For the initial 3 years, this works out to a passive quota of 31, or 75% of the full quota. This passive quota of 31 for Belarus-Russia is fully subscribed. In addition to the 8 flights allocated to the United States, the Belarus-Russia quota was exhausted as follows: Germany---3, France--3, the United Kingdom--3, Canada--2, Italy---2, Norway--2, Turkey--2, the three Benelux states acting as a combined party--l, Denmark--l, and Poland--l. In addition, although Finland and Sweden are not initial signatories to the treaty, one quota over BelarusRussia was set aside for Finland and two for Sweden in anticipation of their early accession to the treaty and in recognition of their direct security concerns and the contribution they made to the success of negotiations.

All 31 of the available passive quotas over the Belarus-Russia group of parties are allocated, while only 4 passive quotas are allocated over the United States. As a result, BelarusRussia will be subjected to significantly more observation than the United States, even though the nominal passive quotas are identical. Further, because of the treaty's data sharing provisions, the United States or any other participating state will be able to obtain the data from observation flights there.

The United States and BelarusRussia have by far the largest passive quotas in Open Skies. Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom each have quotas of 12. Portugal has the lowest-- two.

The distribution of active quotas-- i.e., the rights to conduct observation flights over individual participating countries or groups of countries-will be subject to annual redistribution in the Open Skies Consultative Commission on the basis of consensus. Absent consensus for change, the previous years distribution will continue in effect.

Aircraft

The Open Skies Treaty provides that any party may designate one or more aircraft for use in Open Skies. It provides, further, that either aircraft of the observing party or the observed party may be used on observation flights. The United States, and most of the other participants in the talks, would have preferred that only aircraft of the observing party be used. The former Soviet Union, however, insisted on the right to provide the aircraft for observation of its own territory.

Because the treaty contains options for aircraft provided by either the observing or observed party, the treaty also contains extensive measures to ensure that the capabilities of the aircraft utilized and the sensor equipment mounted on them meet specified treaty standards. These measures include procedures for initial certification of aircraft and sensors, provisions for inspection of aircraft and sensors prior to observation flights, provisions for demonstration flights over test targets, provisions for the presence and rights of personnel of both the observing and observed parties on board the aircraft during an observation flight, and provisions for the sharing of the raw data gathered on an observation flight between the observing and observed parties.

Data Sharing

The NATO "Basic Elements" paper of December 1989 stated that "members of the same alliance will determine among themselves how information acquired through Open Skies is to be shared." This provision was based on US concerns that data collected by the United States or its allies under Open Skies should not be shared with the Warsaw Pact countries, since it might enable them to better assess their vulnerability to observation and thereby to improve their cover, concealment, and deception techniques.

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact left the countries in Central and Eastern Europe without a formal security structure within which data might be shared and, at the same time, radically reoriented their security concerns. As a result, they then argued strongly for broader sharing of Open Skies raw data. In addition, the decision that the categories and specifications of the Open Skies sensors would be precisely defined in the treaty made it possible for countries to calculate their vulnerability to observation, regardless of data sharing. This reinforced further the argument for the widest possible sharing of raw data.

As a result, under the Open Skies Treaty, all participant states can purchase the raw overflight data produced by any participating state's flight over any other. This wide access to raw data will greatly multiply the value of the regime to individual participating countries, enabling them to compile data well beyond that which they could acquire with their own observation flights.

Operational Costs

Basic agreement on the allocation of costs was reached in the first session of the Open Skies Consultative Commission in the spring of 1992. This agreement was formally adopted, however, in the second session of the Open Skies Consultative Commission in the fall of 1992, when agreement was also reached on the waiver of fees for navigation aids and air traffic control services.

The cost allocation agreements clarify the responsibilities of the observing and observed parties in various scenarios, thereby minimizing the potential for future disagreement or unexpected financial burdens. These agreements deal with payment for goods and services related to the observation aircraft and specify that the prices for the above items shall be set at the lowest commercially available rate at the airport in Cologne, Germany. The cost agreement also deals with the costs of recording media and processing that media, as well as a number of other detailed subjects such as the allocation of costs for the certification of aircraft, demonstration flights, and deviations or curtailments of flights.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, the Open Skies Treaty will provide an important tool for enhancing international security in the new circumstances of the post-Cold War world. It will increase the ability of all participating states, regardless of size and wealth, to seek and exchange meaningful security information through a regime of unarmed observation flights according to internationally agreed [to] and legally binding procedures. It establishes a regime of unprecedented transparency and openness which will contribute to mutual understanding of military forces and activities. In addition to reducing tensions, Open Skies will enhance the ability of many of the participating states to monitor arms control agreements. Overall, the treaty will promote the US interest in greater international security and in the ability of many more states to assume active and responsible roles in maintaining that security. For these reasons, I urge the Senate to give the Open Skies Treaty early and favorable consideration.

Statement by Secretary/Christopher released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Washington, PC, March 24, 1993.

Today, I have appointed a panel to examine the implications of the UNsponsored El Salvador Truth Commission report for the conduct of US foreign policy and the operations of the Department of State. The panel will be co-chaired by retired career Ambassadors George Vest and Richard Murphy.

Acting as academic advisers to the committee will be Professor I.M. Destier of the University of Maryland and Professor Carol Lancaster of Georgetown University. Professor Destier has authored several books and articles on the foreign policy process, including a seminal work on the subject titled Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy, Princeton University Press, 1972 and 1974. Professor Lancaster is a noted scholar and has authored numerous articles on development and Third World issues.

The atrocities committed during the long civil war in El Salvador are well documented in the Truth Commission Report. Although the report contains no explicit criticism of the US Government or its representatives, its publication does have implications for the conduct of US foreign policy and the Department of State's operations. Respect for human rights is a cornerstone of US foreign policy, and when questions arise that challenge our commitments, we have an obligation to seek answers.

Accordingly, l have asked this panel to review the Truth Commission's Report and examine the activities and conduct of the Department during this period. The panel's review will include responsiveness to congressional and public inquiries, human rights reporting, and the degree to which we encouraged State Department officers to conduct a full and independent inquiry of abuses by both sides in the civil conflict. The panel is to report its findings to me and make recommendations on steps the Department can take to ensure that the Department functions in a manner consistent with the highest professional and ethical standards and our nation's values.

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