Special Forces: Ensuring the Quality of Our Future Force - United States army

Within the United States Army, the Special Forces career-management field, or CMF, is unique for a number of reasons. One of those is the autonomy that SF has in assessing, selecting and training its entry-level personnel.

That autonomy gives SF a distinct advantage over other CMFs, but when there are shortfalls in the SF personnel inventory, that autonomy can become a major disadvantage. Because SF trains its own entry-level personnel, it cannot use Department of the Army funds to increase the number of training slots, as other CMFs can, to quickly correct population shortages.

The responsibility for producing sufficient personnel to fill SF units therefore falls squarely on the shoulders of the SF community. In fulfilling that responsibility, the SF community is hampered by two misperceptions: that the quality of the SF force has been degraded, and that entry-level SF soldiers should be capable of performing at a higher level.

Quantity vs. quality

The first misperception is that the SF qualification standards have been lowered or compromised in order to produce greater numbers of graduates of the SF Qualification Course, or SFQC.

Using the criterion of the number of SF soldiers assigned to standardized mental-categories, we can compare the intellectual capability of today's SF enlisted force to that of a previous period. Today, 2 percent of the SF population is listed as mental-quality-category IV, compared to the Army's average of 4 percent. [l] In 1987, when the SF population was 7 percent smaller than today's force, SF also had 2 percent of it soldiers listed in mental-quality-category 1V. [2] Today's entry-level SF soldiers therefore appear to be no less intelligent than their predecessors.

The assessment-and-selection process for today's SF volunteers remains demanding. In June 1988, 207 soldiers reported to Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS. Of those, 112 (54 percent) were selected to attend the SFQC. [3] In November 1999, 319 soldiers reported to SFAS, and 124 (38.9 percent) were selected to attend the SFQC. [4] SF candidates continue to meet tough, demanding standards. Those who are selected to attend the SFQC embody physical and mental endurance equal to or superior to that of their SF predecessors.

The academic standards for soldiers who are selected to attend the SFQC continue to be rigorous, as well. In May 1988, attrition for the 18E course was reported on the Army Training Requirements and Resources System, or ATRRs, as 47 percent. [5] Eleven years later, in the quarter ending in December 1999, 18E attrition was again reported on ATRRs as 47 per cent. [6] The level of MOS proficiency required of the current SF population is as demanding as it has been at any other time in the history of the SFQC.

The Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, has remained vigilant in maintaining its established training standards, despite the fact that it has had to absorb major personnel reductions. In December 1993, SWCS had 512 CMF-18 NCOs; during FY 1994, SWCS produced 328 SFQC graduates. [7] In September 2000, SWCS had 361 CMF-18 NCOs, yet during FY 2000, it produced 370 SFQC graduates. [8] By producing more SFQC graduates with fewer instructors, SWCS demonstrated that it recognizes the increased urgency of producing SF-qualified personnel. And because of its rigorous academic and individual standards, SWCS is able to maintain the highest quality among SFQC graduates.

Statistics for the SF recruiting of active duty enlisted personnel and for the SFQC graduation rates of active-duty enlisted personnel have shown positive trends since 1994 (see graph on p. 20). More and more active-duty enlisted volunteers have been recruited to attend SFAS. If quality had been compromised in order to produce more graduates, the number of active-duty enlisted SFQC graduates would have greatly increased during FYs 1998 and 2000. In reality, the number of active-duty enlisted SFQC graduates has remained relatively consistent, despite an increase in the number of active-duty enlisted volunteers recruited after FY 1998. Standards of excellence for graduation from the SFQC have remained the same or have improved.

Entry-level performance

The second misperception is that an entry-level SF soldier has been trained to the same level as a seasoned, mid-career SF NCO.

Institutional learning makes up about 30 percent of a seasoned individual's expertise. The remaining 70 percent is developed through a series of professional training experiences with colleagues, mentors and superiors. Trial-and-error accounts for a significant portion of an SF soldier's professional growth. It is through field experience that entry-level personnel acquire greater skill.

Institutional learning forms only the foundation upon which other professional experiences will be constructed. As an individual grows and matures in a specific profession, and as he faces increasing vocational challenges, his job experience becomes the source of his ideas and solutions for work-related problems. As the individual matures professionally, he relies less on his institutional training and more on his occupational experiences.

An anonymous Army drill sergeant is reported to have said to a group of basic trainees, "What I will teach you will help you survive in combat for about three minutes. The rest is OJT." The story underscores the importance of experience that an individual gains after his institutional training has taught him basic theory and simple application.

Seasoned SF members should have reasonable expectations and should judge the skills of entry-level SF soldiers in the context of SFQC training. Organizations should not expect entry-level SF soldiers to be as effective in interpersonal relations, MOS expertise and organizational skills as senior SF NCOs would be.

The "quantity vs. quality" and the "entry-level performance" misperceptions directly affect the recruiting and training of new volunteers and the retention of SF-qualified soldiers. Perceptions frequently form the basis of organizational norms. Negative perceptions can inadvertently degrade the self-worth of individual members of the organization's population. If seasoned members perceive that the professional standards have been lowered, the value that they see in being associated with the organization may also decline, and they may terminate their membership in the organization early. Misperceptions of degraded quality can also be an impediment in attracting new volunteers for SF.

Strongest skills

Since 1994, the population of the SF force has been shrinking. If the trend continues, the number of command and leadership positions in SF will decline, and enlisted and officer personnel will lose a significant number of opportunities for career progression. Leaders of the SF community are aware of the personnel-inventory problem and are working to find a remedy.

In the past, unrealistic expectations have caused SF to lose many quality volunteers who were motivated, trainable and probably worthy of consideration for service in SF. SF lost these soldiers because the community failed to optimize and leverage its greatest competencies: training, coaching and mentoring. SF units regularly train soldiers of other nations; however, the SF community has largely failed to recognize the necessity of coaching and mentoring other soldiers who want to join SF.

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School, SF's institutional component, has recently modified the SFAS to include mentoring and coaching in the assessment philosophy of the SF training pipeline. The larger SF community, however, has largely ignored mentoring and coaching as a means of improving the skills of recent SFQC graduates.

The future of the SF community is contingent upon the willingness of its members to train, to coach and to mentor SF candidates and entry-level soldiers. The SF community can continue to ignore the declining population trend and allow it to continue, or it can begin an organizational retransformation that includes the following objectives:

* Recognize that we have ample volunteers who have the ability to become SF soldiers after appropriate training.

* Acknowledge that the current assessment, selection and qualification process has superior standards and that it produces quality graduates with a baseline training skill set.

* Demonstrate SF's premier teaching competencies by training, coaching and mentoring at every opportunity.

SF soldiers who are committed to success and who have a strong sense of leadership have one other opportunity to enhance the quality of the SF population. They can volunteer to serve at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, where they can train, coach and mentor future Special Forces soldiers. For additional information, telephone Master Sergeant Jeff Wright or Phellicia Sorsby at DSN 221-8832/7768 or commercial (910) 432-8832/7768.

Major Thomas M. Joyce is chief of the Special Forces/Psychological Operations Enlisted Branch, Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, Total Army Personnel Command. His previous enlisted/officer assignments in Infantry and in SF units include the 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger), the 82nd Airborne Division, the 10th Special Forces Group and the 1st Special Warfare Training Group. He received his commission through ROTC and re-entered active duty in 1987 upon his graduation from St. Mary's University in San Antonio, Texas. Major Joyce also holds master's degrees from Syracuse University and from the US. Army Command and General Staff College.

Notes:

(1.) Career Management Field Review; CMF 18 Quality of Force: September 2000.

(2.) Career Management Field Review; CMF 18 Quality of Force: November 1987.

(3.) USAJFKSWCS Total Attrition Excel spreadsheet, p. 1.

(4.) USAJFKSWCS Total Attrition Excel spreadsheet, p. 1.

(5.) Career Management Field Review; CMF 18: 18E: 19 May 1988.

(6.) Career Management Field Review; CMF 18: 18E: September 2000.

(7.) Career Management Field Review; Unit Wraps: December 1983.

(8.) Career Management Field Review; Unit Wraps: September 2000.

[Graph omitted]

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